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FASCISM AND NEOFASCISM

Critical Writings on the Radical Right in Europe

EDITED BY ANGELICA FENNER AND ERIC D. WEITZ

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FASCISM AND NEOFASCISM
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004 978-1-4039-6659-9

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First published in 2004 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS.
Companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-73349-1 ISBN 978-1-137-04122-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-04122-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Fascism and neofascism : critical writings on the radical right in Europe / edited by Angelica Fenner and Eric D. Weitz.
p. cm.—(Studies in European culture and history)
Chiefly papers presented at a conference on "Fascism and Its Legacies: the Re-emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe and the USA," held Sept. 2001 in Madison, Wis.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Fascism—Europe—Congresses. I. Fenner, Angelica. II. Weitz, Eric D. III. Series.

JC481.F33415 2004
320.53'3'094—dc22 2004046966

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: November 2004

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Transferred to Digital Printing in 2013

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Acknowledgments

The present volume emerged out of a very stimulating interdisciplinary research collaborative among four faculty members, Mary Layoun, Marc Silberman, Eric D. Weitz, and Tom Wolfe, at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Two years of lively discussion and planning, sometimes on e-mail, sometimes at live meetings in Minneapolis or Madison, culminated in a graduate seminar, "Fascism and Its Legacies," that we taught concurrently on both campuses, linked by interactive television. Our project was one of a number of research collaboratives that are sponsored by the Center for German and European Studies (CGES), a consortium of both universities that is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). It is to CGES and its two directors, Klaus Berghahn and, at the time, Jack Zipes, that we owe our primary thanks for enabling the four faculty members and a group of graduate students on both campuses to work together in such a lively and engaging fashion.

Out of the research collaborative and seminar we also organized a conference, "Fascism and Its Legacies: The Re-Emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe and the USA," in September 2001 at Madison. The conference was sponsored by CGES and also served as the thirty-fourth Wisconsin Workshop of the University of Wisconsin German Department. Generous support was also provided by Wisconsin's Departments of French and Italian, History, and Sociology, as well as its European Studies Program, European Union Center, the Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change, and the Anonymous Fund. Most of the chapters in the present volume were first presented as papers at this conference. The editors would like to thank all of our contributors, other participants at the conference, and, especially, Mary Layoun, Marc Silberman, and Tom Wolfe, for their ongoing engagement with a most serious and troublesome subject, the radical right in Europe.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the permission of Central European University to reprint Ivan Ćolović's chapter, "Football, Hooligans, and War in Ex-Yugoslavia," from *The Road to War in Serbia*, ed. Nabojsa Popov, copyright Central European University Press, 2002, and the permission of the Oskar Schlemmer Archives and Secretariat for the permission to include the reproductions of Oskar Schlemmer's "Fensterbilder" in chapter 2.

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Introduction

Angelica Fenner and Eric D. Weitz

Once upon a time, there was a very vibrant discussion on the nature and origins of fascism. The debate began with the publication in 1963 of Ernst Nolte's *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Fascism in Its Epoch), which appeared two years later in English as *Three Faces of Fascism*, a title that overly personalized and obscured the complex meaning of the book.[1] Two decades later, Nolte would become lauded and reviled for his efforts to relativize and diminish the Holocaust. But in the 1960s, his work had an inspiring and creative impact. The term "Fascism" had first been coined by Benito Mussolini to identify the extreme right-wing movement he headed in Italy. A "fascismo" literally refers to a bundle of wheat and was adopted in order to associate the Italian party and state with the glories of the Roman Empire. From the 1920s into the early 1950s the term had wide currency. Fascist intellectuals like Giovanni Gentile sought to endow the word with philosophical significance; those individuals and movements around Europe seeking to mimic Mussolini's success openly embraced the label. Yet "fascist" was also the term of vilification adopted by those on the left and in the center who fought against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the many other extreme right-wing movements and states that arose in the wake of World War I. In its famous 1933 definition, the Communist International (Comintern), for example, labeled fascism as "the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital."[2]

But it was Nolte's book that first gave the term "fascism" much deeper philosophical and historical significance and moved it from the political to the scholarly world. Nolte identified fascism as *the* defining movement of the epoch of high modernity, that is to say, the years from the 1890s to the end of World War II. It was fascism's "resistance to transcendence," its very opposition to modernity's liberal and Marxist promise of individual and collective emancipation that made fascism the mark of the epoch. Hence, fascism was never solely an Italian phenomenon despite the word's Italian derivation. Nolte compared in his study the French Action Française, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism and their respective leaders, Charles Maurras, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler. Whatever the particularities of the three movements, he maintained that they all were bound together by a common opposition to liberalism and Marxism and by the positing of a new world order rooted in a philosophy of action and extreme nationalism.

There was, though, another strand of thinking that emerged around the same time as *Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, and it, too, powerfully stimulated the debate on

fascism. This second strand was anchored in the New Left, especially in Britain and Germany, but also in other countries. Here, the discussions were carried out in a variety of periodicals, most notably in *New Left Review* in Britain, *Das Argument* in Germany, and *Telos* and *New German Critique* in the United States, and spilled over into the academic world as well. The issues were rather different from Nolte's, although the New Left discussants presumed, as did he, that there was something epochal about fascism that had to be understood; and for Marxists, that meant explaining its emergence out of and its continual relation to capitalism. The New Left viewed the Comintern's 1933 definition as not necessarily wrong, but certainly as much too simplistic. The effort to give more intellectual substance to fascism was profoundly shaped by the reception in Britain, France, and the United States of Antonio Gramsci's writings, and in France and Britain by the structural Marxism of Louis Althusser. The Comintern definition had precisely followed the lines of Second and Third International Marxism, which made any cultural expression or political movement an unmediated reflection of the "real" substance of society, namely, its political economy. Gramsci's subtle modification of this model allowed for the partial autonomy of the cultural realm and, very importantly, raised for analysis—not simply for assertion—just how it was that political elites came to establish their domination over their populations.[3] Although working out of the rather different intellectual approach of Althusserian Marxism, Nicos Poulantzas's studies in the 1960s and 1970s also rejected the simple base-superstructure model of Second and Third International Marxism, and allowed for the partial autonomy of the state in capitalism.[4]

The publications emanating from Nolte and the New Left inspired a flood of research and writing on fascism. Significantly, New Left editors and writers rediscovered, translated, and republished some of the iconoclastic—and more interesting—interpretations of fascism from the 1920s and 1930s, such as those by the German communist August Thalheimer and the German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. But a great deal of original research was also carried out, primarily in the disciplines of history, sociology, and political science. So much of the subsequent discussion delved deeper into the issues raised by Nolte and the New Left: Was fascism anti-modern (as so many of the observers of the interwar era had thought, as did Nolte in his own fashion), modern, or, perhaps, modernizing? What were the geographic limits of fascism? How many movements and regimes in Europe could properly be termed fascist? Franco's Spain, Horthy's Hungary, Pilsudski's Poland, along with the obvious candidates, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy? And what about outside of Europe? Could Peron's Argentina and Imperial Japan also be considered fascist? Why were some societies and countries subject to the fascist allure and not others? What were fascism's chief characteristics? What was the relationship between state and society under fascist rule? How did fascist systems actually function? Did workers, the bastion of the Left, become enmeshed in the fascist system, or did they maintain a stance of resistance? Were Mussolini and Hitler really able to create immense popular support, and if so, how? And in the long view, what were the historical origins of fascism? Were the places where fascism had succeeded somehow "failed" societies that had been unable to negotiate successfully the transition to modernity?

To answer these sorts of questions, scholars began ransacking the archives and reading more deeply in political theory. The results were roughly four kinds of studies: (1) explorations of the historical origins of fascist movements within specific countries, which, depending on the author's proclivities, might extend as far back as the eighteenth century and would emphasize, to one degree or another, ideological, political, or social factors; (2) deep probings of the inner workings of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, focusing in particular on the competitions among various elites, the relationship between the business class and the fascist state, and the role of different party and state agencies; (3) social histories of particular cities, neighborhoods, or rural areas that sought to identify the factors that made for collaboration with or resistance against (or, more commonly, a mixture of the two) the fascist system; and (4) more theoretically oriented studies on the meaning of fascism and the nature of the state under capitalism.[5]

The fascist debate also had its naysayers: those who claimed that the term was far too general to offer adequate insights into political systems as diverse as those of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Francoist Spain, among many others.[6] More serious were two other problems that continually stalked the fascism debate in both its Nolte-derived and its New Left strands.

The first problem was a partly concurrent debate on "totalitarianism," a word that, in its various permutations, such as the "total state," was also used as a self-designator by Italian Fascists and, in critical fashion, by their opponents. Notably, it was an Italian journalist and anti-Fascist activist, Giovanni Amendola, who, in 1923, first used *sistema totalitario* to describe the ambitions of the Fascist state.[7] The term circulated widely in the English-speaking world in the 1930s, partly through the teachings and writings of European intellectuals who had fled fascist Europe. Two path-breaking conferences in the United States, at the University of Minnesota in 1935 and at the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia in 1939, provided the venues for some of the first systematic scholarly comparisons of the two systems.[8]

The term "totalitarianism" fell into disuse during the war years, a time when the Soviet Union was praised even by *Life* magazine and the State Department promoted pro-Soviet propaganda films to the American public. But then came the Cold War and the publication in the 1950s of the very major works by Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* and Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzeszinski, *Totalitarianism*, which fueled another strand of discussion and research alongside the fascism debate that continued into the early 1970s.[9] The advocates of totalitarian theory had an even broader target than the partisans of the fascism debate: the defining character of the modern epoch was not, in their view, the movements only of the extreme right, but those of extreme right and left together. Totalitarian theorists drew fascism and communism into a common field defined by a tyrannical party-state, the key role of the party leader, the virtually unlimited powers of the secret police, and the collapse of the public and private spheres. As numerous commentators have pointed out, Arendt's discussion was far more nuanced, much more historical and philosophical and, indeed, much more interesting than that of Friedrich and Brzeszinski, but it is the latter's work that codified the meaning of totalitarianism.

Lurking, then, in the background of the fascism debate was the nagging question of which of the two terms, fascism or totalitarianism, better captured the murderous

and tyrannical underside of the modern world. New Left partisans rejected totalitarian theory in its entirety. Whatever the shortcomings of the Soviet system, it was definitely not capitalist, hence, an entirely different order than the fascist systems which, in the New Left (as in the Comintern) view, were always rooted in capitalism. Any effort to link fascism and communism was seen as a political ploy that diverted attention from the real causative factors that gave rise to fascism. Those in the "vital center" (to use Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s renowned phrase) and on the right willingly and gratefully adopted the term totalitarianism.[10] In their view, whatever the differences between communism and fascism, they were joined together by the common threat they posed to Enlightenment reason and liberties and the associated institutions of political liberalism and market capitalism.

The second and perhaps more profound problem for fascism theory was anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. From the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, it is important to recall the intellectual world of the late 1940s into the early 1960s, when the annihilation of the Jews was seen as only one of a series of crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis. With some notable exceptions, the Holocaust—a term that only came into wider currency in the latter part of the 1960s—had no special place in the effort to understand National Socialism and was not seen as the ultimate raison d'être and symbol of the Third Reich. Only beginning with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 and then, for a host of other reasons, some of them having to do with the changing position of American Jews and of Israel, did the Holocaust take on ever increasing significance until it has become a central element of public and popular culture in the West.

Neither Nolte nor the New Left authors were ever able to deal with the Holocaust in any kind of systematic and serious fashion; it remains the great blind spot in the New Left fascism debates of the 1960s and early 1970s. Those committed to Marxist approaches had no difficulty writing about labor, capital, and the state under fascism, yet they had profound difficulties granting racial and national ideologies any autonomous significance. In the Marxist reading, racism and nationalism could only rank far behind the profound significance of class, or were regarded as ploys of the ruling classes that diverted populations from pursuing their true interests. In retrospect, Nolte's failings in *Three Faces of Fascism* were even more profound. His discussions of anti-Semitism are, at best, strange; furthermore, the Holocaust and its associated words do not appear in the index in either the English or German versions of his work. One can only speculate on the reasons, but perhaps it is not an incidental point that Nolte was Martin Heidegger's student.

By the mid-1970s, however, the fascist debate had run its course (as had the debate on totalitarianism). It is hard to discern the emergence of consensus on any of the key issues; the varying positions had been well argued and there was little more to say. The New Left also waned in significance, both politically and theoretically, and few new, creative intellectual insights were forthcoming from that quarter. The historiography instead turned inward to contemplate the workings of the individual fascist systems and also, through the influence of social history, to assess microhistories of particular towns and neighborhoods under the fascist systems. The studies on the internal functioning of the regimes, especially on the Third Reich by Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat and by Renzo de Felice on Italy, tended to undermine

the idea of fascism as a useful analytical term.[11] Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany seemed quite different, aside from the pageantries promoted by both systems, the parades of followers in disciplined military formations, the grandiose buildings, the theatrical extravagances of the leaders. Mussolini's Italy appeared far less brutal, and, until the late 1930s, not racist at all (though many commentators ignored Italy's policies in its colonies and the war against Ethiopia). Italian Fascism's origins in left-wing socialism had long-lasting reverberations, granting to syndicalism a significance that was wholly lacking in the Third Reich.[12]

Most important, for all its repressive characteristics, Italian Fascism had never produced an Auschwitz, had never been focused on human annihilation, as was certainly the case with the Third Reich. In the historiography on Germany—sometimes generated outside of Germany itself—the Holocaust increasingly became the central theme of research, so that by the 1990s Holocaust Studies had itself become something of a scholarly field. As the Holocaust developed into the quintessential symbol for all that Nazism signified, there seemed ever fewer links between Fascism and Nazism. To be sure, important works on fascism were published in this period. Stanley Payne brought out first a long synthetic essay, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*, and then his magnum opus, *A History of Fascism*, in 1990.[13] Ze'ev Sternhell set off major debates with his claim that fascism was "neither right nor left" but a movement of its own character with profound revolutionary impulses.[14] Victoria De Grazia wrote two pathbreaking books on the social and gender history of Italian Fascism.[15] Roger Griffin authored one of the most innovative theoretical works in which he set out a new definition of fascism, that of a political ideology whose "mythic core" entails a belief in rebirth or renewal ("palingenesis," in his terminology) through "populist ultra-nationalism."[16] But Tim Mason's plaintive plea in 1989 most aptly caught the moment: "Whatever happened to fascism?"[17]

Actually, what had happened was that the discussion on fascism shifted to other disciplines. The fascism debates of the 1960s and early 1970s had involved primarily historians, political scientists, and sociologists. Some of the partisans, notably George L. Mosse, examined seriously the realm of culture.[18] But by and large the argumentation was about social structure and formal political ideology—realms not necessarily divorced from culture or representation, but given a somewhat narrow definition in the fascism debates. By the 1980s and 1990s, the intellectual landscape had shifted dramatically and the most innovative intellectual trends were coming from the humanities. Culture broadly defined became the field of inquiry and new ways of looking at fascism emerged, not from the disciplines where the debate had traditionally been lodged, but from language and literature departments, film studies, and, most generally, from cultural studies. The transdisciplinary social philosophy and cultural criticism of Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno—whose now-classic writings were barely known in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s—proved particularly inspiring. Indeed, what has come to be referred to as "cultural studies" actually grew out of an interdisciplinary nexus of multicultural, postcolonial, and poststructural concerns, with wide-reaching repercussions for the types of questions posed in scholarship throughout Western Europe and North America.

The poststructuralist critique of idealist constructions of identity, together with post-Marxist reconfigurations of the relations of discourse, ideology, and materiality, inspired many scholars across disciplines to rethink that object choice known as fascism. Power and discipline, rather than originating in some sort of ideological superstructure expressed through the formal political operations of the state and enforced through the military or policing agents, could also be regarded as dispersed through what Foucault would refer to as discursive formations: for example, madness, medicine, crime, and sexuality, through which knowledge production comes to exercise authority over the body.[19] In this view, fascism is not exclusively attributable to the efforts of political regimes to impose an agenda upon (predetermined) national subjects; instead, fascism itself could also be regarded as comprising a particular mode of subject formation. For several intellectuals within the German cultural sphere, this meant reinscribing the human body into critical discourse. George Mosse linked fascism and the evolution of racialist nationalism to discourses of sexuality and masculinity formation that trace back to the Second Empire.[20] Other scholars assessed the body's territorialization under fascism while also interrogating continuities within the contemporary social order, as exemplified in such classic tomes as Klaus Theweleit's *Male Fantasies* and Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge's as yet untranslated (and perhaps untranslatable) *Geschichte und Eigensinn*.[21]

With the so-called linguistic turn, scholars in the humanities began to regard not only cultural artifacts, but also social and political phenomena, as essentially textual, meaning that they were open to discursive analysis. In other words, techniques of literary scholars once reserved for poetry and novels were applied to a much wider range of phenomena, including many aspects of fascism and neofascism. The mass choreography of bodies and symbols evinced in Nazi rallies or, alternately, the semiotic codings of Jörg Haider's website, were as open to hermeneutical interrogation as the writings of Ernst Jünger, Robert Braisallach, and Gabrielle D'Annunzio. All of these phenomena were regarded as necessarily implicated in systems of signification and symbolic structures; all of them revealed the workings of power. Susan Sontag's article, "Fascinating Fascism," is representative of the shift that took place, as scholars of fascism commenced exploring anew the relationship between representation, ideology, and subject formation, turning to such historical media of mass culture as film, radio, advertising, evangelical newsletters, and museum exhibitions.[22]

"New Historicism" emerged in this context. By combining deconstructionist and poststructuralist approaches with anthropological thick descriptions, New Historicism became another innovative tool with which literary scholars analyze fascism and neofascism. Scholars working with this approach assert that "history" does not so much consist of compiled texts, such as state records, eyewitness accounts, cultural artifacts, visual and print media; rather, "history" is constituted by the combined strategies of reading and interpretation of these materials as text. Further, these documents exist as a function or articulation of a context, with context understood to mean the very condition of textual production by which narrative meaning and coherence are produced.[23] These revaluations of the meaning of history, of the very way in which history is constituted, blended with both poststructuralism and identity politics to open up new research domains. Within the discipline of history as such, the focus on women's history was already well underway through the broader

movement of "history from below." Under the premise that aspects of human culture once regarded as private practices or biological imperatives, such as gender, race, and sexuality, are, in fact, central to constituting the political and merit historical evaluation, a new wave of studies of fascism has flourished. Bridenthal, Grossman, and Kaplan's anthology, *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany*, was one of the pioneering works in this area.[24]

During the 1980s and 1990s, identity politics dovetailed with the discourse of multiculturalism to encourage variously marginalized groups to articulate their experiences of oppression and herein reconceptualize the terrain of historiography. The living testimony of subjects who survived the Holocaust or otherwise endured traumatic persecution under fascism has become the object of disciplinary study to such an extent that by the mid-1990s one could discern a niche referring to itself as trauma studies, whose subject matter broadened to encompass such groups as former Vietnam veterans or survivors of incest.[25] Implicit in trauma studies was a preoccupation with personal and collective memory as media through which to access trauma, in effect, rendering memory a form of signification intimately bound up in the production of identity, representation, and, for that matter, of historiography.[26] In interrogating historical fascism and its contemporary correlates, questions of unresolved collective trauma and memory work have gained new significance, for it is the memory-images and testimonial narratives generated by both individuals and groups that ultimately provide the content and the impetus for political and moral claims about historical oppression in the past and present.

Thus one can trace a shift in research on fascism within the humanities, evolving from contemplating empirical "objects" of study, to regarding the textuality and discourse that necessarily constitute these objects, and finally, to encompassing the human subjects who themselves generate narratives out of unresolved memories. This development has been accompanied by a greater scholarly self-reflexivity about the impossibility of achieving an Archimedean standpoint outside discourse from which to empirically establish value and meaning. Contemplating one's situatedness means evaluating the manner in which scholarship is ineluctably informed by factors of identity and how these intervene in discourse to constitute an epistemological stance toward the object of study. Knowledge production itself is a form of power that can be wielded to steer a different course for the future by redefining our understanding of the past, even as such an endeavor remains fraught with epistemological pitfalls.

At the same time, historians, sociologists, and political scientists were coming under the influence of the new developments in the humanities. Few social scientists were ready to make the radical epistemological breaks that poststructuralists and deconstructionists had undertaken. But by the late 1980s and into the 1990s, new studies of fascism in history and the social sciences had begun to appear that explicitly examined the realms of culture and meaning formation. Traces of the influence of cultural studies were apparent in works on the rallies, urban planning, and language of fascist movements.[27] A number of edited volumes brought together scholars from a variety of fields who worked on fascism, and their interdisciplinary character was notably different from those of the 1960s and 1970s.[28] Historians more often found stimulating conversation with scholars of psychology and literature than with economists and political scientists. The study of "memory"

became a boom field, and much of the work focused on the fascist period and entailed oral histories of perpetrators, resisters, and survivors.[29]

Then, amid all these intellectual developments, came the dramatic political shifts of the 1990s. After World War II, the United States had led the creation of a liberal, capitalist zone in Western Europe and North America. Fascist parties and movements were eliminated from the political landscape and survived only as marginal groups without any significant political influence. (With a few exceptions, notably Italy and France, the same was true of the left.) Eastern European countries under Soviet control had even more forcefully driven out and suppressed the extreme right. While a revival of extremist activity in Western Europe began during the 1980s, the collapse of Communism resulted in a surge of the extreme right all across the continent. During the 1990s, fascism, or something like it, was suddenly and unexpectedly resurgent, evident in racist violence against Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians resident in Europe; in the reemergence, in places like Rumania and Croatia, of all the paraphernalia—pins, flags, uniforms, slogans—of the indigenous fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s; numerous anti-Semitic incidents in many countries; and in outright warfare in the former Yugoslavia. A wave of commentary and social science research ensued, often marked by a tone of near-disbelief that 50 years after the end of World War II, Europe could again be forced to deal with the extreme right.[30]

The right-wing revivals were very much a response to the political and social dislocations of the 1990s, including substantial unemployment, the erosion of the security net that the welfare states of both Eastern and Western Europe had provided, and the deterioration of urban neighborhoods. They were also a response to the wide-scale population migrations that have taken place across the North/South and East/West axes of Europe since 1945. These migrations first assumed significance during postwar recruitment of manual labor from Portugal, Italy, Turkey, and Northern Africa, especially in France and Germany. Yet shrinking population growth throughout Europe also impelled many nations to accept migrant labor into its folds—labor that was not an abstract resource to be beckoned or dismissed at will, but rather constituted through individuals with the aspiration to reconstruct their culture and social fabric abroad. Further sources of population flows can clearly be traced to decolonization of territories held by Great Britain in South Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, by France in Northern and sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, and by the Netherlands in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, developing nations wrestled with regime changes and struggled to assert national identities that could not but bear the lingering trace of earlier colonial models. The seismic repercussions of political upheaval throughout the developing world set into global motion political and economic refugees who sought entry into "fortress Europe." With the gradual dissolution of barriers to the flow of goods and bodies across national boundaries and the installment of a single European currency, the nature of national identities within Europe continues to undergo radical challenge and reconfiguration. Amid the transformations and dislocations of the 1990s, some individuals began to look for solutions in movements and ideologies that sponsor quests for lost origins and ethnic roots and that promise a revival of the mystical, pristine nation, often accompanied by neofascist rhetoric and violent assertions of territorial claims.

This volume appears in this intellectual and political conjuncture, one marked by the strong influence of cultural studies, broadly construed, and by deep concerns about the revival of the radical right in Europe. Our goal is to bring the newer modes of inquiry into dialogue with more "traditional" ways of viewing fascism. Our approach is deliberately interdisciplinary, even eclectic. Some of the chapters are steeped in archival research, seeking to understand the motivations of Danish Waffen SS recruits, for example, while others are the results of recent studies of young skinheads in contemporary Germany. Other contributions are grounded in discourse analysis and provide critical readings of fascist films or racial theory. A number of contributions are themselves notably eclectic in approach and methodology.

Fascism and Neofascism: Critical Writings on the Radical Right in Europe deliberately covers a broad time span, from the period of "classical" fascism in the first part of the twentieth century to the reemergence of the radical right in the 1990s. A fundamental question guides the volume: to what extent is the contemporary extreme right linked to classical fascism? If so, what are the precise forms of linkage? In a few cases, there are biographical connections in the sense that men (and a few women) who came of age at the end of World War II have resurfaced among contemporary extreme right movements and parties. Certainly, the symbols of the old fascist movements, the flags, insignias, uniforms and so on are ubiquitous in contemporary movements.

At the same time, it is the sense among most (though not all) contributors that the contemporary radical right is a rather different phenomenon than the classical fascism of the 1920s–1940s. The issues are different, the historical contexts quite distinct. In some cases, such as that of Austria, we have neo-right movements emerging out of quite prosperous and stable societies—a far cry from Rumania, Italy, and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. Nowhere, even in Russia, does the shadow of such a hugely destructive event as World War I cast a pall over present-day European societies. Anti-Semitism has traditionally been the common stuff of the extreme right and has also undergone a revival in Europe, but the target of resentment today is far more the immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia who populate European countries to a much greater extent than ever before. Both the prosperous and the nearly destitute European societies continually generate rebellions among youth, some of whom find identity and meaning in right-wing subcultures. Perhaps most important, it is the myriad effects of globalization, not the dislocations caused by total war or the crises of "classical modernity" that contribute to the creation of a new extreme right.[31] Some communities and countries find themselves marginalized by global processes, with devastating economic results. Other communities, less adversely affected, nonetheless seethe with resentment at the seemingly impersonal, all-powerful bureaucracies, whether located in capital cities like Rome or in the European Union centers of Brussels and Strasbourg, that increasingly regulate people's lives.

Yet we retain in our title and usage the term "neofascism," which of course posits some degree of relationship between the contemporary radical right and classical fascism. We offer here no exacting definition of neofascism, nor, for that matter, of fascism. We are content to let our various contributors work with their individual understandings. But it does seem to us that there exist some features common enough to both fascism and neofascism that we can talk about them as related

phenomena. In both periods, the extreme right is identifiable by its commitment to extreme national and racial ideologies. The emancipatory promise of the Enlightenment tradition (though sometimes honored more in the breach than in practice), whether in its liberal, radical republican, or socialist form, has been explicitly rejected by fascists and neofascists. Instead they posit a hierarchical world of dominant and subordinate groups, each group sharply delineated from others by its purported national or racial essence. They articulate a Social Darwinist position that honors struggle among these groups as performatively evincing the essence of History. They promote an ethos of masculine violence—as politics and as a way of being in the world. Even those movements that might not practice violence themselves—like Jörg Haider's in Austria—pay homage to the violent combat of the past. And while girls and young women play a more active role in the contemporary neofascist movements, they still remain largely subordinate within a male hierarchy.

In chapter one, Andrew Hewitt reevaluates the key theorists—Benjamin, Horkheimer and Adorno, Georg Lukacs—who have inspired so much of the work in the humanities on fascism and neofascism. The central text is Benjamin's *The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, with its much-cited phrase about fascism as "the aestheticization of politics." Although insufficient in many ways, Benjamin's essay is so critical because it raises the twin problems of representation and subjectivity. For Horkheimer and Adorno, fascism marked the death of the subject; for Lukacs, fascism was essentially irrational precisely because it developed from a bourgeoisie that feared substantive, that is, proletarian, subjectivity. Hewitt also assesses the concept of "totalitarian" and how humanists deploy it differently from social scientists, with profound consequences for our understanding of fascism. For those inspired by Horkheimer and Adorno, "totality" is a mode of domination that lies implicit in the Enlightenment drive to de-mythologize the world. Totalitarianism is not unique to fascism and communism, but also finds expression in consumer capitalism. Hewitt also explores the way the contemporary French theorists Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy analyze myths as a means of constituting identity. Through his consideration of these key issues—subjectivity, totality, myth—Hewitt suggests that a fascist mode of practice and thinking is not limited to the period from the 1920s through the 1940s and to those movements and regimes that labeled themselves fascist.

Lutz Koepnick takes up some of the question of the aestheticization of politics under fascism, exploring in detail the aura surrounding the leader, Adolf Hitler, in particular. Hitler very consciously sought to create a charismatic persona through the mystique of the spoken word. He was highly attentive to his own voice and gestures, and adverse to still photography and, initially, film, which seemed to contain and diminish his presence. But all that changed with the advent of sound film. Hitler and other Nazi leaders quickly recognized it as a medium that, unlike still photography or silent movies, fostered Hitler's vocal aura, indeed, made possible, a *Gesamtkunstwerk* on the order of a Wagnerian opera. In extensive and insightful analysis of the famed Nazi propaganda film, *Triumph of the Will*, Koepnick shows how director Leni Riefenstahl's framing of the film entailed a fascist aesthetic that rendered Hitler's gaze omniscient, while also constructing the subject-viewer. For all the similarities between Nazi and Hollywood films, Koepnick cautions against any

easy comparisons between the two. In its sweeping, controlling gaze, the fascist aesthetic exemplified by *Triumph of the Will* revealed a deep unease about cinema's potential to unleash unrestrained desires.

In a strikingly original essay, Claudio Fogu explores the meaning of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, which Mussolini's regime established on the tenth anniversary of the March on Rome. Fogu uses the exhibit to explore Fascism's inextricable links with modernism, and Futurism in particular. Scholars have long noted this affiliation, which, in Fogu's view, sharply demarcates Fascism from National Socialism. But Fogu goes well beyond the observation that Fascism happened to adopt the modernist style. Rather, modernism gave to Fascism its particular dynamic, its self-understanding, which collapsed past and future into an ongoing present and an emphasis on the distinguishing "event." Fascist-modernist "style" was a way of being in the world, not a fashion accessory. In this manner, Fascism challenged Enlightenment understandings of the linear progression of time. Fogu suggests that the specifically Fascist conception of time, history, and style have been enduring legacies, helping to create the posthistoric imaginary that has become so central to Western culture. Like Hewitt, Fogu suggests that certain characteristics of fascism are not limited to a particular place and time in the first half of the twentieth century.

Fascism and neofascism have been pan-European phenomena. Claus Bundgard Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith examine the Danish variant. In the 1930s, many Danes, discontented with the established parties and compromise politics of the day, were attracted to the heroic, nationalist claims of the fascist states and their appearance of order and discipline. However, the German invasion in 1940 virtually eliminated the option of an indigenous Danish fascism, while pro-Nazi groups gained support. Some thousands of men volunteered for special Waffen SS brigades and saw action on the eastern front. They also underwent the ideological indoctrination that prevailed in the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. After 1945 and amid the Cold War, the surviving veterans claimed that they had been fighting communism and had played no part in German atrocities against Jews and others. Postwar Danish society was only too willing to accept a memory trope that covered up complicity with Nazi Germany.

In a major reinterpretation of key aspects of National Socialism, Dagmar Herzog argues that the Nazis were not at all advocates of sexual repression. That has been the common, unquestioned understanding, one that goes back to theorists of the Frankfurt School and, notably, Wilhelm Reich, all of whom drew a direct link between sexual repression and the brutal authoritarianism of the Nazis. Based on wide readings of Nazi era documents, Herzog shows that many leading Nazis forcefully attacked Christian morality and developed a cult of the body that, at times, sounds eerily contemporary. The Nazis managed to separate rhetorically and ideologically the "degenerate," "Jewish" sexual promiscuity and experimenation of the Weimar era while advocating pre- and extramarital sex—for the racially elect—as expressions of Aryan nobility. The Protestant and especially Catholic churches fulminated against these positions, and found themselves cleverly and incisively attacked by Nazi ideologues. Herzog shows how consevative Christians in the postwar era successfully founded their condemnation of Nazi atrocities on the Third Reich's

support for sexuality. The Christian Democratic Union, in close alliance with the Catholic Church, promoted a far more repressive sexual morality that deeply shaped society, culture, and politics in the Federal Republic.

Diethelm Prowe shifts the historical focus to the postwar era by exploring the character of the new radical right. Through critical engagement with the very extensive literature on fascism and neofascism, Prowe argues that the two movements are really quite distinct. Only at the most general level do fascism and neofascism share common characteristics. Prowe clearly delineates the distinctive historical contexts of the two eras, post–World War I and post-Communism, that have spawned the two radical right movements. While some features of classical fascism were clearly evident before 1914, the movement really developed out of the brutalities and the vast dislocations engendered by the Great War. The more recent radical right, in contrast, has emerged in societies that, despite whatever serious problems they might have, are relatively stable and prosperous. The new radical right, Prowe argues, is the product of a sense of cultural unease among many Europeans, an aversion to the liberalizing trends since 1968 and, especially, to the reality of large-scale immigration from the global south. These immigrants, not Jews, as in classical fascism, have been the main targets of the extreme right. While Prowe states that the radical right will remain a part of the European landscape, he ends on an optimistic note: immigration is a reality, European economies require the more youthful labor force that immigration provides, and European societies will learn to adapt to multiculturalism.

In an analysis that is at once theoretical and historical, David Carroll takes up the "fiction" that lies at the heart of virtually all fascisms and neofascisms—race. There is no scientific validity to race, Carroll argues, in accord with most contemporary scientific and scholarly discussions. It is an invented historical construct, a means of making sense of human difference and organizing polities and societies. Yet there is a reality to race. Drawing on the writings of Étienne Balibar and other French theorists, Carroll argues strongly that race is not some kind of irrationalism or pathology; however fictive, it is a functional principle: it serves to organize society along axes of domination and subordination, inclusion and exclusion. Carroll then turns to the implementation of race in French colonial Algeria and shows how Jews, Arabs, and Berbers were lumped together into a collective other that was anything but "French." He establishes a direct link between colonial racism and the anti-Semitic policies of Vichy France. Moreover, citing Balibar again, he shows how racism and nationalism, if not exactly the same thing, are closely linked to one another. Carroll suggests, unlike Maria Bucur and Prowe, that there is a strong and fundamental connection between fascism and neofascism, and it is the principle of race that constitutes the linkage. He goes even futher to suggest that any political system that operates on the basis of race, including liberal ones, bears affinities with fascism.

Maria Bucur then provides a detailed case study of the relationship between classical fascism and neofascism in Romania. She begins by sketching some of the distinctive features of Romanian politics and society from the late nineteenth into the twentieth centuries, notably its relative economic backwardness, weak socialist tradition, and strong anti-Semitic tendencies. Romanian politics have always been somewhat to the right of the European standard, even during the communist era. The Iron Guard, the major fascist movement from the 1920s into the 1940s, had almost nothing of the

"socialist" rhetoric and policies of both the Nazis and Italian Fascists. The movement was mostly directed against foreigners and Jews and idealized the Romanian peasantry as the essence of the nation. While Romanian fascists were repressed by the communist regime, Nicolae Ceauçescu, in the last years of his reign, cultivated ties with veterans of the Iron Guard and invoked their legacy in some displays of public memory. Largely in agreement with Prowe's discussion, Bucur argues that the radical right that has flourished in Romania following the collapse of communism in 1989 is essentially a distinctive phenomenon. The Greater Romania Party, the main organization of the neo-right, uses much of the symbolism of the Iron Guard. Its anti-Semitic and anti-Hungarian positions also echo the older fascist movement. But the social base of the contemporary movement is distributed across diverse urban populations rather than among the peasantry, and its enemies are the institutions of globalization that are seen as exercising excessive control over the Romanian economy and society. In many ways, Bucur suggests, Romania, still engaged in a politics that pits liberals against reactionaries, is again out of step with broader European trends.

Joachim Kersten's criminological research focuses upon youth identification with right-wing extremism and the display of xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments in the new and old German federal states (*Länder*). Kersten criticizes extant explanatory models that depict the reemergence of right-wing extremism as a consequence of globalization and forces of modernity, in which high unemployment plays a significant role, or alternately, as a vulgarized version of Horkheimer and Adorno's "authoritarian personality." These interpretations, according to Kersten, fail to take into account gender and situational factors evident in many cases of hate crime in postunification Germany. In the East, the skinhead lifestyle romanticizes a certain masculine rebel image; these youth perceive themselves as misunderstood and marginalized by the broader society, even identifying with a certain victim status. It would seem that socialism's white working-class culture has been replaced by a form of camaraderie grounded in violence against diffusely defined enemies. While such sentiments are not necessarily apolitical, they are not supported by an explicit political platform or rational discourse. Violence among subcultures (skinheads, neo-Nazis, hooligans) in both the East and West frequently surfaces around situational circumstances (alcohol, masculinist status, disputes over honor or territory). To the extent that old Nazi emblems, rites, and slogans are invoked, they are utilized in a gesture of rebellion to trigger a predictable reaction of outrage among the general population. Right-wing parties serve a symbolic purpose, but are not always the primary form of organization, while antisocial behavior has diverse origins. Kersten concludes that the extreme right is a complex phenomenon not subject to any single characterization.

Ivan Čolović is similarly preoccupied with right-wing extremism, but focuses upon its manifestation among spectator sport fans in the former Yugoslavia. He explores how the moral and political valence assigned football "hooligans" became transformed with the outbreak of armed conflict in the early 1990s. Behaviors once deemed antisocial and vandalistic were harnessed in the service of nationalist discourses and the state's war policy. Ultimately unruly hooligans in Serbia were recruited into paramilitary formations that played a key role in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. This phenomenon calls into question prevailing theses regarding the positive psychosocial impact of spectator sport events, according to

which a football match constitutes a sort of ritualized war, offering violence a symbolic, carnivalesque expression that functions to diffuse the potential for real violence. Čolović draws more sober conclusions: Ethnic war does indeed rechannel hooligan aggression so that its target is no longer domestic authority but rather presumed "enemies" of the nation, in this case, Croats and Muslims. The subculture of football violence comes to reign victorious over civil society and, indeed, to become the new dominant culture.

Tore Bjørgø focuses on the manner in which the discourse of fascism and the resistance movement in Norwegian and Danish history have been reworked by the contemporary Scandinavian radical right as a means to redefine the terrain of self and adversary. Bjørgø distinguishes between two branches of the right-wing movement, each aligned with a distinct historical and ideological tradition. Those driven by nationalism and anti-immigration regard themselves as a new resistance movement modeled upon the anti-German resistance movement, while those disseminating a neo-Nazi and explicitly racist ideology draw upon the earlier rhetoric of anti-Semitism and National Socialism to defy a national leadership they have termed the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). Only a small portion of the population in Norway and Denmark has embraced the analogies of the new "resistance movement"; most find the comparison to the occupation era deeply offensive. Yet Norwegians and Danes have less secure national histories than their neighbor Sweden, and the radical right has had some success in its effort to reappropriate a history of national resistance.

Three essays focus specifically on right-wing politics and intellectual currents of thought in contemporary France. Michel Wieviorka is preoccupied with mapping continuities and discontinuities between contemporary racism and anti-Semitism on the one hand, and the ideologies underpinning French fascism in the Vichy era, on the other. He regards the broader reemergence of racism in Europe as anchored less in any sort of scientific rationale than in cultural differences grounded in lifestyle, family values, and work habits. Contemporary racist movements have dovetailed with the rise of strands of populism that find easy targets to blame for declines in earning power or social status. Italy's Ligue du Nord exemplifies this posture in its desire to sever the North from the South to facilitate modernization and economic efficiency. Within France, Wieviorka points to the rise of certain types of interethnic conflict accompanying the immigration process, such as anti-Semitic sentiment harbored by French citizens of Caribbean or North African origin. He also identifies larger structural crises that have contributed to ethnic tensions, such as the decline of France as an industrialized society, in which one of the central orientations of social life was class identity. As mobility along the economic scale becomes increasingly unpredictable, social groups have distinguished themselves via other vectors of identity, including cultural traits. Economic streamlining has also radically altered institutions that once underpinned the Republic and provided social security. In general agreement with Prowe and Bucur, Wievieorka argues that ideological continuities with historical fascism are too precarious to carry significant weight. The racism of the Front national (FN), he maintains, references primarily more contemporary developments rather than the stereotypes of the fascist era, which have since been totally discredited in the public sphere. Continuities with the colonial war in

Algeria, however, are more evident, particularly among former *pieds-noirs* now operating within the ranks of the FN.

Franklin Hugh Adler addresses the rise and fall of France's extreme right party, the Front National (FN), in context with a parallel decline in public anxieties about immigration and what the French refer to as *insécurité,* that is, a generalized fear of criminal activity. The FN's speculation on the immigration issue was central to its ascendancy in 1984 and served to define and distinguish the political right from the political left. While a number of political and social factors have alternately fuelled or dampened public anxieties about immigration over the years, Adler chooses to focus upon a more recent internal crisis within the FN as contributing to public eclipse of the immigration issue. He traces the development of the FN from an alternative party in 1972 that sought to unsettle the dominant political parties, to its successful alliance by 1984 with other parties right of center, and finally to its demise in 1997 when Bruno Mégret began to more openly clash with Jean-Marie Le Pen over his radical extremism and thereupon formed the splinter party, the Mouvement National Républican (MNR). Adler analyzes the strategic "war of position" with which this ideological transformation of political control took place, and assesses the role of the immigration issue in relationship to the changes in political platform. He concludes that the MNR ultimately remained a carbon copy of the FN, rather than offering a more moderate alternative to Le Pen's extremism.

Le Livre noir du Communisme, published in France in 1997, caused an immense stir. Richard Golsan undertakes a formidable exegesis of the controversy and reveals how unresolved France remains with the fascist legacy. Stéphan Courtois's introduction to *Le Livre noir* constitutes a veritable tallysheet of the crimes committed by individual Communist regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, Cambodia, and North Korea. It was less the sheer enormity of the victims cited by Courtois that elicited indignation than the manner in which his analysis established a moral and legal equivalency between the crimes of Nazism and Communism. Indeed, he concluded that Communism had inflicted even greater damage upon humanity than Nazism. Recognizing that the Nuremburg statutes for crimes against humanity were only legally oriented toward the Axis powers, Courtois drew upon the 1992 French Criminal Code, which defines crimes against humanity in terms broad enough to include those committed by Communist regimes. Golsan deftly reviews some of the more significant arguments presented by scholars and critics in response to Courtois's assertions and also situates the book in relationship to François Furet's earlier work, *Le passé d'une illusion*, which helped launch the debate about similarities and divergences between fascism and communism. Golsan argues that *Le Livre noir* effectively brought to 1990s France the German Historians' Debate of the 1980s. Courtois's discussion of the sheer horror and number of the communist crimes seemed to lend credence to Ernst Nolte's assertions in the Historians' Debate that Hitler and the Nazis so feared the Soviet menace that they had to come up with radical and preemptive measures to stymie it.

Angelica Fenner's article is similarly preoccupied with a textual artifact that engages previously established modes of interpreting the fascist past, in this case, via a recent docudrama reenactment of one of the most controversial crimes in Stuttgart's postwar history, which involved the fatal police shooting of a Liberian asylum seeker in 1989. To describe the manner in which Frieder Schlaich's 1999 film

revisits questions of guilt, complicity, the institutionalization of oppression, and the etiology of racism, Fenner draws upon the psychoanalytic mechanism of the "repetition-compulsion," a concept also invoked by Holocaust scholars to identify the recurring waves of self-contemplation observed in public discourse within Germany. In reconstructing events surrounding the tragic shootout, Schlaich seems to ambiguously straddle intentionalist and functionalist approaches to the origins of racism. Repeated instances at the level of *histoire* seem intent upon revealing the German subject as conflictually interpolated by both Christian humanism and a cultural racism grounded in disillusionment with the general forces of globalization facing Europe. As such, the citizens who encounter the Liberian man, Otomo, in his final hours of life are presented through the legitimizing lens of normalization, of Germans coping and responding not necessarily differently than other industrialized European citizens at the close of the twentieth century. Simultaneously, at the level of discourse or enunciation, the manner in which the narration evokes preestablished assumptions between filmmaker and audience, Schlaich engages in a series of citations of the New German Cinema that align his work with a far more incriminating gaze seeking traces of the fascist past in contemporary social life. Yet Schlaich's generation cannot really share in the oedipal agenda that underpinned the New German Cinema and that was once embodied in the Oberhausen Manifesto's assault upon "papa's Kino." Thus, despite the thoughtful layering of meanings and a more nuanced exploration of racism than many filmmakers exhibit, his cinematographic citations and casting of Eva Mattes in a lead role somehow ring hollow and emptied of biographical legitimacy and an adequate political coherence, like so many commemorations that scholar Jeffrey Olick maintains have become a normal part of West German public and political ritual.

If we take a glance back at the overall history of the West since 1914, the complete marginalization of the extreme right from roughly 1945 to 1980 actually appears to be more the exception. Western societies continually generate movements of the extreme right. Yet in few places today is it likely that neofascists have any chance of seizing state power. While it was control of the state that made the classical fascist movements so dangerous and destructive, neofascists are nevertheless capable of gross violations of human rights, as exemplified in their rampages against Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians in Europe. Furthermore, while Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic could hardly be termed a fascist state, some of the most brutal participants in the Balkan wars of the 1990s were organized into neofascist paramilitary formations. The radical right will remain with us. These essays provide perspective on and understanding of its historical and contemporary significance.

Notes

1. Ernst Nolte, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Munich: Piper, 1963), Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).
2. Executive Committee of the Communist International, Thirteenth Plenum, "Fascism, the War Danger, and the Tasks of Communist Parties" (December 1933), in Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International 1919-1943* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 296–303.

3. Especially in the famous, scattered sections on hegemony, in English in *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International, 1971).
4. Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*, trans. Judith White (London: New Left Books, 1974), and idem, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagan (London: New Left Books, 1973).
5. A complete listing would require an entire bibliographical book, and even then might be insufficient. Good edited collections include Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Arnold, 1998); Wolfgang Schieder, ed., *Faschismus als soziale Bewegung: Deutschland und Italien in Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1983); George L. Mosse, ed., *International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); S.J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (New York: Random House, 1969); and idem, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: Random House, 1969).
6. Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept," *American Historical Review* 84, 2 (1979): 367–98.
7. See Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Wolfgang Wippermann, *Totalitarismustheorien: Die Entwicklung der Diskussion von den Anfängen bis heute* (Darmstadt: Primus, 1997), p. 9.
8. See the publications that ensued from both conferences, Guy Stanton Ford, ed., *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1939), and *Symposium of the Totalitarian State: From the Standpoints of History, Political Science, Economics and Sociology* (November 17, 1939), *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 82, 1 (1940).
9. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951; Cleveland: Meridian, 1958), and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezsinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
10. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).
11. Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini* (Turin: Einaudi, 1965–1997), especially vols. 3 and 4: *Il Duce* and *Lo Stato totalitario 1936–1940*; Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Sturcture of the Third Reich*, trans. John W. Hiden (London: Longman, 1981); and some of the essays in Hans Mommsen, *Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Gesellschaft: Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, ed. Lutz Niethammer and Bernd Weisbrod (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), and idem, *From Weimar to Auschwitz*, trans. Philip O'Connor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
12. See, e.g., Franklin Hugh Adler, *Italian Industrialists form Liberalism to Fascism: The Political Development of the Industrial Bourgeoisie, 1906–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
13. Stanley Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), and idem, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
14. Ze'ev Sternell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
15. Victoria De Grazia, *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and idem, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
16. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Pinter, 1991), quotes 26.
17. Tim Mason, *Nazism, Fascism, and the Working Class: Essays by Tim Mason*, ed. Jane Caplan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 323–31. Mason wrote some of the most significant contributions to the fascism debates of the 1960s and 1970s.
18. See as just one example, George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975).

19. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1972.
20. See the following works by Mosse: *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grossel & Dunlap, 1964); *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle Class Morality and Sexual Norms in* Europe (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: Fertig, 1999)
21. Klaus Theweleit, *Male Fantasies*, vols. 1 and 2, trans. Erica Carter and Chris Turner. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989); Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, *Geschichte und Eigensinn* (Frankfurt am Main: Zweitausendeins, 1981).
22. Susan Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism," *The New York Review of Books* (February 6, 1975).
23. See H. Aram Veeser, ed., *The New Historicism* (New York: Routledge, 1989).
24. Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, and Marion Kaplan, eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984). See also Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1987); Victoria DeGrazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); David Good, Margaret Grandner, and Mary Jo Maynes, eds., *Austrian Women in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives* (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1996); the special issue, "Sexuality and German Fascism," compiled by the *Journal of the History of Sexuality* (January/April 2002) and edited by Dagmar Herzog.
25. See, e.g., the two anthologies edited by Cathy Caruth: *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) and *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), as well as Kirby Farrell's *Post-Traumatic Culture: Injury and Interpretation in the Nineties* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
26. See Dominick LaCapra's two monographs, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), as well as Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub's *Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
27. To give just a few examples: Peter Reichel, *Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches: Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993); Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, trans. Keith Botsford (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Marla Stone, *The Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and Ruth Ben Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). A much earlier and still valuable study on language is Victor Klemperer, *LTI: Notizbuch eines Philologen* (Berlin: Autbau-Verlag, 1947).
28. Notably, Saul Friedländer, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
29. Luisa Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class*, trans. Robert Lumley and Jude Bloomfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and the three-volume series under Lutz Niethammer's direction, *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930 bis 1960* (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf, 1983–85). See also the journal, *History and Memory*.
30. For just a few examples of an extensive literature, see Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Roger Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (London: Penguin, 1996); and Michael Minkenberg, *Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1998).
31. The term "classical modernity" is from Detlev Peukert: *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, trans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).

Chapter One

Ideological Positions in the Fascism Debate

Andrew Hewitt

This essay is intended to offer a kind of user's guide to theories of fascism. The aim of the guide is neither to provide an exhaustive analysis—or even list—of those theories, nor to synthesize them into a new or more comprehensive theory. Instead, what is proposed is a map of sorts that will signal some of the landmarks and fault lines distinguishing various theories and provide orientation for those interested in what the humanities have to offer to a theory of fascism. As with most maps, the mode of presentation is essentially synchronic, and though reference might be made to some historic shift, no real attempt will be made to offer a history of theories of fascism. Moreover, the use of a generic term throughout this article—"fascism"—reflects not an assertion of some common value running through various specific historical regimes, but rather the abstract remove at which theories of fascism have tended to operate within the humanities. Where it might be the task of the historian to insist on distinction and detail, the theorists dealt with in this presentation tend, instead, to operate at the level of generality—providing paradigms for the orientation of more detailed study. Finally, no pretense will be made to cover in exhaustive fashion the literature generated within the humanities pertaining to the study of fascism. The objective, instead, is to indicate the major points of division between competing trends in fascism theory.

To distinguish between social sciences and humanities in the current climate of academic interdisciplinarity might seem anachronistic, but the distinction does help to isolate a certain strain of theory that will here be identified with the humanities. In brief, whereas the social sciences might wish to analyze the origins and consequences of fascism as a political movement, "humanist" theories of fascism have from the very first focused on questions of representation. At first sight, this might seem like an amicable division of labor—politics to the social sciences, aesthetics to the humanities. But, of course, Benjamin's analysis in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"—perhaps the most influential theory of fascism within the humanities, broadly defined—challenges precisely that distinction.[1] Though no alternative reading of Benjamin is proposed within the confines of this essay, in order to understand what is at stake in theories of fascism developed by humanists, it is necessary to return to his seminal analysis in the "artwork" essay. Fascism, Benjamin argues, in a turn of phrase that has become a commonplace, is characterized by the

aestheticization of politics. This insight has since been worked through in many different ways, but it is clear that Benjamin's essay does not propose a re-division of those two illegitimately conflated discourses, aesthetics, and politics. Nor, however, can we interpret his call for an inverse politicization of aesthetics as a simple cry for a more engaged or propagandistic antifascist art.

The conflation of aesthetics and politics is a historical given, both at a banal level—what politics can we imagine in the media age that *would not* be directly aestheticized?—and at a more profound level: questions of representation have become directly political in a bourgeois public sphere that is predicated upon the right of political representation for all its citizens. Thus, for example, Benjamin talks of "modern man's legitimate claim to being reproduced" (232), the proletariat's "right" to see itself reproduced in the cultural artifacts it produces and consumes. But at the same time he claims that fascism succeeds by "giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves" (241), while refusing the proletariat its substantial, material, and political rights. The work of representation has been parsed out here into the twin functions of expression and reproduction. On the one hand there is the right to be "reproduced"—a genuine and politically legitimate claim—and on the other the "right" to "expression," a right that, in the context of this essay, is illegitimate and suited to a fascist manipulation of power. This separating out of the twin poles of representation—reproduction good: expression bad—might seem surprising at first, since it valorizes the impersonal, reproductive mechanism or structure of representation over the authenticity of the expressive human material to be represented. Benjamin's elaboration of the way in which aesthetics is always already political—the way in which representation is a political concern—is crucial. For it suggests that fascism responds to an emptying out of the space of interiority, that "expression" merely creates a semblance of "authentic" human material, and that authenticity itself is inauthentic, a mere distraction from the truly authentic project of material revolution. At the very least, this is what I choose to retain from Benjamin's essay: the question of the subject caught between "expression" and "reproduction." Abstracting from Benjamin's analysis, one might trace theories of fascism along "the axis of the subject." That is to say, one might begin mapping those theories by asking: do they take fascism to be the realization of the logic of the subject (an elaboration of theories of "expression") or as a symptom of the demise of the autonomous bourgeois subject in an age of mass politics?

Suggestive as Benjamin's analysis may be, it has obvious limitations when it comes to confronting the historical specificity of Nazi crimes. Moreover, taken at the banal level of a critique of politics in the age of mass media and image manipulation, what begins as a theory of fascism begins to look like nothing more than a theory of postmodern politics. In fact, as recent rereadings have emphasized, there is a lot more to Benjamin's essay than the simple critique of a politics too concerned with appearance and presentation over substantive political and social concerns.[2] Before moving on from Benjamin to examine the theories of fascism that have proliferated in the postwar period, we should note that he was by no means alone in signaling the new importance of questions of representation to the political analysis of fascism. His contemporary, Ernst Bloch, was, if anything, even more acutely focused on such questions in his critique of the left's failure to take seriously the strength and potency

of fascist "representation," fascist symbolism.[3] Contrasting Bloch and Benjamin, however, provides another nice line of distinction that we will see traced through subsequent theorists—namely, the question of the utopian. Benjamin's breakthrough—shared by Adorno, despite their disagreement over Benjamin's valorization of reproduction and de-auraticization—was to demonstrate the inauthenticity of a certain ideology of the subject (and his "right" to self-expression).[4] Bloch, on the other hand, is more traditionally rooted in a vision of authentic political aspiration, which—even when falsified in fascist ceremonial—remains legitimate and utopian. Whereas Benjamin uncovers the inauthenticity of the ideologically authentic, Bloch focuses instead on the authenticity embedded in the inauthentic.

This drawing of distinctions over the question of authenticity is crucial to understanding the context in which Benjamin's essay was resuscitated and lionized beginning in the 1960s. For it is the very same question that lies at the heart of the modernism/postmodernism debate that came to dominate cultural debate at around the same time. Benjamin's analysis of the "aestheticization of politics" and his critique of an ideology of authentic (or "expressive") subjectivity was presented in the context of an essay about the de-auraticization of art through mechanical reproduction. While its reception in the 1960s was clearly determined by a specific political agenda—the left's desire to use the critique of fascism as a tool against an essentially totalitarian parliamentarism that allowed little space for real political opposition—that reception was also clearly overdetermined by a contemporaneous crisis in the arts. The demise of abstract expressionism as the definitive modernist form and, concomitantly, the emergence of movements such as pop art that celebrated mass production and consumption, threatened the entire ideology of cultural modernism (at least as it had been defined in America in the postwar era). This narrative of modern art had sought to mesh abstraction at the level of the object with expression at the level of the subject. Questions of authenticity, expression, and reproducibility were both politically and culturally relevant again, and it is in this context that the "Benjaminian" tradition of theorizing fascism must be read.

This brief historical preface to an essentially synchronic analysis intends not so much to reconstruct the shifts and developments in theories of fascism as to question the relevance of theories of fascism in our current intellectual and political environment. In his important study, *Reflection of Nazism*: *An Essay on Kitsch and Death*—first published in 1982—Saul Friedländer was one of the first to comment on the discrete history of fascism within the humanities.[5] His study focused on works of fiction, film, cultural representations, and reproductions of Nazism, but his broad thesis is suggestive to historians of theory also. "At the end of the war," Friedländer writes,

> Nazism was the damned part of western civilization, the symbol of evil. Everything the Nazis had done was condemned, whatever they touched defiled; a seemingly indelible stain darkened the German past, while preceding centuries were scrutinized for the origins of this monstrous development[. . .]By the end of the 'sixties, however, the Nazi image in the West had begun to change. Not radically or across the board, but here and there, and on the right as well as on the left and revealingly enough to allow one to speak of the existence of a new kind of discourse. (11–12)

He is proposing two stages of "fascism reception." The first stage consisted of denial and repression on the one hand or, on the other, a presentation of good and evil that fitted rather well the prevailing narrative ethic of the culture industry. The second stage—exemplified, for Friedländer, by such cultural phenomena as *The Sorrow and the Pity*, Michel Tournier's novel, *The Ogre*, Syberberg's *Hitler, a Film from Germany*, and the memoirs of Albert Speer—emerges from a growing discontent with the hegemony of theories of totalitarianism that equated fascism and communism.

The result, for Friedländer, is a new form of representational kitsch that was perhaps best analyzed in the United States by Susan Sontag in her study of "Fascinating Fascism."[6] Friedländer's assumption—faced with this second stage—is that

> Any analysis of Nazism based only on political, economic, and social interpretations will not suffice. The inadequacies of the Marxist concept of "fascism," whether historical or contemporary fascism, are obvious. But liberal historiography is no more coherent[. . .]Under the circumstances, only a synthesis of diverse interpretations appears satisfactory: Nazism can thus be seen as a product of a social and economic evolution whose internal dynamic Marxism has perhaps illuminated; of a political transformation in part independent of the socioeconomic "infrastructure"; and, finally, of a psychological process, responsive to its own logic, that is intertwined with the economics and the politics. (14)

Since the socioeconomic conditions that gave birth to Nazism no longer prevail, according to Friedländer, and since "the political evolution of the West does not resemble in the least that of Europe between the two world wars" (14) it is under his third rubric—"a psychological process, responsive to its own logic"—that some recrudescence of fascism is to be feared. What is notable, however, is that the second stage of fascism reception—to follow Friedländer—was characterized less by the analysis of "psychological processes" than by a reconsideration of systems of representation.

The most important writings on psychological aspects of fascism—Reich's early study of *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* and the empirical studies undertaken by the Frankfurt School and collected in *The Authoritarian Personality*—had become politically problematic by the 1960s. Reich's equation of political and sexual liberation was too tied to class political analysis to be easily accessible to the counterculture and the presupposition of an authoritarian psyche played all too easily into Cold War theories of totalitarianism that were now being questioned.[7] Meanwhile, the left's rediscovery in the early 1960s of Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (to be examined later) led to the reconstruction of an Adorno–Benjamin debate about modes of production and modes of representation rather than to a new focus on the psyche of the individual fascist. Somewhat paradoxically, then, Friedländer's own recognition of the importance of questions of representation—and, therefore, of theories of fascism that are not reconstructed purely from documented historical "fact"—is something he shares with some texts of the "second stage" that he seeks to critique. The task his work sets us then, is the following: how do we deal with questions of representation without reducing fascism to a mere representational episteme?

Since our ambition here is to gain insight into those paradigms developed in the humanities for understanding fascism, it would not be apposite simply to transpose those terms of differentiation that have characterized analysis in the social sciences onto the theorists in question here. Nevertheless, the terms of debate in the social sciences do have their correlates in the humanities: thus, for example, the question of totalitarianism as a generalizable political structure is replicated in philosophical analysis through a concern with the category of "totality." Similarly, the question of fascism's relation to the process of modernization transmutes—via readings of Weberian rationalization—into a questioning of the structure of reason and rationality in general. For a long time, though, the twin poles of theory have been Lukacs and Adorno, who have served synecdochically to characterize theories of fascism as irrationality (Lukacs) or as the outcrop of a radicalized and de-substantiated form of reason (Adorno). For the purposes of the analysis here, this dichotomy shall be allowed to stand. In the presentation that follows, however, a second major axis of distinction will be invoked to differentiate theories of fascism. This second axis—distinguishing between theorists who believe that fascism marks the death of the subject and those who believe, instead, that it is the absurd realization of a de-substantiated, structural logic of subjectivity—might, at first sight, seem simply to replicate the terms of the first axis. Those who believe that fascism is "irrational" might be presumed to be working from a model of subjectivity that would oppose such irrationality. Those who see in fascism the realization of the logic of the subject, meanwhile, would seem necessarily to condemn "rationality" as a form of empty structure that fascism emptied of any ethical substance. In fact, the ideological positions with regard to fascism are more complex, and might be arrayed across the following matrix:



Of course, even this account will simplify the multiplicity of arguments with respect to fascism; most obviously, one might wish to add a crucial third dimension to the analysis—namely, whether or not the theorist subscribes to the totalitarianism thesis

linking fascism and communism.[8] A further crucial axis of distinction would be between those who regard fascism as one of the forms taken by political and cultural modernity, and those who view it as a more or less overt reaction *against* modernity. Both of these axes of distinction, however, would lead one to focus on more properly *political* questions regarding fascism,—questions displaced in this presentation by more cultural and philosophical concerns. However, this heuristic division remains helpful as a point of departure. The names in the various quadrants still serve synecdochically and the grid as such is proposed for the interesting questions it raises rather than to provide definitive solutions. Similarly, the ensuing presentation is not intended to justify this rigid structure so much as to provoke further thought.

We will not dwell on the second quadrant since it effectively describes the logic of Friedländer's "first wave" of fascism reception. This position was understandably popular with both intellectuals and politicians within postwar Germany, who were eager to reestablish some sense of normality. If fascism was a political and psychic aberration, neither Germany nor the political discourse of the bourgeois public sphere was necessarily permanently scarred. A return to normality was possible once the political subject and the body politic had been adequately "*entnazifiziert,*" the position is most effectively represented by the consensus in the *Bundesrepublik*: "Fascism was an aberration; it was irrational; it resulted from an otherwise liberal polity being misled by opportunistic swindlers etc. This sort of thing might still be going on in totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union, but not here in Germany now that the forces of reason and liberal tolerance have won out." The position had the benefit of fitting well with prevailing theories of totalitarianism that blurred the distinctions between fascism and communism.

Without wishing to efface the distinctions between important and influential theorists, one can see the lingering influence of such thinking in the works such as Stern's *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, or Sontheimer's *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik*. Mosse's *The Crisis of German Ideology*, meanwhile, makes similar arguments, but holds Germans responsible for an active acquiescence to a certain cultural logic that dissembled individual responsibility.[9] Psychologically oriented studies also tend often toward this mode of analysis. Though Reich's *Mass Psychology of Fascism* had been one of the first studies to reject the notion that fascism was simply a swindle or an imposition on an unwitting populace, it sought nevertheless to analyze the process whereby the autonomous individual is disconnected both from class consciousness and from his own libidinal self-interest. In the postwar context, meanwhile, the Mitscherlichs's study, *The Inability to Mourn*, posited a form of narcissistic disturbance in the German collective and historical psyche that had plunged Germany into the obsessive forgetfulness of melancholia.[10] The claim made in this work for a need to mourn the past indeed raised the need for *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, but in the interests of a therapeutic return to non-narcissistic, healthy political and national identity. In other words, while the Mitscherlichs clearly marked a move beyond the repression of the Nazi past in the *Bundesrepublik*, the position they espouse still accepts the terms of analysis of their opponents. The dangers of so simple a prescription would subsequently be made clear by Adorno in his essay "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?"[11] Adorno demonstrates that a therapeutic mourning (a Freudian working through) can, in the ethical sense, be nothing more than an

"acting out," another mode of having done with the past. This, indeed, would be the central dilemma of the famous *Historikerstreit* of the 1980s.[12]

The "second stage" of fascism reception, which we have identified with the Benjaminian problematic of representation, has largely been concerned with the question of *un*-representability. Particularly in the American context, the unrepresentability of the Holocaust has been the central tenet of much writing on fascism. The development of trauma theory as a broader field of study can be directly traced to such concerns. We will have more to say of this in the conclusion, but for now let us dwell on the question of representation itself—not as a possibility or impossibility, not as a necessity or a desecration, but as a field of political contention and engagement. The immediate value of separating out the question of rationality and the question of the subject in the grid outlined above is to highlight an ambiguity in the concept of "rationality" itself. For if it is possible to argue that fascism fuses "rationality" with "the death of the subject"—as Horkheimer and Adorno will do in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*—it is necessary to think of rationality itself as something other than subject-centered reason. This is precisely what Horkheimer and Adorno propose in what effectively amounts to a conflation of "rationality" in the broadest sense of the word—as reason—and "rationalization" in the Weberian sense of disenchantment, or in the Marxian sense of a division of labor.

An interesting way into *Dialectic of Enlightenment* would be to see it as an articulation of the totalitarianism thesis *avant la lettre*. The twist in this instance, however, is that Horkheimer and Adorno do not use totalitarianism as a blanket term to cover both fascism and communism. It is American consumer capitalism and National Socialism that are brought together by their use of the term "totality." This is possible because they analyze totalitarianism not as a political order, but as a mode of thinking oriented toward systemic totality at the cost of the unique and the fragmented. They do not oppose totalitarian regimes in the name of the autonomous subject, but in the name of the fragment, for the logic of the subject and the logic of totality are commensurate in their analysis. This might seem to contradict the placement of their analysis in the fourth quadrant, and that placement is, indeed, one of the grosser simplifications of the grid. What is at stake, however, is a difference in the definition of rationality in the respective works of Lukacs and Adorno; a difference that makes a simple opposition between their positions with respect to fascism misleading.

As representative of the fascism-as-radicalized-rationality school of thought, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is rightly famous for its opening lines:

> In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy. (3)

Here are encapsulated the key elements of the argument: the dialectical opposition of myth and enlightenment that will result in the argument that enlightenment reverts to its mythic origins once it asserts its own interpretive adequacy as a closed structure ("Myth turns into enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity" [9]); enlightenment equals disenchantment; enlightenment turns on a model of individual and

political sovereignty; and "for the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect[. . .]enlightenment is totalitarian" (6). As noted above, the concept of reason emerges rather impoverished from this study as little more than instrumental thought linked to, and made possible by, the social processes of rationalization.

It is important to note the crucial distinction between the different concepts of rationality employed by Horkheimer and Adorno on the one hand, and Lukacs on the other. Some inkling of this is encapsulated in the conflation of conformity and totalitarianism to which the quote from *Dialectic of Enlightenment* refers. The key to the presentation of totalitarianism here is not a political structure, but the very notion of totality itself. "*Das Ganze*," as Adorno famously claims in *Negative Dialectics*, "*ist das Falsche*." By concentrating on the ways in which totality has been marshaled to protect man from the contingencies of nature and to provide convincing narratives that take him from out of the sway of nature, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that myth itself is already a form of Enlightenment and a manifestation of totalizing thought:

> Mythology itself set off the unending process of Enlightenment with which ever and again, with the inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to the destructive criticism that it is only a belief—until even the very notions of spirit, of truth, and, indeed, enlightenment itself, have become animistic magic. (11)

The concept of Enlightenment, then—that an intellectual historian might typically trace back to the intellectual and political project of the eighteenth century—is radicalized and traced back to Greece, to the pre-Socratics even. Odysseus will serve Horkheimer and Adorno as the test-case of enlightened—indeed, bourgeois—subjectivity. This epistemological history, however, runs parallel to, rather than replaces, a more traditional political history, for "the universality of ideas as developed by discursive logic, domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up on the basis of actual domination" (14).

Whatever the validity of this expansion of the historical concept of enlightenment, its basic presupposition—"*Das Ganze ist das Falsche*"—could not be further from Lukacs, for whom the striving for a totalizing account of historical existence is the very definition of reason. It was after 1848 that the bourgeoisie realized it was no longer a historically progressive force and sought to dissemble the fact through ideological obfuscation—the very attempt to offer a coherent totalizing justification of bourgeois hegemony is renounced. Hegel, for Lukacs, would be the last systematic bourgeois rationalist, his systematicity already fatally compromised by a necessary failure to accept the material basis of historical progress:

> With the Hegelian system the project of systematically ordering the world as a totality according to its own laws of development, and on the basis of idealist principles—on the basis, that is, of human consciousness—collapsed [. . .] We also know that this demise of the system in bourgeois thought gave rise to a groundless relativism and agnosticism.[13]

Hegel's totality may be flawed, but after Hegel the very concept of totality itself will be seen as the problem. At its most extreme, Lukacs's argument would hold that both

fascism and the aestheticisim of Adorno are products of the same process of ideological decay. The relativism and agnosticism of which Lukacs writes—and which we will examine in more detail below—results in a so-called second enlightenment—typified by Nietzsche—in which the "inhumane," systematic aspects of the first rational Enlightenment will be supplemented by a closer attention to the exigencies of "life" in *Lebensphilosophie*.

Clearly, then, Lukacs and Adorno differ fundamentally on the question of totality—less, that is, on its function within the definition of reason, than on its *value*. *Dialectic of Enlightenment's* critique of totalizing thought and its supporting structures of totalitarian society—be it capitalist or fascist—is not intended as a championing of the rights of the individual over and against social order. The emergence of the bourgeois individual is part and parcel of that totalitarian thought:

> The social work of every individual in bourgeois society is mediated through the principle of self; for one, labor will bring an increased return on capital; for others, the energy for extra labor. But the more the process of self-preservation is effected by the bourgeois division of labor, the more it requires the self-alienation of the individuals who must model their body and soul according to the technical apparatus. This again is taken into account by enlightened thought: in the end the transcendental subject of cognition is apparently abandoned as the last reminiscence of subjectivity and replaced by the much smoother work of automatic control mechanisms. (29–30)

"The principle of self"—to be elaborated below in terms of a "logic of the subject"—is not immediately identical with the experience of selfhood. Horkheimer and Adorno supplement their critique of subjectivity with a more insistent critique of any attempt to escape it:

> Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the self, the identical, purposive and virile nature of man, was formed, and something of that recurs in every childhood. The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to maintain it. (33)

Where does this leave us? On the one hand, the concept of the individual is ideologically compromised and its artificiality is experienced as a "strain" by the individual who must enact it. On the other hand, the unhalting, totalitarian march of reason does not even pause before "the transcendental subject of cognition," which must also eventually be "abandoned as the last reminiscence of subjectivity." Where is the possibility of resistance, or even of a happier existence, being located?

Horkheimer and Adorno are arguing that the value of the category of subjectivity lies neither in the ideological figure of the transcendental subject, nor in some quasi-somatic "forgetting" of that subject and an insistence on individual experience. It is precisely in the "strain" involved in accommodating the two levels that the possibility of resistance lies; in the strain of maintaining an ideological construct, a strain that is replicated ontogenetically in the education of every individual. Elsewhere—in an essay on the psychological appeal of fascist propaganda—Adorno identifies the fascist impulse with "the temptation to lose" a subjectivity that can only be experienced as a "strain" in the modern world.[14] The *völkisch* selflessness of which the

fascist vaunts, Adorno argues, is quite real: these are people who have laid down the burden of selfhood. It is for this reason, then, that we place Horkheimer and Adorno in that quadrant that defines fascism as the pursuit of reason that dismantles the subject. Compromised though it may be, the concept of the subject must be retained—experienced as a "strain" (that marks and confirms its ideologically compromised status) or projected as the transcendental subject.

For Horkheimer and Adorno, the rationality that results in fascism is not a rationality predicated on the subject, but an instrumental rationality of objects and their exploitation. The category of the subject is a by-product of that rationality, but not its cause and certainly not its end-point:

> It is not merely that domination is paid for by the alienation of men from the objects dominated: with the objectification of spirit, the very relations of men—even those of the individual to himself—were bewitched. The individual is reduced to the nodal point of the conventional responses and modes of operation expected of him. (28)

At this point it would be appropriate to contrast Adorno and Horkheimer to Benjamin on the question of demystification and the de-auraticization of art. For Benjamin—much more sanguine about the positive effects of mass reproduction's dispelling of myths of aesthetic authenticity—technology acts in the name of a reason that transcends bourgeois notions of subjectivity and the fetishized and complementary notion of objectivity exemplified in the work of art. For Adorno, on the other hand, the experience of aura serves as a reminder—however ideological—of other possible realms and regimes of existence. It serves a utopian function that is nevertheless *experienced* rather than simply posited. For Benjamin, the problem is the ideological fixation on the subject, for Adorno, the sheer instrumentality of our concept of the object. Much has been written on this aesthetic question, however, and it would be more helpful in the present context to consider Adorno and Horkheimer alongside Lukacs on these questions, since he has long served as their counterpart in reconstructions of the fascism debate.

At first sight, Lukacs might seem to be the preeminent theorist of the "irrational death of the subject" school of thinking, and certainly the fascism debate was for a long time framed by Lukacs on the one hand (fascism as irrational) and Horkheimer and Adorno on the other (fascism as the *reductio ad absurdam* of reason). The title of Lukacs's most famous and most substantial contribution to the debate certainly makes his initial premise crystal clear—*Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, the destruction of reason. There can be little doubt as to where he stands on the rationalism–irrationalism axis. He is not prepared, however, simply to equate the destruction of reason with the death of the subject. Perhaps the primary insight offered by reinserting the question of the subject into our grid is the reassessment of Lukacs's argument that it necessitates. One might say that irrationalism, for Lukacs, culminates in the hysterical hypertrophy of a bourgeois subject faced with the historical trauma of his own displacement by the proletariat. It is no coincidence, then, that the key figure in Lukacs's genealogy of fascism is Nietzsche. Nietzsche represents for Lukacs not a loss of subjectivity, but a loss of perspective on the *limits* of subjectivity. In the presentation that follows we will rely on the abridged version of the argument that

Lukacs presents in his 1962 study *Von Nietzsche zu Hitler: Oder Der Irrationalismus und die deutsche Politik*.

One can only approach this work by first acknowledging how wildly unfashionable it has become. In the light of the reinterpretation of Nietzsche through French theory, Lukacs's version of Nietzsche seems almost scandalous and it is not helped by the author's rhetorical excess. Lukacs asks: "Is it really a libel to claim that Hitler, Himmler, Goebels and Göring found in Nietzsche's dictum "everything is allowed" an objective intellectual and moral fellow-traveler?" (11)[15] Well, yes, it is—but this should not blind us to the complexity of his argument. For example, it is interesting that Lukacs's interpretation of the Dionysian focuses not on the moment of destruction and immolation of the God-subject, but upon his egoism—"everything is allowed." While this is obviously a simplification of the Dionysian, the *direction* of that simplification is important: it tends to implicate the absolutely autonomous subject in the project of fascism rather than linking fascism to the self-abnegation and self-destruction of Dionysus. For all his rationalism, Lukacs is clearly taking a critical distance from the philosophical and historical category of subjectivity.

The historical argument of *Von Nietzsche zu Hitler* reiterates a version of the German *Sonderweg* narrative. The problem begins with the *Bauernkriege*. The historical task of such wars ought to have been—as it was in Britain and France—the final breaking of feudal systems and the establishment of the nation-state as a proxy form of political subjectivity for the people. At this stage of Lukacs's argument, the nation-state plays a crucial liberational function precisely in that it establishes—albeit through a displacement—the notion of political subjectivity for the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, throughout the book Lukacs repeats Weber's lament that the Germans never beheaded their king—for in such an action the reality of bourgeois agency reveals itself on the historical stage. In Germany, the feudal nobles win out and the nation-state is never established. Germany thereby enters the modern period in a quasi-feudal form of *Kleinstaaterei*. This is hardly a new argument, but it leads Lukacs to a critique of a specifically German utopianism. Whereas in Britain and France bourgeois philosophy and the bourgeois state effectively go hand in hand, in Germany philosophy's task is to posit the form of subjectivity that has never been historically realized. Thus—and this is crucial to what we are calling the axis of the subject—the very concept of (national) subjectivity becomes virtual and utopian in the German context, with the result that it is shaped by none of the checks and balances that political reality imposes on the concept of philosophical subjectivity in France or Britain, where bourgeois subjectivity and nationhood go hand in hand: "utopias come into being when the material basis for change is lacking" (12).[16] What this means, then, is that Lukacs is not implicating the category of the subject per se in fascism, but rather a specific form of unrealized and unrealizable utopian subjectivity. In the German context, for Lukacs, the very concept of (political and philosophical) subjectivity stands under the banner of irrationalism insofar as it has no real socioeconomic underpinning.

As in all Lukacs's historical presentations, the failed revolutions of 1848 take on great importance. At this point, the bourgeoisie is faced with the fact that it is not the progressive political force it claimed to be. Up until this point even political and philosophical positions that might otherwise seem reactionary served a progressive

function in the dismantling of absolutism, the last vestige of feudalism. Now, however, philosophy takes on an apologetic tone and turns away from any real engagement with the political issues of the day. For Lukacs, Schopenhauer exemplifies this tendency. Whereas overtly reactionary bourgeois philosophers of the earlier generation—such as Schelling—would hark back to feudal paradigms, Schopenhauer, for the first time, can embody a bourgeois agenda as itself intrinsically reactionary. All too often, however, accounts of Lukacs stop at this point: post-1848 all bourgeois philosophy and culture is reactionary, with the exception—unbeknown to the author in question—of the occasional privileged realist novelist. This misses the key moment in the argument, however: it is, after all, Nietzsche rather than Schopenhauer who serves as ideological precursor of Himmler in Lukacs's presentation.

It is the historically determinable fate of Nietzsche—as he himself acknowledges, and as Lukacs will insist—that he be "untimely." What Nietzsche represents is a shift from bourgeois, nation-state capitalism toward the conditions of imperialism. But he does so *prior to* the establishing of any German imperialist project. What this means for Lukacs, is that Nietzsche can invoke the conditions of imperialist exploitation—without having to face the realities of imperialism—as an antidote to the antinomies of bourgeois political life. In other words, whereas other nations present a natural ideological reflection of their real political conditions ("a gradual organic growth of national objectives into imperialistic and world-political ones" [16])[17] Germany, once again, projects the imperialist project as a merely utopian possibility. The savagery and exploitation that other nations must obfuscate and excuse in their ideological self-justifications of imperialism here serve, on the contrary, as a response to what Nietzsche perceives as the inadequacies of the bourgeois political subject. Thus, Lukacs directly links—via Nietzsche—fascism and imperialism, but not in the sense of a reductive economism, but quite specifically as fantasy structures.

The form that this "fantasy" takes, according to Lukacs, is myth. Since myth is the key concept to the theory of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (whom we might otherwise take as the antithetical theorist to Lukacs) we should, at this point, examine more closely Lukacs's usage of the term before moving onto an examination of the French theorists' work. As we saw earlier, Lukacs argues that one symptom of the end of progressive bourgeois thought is the end of dreams of systematicity. Hegel represents the last attempt to fuse totalizing philosophical and social models and in his wake follows the relativism and agnosticism typical of decadent bourgeois thought—a tradition that will culminate in *Lebensphilosophie*. Nietzsche, however, responds by offering for the first time a philosophical justification of domination that breaks with bourgeois pretensions to universality—it is a philosophy for the rulers. The dream of totality is, meanwhile, displaced into the mythic realm. He argues:

> Nietzsche can envisage a sufficiently strong bulwark against the dangers of socialism only in a decidedly and aggressively reactionary imperialist bourgeois state. Only the emergence of such a power awakens in him the hope of finally rendering the working class harmless. (84)[18]

The reduction of Nietzsche's thought to a mere defense mechanism against socialism might be overstated, but once again the simplifications obscure what is truly interesting

in Lukacs's thought. He argues that Nietzsche is ahead of his time in anticipating the arrival of imperialism as a solution to the aporias of bourgeois universalism (humanity becomes an export rather than a product for consumption at home and must, furthermore, be ruthlessly imposed). However, this anticipatory nature of his thought once again invites the kind of utopianism that characterizes German politics: it offers imperialism as a solution that stems not from the dynamics of an internal politics, but as a utopian and ideological *deus ex machina*. The authoritarian impulse that would lead Nietzsche to extol the virtues of a military state relies upon a typological rather than class-specific understanding of power.

Lukacs's argument brings us face-to-face with a terminological difficulty already hinted at in the presentation of Horkheimer and Adorno: namely, the problems that arise from conflating the fate of the subject with what one might call "the logic of the subject." While Lukacs's analysis foregrounds the deleterious effects of a hypertrophied bourgeois subjectivity—exemplified, finally, in the insanity of Nietzsche—his entire historical narrative nevertheless depends upon what we can only term the logic of the subject. The problem with bourgeois subjectivity lies not in the category of the subject itself, but in the failure fully to realize the historical potential of the category. The crisis of the bourgeoisie lies in its failure to accept that the proletariat—rather than the bourgeoisie—is the subject of history. The logic of the subject is the logic of a coherent historical narrative that provides for the victory of the proletariat. We need to move beyond this apparent performative contradiction in Lukacs's argument, however, to note that his use of the proletariat as the "true" subject of history is always tactical. In fact, as Marx points out, the bourgeoisie is the only class whose very essence lies in its existence *as* a class. While the proletariat exists as the counter-class to the bourgeoisie, it does so only provisionally and as a reflection of the bourgeois worldview. The historical task of the proletariat is its own self-liquidation, the liquidation of itself as the "subject of history." Thus the "crisis" of bourgeois subjectivity—"I am not the Subject of history, the Other is"—is a crisis purely internal to the logic of that subjectivity. The symptom of that ideological crisis is, therefore, not simply the bourgeoisie's refusal to acknowledge the historical subjectivity of the proletariat, but its very insistence upon subjectivity itself as the ultimate stake—and sole measure—of historical progress.

At this level, then, Lukacs's concept of historical reason implies—rather than resists—the "death of the subject." It is, therefore, no paradox to place him in the "irrational subject" quadrant. In so doing, however, we need to distinguish him from other figures such as, say, Reich or the Mitscherlichs, for whom the problem is one of an aberrant political subjectivity (fascism) rather than of the intrinsic aberration of the very category of the subject itself. To reframe Lukacs in this manner suggests curious and surprising moments of concurrence with the later analysis of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy in their important essay "The Nazi Myth."[19] At first sight, no one could be further from Lukacs's reliance on rationalism as a system that, through its very failure, sloughs off the pretensions of the bourgeoisie to historical subjectivity. As if taking direct aim at Lukacs, the French theorists explicitly voice,

> our suspicion and scepticism of the hasty, crude and usually blind accusation of *irrationality*. There is, on the contrary, a *logic of fascism*. This also means that *a certain logic is fascist*, and that this logic is not wholly foreign to the general logic of rationality inherent in the metaphysics of the Subject. (294)

They will go on to argue that "the *ideology of the subject* (which, perhaps, is no more than a pleonasm) is fascism, the definition holding, of course, for today"(294). They further insist that "the logic of the idea or of the subject [. . .] is, first of all, the Terror" (294). Whereas bourgeois political theory generally identifies terror as an attack on the legitimacy of the Subject-State, for Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy the state of the subject *is* a state of terror—a totalitarian delimitation and exclusion around the category of subjectivity. Their position can be taken as a direct attack on Lukacs, however, only if we assume that for Lukacs the operation of reason and the fate of the transcendental subject are one and the same. However, as we have shown, Lukacs in fact attacks the bourgeois hypostatization of subjectivity as a failure to recognize the objective movement of history. The real challenge posed by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, therefore, is to Lukacs's retention not of "the subject" as a historical agency (this he clearly critiques) but to the underlying "logic of the subject" that still underpins his Marxism—not as a humanistic imperative, but as an epistemological presupposition.

The curious moment of concurrence in the work of Lukacs and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, however, takes place in and around the question of myth, and this question of myth and/or ritual has itself proven one of the key points of critical analysis in attempts to understand the cultural politics of fascism. Neither Lukacs nor Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy focus on the specific mythic material employed by what Lukacs calls irrationalist thought. As we have seen, Lukacs is concerned primarily with a certain "mythic situation" in which Nietzsche's work is produced. His anticipation of the imperialist phase of bourgeois ideology necessitates, for Lukacs, a "mythic" solution of the antinomies of the ideology of his time. Confronting the ideological ruptures of his time, he invokes the *Übermensch*—whom Lukacs identifies with the imperialist subject—not as a real political possibility, but as a mythic resolution. Thus, in Lukacs's interpretation it is Dionysus—the foreign God—who exemplifies proto-fascist tendencies, rather than Apollo, whose ethic of discipline one might otherwise more readily have aligned with the militarism Lukacs sees in late Nietzsche.

The key, however, is to understand not the specific mythic *material* that Nietzsche invokes, but the availability of the *mythic mode* as an anticipatory or utopian displacement of politics. Myth maintains—and resolves—at the level of mere typology what would subsequently become a reality of class politics: once again, Germany entertains in utopian mode what for other truly imperial powers becomes an essentially political and pragmatic problem. To this extent Lukacs's Nietzsche replicates the German dilemma—philosophy is uncoupled from its imperialist realities just as it was earlier from the reality of a nation-state. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy deal with myth in a very similar manner:

> We will not speak here of Nazism's *myths*, in the plural. But only of the myth of Nazism, or of the National-Socialist myth *as such*. We will speak, in other words, of the fashion by which National Socialism constitutes itself, with or without the use of myths, in a dimension, for a function, and with a self-assurance that all three can be properly termed mythic. (292)

In other words, their concern is not with the mythological stock of Nazism, but with the structural and constitutive function of myth as a mode of identity-formation. As

they state, "myth is a fiction, in the strong, active sense of 'fashioning' or, as Plato says, of 'plastic art': it is, therefore, a *fictioning* whose role is to propose, if not impose, models or types" (297). A better description of the function of Nietzsche in Lukacs's presentation would be hard to come by. The model or type of the superman is, in this sense, precisely a mythic construction that resists historical realization and that derives its appeal precisely from that resistance to historicity.

This concern with the mythic mode leads Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy to reformulate a version of the German *Sonderweg* argument, which holds that fascism was a specifically German response to modernity. Once again, however, their stress is on the productive and performative nature of ideology, rather than on an intellectual historical account of fascist origins:

> There incontestably has been and there still is perhaps a German problem: Nazi ideology was a specifically political response to this problem; and there is no doubt whatsoever that the German tradition, and in particular the German tradition of thought is not at all foreign to this ideology. But this does not mean that the tradition is responsible for it, and because of that fact, condemnable as a whole. Between a tradition of thought and the ideology that inscribes itself, always abusively, within it, there is an abyss. (295)

The parallels with Lukacs's presentation of Nietzsche's ideological function are striking. By rejecting a cumulative narrative of fascism's genesis (an account that would claim to trace the origins of fascism) they invoke instead the same notion of anticipation or utopianism that is implicit in Lukacs. That is to say, in both presentations, fascism is not something that needs to be traced back, but a certain political and philosophical—or mythic—mode of projecting forward. At best, what we might isolate is not a series of cause and effect, but a gestural repetition, a tradition of projection, so to speak, in which fascism's *Nachträglichkeit* consists of a sequence of reconstructed, mythic anticipations. In a sense, then, Lukacs does violence to his own method when he does, after all, trace Nietzsche as a forefather of fascism, since—as he presents it—the fascist impulse lies in the mythic/utopian act of projection. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy point out, any claim at a determining logic in intellectual tradition "belongs—very precisely—to the 'myth' we analyse" (295). It is clear that their approach invalidates traditional approaches to intellectual history.

Though we have been focusing on unexpected moments of convergence between Lukacs and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, it would be misleading to overstate such moments. On the key question of totality and ideology, the French theorists clearly side with Adorno. The concept of ideology they invoke is directly drawn from Arendt, from whose *Origins of Totalitarianism* they quote: "The movement of history and the logical process of this notion are supposed to correspond to each other, so that whatever happens, happens according to the logic of one 'idea' " (293).[20] Ideology, then, is the conflation of the movement of history with the narrative of that movement—in their gloss of Arendt, "not the 'history of the world' but rather the 'world as history' " (293). Myth, one might then say, is the ascribing of motive power to narrative—myth is a narrative that does not simply describe but also produces the self-enclosed identity it supposedly references. Thus, Nazi myth, for Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy brings into being the subject of history upon whose prior

existence the whole ideology is supposedly based (the *Volk*). In the same way that Nietzsche—according to Lukacs—invokes an imperial subject whose historical moment has not yet come, and ascribes to that subject the fundamental power to overcome the inconsistencies of bourgeois ideology, so Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy see Nazism invoking its own subject position both as something originary and as a project to be realized.

The structural argument—relying on myth and ideology as structures rather than as substantive content—clearly places Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy in the camp of theorists of totalitarianism: indeed, they explicitly align class and race as singular concepts that give birth to a totalizing philosophy. It is in this, of course, that they differ from Lukacs—for whom no theory of history that cannot offer a totalizing solution would be adequate. It is fitting that the rejection of totalizing ideology and the rejection of the ideology of the subject go hand in hand in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, while for Lukacs it is totality that redeems both history and the subject (or redeems, indeed, the subject through history). Whereas in Lukacs we observed an ambiguity with regard to the subject—the rejection of hypertrophied bourgeois subjectivity, but the reliance upon a certain logic of the subject to explain the historical mission of the proletariat—in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy the fate of the subject and the fate of the state are one and the same, such that

> it would further be necessary to rigorously demonstrate how the Total State is to be conceived as the *Subject-State* (whether it be a nation or humanity, whether it be a class, a race, or a party, this subject is or wills itself to be an absolute subject), such that in the last instance it is in modern philosophy, in the fully realized metaphysics of the Subject, that ideology finds its real guarantee. (294)

This is perhaps the baldest statement of the identity of (fascist) ideology with the logic of the subject: "in the last instance it is in modern philosophy, in the fully realized meta-physics of the Subject, that ideology finds its real guarantee." The statement's indictment of metaphysics bears a clear relation to Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of reason in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, with its assertion that "domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up on the basis of actual domination" (14). For all the ahistorical invocation of Greek myth, however, Horkheimer and Adorno insist that the condition of bourgeois subjectivity (anachronistically ascribed to Odysseus) "subjects" the individual in two ways—both liberating and enslaving him. That moment of "strain" has been eradicated from Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's seamless account of totalitarian identity formation.

Despite the structural approach to myth as functional performative, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy nevertheless insist in the specificity of Nazism as something German and as a racist ideology. They insist, in other words, that the content of the mythology is structurally determinant in the self-understanding of ideology in Nazism. This leads to the following crucial theses linking the structural and content-based levels of argumentation:

1. It is because the German problem is fundamentally a problem of *identity* that the German figure of totalitarianism is racism.

2. It is because myth can be defined as an *identificatory mechanism* that racist ideology became bound up in the construction of a myth.

With regard to this second thesis, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy point out the specificity of the Aryan myth as a solar-centered mythology (thereby overlooking, it should be said, an important strain of matriarchal and tellurian imagery in proto-fascist thought); that is, a mythology directly concerned with the centrality of the male subject.[21] The Dionysian—as an attack on the principle of the integrity of that subject—would, for Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, necessarily place Nietzsche in opposition to such Aryan subject-formation.

If the structural logic of myth in this essay seems clear enough, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy now have to make the historical argument. Their claim is that the idealist tradition—at least as far back as the Romantics—was focused on this problem of identity as a self-performance, as something that needs to be brought into being. Whereas Lukacs attempts to offer a social and political explanation of this fact (i.e., the absence of the nation state as a "model" of identity, and the subsequent utopian nature of German identity-formation), the French theorists' argument remains within the realm of ideas. Germany, they argue—and the argument is a well-worn one in the field of *Germanistik*—was in thrall to Greece. To misappropriate Marx's terminology, Germany had been deprived of the means of production of identity. "It would be perfectly accurate," Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy claim, "to describe the emergence of German nationalism as the *appropriation of the means of identification*" (299). Thus construed, Germany's identity would always be mimetic with respect to the Greek model. "What Germany lacked, therefore, in practical terms, was its subject (and modern metaphysics, as the metaphysics of the Subject, did not complete itself there by accident)" (299). This situation Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy describe as a double-bind: in effect, "I must be authentic like the Greeks."

Just as, for Lukacs, myth was the name for the anticipatory resolution—at the level of typological thought—of issues that had yet to find their pointed social and political articulation, so, for Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, myth also reduced identity to the level of type. "Myth and type are indissociable," they claim, "for the type is the realization of the singular identity conveyed by the dream. It is both the model of identity *and* its present, effective, *formed* reality" (306). With respect to Nietzsche, of course, this invocation of dream is highly significant. Dreaming is the mode of the Apollonian, as opposed to the drunkenness of the Dionysian; dream insists upon the distinction between dreaming and dreamed identity, whereas in drunkenness the very autonomy of the subject is undermined. Mythic, typological thought needs not only to "resolve" ideological and historical problems, but also to celebrate its own ability to do so:

> Even as it must form an effective type, the act of faith must immediately be the "life" of the "type." (For this reason the symbols of a mythical order, uniforms, gestures, parades, the enthusiasm of ceremonial, as well as youth movements and all sorts of other associations, are not only techniques, but ends in themselves: the finality of a total *Erlebnis* of the "type." The symbolic is not only a kind of guidepost but also a realization of the dream.) (308)

However, if this is true—if the techniques of identity-formation are at the same time performances of identity (the community of the faithful)—then it becomes impossible to isolate "fascist" impulses on either the Apollonian or Dionysian side. The uniform connotes identity, but connotes it as something typological (the Apollonian distance of dreaming). But the form of identity to which the fascist aspires *is* that of the uniform (or uniformed) party-member on the parade-ground (the Dionysian immanence of performance). Fascism would thus be the Apollonian harnessing of the Dionysian transgression, or—from the other side—the fantasy of actually embodying a purely typological self-identity.[22]

Simplifying Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, it might seem that the insistence on "type"—and the identification of the Jew as "anti-type"—defines precisely the kind of antinomian thought that allowed fascism to cast its political project in such manichaean terms. As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it:

> If the Nazi myth was initially determined as the myth of the "race," it is because it is myth of Myth, or the myth of the creative power of myth in general. As if races were themselves, above all, the *dreamed types* of superior power [. . .] In this respect, it's essential to point out that the Jew is not simply a bad race, a defective type: he is the antitype, the bastard par excellence. He has no culture of his own. (306–7)

It is not simply a logic of "them and us." There is no "them"—or if there is, there ought not to be; they must be eradicated. "They" are not an alternate or merely inferior existence, but the very threat of non-existence itself. Even this form of oppositional thinking, however, is susceptible to the contagion of a negative narcissism. If the Jew is the anti-type, how can he be opposed, typologically, to the Aryan type? It is the very nature of the anti-type to resist such typological containment: in almost all fascist propaganda, such as the infamous film, *Der ewige Jude*, this is the great threat of the Jew, his ability to pass and infiltrate. The type of the anti-type is crucial to—yet fundamentally inconsistent with—typological, mythic thought.

Horkheimer and Adorno take up this question in their "Notes on Anti-Semitism" (in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*) to elaborate a theory of negative narcissism—a relation of mimesis—in which the Jew represents both that which I wish to be and that which I must resist in order to be what I am. The fascist's relation to the Jew is marked by that key ambiguity we noted earlier in Horkheimer and Adorno with respect to the "strain" of identity: "The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to maintain it." The Jew is both a threat to identity and a seductive invitation to lay down the burden of identity.

Introducing the axis of subjectivity as a means to complicate a debate long presented simply in terms of rationality and irrationalism produces unforeseen complications. Specifically, it raises the question of subjectivity itself, which Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy all-too-blithely identify with a unified "Western metaphysics." One of the ways in which research on fascism has had repercussions beyond its own, more strictly defined field is in opening up alternative models of individual and national subjectivity. More specifically, we find ourselves confronted again and again with narcissism as a paradigm of subject-formation, rather than with a simple subject–object division within which the subject constitutes itself by way of an opposition.[23]

We find traces of a theory of narcissism from the very earliest critical theories of fascism in Germany, and it would not be hyperbole to argue that the foregrounding of the question of narcissistic subjectivity in treatments of fascism has led in large part to a rethinking of postmodern subjectivity in general. This is, indeed, one of the ways in which the resurgence of interest in fascism as a field of study and the development of a "postmodern" sensibility in the humanities can most interestingly be linked. The narcissistic logic of the subject, however, is rarely presented as a happy one, and it would be more accurate to say that fascism allows its theorists not to develop an alternative model of (narcissistic) subjectivity, but rather to examine the aporias of any such logic. Again and again narcissism is examined in terms of its failed self-enclosure, for example, through an examination of melancholy. Benjamin's early analysis in "Theories of German Fascism," for example, already argues that Germans had internalized the "loss" of World War I and made the very experience of loss the core of their "identity."[24] Whereas Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy argue that a lack of national identity leads to a German (Idealist) fixation on the question of the subject, Benjamin argues convincingly that idealist metaphysics should be thought not simply as a positive supplement to an otherwise beleaguered sense of identity, but that in fascism that very sense of loss has become the basis for a melancholic subjectivity. Adorno, meanwhile, uses the trope of narcissism to link fascism and homosexuality in *Minima Moralia*.[25]

Having begun by briefly situating the so-called second stage of fascism reception within broader debates of the later 1960s, we seem to have found our way back to the question of postmodernity. We might, therefore conclude with a rethinking of the significance of theories of fascism today. Friedländer noted within the tradition of political analysis that theories of totalitarianism—theories that suited a Cold War logic by conflating fascism and communism—had reached a dead end by the late 1960s. If we look for the cultural and artistic cognates of that theory, we find, of course, the rejection of Socialist Realism and Nazi *völkisch kitsch* as being essentially one and the same, and the establishment of an inexorable trajectory toward abstraction as the cultural equivalent of free market capitalism. It is in the 1950s—the heyday of theories of totalitarianism—that we find our current canon of the literary avant-garde being established in the American academy while Abstract Expressionism is exported to the erstwhile art capitals of the world as the belated cultural expression of American political and economic hegemony. Could it be that just as theories of totalitarianism went hand in hand with a more or less explicit cultural agenda, that the crisis of those theories helped determine—and was in turn determined by—a crisis of cultural and aesthetic modernism? If Friedländer can write of kitsch with respect to his analysis of Nazi representations—and if Sontag can pen an essay on kitsch and camp at roughly the same time as her essay on "Fascinating Fascism"[26]—what new cultural vocabulary makes this possible? What significance, for example, does pop art's questioning of the ethical and aesthetic superiority of subject-oriented abstraction in the name of an object-oriented representationalism have for the emergence of a "second wave" of fascism theory that foregrounds questions of representation?

The second reason for focusing on the question of postmodernity in examining the shift in "fascism reception" is a more directly political one. This second stage

emerges at a time of political unrest when what is questioned is less the ultimate goal of political action than the value and legitimacy of political action within established democratic parameters. As Kriss Ravetto has shown with regard to Italy, for example—where she posits three, rather than two stages of fascism reception—films such as *The Night Porter* or practically the entire *oeuvre* of Pasolini play out against a political background of terrorism and the inability of established political authority to react effectively.[27] Similarly, one might wish to examine the cultural politics of Syberberg and Fassbinder in the context of terrorism in Germany, or Tournier and *The Sorrow and the Pity* in the light of the rise and fall of the New Left in France. This has not been the task of the current analysis. What becomes apparent by situating the new discourse on fascism in its political context of crisis and the threat of terrorism, however, is the fact that it is much more difficult to posit the shift or break of which Friedländer writes in the Anglo-Saxon world (the book itself was first published in France). When Sontag, for example, moves toward an analysis of this new discourse, it is by way of cultural imports—Riefenstahl, Syberberg and so on. Asking why this should be so might help us understand the *current* cultural and intellectual milieu into which the theorist of fascism ventures.

First and foremost, in the American context of humanist scholarship, fascism and the Holocaust have—or had—effectively become synonymous. This is, not, of course, to suggest that they can be somehow uncoupled—along the lines of arguing that fascism is not intrinsically racist, or that Hitler had some good ideas, if it hadn't been for the Holocaust and so on. What is clear, however, is that there has been a consistent ethical concern in American responses to fascism and that the (albeit repressed) proximity of Germany, Italy, and France to their Nazi or collaborationist pasts opened up fascism as a field of *political* rather than *ethical* representations. Fascism for the young New Left of Europe in the late 1960s felt like something still *politically* present and operative—and would remain so throughout 1970s—and terrorism was therefore a viable alternative to a political discourse that foreclosed effective opposition. In America, however, it is notable that books such as Friedländer's were published in the early 1980s and that works by Arno Mayer and Dominick LaCapra focused on questions of representation specifically with respect to the Holocaust.[28] One might argue that the German *Historikerstreit* of the early 1980s was the intellectual touchstone for American reconsiderations of fascism, focusing as it did on the question of the Holocaust. In other words, although the foregrounding of the Holocaust defined fascism differently in the American context, the questions of representation raised by figures such as Friedländer and LaCapra with regard to the Holocaust began to open up the question of fascism and representation more broadly.

As a result, an analysis of the so-called second stage of fascism reception necessarily inaugurated a third stage in which questions of representation and politics were examined but without the political urgency that marked European cultural work of the1970s. It is this work that has to confront most pressingly the limits of Benjamin's analysis, however, since it is itself more distanced from the very real political stakes of an analysis of fascism. Finally, it should be noted that even where such works reject the "fascism as rationalization" or "fascism as the logic of the subject" arguments, Friedländer's insistence on the demise of the totalitarianism model of understanding fascism does not hold true in the realm of representation in the same way that it might

in the social sciences. Much contemporary, humanist work on fascism has returned to an examination of the "totalitarian" as a structure of thought rather than as a political structure. The "antitotalitarian" claims it makes therefore seem more sweeping and radical—as in the case of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy—but are difficult to square with a political agenda. Perhaps the threat of global terrorism will once again resituate the debate in the United States, giving greater urgency to the political issues of terror that set the stakes for Europe's own re-confrontation with fascism in the late 1960s.

Notes

1. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, 1968), pp. 219–53. In the German context, Benjamin's essay was received by theorists steeped in a tradition of Marxist theory that was absent from the American scene. The result was works such as Rainer Stollmann, *Ästhetisierung der Politik* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978) and Peter Reichel, *Der schöne Schein des dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus* (Munich: Hanser, 1992). An overview of the impact of Benjamin's aestheticization thesis on the German left is to be found in Martin Hubert, *Politisierung der Literatur—Ästhetisierung der Politik. Eine Studie zur literaturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der 68-er Bewegung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1992).
2. The two articles that most convincingly rethink Benjamin's essay in the context of his related writings on the fantasmagoric effects of high capitalism are Susan Buck-Morss, "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered," *October* (1992): 3–41; and Lutz Koepnick, "Fascist Aesthetics Revisited," *Modernism/Modernity* 6, 1 (January 1999): 51–74.
3. Bloch's critique of the left's blind reliance on the inevitable victory of historical reason and its disregard of the utopian is to be found in Ernst Bloch, *Heritage of Our Times*, trans. Neville Plaice and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
4. Published in German in 1964, the work by Adorno that most directly critiques the cult of (existential) authenticity is *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973). It is, however, also central to the work treated at greater length below, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1979). The disagreement between Adorno and Benjamin on the value of the auratic—which for Adorno guaranteed the space of aesthetic experience as the possibility of a resistance—runs throughout Adorno's writings on art and music and is best exemplified in the late, unfinished work, Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
5. Saul Friedländer, *Reflections of Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death*, trans. Thomas Weyr (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
6. Susan Sontag, "Fascinating Fascism," *Under the Sign of Saturn* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980), pp. 73–105.
7. Wilhelm Reich, *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, 3rd. ed., trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970). Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).
8. The totalitarianism argument that served to equate fascism and communism as twin forms of totalitarian government was popular at all levels of debate through the 1950s and 1960s. It finds perhaps its most nuanced expression in Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1951). It is interesting to note that recent work on fascism has begun turning back to Arendt as a source of critical thought on the political significance of totalizing systems.

9. Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (New York: Doubleday, 1965). Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1978). George Lachmann Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).
10. Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn*: *Principles of Collective Behavior*, trans. Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove Press, 1975).
11. Theodor W. Adorno, "What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?" trans. Timothy Bahti and Geoffrey Hartman, in *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, ed. Geoffrey Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 10–28.
12. The essays, articles, and letters that made up the so-called *Historikerstreit* are collected in English in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*? *Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, The Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust*, trans. James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).
13. Gyorgy Lukacs, *Von Nietzsche zu Hitler*: *Oder Der Irrationalismus und die deutsche Politik* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1966), p. 38. All quotations and page references from Lukacs are from this text (originally published in 1962) and are in my own translation. The core of this work is a condensed version of the argument elaborated at greater length in a study originally published in 1953, Gyorgy Lukacs, *The Destruction of Reason*, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin, 1980).
14. Theodor W. Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Structure of Fascist Propaganda," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 118–37.
15. Ist es wirklich eine Verleumdung Nietzsches wenn man sagt: Hitler und Himmler, Goebbels und Göring haben zu ihren Taten objektiv in Nietzsches "alles ist erlaubt" einen geistig-moralischen Verbündeten gefunden?
16. Utopien entstehen dort, wo die materielle Basis der Umwandlung noch fehlt.
17. ein allmähliches Hinüberwachsen der großen nationalen Zielsetzungen ins Imperialistisch-Weltpolitische.
18. Erst in einem dezidiert aggressiv-reaktionären Staat der imperialistischen Bourgeoisie vermag Nietzsche eine hinreichend starke Abwehrmacht gegen die sozialistische Gefahr zu erblicken, erst das Aufkommen einer solchen Macht erweckt in ihm die Hoffnung, die Arbeiterklasse endgültig unschädlich machen zu können.
19. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, "The Nazi Myth," trans. Brian Holmes, *Critical Inquiry* 16, 2 (Winter 1990): 291–312.
20. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy quote from a 1962 edition of Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951: New York, 1962): 469.
21. One of the most fruitful sources for "matriarchal" imports into proto-fascist thought is a work originally published in 1926, Alfred Baeumler, *Das mythische Weltalter: Bachofens romantische Deutung des Altertums* (Munich: Beck, 1965). Baeumler draw on the work of the nineteenth-century scholar Bachofen. The most important of Bachofen's work on matriarchy and mythology is collected in English in: J. Bachofen, *Myth, Religion and Mother Right: Selected Writings*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). This tradition of thought in fascist ideologues is addressed in Andrew Hewitt, "A Fascist Feminine," *qui parle: Literature, Philosophy, Visual Arts, History* 13, 1 (2002).
22. The question of ritualized and mandatory transgression as a cohering principle of the fascist collective is a central thesis of one of the most important works on fascism not yet mentioned in this article, Klaus Theweleit's, *Male Fantasies*, 2 vols., trans. Stephen Conway, Erica Carter, and Chris Turner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987–1988).
23. The term "narcissistic" is being used in a deliberately imprecise and nonclinical manner here to denote a broad swath of theories of subjectivity that do not derive the contours of subjectivity from an inter-constitutive encounter of subject and object. My argument

would be that notions of "narcissistic" fascist subjectivity actually rehearsed theories of the subject that would subsequently be generalized across the spectrum. What first seemed to serve as a theory of the fascist subject revealed itself as a theory of the subject in general, lending credence, perhaps, to the theories of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. Most notably, the misnomer "narcissistic" should be taken, for the present purposes, as referring also to the model developed in Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I," *Ecrits: A Selection*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1–7.

24. Walter Benjamin, "Theories of German Fascism: On the Collection of Essays *War and Warrior* edited by Ernst Jünger," trans. Jerolf Wikoff, *New German Critique* 17 (Spring 1979): 120–28.
25. Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974). For a consideration of how the theory of "homo-fascism" is developed in this and other works by Adorno, see Andrew Hewitt, "The Frankfurt School and the Political Pathology of Homosexuality," *Political Inversions: Homosexuality, Fascism, and the Modernist Imaginary* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 38–78.
26. Susan Sontag, "Notes on Camp," *Against Interpretation and Other Essays* (New York: Dell, 1966), pp. 277–93.
27. Kriss Ravetto, *The Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
28. I cite these two figures as emblematic of a much broader concern with ethical issues of representation raised by the Shoah: Arno J. Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The "Final Solution" in History* (New York: Pantheon, 1988) and Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

Chapter Two
"Windows 33/45": Nazi Politics and the Cult of Stardom

Lutz Koepnick

To visit the online website of the Austrian right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) is to be plunged into the deepest of epistemological mysteries. At one time, visitors to the site would first encounter an image of Jörg Haider showing off as a youthful and charismatic individual, a dynamic politician eager to face all kinds of physical challenges. A few further clicks of the mouse presented viewers with images of Haider posturing as the fearless mountain climber, tough ice hockey player, gutsy bungee jumper, skillful downhill skier, relentless jogger, or bright-eyed American football player. The tenor of this digital slide show presented Haider as impervious to corporeal fatigue, unaffected by constant exertion and universal visibility, indeed, exhibiting a striking virility in both private and public life—all qualities presenting him as uniquely equipped for the task of reinforcing the boundaries of contemporary Austria and rejuvenating its body politic.

Haider's original Web presentation recalls images from an earlier era: Benito Mussolini displaying himself bare-chested on the snowy slopes of Terminillo, near Rome, in early 1937.[1] Like Mussolini, whose public persona was carefully constructed to seem beyond mortal limits, Haider's digital self-promotion links political legitimacy to images of youthful athleticism and outdoor recreation. One is left with the impression that nothing could possibly prevent this man of many talents and ceaseless energy from realizing his goals. And yet, in September 1999 a few shrewd computer hackers associated with tequilin.com ("Taking a crack on the forces of evil since 1999!") manufactured a replica of the FPÖ's website that successfully obstructed Haider's staging of authenticity and self-determination (figure 2.1). Now, visitors to the official FPÖ homepage are automatically redirected to an alternate site bearing the following puzzling message:

> Official Announcement: Because our home page at fpo.at has been faked by cyber terrorists we issue the following warning: the web site hosted at fpoe.at is a faked version of our homepage at fpo.at. Upon visiting fpoe.at be aware, that you are visiting a faked web site that offers distorted information on our cause. We have already initiated legal steps to stop these cyber terrorists![2]

The unwitting visitor is thereupon transported to what is, in effect, an almost identical copy of the official FPÖ homepage, with the following critical difference: certain


tequilin - Netscape
File Edit View Go Communicator Help
Back Reload Home Search Netscape Print Security Shop
Bookmarks Location http://www.tequilin.com/announcement/
What's Related
Instant Message WebMail Radio People Yellow Pages Download Calendar Channels RealPlayer
Official Announcement
Because our home page at fpo.at has been faked by cyber terrorists we issue following warning: the web site hosted at fpoe.at is a faked version of our homepage at fpo.at. Upon visiting fpoe.at be aware, that you are visiting a faked web-site that offers distorted information on our cause. We have already initiated legal steps to stop these cyber terrorists!
Document Done

Figure 2.1 Tequilin.com's faked FPÖ web page (September 2001).

hyperlinks directly link users to the websites of upfront neo-Nazi organizations, a number of fictional messages ridicule Haider's sportive persona, and further, the Horst-Wessel-Lied resounds brazenly through the computer speakers. With some further tinkering, an adroit user might succeed in accessing the FPÖ's original website, after realizing that the "Official Announcement" of the first screen was a hacker's way of persiflaging the FPÖ's response to the faked homepage.[3]

What is most interesting about this encounter with digital doubling, is the manner in which it obfuscates the status of what is original, real, or authentic. After advancing past the initial warning, nothing in the ensuing browser windows can be taken at face value anymore. Unless one is trained to read code, there is simply no way of ascertaining whether any of the images, texts, and links on screen were originally intended to be there or whether they have been faked. As they reframe the windows of the FPÖ's homepage, the "cyber terrorists" of tequilin.com thus drive a powerful wedge through Haider's politics of charismatic resolution. Not only do they tarnish the window through which Haider wants to be seen and consumed as a spectacular attraction and unique force of nature, by copying what according to the FPÖ's rhetoric defies replication, the hackers of tequilin.com also draw attention to the performativity of all political and social identities. They reveal Haider as actively trying to pass as a man of physical immediacy and unbridled virility, his public persona nothing more than a special effect, a highly mediated presence akin to drag and relying on the ability of contemporary technologies to freely morph one image into another.[4]

Tequilin.com's intervention indicates the extent to which digital culture and the Internet during the 1990s have changed the terms of political representation and activism by challenging conventional understandings of knowledge, perception, and being. As Mark Poster has written, "The magic of the Internet is that it is a technology that puts cultural acts, symbolization in all forms, in the hands of all participants; it radically decentralizes the positions of speech, publishing, filmmaking, and radio and television broadcasting, in short the apparatuses of cultural production."[5] And yet, nothing would be more foolish than to assume that the decentered structure of the Internet would automatically subvert former templates of power and render cultural production more democratic. Consider, for example, how swiftly hate groups of the extreme right embraced digital imaging and networked computing in order to spread their messages and recruit new members. On the other hand, thanks to the fundamental instability of digital symbolization, cyberspace also offers abundant tools with which to deflate the aura of authenticity attached to wielders of power and to agitators such as Jörg Haider. As the case of tequilin.com illustrates, the material structure of digital representation and Internet communication has equipped individual users to challenge fetishistic images of authorial power in a manner previously unavailable within industrial mass culture. Cyberspace has enabled us to revise modern notions of individual embodiment and sovereignty. It has done so by undermining the previously uncontested capacity for representation to endow aspiring individuals with charismatic values, whether in the service of liberal democracy or—like Haider—in the interest of nativist self-assertion.

My intention in this essay is to revisit strategies of representation from an earlier era, specifically, the orchestration of sight and visibility under National Socialism, in order to shed light on the continuities and discontinuities with contemporary right-wing media politics. Haider's FPÖ merits comparison with Nazi political tactics, as the latter aspired to recenter a differentiated modern state and homogenize a culturally diverse society by lending political operations the visible appearance of dynamic, heroic, and unified action. Nazi propaganda furthermore sought to bond the body politic and remove any traces of otherness by means of carefully crafted images of charismatic leadership and extraordinary will power.[6] However, where Haider exploits the digital window, Nazism drew heavily on the tools and cultural practices of industrial mass culture—photography, radio, and most especially film—to reframe the political as a space of existential authenticity and national self-assertion. Third Reich politics embraced modern technologies of representation and distraction in order to imbue leadership with synthetic aura. The following pages explore examples of Nazi film and photography that strategically position Adolf Hitler in a variety of window settings so as to frame viewer attention and refashion his public appearance. In presenting himself as a fenestral spectacle, to what extent was Hitler consciously emulating the codes of media stardom concurrently developed in German sound cinema of the 1930s? Further, how did Nazi representations of Hitler at the window organize political loyalty via the protocols of a modern consumer society? And finally, to what extent was it possible under the constraints of Nazi cultural surveillance to develop counterimages corresponding to the contemporary ones of tequilin.com—images that could contest the dominant framing of audiovisual attention, emphasize the mediated character of modern perception, and

hence, challenge the myth of authenticity so central to the cult of both Nazi power and film stardom?

I

In the early evening hours of January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler appeared at the window of his new office and presented himself to a chanting crowd gathered in front of the Berlin Chancellery at Wilhelmstraße 78. Located on the second floor, the Chancellor's office had three windows, all of them overlooking Wilhelmplatz and inhabited a modern section of the Chancellery whose construction had been completed only three years earlier under the direction of Eduard Jobst Siedler und Robert Kisch. The functionalist style of Siedler and Kisch's annex had caused much outrage among those eager to preserve the neoclassicist milieu of Wilhelmplatz. For Hitler, however, during the first hours, days, and months of his chancellorship, the new annex produced concerns and frustrations of a very different sort. Crowds often gathered under the new German Chancellor's office window, demanding to see the *Führer* and thus making it impossible for Hitler to work inside. The huge, albeit plain, windows of his office also turned out to be unsuitable for staging Hitler's visual appearance. Siedler and Kisch's window design forced Hitler to assume awkward postures in order to enjoy public visibility. Rather than displaying the *Führer* as a powerful attraction, the frame of the office window dwarfed the *Führer*'s body and herein undermined the possibility for spectacular self-presentations. Hitler's first public appearance in the role as Reich Chancellor thus bore mixed results. "The window was really too inconvenient," Hitler remarked later to his master architect Albert Speer. "I could not be seen from all sides. After all, I could not very well lean out."[7]

The new Reich Chancellor set out to have the problem fixed immediately. By permitting too much public contact and transparency, the old office windows undermined the *Führer*'s desire for privacy and control. Hitler quickly moved his office to the back of the building, where the windows of his new office opened to the quiet solitude of the building's garden rather than overlooking the noisy throngs of Wilhelmplatz. However, because Siedler's and Kisch's design failed to display Hitler as an object of panoramic to-be-looked-at-ness, Hitler had Speer add a new "historic balcony" to the facade at Wilhelmplatz. Siedler protested against this new addition, claiming Speer's balcony would violate the building's aesthetic integrity and infringe on the architect's copyrights. Hitler, however, resolutely dismissed these objections: "Siedler has spoiled the whole of Wilhelmplatz. Why, that building looks like the headquarters of a soap company, not the center of the Reich. What does he think? That I'll let him build the balcony too?"[8] When it came to staging the *Führer*'s public appearance, they were not taking any chances. By 1935, Hitler had achieved both his aims: a historic balcony, which, instead of framing his appearance, showcased the *Führer* as a theatrical sight of extraordinary meaning; and a secluded office that permitted him to contemplate strategy and execute the ordinary aspects of political leadership.

It is well known that windows have played important roles in democratic as well as nondemocratic politics, functioning to display power, legitimate authority, and broadcast political change. Consider, for example, the infamous Prague Defenestration of

May 23, 1618, which symbolized a political coup that helped trigger the Thirty Years War in Europe. Alternately, there is Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann's use of a window of the Berlin Reichstag on November 9, 1918 when proclaiming the first German Republic. However, contrary to what one would expect, Hitler's relationship to windows was deeply ambivalent, to say the least. As a site of staging power, windows—in Hitler's opinion—limited perspective and excluded a multiplicity of possible viewing positions. Their frames drew too much awareness to themselves, revealing the spectacle *as* spectacle, and hereby thwarting any sense of immediacy and authenticity. They opened views on Hitler that exhibited the spectacle as spectacle and hence potentially undermined the self-effacing myth of Hitler as a charismatic leader. Instead of presenting him as a breathtaking attraction, Hitler sensed that window frames catered to the desire of the masses to access their new *Führer* in the form of an image—a desire that unwittingly consumed what it yearned for, drawing near the elusive object that required distance to sustain its charisma. In privileging balconies over windows as the most appropriate stages of Nazi leadership, Hitler hoped to present himself as a sight literally exceeding the defining power of any ordinary frame; as an image whose aura captured minds and coordinated attention without the help of external framing devices; as a transparent lens that brought into focus nothing but himself.

Given this ambivalance, then, we must ask why do window frames play such a prominent role in the opening sequence of the most notorious of all Nazi self-promotions, Leni Riefenstahl's 1935 *Triumph of the Will*? Why does the first sequence of Riefenstahl's film not only—famously—open with sublime views on Nuremberg as cast through the windshield of Hitler's airplane; yet also end with Hitler confidently displaying himself at the window of his Nuremberg Hotel while the crowds below seem to go wild in a scopophilic frenzy? And why did Hitler, whose participation in the staging, shooting, and editing of the project is well documented, permit Riefenstahl what he had rejected in Siedler and Kisch's Chancellery design only months earlier—namely, the staging of power as a fenestral spectacle?

In his seminal essay on *Triumph of the Will*, Steve Neale has argued that the opening sequence is centrally concerned with the activity of looking itself, with defining a complex relay of looks and anchoring it in Hitler's presence (and occasional absence). According to Neale, the first sequence of Riefenstahl's film aspires nothing less than to ground the political relationship between Hitler and the crowd in an asymmetrical system of looking: "Hitler's status *in the film* derives from, and is motivated and signaled by, the fact that he is structured and marked as the privileged object of the gaze, that he himself is the ultimately significant spectacle—for the crowds *in* the film and for the spectators *of* the film."[9] We experience Hitler looking at city and people from above. We see ecstatic individuals looking at Hitler. We see Hitler seemingly directing the look of cats and even inanimate statues. We see his Mercedes passing through areas of light and shadow, seemingly allegorizing the work of cinematic recording and projection. Furthermore, the dynamic rhythm of Riefenstahl's editing in this first sequence lures, entertains, and overwhelms the scopic drive, as the camera oscillates between close-ups and long shots, point of view perspectives and reaction shots, images of movement and scenes of stasis, tableaux of looking and of display. Though clearly not designed as a narrative feature film,

Triumph of the Will here seems to engage the viewer's attention by suturing the spectator according to the codes of classical narrative cinema. It inscribes the spectator as a looking subject within the diegesis itself—a diegesis that hinges on an energetic and carefully choreographed interplay of presence and absence, lack and fulfillment. This first sequence closes with a culminating view of Hitler at the Hotel window, first looking to the right, then to the left (figure 2.2); acknowledging the



Figure 2.2 Video caption and frame enlargement from Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the will* (1935).

look of the frenzied crowd and, as it were, returning the gaze; his arms outstretched, his face indicating a state near reverie itself. Finally, in the last shot of this sequence, according to Neale, Hitler in fact seems "to turn his head not in order to look at something specific, but in order that the gaze itself can be properly and fully looked at, undisturbed by any possibility of its being caught within a specific action or event, which would direct our attention and our gaze away, or absorb it into a function conflicting with the one that it in fact performs, soliciting the look of the spectating subject."[10]

Neale's discussion of how Riefenstahl installs spectacle and looking as central principles of the film's textual operations is incisive indeed. In line with most postwar scholarship, Neale understands the political aesthetic of Nazi Germany mostly in terms of a shrewd colonization of the visual; he conceptualizes Nazi film and visual culture as a laboratory of primal effects silencing spectators with the spellbinding power of images. What Neale, however, seems to overlook is the peculiar role of sound in organizing the political as a homogenous space of spectacle and mass consumption. I am not thinking so much of Herbert Windt's pseudo-Wagnerian soundtrack, which submerged the viewer in a flow of majestic melodies. What is more interesting is the diegetic inscription of sound at precisely the moment when Hitler is about to open the Hotel's window and present himself to the gaze of the masses. As always in Riefenstahl's work, the sequencing of images and sounds is of extreme importance. She starts with a low-angle medium-long shot that depicts Nazi soldiers in black uniform, neatly lined up. She then cuts to two consecutive long shots swerving over an ecstatic crowd first from the side and then from a more frontal perspective. Whereas in shot one Riefenstahl still offers us Windt's Wagnerian soundtrack, in shot two and three she shifts to diegetic sound: a seemingly amorphous roar, emanating from a multitude of voices. Next, we cut to two somewhat shaky medium shots of young male onlookers and then to a frontal close up isolating a middle-aged woman's face from the crowd around her. It is precisely at this moment that the crowd's chaotic shouting unifies into an identifiable slogan: "We want to see our *Führer*." Next, we cut to a long shot, one marked—according to the codes of classical narrative cinema—as the woman's point of view. The camera smoothly pans to a waving swastika flag in front of the hotel, briefly pauses on a sign installed underneath the window, and then focuses our attention onto the window itself as Hitler reaches to open it. When the *Führer* finally appears, Riefenstahl quickly cuts back to the exuberant throng in front of the hotel. Now that the people's hopes and desires have been fulfilled, the crowd's voice disintegrates into a boisterous rave again.

Riefenstahl's soundtrack at the end of the opening sequence functions similarly to the image track, rhythmically progressing from far to near, from mass to individual, from the abstract to the particular, in order to set the stage for Hitler's appearance.What remains fundamentally puzzling, though, is why Riefenstahl's camera so conspicuously dwells upon the sign under the hotel's window that reads "Heil Hitler," while we hear the crowd demanding the presence of the *Führer*. Made from electric bulbs, the writing on the sign clearly mimics modern-day light displays. If this scene were shot at night, we would no doubt expect these two words to blink like a street ad for an urban cabaret show. Why, one cannot but wonder, do we hear

and see the voice of the people together with the image of Hitler in the frame of the window? The sign almost seems to have the disruptive function of a cue card, one whose presence should have been hidden to achieve the most sweeping impression of immediacy and spontaneity? If this scene indeed mobilizes the codes of classical narrative cinema in order to display Hitler like a film star, why doesn't Hitler here do the kind of thing for which he was known best—addressing the gathered masses as a skillful rhetorician? In classical cinema, the star's performance often interrupts narrative progress in favor of spectacular interludes whose purpose is to exhibit the star's peculiar features to the viewers' consuming perception. Whenever it functioned as a star vehicle, classical narrative cinema opened showcases in which the star could do his or her peculiar thing. Why, then, did Riefenstahl—whose impact on the general choreography of the party rally is well known—choose to present the passionate speaker Hitler as a silent consumer of the consumers' gazes? Why did she disallow any words to emanate *from* the frame and space of the hotel's window in this first sequence?

In order to answer these questions it is useful first to recall that Hitler started out his political career between 1919 and 1923 as a sly agitator whose primary tool and trademark was his voice, not his sight. Eager to revive a nation that had lost face due to the Versailles Treaty, Hitler fashioned himself as the inner voice of the German conscience.[11] Acoustical properties—the rhythm of speech, the guttural registers of his vocal organ—were meant to carry individuals beyond themselves and fuse them with crowds of enchanted listeners. As the self-stylized voice of the disenfranchised, Hitler at the same time largely rejected any attempt to circulate photographic portraits of him in the public. According to later court photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, in fall 1922 Hitler requested the sum of $30,000 to have his picture taken and printed in national and international newspapers.[12] In May 1923, the magazine *Simplicissimus* published a satirical arrest warrant by Thomas Theodor Heine in response, asking "How does Hitler look like?" Heine's drawing presented a gallery of 12 widely different physiognomies only to conclude that Hitler couldn't be depicted in the first place, for "Hitler is not an individual. He is a condition. Only a futurist can represent him as an image."[13] And also in 1923, Hitler's movement distributed a postcard with the title "Hitler is Speaking!" which showed the interior of Circus Krone in Munich, dramatically lit and packed with hundreds of mostly male listeners, directly facing the camera. Hitler's body, however, remained out of sight in this postcard, the specter of his voice evinced only in form of the devout faces of the crowd.

Hitler's image—so the apparent rationale of Hitler's early campaign style—had to be protected from vulgar sight so as to heighten the allure of the *Führer*'s most valuable property, the aura of his voice. Hitler's early unease about the power of the visual, however, had nothing to do with some variant of iconophobia or alternately, a fetishistic vocophilia—two pathologies of the mind that have often been attributed to Hitler's personality and even to National Socialism in general. Instead, it simply reflected Hitler's strategic concern that photographic images, because of their base in mechanical reproduction and duplication, might dispel the magnetism he was eager to develop in his performances as a speaker. Although photographic images in later years would play an essential role in engineering the "Hitler myth,"[14] in the eyes of

the "drummer"[15] Hitler—that is, the agitator of the early 1920s—mass-circulating images had the potential to thwart his self-invention as a charismatic leader.

In his *Economy and Society* (1920), Max Weber had defined charisma as a form of authority reliant on the imputed extraordinary, otherworldly, quasi-superhuman qualities of the leader. The charismatic leader, according to Weber, "preaches, creates, or demands *new* obligations—most typically, by virtue of revelation, oracle, inspiration, or of his own will, which are recognized by the members of the religious, military, or party group because they come from such a source."[16] We need not assume that Hitler read Weber's sociological treatise, but it is Hitler's self-conception as a charismatic leader that explains much about his early evasion of visual media. Whether speaking without any technological aid in the early years, amplified through loudspeakers after 1926, or piped through the radio ever more profusely after 1930, Hitler exploited his voice in order to produce impressions of an extraordinary immanence, of an otherworldly intervention. His seemingly unbridaled presence and authority accessed the deepest recesses of the listener's soul so as to evoke emotions of charismatic redemption and shape new bonds of community. The photograph, by way of contrast, seemed essentially to weaken Hitler's desire to establish new obligations. Photographs severed Hitler's image from his voice, his sights from his sounds. Even as they sought to isolate him as a person of heroic vision and incessant resolution, they deflated the kind of otherworldly authority Hitler assumed when performing as a speaker—as an embodied voice, as a vocal spectacle—before live audiences. Whereas the visible voice seemed to recuperate the virtues of the popular, of community and sensual immediacy, silent images were stained by the evils of modern mass culture, of mechanical reproduction, and of an abstract and alienated society.

In some sense, then, Hitler's early unease about photographic reproduction was fueled by the same impulse that caused him to disparage Siedler and Kisch's window design in 1933. Like the window of the Chancellery, photographs functioned to "contain" his charismatic presence and thereby reduced his ability to control every aspect of his public reception. Photographic images, according to Susan Sontag, change according to the many contexts in which they are seen, and "it is in this way that the presence and proliferation of all photographs contributes to the erosion of the very notion of meaning."[17] The containment of the power of speech within the confines of a silent and still photograph, in the eyes of the early Hitler, enabled multiple and competing practices of reception and thereby undermined his ambition to re-anchor the German nation in shared meanings and experiences. Photographic images of Hitler as a speaker hid more from sight than they showed. That Hitler in 1926 and 1927 agreed to pose in front of Hoffmann's camera in order to improve his oratorical gestures did not signal a fundamental change in Hitler's ambivalence toward the audiovisual during the 1920s. Hoffmann's famous images presented him as a wildly gesticulating orator, practicing the art of seducing (imaginary) audiences. His photographs have often been ridiculed as a self-revelatory freak show, proffering evidence of Hitler's pathological narcissism. To be sure, Hitler's excessive gestures in these pictures do indeed recall the acting codes of expressionist horror films. And yet, what incites us to see Hitler as a freak here has less to do with the *Führer*'s outrageous gesticulation itself than with the images' lack of sound. Hoffmann's pictures, in this

way, testify to the very concerns that energized Hitler's own anxieties about the articulation of charismatic speech through mechanical reproduction. The task of the visual, for the Hitler of the 1920s, was to render his voice fully present and to amplify the charisma of speech. Images somehow had to be imbued with acoustical properties and the resonance of his voice, so as to avoid ghostly and freakish impressions that would undermine the Nazi project of charismatic reawakening.

The crucial turning point for Nazi media politics was therefore June 3, 1929, the day the Gloria-Palast in Berlin showed the first film featuring synchronized sound in Germany.[18] The coming of film sound resulted in an unprecedented homogenization of previous models of spectatorship as well as of the film industry's economic structure. However, it pushed filmmakers to develop new ways of staging human bodies in diegetic space and of inscribing the audience's perspective into the film itself. Sound offered new means of generating fantasies of wholeness and corporeal self-presence: "The addition of sound to cinema [introduced] the possibility of representing a fuller (and organically unified) body, and of rendering speech the status of an individual property right."[19]

In 1930s France, film critics with ties to the extreme right such as Maurice Bardèche and Robert Brasillach expressed an insistent hostility toward commercial sound cinema, which they saw as countering the medium's real aesthetic and political mission.[20] Nazi filmmakers and film officials, in contrast, embraced synchronized sound as a highly welcome tool of fantasy production. Although actual practice often contradicted theory, cinematic sound was seen as a viable means to disseminate the timbre of the German language and of German musical traditions, and in doing so, to incorporate diverse viewers into the national community. The sound film, in the estimation of Nazi film theorists and practitioners, not only increased cinema's mass cultural reach, it also articulated within the bounds of industrial society Richard Wagner's idea of opera as a *Gesamtkunstwerk* by fusing sight and sound, body and voice, music and dialogue, into dramatic unity. No matter how modern and technological in origin, synchronized sound could transport modern subjects beyond their mundane realities and allowed them to recuperate the mythic. Like Wagner, for whom "the unity of the music drama was achieved through the synthesis of its elements, with the total effect equaling more than the sum of its parts," [21] Nazi filmmakers hoped to create audiovisual spectacles whose unified effects could forge contradictory experiences into fantasies of reconciliation. In contradistinction to their French counterparts, they endorsed synchronized sound around 1930 as a long-awaited mechanism to revamp mechanical reproduction as a means to facilitate nothing less than auratic experience.

Which finally returns us to Riefenstahl's depiction of Hitler and the puzzling sign installed directly beneath the window sill of his Nuremberg Hotel in 1934. I would suggest that Riefenstahl's window picture, far from lacking control or being redundant or sloppy, is actually a very sophisticated attempt to reauraticize film with the help of synchronized sound. In accord with the Wagnerian aspirations of Nazi film theory and practice, Riefenstahl here explores the possibilities of sound cinema in order to redefine mechanical reproduction as a site at which the *Führer*'s charisma can find material expression. As if trying to alleviate Hitler's earlier unease about the photographic image, the choreography of sights and sounds in Riefenstahl's window scene seeks to prove that industrial technology can convey his extraordinary

charismatic leadership after all. It produces its evidence through four different, albeit interrelated, strategies. First, with the help of an editing maneuver that recalls Eisenstein's principle of intellectual montage, Riefenstahl transfigures Hitler's visual appearance into that of the voice of the people. The *Führer* doesn't need to "do his thing" here, namely speak, because Riefenstahl's shot already identifies his body as the incarnated voice of his subjects. Second, the window scene engages the viewer in an enchanting dialectic of the seen and the unseen, of the visual and the auditory, of on-screen and off-screen space. With the people's voice in the off, Riefenstahl's window image dramatically expands the space in which cinema seeks to anchor its meanings and pleasures. It integrates diverse spaces of expression and experience into a higher synthesis, a cinema of total effects in which the whole counts more than whatever element we can see or hear in isolation. Third, in deliberately displaying the "Heil Hitler" sign below the hotel window, Riefenstahl's shot renders the sound of the crowd as image and thereby further resolves the concerns that once troubled Hitler. Rather than being singled out as a distinct realm of representation, the visual here is essentially driven by and connected to the verbal, as a register of perception and articulation grounded in the sonoric. Fourth and finally, by framing Hitler as a living image within the film's frame itself, Riefenstahl's window sequence strives to emancipate the photographic image from its precarious lack of inner movement, its unpredictable reception, and its potential erosion of meaning. The younger medium of film here, in Jay Bolter and Richard Gruisin's words,[22] remediates the older medium of photography, not only to restore control over the process of reception and exclude the possibility of drift, but to elevate both media to a level where sounds and images appear unmediated. Industrial culture is thus empowered to once again produce auratic experiences and charismatic effects.

At this point, it may be useful to compare Riefenstahl's framing of Hitler as the embodiment of the people's voice with the oratorical style and performance of Benito Mussolini. Like Hitler, Mussolini based his popularity on emotional appeals and direct communication. Though he considered prolix speeches as antithetical to fascist activism, his verbal presentations—their measured rhythm, their phonetic repertoires—captured people's attention. More importantly, however, Mussolini used speeches to produce impressive imagery that could be circulated with the help of visual media: "His face was a spectacle in itself, appropriately coordinated with Mussolini's oratorical tone and body movements. His head leaned halfway back, his eyes almost out of their sockets, his chin and mouth forward, Mussolini underlined with his exaggerated facial expressions the word units he uttered. At the same time, by moving his head down and striking his classical posture of hands at the waist, waving his right hand with a rotary movement, Mussolini communicated hardness and firmness."[23] For Mussolini, public speaking provided a venue for expanding and disseminating his charismatic image. The primary task of his voice was to enhance the visual spectacle of his authority, which explains why Mussolini paid little attention to the propagandistic possibilities of radio.[24] Hitler, by way of contrast, understood public visibility as a medium for broadcasting the magnetism of his voice. His sounds were inseparable from his image, which might explain why the Hitler regime in the second half of the 1930s did not further pursue the development of German television because it shrunk sounds and images down to an undesirable size.[25]

A year prior to the experimental television broadcasts of 1936, Riefenstahl's window scene staged Hitler's version of charismatic politics at its most effectual, defining sound film as a medium projecting the *Führer* as an overwhelming presence and further, as an instrument shaping enchanted communities rather than as idle fodder for distracted couch potatoes—in effect, as anti-television. In its peculiar integration of sound and image, of voice and body, of the written and the auditory, Riefenstahl's window scene aspired to reinstate what neither photography nor silent film in themselves (according to Hitler's early media politics) could accomplish. What was to triumph here was not only the will of the *Führer* but also the Wagnerian medium of sound film over its technological predecessors. If mechanical reproduction before the advent of sound film seemed to dissolve charismatic presence, Riefenstahl's window sequence sought to demonstrate that sound film was the most appropriate tool for restoring phenomena of distance, however close they might appear. Unlike photography, sound film could frame and display the *Führer*'s body as unified, authentic, and self-present, even when his most precious trademark, his voice, was silent. And in contrast to silent film, sound cinema offered more effective ways of framing and organizing the viewer's attention within the filmic text itself, lending mediated effects the appearance of the elemental. In staging Hitler as a fenestral spectacle, Riefenstahl presented him as a self-contained and awe-inspiring being whose power was indisputable and functioned to emancipate the state from the modern heteronomy of economic, administrative, social, and cultural imperatives. In short, a power that implements the autonomy of the political and thus fulfills the dreams of interwar intellectuals of the extreme right.

II

In the mid-1930s, after facing a slump in box office returns and popular appeal, the German film industry engaged in concerted efforts to build up a Hollywood-like star system of its own. Nazi films stars such as Zarah Leander, Lilian Harvey, Willy Fritsch, Hans Albers, and Heinz Rühmann proved highly instrumental in transforming the products of Goebbels's film studios into mass cultural product packages. Like the Hollywood stars of the same era, the celebrities of Nazi entertainment cinema helped connect individual films to the arenas of musical consumption, fashion, make-up, or tourism—arenas that were of central importance to the Nazi agenda of modernizing German leisure culture. Although influential Nazi film critics such as Oskar Kalbus and Fritz Hippler expressed some concern about the hedonistic attitudes associated with film stardom,[26] Nazi film stars played a central role in redefining film spectatorship in middle-class terms of respectability, privatized consumption, and the formation of the individualized self. Interwar ideologues of the extreme right may have rejected the individual's physical needs and desires.[27] They may have privileged sacrifice over the allure of happiness, discipline over spontaneity, sacrifice over individualism, the armored over the pliant body. Nazi film star images, however, seemed to encourage fantasies of personal self-transformation and social mobility that, to some degree, challenged received notions of individual sovereignty, identity, and authority. They were designed to empower individual spectators to flirt with temporary losses and mimetic transgressions of their ordinary selves.

Like the Hollywood star cult of the Depression era, the Nazi star system of the mid-1930s invited the viewers to refashion their own identities after the sights and sounds presented on screen. Rather than denying the spectator's body as a site of private pleasure and imaginary redress, the Nazi film industry also participated, to some extent, in promoting—as Andrea Weiss has noted in a different context—"the idea that different roles and styles could be adopted by spectators as well as by actors and actresses, and could signal changeable personalities, multiple identities."[28]

We cannot assess National Socialism without taking stock of how the Nazi state explored the whole spectrum of modern mass culture and commodity consumption in order to captivate minds and bond emotions. Contrary to the regime's credo of political mobilization and coordination, the Third Reich was quite eager to offer middle-class diversions and Hollywood-style entertainment, even promoting ideology and political action as desirable consumer items. Yet we would do well not to blur fundamental differences between the marketing of Coca-Cola, Mercedes Benz, and the sights and sounds of, say, UFA star Zarah Leander on the one hand, and the promotion and consumption of Hitler and his charisma, on the other. While the regime was willing to make some room for the hedonistic fantasies and material pleasures associated with modern consumption-oriented societies, in the area of political representation, it clearly feared that such an appeal to the senses could lead to unwanted individual self-redress and political nonconformity. The rise of modern consumer culture might be inevitable, but needed to be framed by normative discourses and political interventions in order to secure its proper impact. It is in Riefenstahl's use of window settings, I suggest, that these striking ambivalencies of Nazi consumer politics and its cult of stars become most evident.

Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* begins with a famous shot straight through the windshield of a Junkers Ju 52. The opening shot veers immediately to the left so as to grant us a spectacular view of cloud formations glimpsed through and framed by the airplane's side window. The camera's ninety degree pan is smooth and unobtrusive, yet it clearly communicates what any viewer familiar with the codes of narrative cinema will identify as a sense of subjectivity and authorization. Riefenstahl's camera initiates and authenticates its mission by assuming the perspective of the airplane's pilot. Of course, it becomes evident only moments later that the pilot's gaze allegorizes the *Führer*'s gaze itself, a sublime gaze powerful enough to call Nuremberg to life and organize the movements, perceptions, and fates of its citizen into patterned forms. It is Hitler's gaze that secretly conjures and shapes all appearances, events, and meanings. It is the divine *Führer* who defines the terms of political and aesthetic representation. And it is Riefenstahl's camera that enables the viewer, for a brief moment, to glimpse the world through Hitler's supernatural perspective, to be bathed in his power and witness how the window of his eye orders the complexities of both nature and social life.

Riefenstahl's presentation of the *Führer* as aviator and vision machine harked back to Hitler's innovative use of airplanes during the 1932 election campaign: "Flying from city to city in a truncated campaign squeezed into less than a week to accommodate an Easter truce in politicking, Hitler was able to hold twenty major speeches in different venues before huge audiences, totaling close to a million persons. It was a remarkable electioneering performance, the like of which had never before been

seen in Germany."[29] Hitler's *Deutschlandflüge* established the future dictator as a man not only of restless energy but also of emblematic modernity. The airplane enabled Hitler to meet his followers in their own particular situations and localities, without employing the intermediary of mechanical recording and copying. Mechanical reproduction, Walter Benjamin wrote in 1935, "can put the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself. . . . The cathedral leaves its locale to be received in the studio of a lover of art; the choral production, performed in an auditorium or in the open air, resounds in the drawing room."[30] Hitler's airplane campaigns, by way of contrast, sought to beat the modern culture of the copy at its own game. It allowed the *Führer* to be seen and heard in places formerly out of reach, yet it did so without substituting the original—Hitler—with some kind of technical reproduction—a copy of Hitler's image. Rather than simply replacing tradition, Hitler's *Deutschlandflüge* were meant to create traditional experiences of contact and community with the help of modern technology. Rather than undoing the past, Hitler's plane was supposed to reinvent it for the future.

As they invite the viewer to approach old Nuremberg through the eyes of the aviator Hitler, the opening shots of *Triumph of the Will* reframe Nazi modernism by means of the cinema itself. Modern aviation, for Riefenstahl, is tele-vision in reverse. It might shrink the parameters of spatial and temporal experience, but it nevertheless enables charismatic impressions of presence and proximity, of authorship and authenticity. As an allegory of Riefenstahl's own cinematic project, the windshield of Hitler's airplane, far from merely displaying what lies beyond them, produces the real as a sublime and self-contained attraction. Rather than framing or penetrating reality, the windshield authors it like an awe-inspiring artwork. In doing so, Hitler's airplane seems to embody the opposite of everything that, for Walter Benjamin, qualified film and photography as tools of collective self-representation and proletarian emancipation. Instead of empowering the viewer to explore and reconfigure the visual field like a surgeon, Riefenstahl's airplane posits Hitler as a magician whose gaze conjures the tangible world for us from a distance. Instead of eliminating the auratic and its authority, Riefenstahl's window shot establishes and consecrates Hitler's power over the viewer's life and imagination. Because in Riefenstahl's world the gaze of the *Führer* creates the very subjects that will later cast pleasurable looks at him, there is no space for coincidence or imprecision, no space for ambiguity or unsolicited interpretation. By anchoring the film in Hitler's omniscient perception, Riefenstahl aspires to bind her images into one coherent statement, one that excludes the possibility of competing appropriations, constrains the potential drift of the visual, and completely controls the spectator's attention. Even as Riefenstahl installs spectacle as the organizing principle for her cinematic operations and for Nazi politics alike, she clearly also fears the capacity of images to unravel stable meanings and herein produce what Paul Willemen calls "delirium."[31] She frames Hitler's presence (the Hotel window scene) and the spectator's perception (in the opening shots), not in order to simply inspire visual pleasure and satisfy our scopic drive, but to manage our experience, regulate interpretation, and discipline consumption. We may have come to understand *Triumph of the Will* as the Third Reich's most skillful attempt at fusing aesthetics and politics, at exploring modern visual culture in order to legitimate political authority. But as Riefenstahl's use of multiple framing devices

indicates, in the final analysis the political aesthetics of Nazi Germany was marked by fundamental anxieties about the indeterminacy of the image's meaning and the vagaries of visual pleasure. In trying to render mechanical reproduction auratic again, filmmakers such as Leni Riefenstahl hoped, not least of all, to circumscribe cinematic images and reorganize the visual in terms of the putative certainties of the verbal, of speech and propositional meaning. Images were to become words of another means. They were designed to communicate unified messages and, in and of themselves, police the unpredictable power of visual consumption.

It is Riefenstahl's simultaneous inscription of Hitler as the originating subject *and* object of looking, as the unequivocal frame of all meaning and experience, that should caution us not to equate Nazi aesthetics with the movie industry's cult of stardom. In the 1930s, the cult of Hollywood or Hollywood-like star images appealed to fantasies of individual self-transformation and social mobility. It essentially relied on the assumption that certain star images and styles could be adopted by individual spectators and translated into a multiplicity of vernacular uses and meanings. The cult of stardom participated in the rise of modern consumer practices by promoting an ethos of individual self-formation and autonomy that challenged conventional markers of identity, social hierarchy, and privacy. While we should not falsely heroicize this production of individuality and multiplicity qua consumption as automatically subversive, we should also not deny that the sheer quantity of consumer practices and sensual pleasures potentially disrupted naturalized norms of gender, class, ethnicity, and race. Hollywood stars produced effects close to drag: their cult of authenticity was so stylized and hyperbolical that it tended to debunk itself, encouraging the viewer and fan to perform a better job.

Riefenstahl's staging of Hitler, by way of contrast, does everything at its disposal to delimit future uses and meanings *in the image itself*. Like the music of Richard Wagner in Nietzsche's and Adorno's reading,[32] Riefenstahl's imagery not only sought to rouse powerful affects but at the same time to control all possible effects. Hitler's most famous image maker presented herself in her work as an advocate of the public, yet framed the viewer's response to suppress any ambiguities or alternative ways of reception. Riefenstahl's windows are screens of calculated seduction. They overwhelm the viewer's senses with excessive choreographies of sights and sound, not with the intention of encouraging multiple uses and vernacular interpretations, but ultimately to deny the individual body as a site of need, desire, and autonomous experience. Their proximity to modern consumer culture notwithstanding, Riefenstahl's images of Hitler reveal deepseated fears about the utopian energies, materialist longings, and hedonistic pleasure of mass cultural consumption. In fact, we might best understand these images as part of an orchestrated attempt to define a startling countermeasure to the movie industry's cult of stardom and privacy—one in which *Führer* and state emerged as superior moral entities who divorced economic activities from individual needs, desires, and pleasures and, instead, turned these activities into ethical enterprises. National Socialism condemned the contents of modern culture, yet "it found in the dreaming collective created by consumer capitalism a ready-at-hand receptacle for its own political phantasmagoria."[33] Like Hollywood mass culture, the spectacle of Hitler at the window provided imaginary solutions to real contradictions; it established powerful relays from the imaginary to

the real.[34] Unlike Hollywood, however, the Hitler star cult could only allow for one object of desire and painstakingly restricted its everyday applications. Fans and consumers were to imitate the ethical state; they were not to mimic or performatively transform it, but to mimetically disappear within it. Therefore, though we have come to think of Riefenstahl's work as the most characteristic contribution to the Nazi aestheticization of politics, we should see her window pictures of Hitler as forays into a totalitarian culture of *anaesthetics*. Privileging unified forms over messy appropriations, Riefenstahl's Hitler denied the original meaning of aesthetics, namely the sensory experience and pleasure of perception. Although Riefenstahl's images appealed to people's emotions and sentiments, they ultimately strove to neutralize people's senses—to "knock them out."[35]

III

Umberto Eco has famously defined fascism as a form of fuzzy totalitarianism, "a collage of different philosophical and political ideas, a beehive of contradictions."[36] According to Eco, both Italian fascism and German National Socialism served as eclectic screens for highly diverse and often incompatible agendas, desires, and resentments. What, in fact, made fascism fascist was its ability to mesh dissimilar interests and tropes—for example, machismo, cult of heroism, glorification of struggle, vitalism, xenophobia—into an integrationist all-purpose ideology, one that seemed to offer something for everyone, while also drawing clear boundaries between friend and foe. Translating Eco's insights into the vocabulary of our own explorations here, we might as well say that fascism represented nothing other than a self-effacing window that gave heterogeneous experiences the appearance of unified action, and in whose frame temporal and spatial discontinuities gave way to the integrated image of linear time and homogenous space. From today's perspective, Nazi ultranationalism and palingenetic populism may indeed appear confusing,[37] but their success in an earlier era can be attributed, not least of all, to their ability to order and organize people's attention, to refocus their awareness, and thus to order the messiness of modern life within reliable frames of perception.

Perhaps it is for this precise reason that German visual artists unable or unwilling to escape Hitler's Germany often resorted to window motifs in order to allegorize their sense of ideological and existential estrangement.[38] The most famous of all window painters during the Hitler period was former Bauhaus member Oskar Schlemmer. Stripped of his official positions in the early years of the Nazi regime, Schlemmer created a series of 18 paintings between April 13 and July 18, 1942, depicting people in interior settings as glimpsed from the window of his own apartment in Wuppertal (figures 2.3 and 2.4). Relatively small in size, all of these paintings were executed in oil and pencil on cardboard. In most cases, their making can be traced to particular dates and day times, leaving us with a visual diary of Schlemmer's last wave of aesthetic productivity before his death in April 1943. While creating his window paintings, Schlemmer was officially employed at Dr. Kurt Herbert's paint factory in Wuppertal, which flourished during the war, when lacquer paint was used to camouflage military equipment as much as to coat civilian structures. Here, Schlemmer performed technical and artistic experiments with lacquer coating in cooperation

Figure 2.3 Dreigeteiltes Hes Fenster, Fensterbild XVII, 1942, oil and gouache over pencil and colored pencil on board, 29.3 × 22.8 cm. Kunstmuseum Basel, Depositum Schlemmer, with permission of the Oskar Schlemmer Archives and Secretariat.

with other harassed artists such as Willi Baumeister and Georg Muche. No longer permitted to exhibit his paintings, Schlemmer had already gained experience in the art of concealment during the mid-1930s when recoating airport buildings near Würzburg and a gas tank near Stuttgart. In both settings, his designs had functionalized cubist abstraction in order to blur the boundaries between objects and surroundings and thus deceive the onlooker's perception. In the early 1940s, this unforeseen expertise thus situated the persecuted artist in the heart of an industry whose primary function was to make the German war machinery invisible. And yet, the formal shapes and pictorial energies of Schlemmer's window paintings surreptitiously challenged that which had driven Germany into the war in the first place. Exploring the enframing of both visibility and perception, Schlemmer's final images



Figure 2.4 Raum mit Sitzender Frau in Violettem Schatten, Fensterbild XII, 1942, oil over pencil on board, 30.6 × 20.7 cm. Kunstmuseum Basel, Depositum Schlemmer, with permission of the Oskar Schlemmer Archives and Secretariat.

not only undercut the Nazis' desire to erase all traces of difference and otherness, they also defied the manner in which the windows of Nazi media culture sought to define the political as the primary site at which the German people were to behold authentic expressions and charismatic experiences.

In his letters and diary entries of the time, Schlemmer described his window paintings as images reinscribing the thick textures of the visible world and emancipating

perception from the mandates of modernist abstraction. He perceived the act of gazing through the rear window of his apartment and capturing the sight of people in everyday settings as a way to explore the ordinary as a source of classicist composure and transcendental value—in effect, to recover from the existential mess and artistic blockage he had experienced over the past decade. Rather than camouflaging the real, Schlemmer's window paintings were supposed to exhibit and celebrate the visual field in all its diffidence and incommensurability. On May 11, 1942, after having completed the ninth painting, "Dinner in the House Next-Door," Schlemmer wrote to his friend Julius Bissier: "Today, since I can no longer believe in the blissful abstractions of a Picasso . . . and also no longer have the courage to believe in previous (and immodest) forms of modernism, in a curious way I am beginning to appreciate the world of the visible in all its density and surreal mysticism."[39] And one day later, on May 12, Schlemmer noted in his personal diary: "The window paintings: wonders of the visible, mysticism of optics. At least in its transcendence; that is, one cannot really invent such a thing. Energy source for free composition. Regarding the window paintings: I feel like a hunter who, every night between nine and ten o-clock, goes stalking. And then: only here I am true to myself, in the curious sense that I only paint what I see. Yet how I see it, and most of all, how I paint it—that's what counts as much as the old question: 'What is truth?' Aesthetic truth—natural truth . . . "[40]

Schlemmer's self-descriptions have led many scholars and critics to describe, and disparage, his window paintings as antimodernist, as fueled by the artist's retrograde desire to counteract abstraction and, in a quasi-religious gesture, move through and beyond the grid of mimetic representation. Schlemmer's exploration of the visible and its mysticism, so the argument goes, harks back to premodern idioms of authenticity and natural truth in order to redeem perception from the burdens of the present. Ironically, however, in thus defining aesthetic modernism solely in terms of anti-mimetic abstraction, arguments such as these not only erase the multiplicity of modernist projects and practices, they also fall prey to a certain kind of antimodernism themselves. For in excluding Schlemmer's window paintings from the normative canon of modernist art, this position fails to account for the many ways in which modernism may have responded to shifting historical contexts and local situations. Following Schlemmer's own lead, the normative conception of modernism as antimimetic and abstract in the end forgoes modernism's own impulse to engage in ever new ways with an ever-changing present, to put formal experimentation in the service of articulating the contingencies of modern experience, including that of Nazi society.

Schlemmer's self-commentary, then, should be viewed with a pinch of salt. In fact, rather than regard his window paintings as idealist exercises in metaphysics, we should expose their precise historical index, the way in which the formal qualities and contradictions of these paintings simultaneously allegorize and work against very specific historical experiences. At first glance, Schlemmer's paintings recall Leon Battista Alberti's famous 1435 definition of the window as a tool and symbol of Renaissance perspective. In the wake of Alberti, the window's grid came to legitimize a system of representation in which monocular views of space warranted the possibility of mimetic representation and natural authenticity. Over the course of several centuries, the metaphor and motif of the window helped painters fix the visual field

in ordered and disembodied stillness; the window assigned to the viewer's eye a kind of omniscient control over represented space. Schlemmer's window paintings clearly draw on this tradition. Once again, the window's geometry here serves as a tool in order to provide "a comprehensible form for the complexities of human experience."[41] As apertures in architectural walls, Schlemmer's windows seem to resemble the painter's eye itself, creating continuities between the visible world of the everyday and the invisible world of the mind. At the same time, however, Schlemmer also employs the window as a framing device exhibiting the modernist revolt against Alberti's hubris. Rather than displaying space according to one geometric vanishing point, Schlemmer's frames project space as planar and structural and thereby emancipate the visual field from the laws of central perspective. What we see *within* Schlemmer's windows evokes not Alberti's program, but Paul Cézanne's attempts to disrupt perspective and reveal, through variations of color and tone, the hidden structure behind natural settings. Like Cézanne's mature works, Schlemmer's window paintings do not simply try to capture random ephemeral impressions, but aspire to bring the visual field to some kind of intellectual order. Instead of subjecting vision to the laws of central perspective, Schlemmer's frames—like Cézanne's paintings—create sensations of depth and distance, of shape and solidity, by elaborating different tonal planes and semiabstract forms. Within the frames of Schlemmer's windows, the articulation of space results from horizontal or vertical intensities, and not from idealized, omniscient viewpoints.

Schlemmer's window paintings were highly constructivist efforts, products of planning and technique. Instead of arresting momentary sensations intuitively on cardboard, Schlemmer first drew numerous sketches in order to calculate spatial relations and to map out different planes of color and vision. Notwithstanding their dimensions and seeming casualness, Schlemmer's window paintings were designed as laboratories investigating the legacy of different modalities of modern visual perception and spatial representation. What these paintings accomplished, however, was not merely to juxtapose the dissimilar programs of Alberti and Cézanne within the space of one and the same frame, but to stage a dialectic of seeing that defied any final synthesis. Far from reconciling Cézanne's modernist disruption with Albertinian perspectivalism, Schlemmer's window frames revealed the effort, technique, denial, and violence it takes in order to conjure the world as ordered and natural. As they emphatically draw the viewer's awareness to the enframing of perception and visibility itself, Schlemmer's window paintings stress the extent to which nature must always elude our sight because vision is necessarily a social and historical construct. Ultimately, the beauty and melancholy of Schlemmer's final works rests in the way they reveal that neither Alberti nor Cézanne got it right: whenever we see, think, say, touch, or depict nature we have—for better or worse—already entered the realms of mediation, of culture, of representation, of history.

Yet it is only when contemplated against the backdrop of Hitler's use of windows as sites of political display, charismatic interruption, and omniscient visuality that we can fully grasp the significance of Schlemmer's 1942 window paintings. For whatever Schlemmer himself believed to be his project, his window paintings go beyond merely negotiating the legacy of different notions of perspective and aesthetic practices of spatial ordering. Their concern is deeply political, revealing how Nazi society

manipulated people's sense perception in order to coordinate all aspects of private and public life. "The fetish," as Laura Mulvey has written in a different context, "necessarily wants history to be overlooked. That is its function." And she continues: "The fetish is also a symptom, and as such has a history which may be deciphered."[42] As I have argued in the preceding pages, Hitler's use of window settings was part of a broader concerted effort to present his body and appearance as a fetish. Hitler's windows denied the labor and instrumental reason it required to see and to be seen in Nazi mass culture. As they displayed historical experiences as natural facts, these window images fetishized the *Führer*'s body into an object of desire and consumption, a site of charismatic presence and auratic redemption, a phantasmagoria of first order. In the formal arrangements of Schlemmer's window paintings we find a rare attempt at developing instructive counterimages that deconstruct the manner in which Nazi aesthetics organized attention and managed visuality. Unlike Hitler's use of window settings, Schlemmer's windows foregrounded the mediated character of modern perception. Rather than bombarding people with a surplus of visual signs and sensual attractions, Schlemmer's final paintings contested hegemonic framings of perception and in so doing exposed the historical index of seeing, the historicity of perception. Schlemmer's window paintings draw our attention to the processes involved in articulating sight and visibility under the conditions of modern culture. They herein not only compel us to consider what dwells behind the images we see from this era, they also challenge the myth of authenticity so central to Nazi visual culture and media politics. In contrast to our own age of decentered and digitized symbolization, Nazi mass culture may not have granted many spaces to reframe dominant modes of perception and representation. But Schlemmer's window paintings represent at least one attempt to do to Nazi visual culture what tequilin.com did 60 years later to Jörg Haider's self-presentation as a man of charismatic resolution and virility. An early cyber-terrorist of sorts, Schlemmer's window paintings—like tequilin.com's faked Internet pages—present the extreme right's fetishism of power and public visibility as symptoms of a history we cannot afford not to decipher.

Notes

1. Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 72–74.
2. <http://www.tequilin.com/announcement>
3. For more on tequilin.com and the copyright struggles that made the faked FPÖ page possible in the first place, see Michael Bornkessel, "Dichtung und Wahrheit im Web-Wahlkampf," *politik-digital.de*, October 11, 1999 <http://www.politik-digital.de/europa/laender/aut/nat_pol/fake.shtml>
4. Vivian Sobchack, ed., *Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformations and the Culture of Quick-Change* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
5. Mark Poster, *What's the Matter with the Internet* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p.184.
6. I have discussed this issue at length in Lutz Koepnick, *Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999).
7. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 34.
8. Ibid.

9. Steve Neale, "*Triumph of the Will*: Notes on Documentary and Spectacle," *Screen* 20.1 (1979): 69–70.
10. Ibid., p. 76.
11. Claudia Schmöller, *Hitlers Gesicht: Eine physiognomische Biographie* (Munich: Beck, 2000), pp. 50–54.
12. Heinrich Hoffmann, *Hitler was My Friend*, trans. R.H. Stevens (London: Burke, 1955), p. 42.
13. Reprinted in Schmöller, *Hitlers Gesicht*, p. 47.
14. See Rudolf Herz, *Hoffmann & Hitler: Fotografie als Medium des Führer-Mythos* (Munich: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1994) and Ian Kershaw, *The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
15. Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: 1889–1936: Hubris* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 167–220.
16. Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff and Hans Gerth, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 243–44.
17. Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), pp. 105–06.
18. For a more detailed discussion of the coming of sound and how it was used by Nazi media politics, see Lutz Koepnick, *The Dark Mirror: German Cinema between Hitler and Hollywood* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), part 1.
19. Mary Ann Doane, "The Voice and the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space," in *Film Sound: Theory and Practice*, ed. Elisabeth Weis and John Belton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 162.
20. Alan Williams, *Republic of Images: A History of French Filmmaking* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 214.
21. Caryl Flinn, *Strains of Utopia: Gender, Nostalgia, and Hollywood Film Music* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 34.
22. Jay Bolter and Richard Gruisin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
23. Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle*, p. 86.
24. Giovanni Spagnoletti, "'Gott gibt uns das Brot—Er bereitet es uns und verteidigt es': Bild und Mythos Mussolinis im Film," in *Führerbilder: Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Stalin in Fotografie und Film*, ed. Martin Loiperdinger, Rudolf Herz, and Ulrich Pohl (Munich: Piper, 1995), p. 125.
25. For critical examinations of Nazi experiments with television, see Heiko Zeutschner, *Die braune Mattscheibe: Fernsehen im Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Rotbuch, 1995), Erwin Reiss, *"Wir senden Frohsinn": Fernsehen unterm Faschismus* (Berlin: Elefanten, 1979), Siegfried Zielinski, *Audiovisionen: Kino und Fernsehen als Zwischenspiele in der Geschichte* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1989), pp. 98–174, William Uricchio, ed., *Die Anfänge des deutschen Fernsehens: Kritische Annäherungen an die Entwicklung bis 1945* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991).
26. See, e.g., Oskar Kalbus, *Vom Werden deutscher Filmkunst*, 2 vols. (Altona-Bahrenfeld: Cigaretten-Bilderdienst, 1935), p. 128; Fritz Hippler, *Betrachtungen zum Filmschaffen* (Berlin: Hesse, 1942), pp. 102–07. On the uneasy but nonetheless effectual relationship between star culture and Nazi film theorists, see Andrea Winkler, *Starkult als Propagandamittel? Studien zum Unterhaltungsfilm im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Ölschläger, 1992).
27. Falasca-Zamponi *Fascist Spectacle*, p. 121.
28. Andrea Weiss, *Vampires and Violets: Lesbians in Film* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 28. For more on the star cult and consumer strategies of 1930s Hollywood, see also Sarah Berry, *Screen Style: Fashion and Feminity in 1930s Hollywood* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
29. Kershaw, *Hitler*, p. 363.

30. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," trans. Harry Zohn, *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), pp. 220–21.
31. Paul Willemen, "Cinematic Discourse: The Problem of Inner Speech," *Screen* 22, 3 (1981): 63–93.
32. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner* (New York: Vintage, 1967), pp. 153–92, and Theodor W. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: New Left Books, 1981), p. 31.
33. Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), p. 312.
34. Jeffrey Schnapp, *Staging Fascism: 18 BL and the Theater of Masses for Masses* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 2.
35. Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle*, p. 12.
36. Umberto Eco, "Ur-Fascism," *New York Review of Books*, June 22, 1995, p. 13.
37. For more on the definition of fascism as a form of palingenetic ultranationalism, propagating a phoenixlike rebirth of nation, spirit, and culture, see Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
38. Consider, e.g., Paul Weber's 1943 *Das Gerücht*, Anton Räderscheidt's 1943 *Der Gefangene*, Carl Hofer's 1945 *Alarm*, or Otto Pankok's 1945 *Das Judenhaus*.
39. Reinhold Hohl, ed., *Oskar Schlemmer. Die Fensterbilder. 20 Farbtafeln und 19 Vorstudien* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1988), p. 27.
40. Andreas Hüneke, ed., *Oskar Schlemmer. Idealist der Form. Briefe, Tagebücher, Schriften, 1912–1943* (Leipzig: Reclam-Verlag, 1989), p. 339.
41. Suzanne Delehanty, *The Window in Twentieth-Century Art* (State University of New York at Purchase: Neuberger Museum, 1986), p. 17.
42. Laura Mulvey, "A Phantasmagoria of the Female Body: The Work of Cindy Sherman," *New Left Review* 188 (July–August 1991): 150.

Chapter Three

Fascismo-Stile and the Posthistorical Imaginary*

Claudio Fogu

> My dear Raymond, I am writing from the fascist exhibition itself because there are comfortable tables to write: hence the idea of writing to you. The exhibition is filled everywhere with black flags with embroidered skulls, especially in the shrine of the dead. One of these flags figures in the reconstruction of Mussolini's squalid office in Milan. I am quite astonished. I didn't know this history. I am even startled. It won't evidently lead me to buy a shining *croix du feu* (insigna of the French fascistic movement by the same name), nor will it change me a bit, but the effect is very strong.
>
> Georges Bataille, 1934[1]

With these words, addressed to his comrade-friend Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille reported on the spot his "very strong" impression of the *Mostra della rivoluzione fascista* [MRF], a historical exhibition set up in Rome to celebrate the fascist *decennale* (the tenth anniversary of Mussolini's March on Rome). This was Bataille's first visit to fascist Italy. A few months earlier he had published his seminal essay on the "Psychological Structure of Fascism,"[2] in which he theorized the fascist phenomenon as the subordination of *homogeneous* social relations to *heterogeneous* ones; that is, of the cohesive rule of law and economic structures to the flexible world of sacred bonds, psychological ties, "unproductive expenditure," and "excess."[3] The essay was the culmination of two years of intense readings and was aimed at providing a general theory of fascism[4] that also encompassed German Nazism.[5] Thus, one can't help but ponder why Bataille was so astonished, even startled, before the historical exhibition of a phenomenon he had just theorized? Could this exhibition have caused Bataille to waver in his theoretical assessment of the common heterogeneous core of Italian Fascism and German Nazism?

In order to explicate the significance of Bataille's astonished gaze, this essay spotlights the Italian-fascist specificity of what Walter Benjamin famously defined as the fascist "aesthetization of politics." Like Benjamin, Bataille was one of the most acute contemporary observers, adversaries, and general theoreticians of fascism. Benjamin and Bataille also shared an intense critical interest in the relationship between aesthetic avant-gardism and the development of mass culture. However, Bataille's reaction to the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution suggests that the aesthetization promulgated by Italian Fascism may have not been the fruit of an "uncontrolled application of outmoded concepts" as Benjamin posited.[6] Set up by a team of journalists,

historians, and 34 of Italy's most well-known artists, the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution (MRF) instead constituted a "modernist *Gesamtkunstwerk*" of exceptional artistic quality, which also managed to attract over three and a half million visitors.[7] In fascist Rome of 1934, avant-garde aesthetics and mass culture seemed to have found a point of conjunction peerless in the Soviet Union or in the Western democracies, or even in Nazi Germany, where modernist masterpieces were gradually removed from German art museums and Hitler's speeches insisted on the antithetical relationship between Nazism and "degenerate" modern art.[8] Quite plausibly, then, the aesthetic avant-gardism of this exhibition could not have failed to impress an attentive observer and surrealist sympathizer like Bataille. Indeed, recent scholarship and exhibitions of art and design under Fascism offer evidence that further accounts for Bataille's reaction, documenting how the enduring marriage between avant-garde aesthetics and fascist image politics differentiated the Italian-fascist regime from the Nazi-German one precisely in the area of unproductive *aesthetic* expenditure and excess.[9]

Everything, from the personal preferences of the two dictators, to their policy statements, to the political history of the avant-gardes in Italy and Germany, conspired to create two parallel but non-converging paths. Whereas the amateur painter Adolf Hitler used his power, speeches, and financial resources first to denounce all forms of "degenerate" avant-garde arts and then identify Nazi art with a state-approved, vaguely defined "Germanic style," the (ex-)journalist and futurist sympathizer Mussolini sought actively to endorse the talent of avant-garde artists for the cause of Fascism, and he never gave in to reactionary demands to sanction an official art-form of the fascist state.[10] Yet the idea of a broader fascist form of modernism has been supported by recent research on both the cultural origins of Italian fascist ideology and the cultural politics of the regime, even as recent scholarship has also revised an all too monolithic view of Nazi art,[11] and—on the Italian side—highlighted the thematic nazification of fascist culture in the second half of the 1930s.[12]

Long denied even the status of ideology, today most scholars agree that fascist anti-ideological discourse was itself a most powerful form of ideology, that Fascism's lack of a doctrinal core was amply substituted for by a rhetoric that "deployed culturally available language," and that this cultural language was primarily that of French–Italian modernist thought.[13] In particular, fascist rhetoric coalesced around two modernist poles of ideological structuring: the rhetorics of virility ushered in by futurism,[14] and the antimaterialist revision of Marxism operated by George Sorel and revolutionary syndicalism,[15] with the *vociani*—the Florentine avant-garde united in *La voce*—providing Fascism with the rhetorical glue to unite nationalism and modernism.[16] The fascist claim to be "neither left nor right" was therefore intellectually grounded in that common search for new "secular-religious" values that characterized the whole spectrum of Italian modernist culture.[17] Translated into ritual- and image-politics this claim meant that Fascism pursued a unique balance between modernist aesthetization and popular-cultural sacralization of politics. In fact, above all, fascist modernism came to challenge the *double* "Great Divide"—to use Andreas Huyssen's fertile image—that most historians, theoreticians, and critics have traditionally posited between "high" modernism and "low" mass culture and—within modernism—between modernist and avant-garde attitudes.[18]

Since the early 1900s aesthetic avant-gardism and intellectual modernism in Italy grew in synchrony, dialogue with, and opposition to Catholic *modernismo*, the early twentieth-century movement for the reconciliation of Catholic religion and modernity. Cultural modernists shared with Catholic *modernisti* a drive toward spiritual regeneration, mysticism, and a sense of mission, as well as the heretical goal of reaching out directly to the Italian masses as the high priests of a new aesthetic religion.[19] Thus, the modernist attitude of the *vociani* merged an "art for art's sake" orientation with the idea of organizing a proper "party" of modern artists and intellectuals.[20] By the same token, Milanese futurism did not merely appropriate mass-cultural techniques to aestheticize life, but, rather, it was the first avant-garde movement to respond aggressively to mass culture, seeking to transform *it* completely.[21] It was this mass-cultural spirit, rather than its aestheticist prewar premises that survived in so-called second generation futurism and led to its political endorsement of Fascism as well as its diversification and maximum expansion in the 1920s and 1930s.[22] Hence, whether coalesced around Mussolini's "aesthetic politics"[23] or the "lyrical" oxymorons that characterized fascist ideological discourse,[24] the interaction between the institutionalization of fascist image politics and avant-garde aesthetic principles remained mutual and alive throughout the *ventennio* (the two decades of fascist power from 1922 to 1943). Fascist modernism, therefore, differed not only in *size* and *temporal extension* from the "reactionary modernism" that characterized German-Nazi culture but also in *scope* and *kind*.[25] The modernist character of Fascism resided neither in the "spiritualization of technology," nor solely in its appropriation of avant-garde techniques, but rather in its self-presentation as a modernist political movement for the age of mass politics.[26]

At least implicitly, then, recent studies of Italian Fascism have offered insights into Bataille's puzzlement before the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution by highlighting the peculiar blend of Catholic rhetoric and avant-garde aesthetics that distinguished fascist image-politics from the racial utopia relentlessly projected by its totalitarian rival and future ally. In addition, by distinguishing fascist modernism from the racial Darwinism that informed Nazi culture, studies of fascist culture have also called attention to the specific legacy of the Italian-fascist "aesthetization of politics" in postfascist times. Film scholarship, of course, has been at the vanguard of this research and has revealed, for example, the enduring contest between fascist and bourgeois rhetorics of virility expressed in the ongoing recoding of the fundamental image of the *femme fatale*, from the silent era onward through fascist movies, and in postwar feminizations of Fascism.[27] Along parallel lines, a more theoretically informed assessment of *Mussolinismo-ducismo*—the myth-cult of Mussolini—as an essential and simultaneously distinct trait of *fascismo*, and in some respects even its rival, has revealed its intimate relationship with the concurrent rise of the "culture of personality" in the West.[28] Finally, the analysis of fascist advertising and design industries has highlighted specific continuities between corporate-fascist and corporate-capitalist image politics in the postwar era.[29] In a word, most recent studies of fascist modernism have highlighted significant areas of contiguities, mutual appropriations, and imaginary transfigurations between fascist visual culture and postindustrial mass culture. These same studies, however, have also sometimes overestimated the exclusive dependence of fascist modernism on futurist

poetics and aesthetics leaving us with a fundamental question to address: What specific contribution to the overall development of mass culture in the twentieth century did fascist modernism make that futurism had not already made or, plausibly, would not have made in the 1920s and 1930s? What, in other words, was specifically "fascist" in fascist modernism, and what legacies exist in postfascist mass culture?

I would suggest that one answer to these questions may be found in the specific object of Bataille's astonished gaze before the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution. This referent was not the avant-garde aesthetics of the exhibition per se, but a "history" (of Fascism) that Bataille claimed to ignore. And this *history* was surely not only the *res gestae* of fascist violence and defiance of death symbolized by the skull exhibited in the reconstructed study of Mussolini, but also the unique *historia rerum gestarum* staged throughout the exhibition. In the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution there found visual expression a peculiarly fascist-modernist vision of the relationship between historical agency, representation, and consciousness that had nothing to do with the eschatological vision of Nazism or the futurist negation of the past. As I shall argue below the exhibition of the *decennale* gave visual form to a fascist *historic imaginary* that not only sought to oppose and undermine both liberal-positivist and Marxist-materialist conceptions of history, but may have also constituted the principal laboratory for the formation of posthistoric(al) forms of imaginary that we inhabit today.

Mussolini's March on Rome in 1923 became a historic marker, celebrated as the founding event of the so-called Fascist Revolution. Little wonder that its *decennale* would be consecrated by an exhibition seeking to represent the history-making nature of the revolutionary event. Yet the visual spectacle presented on October 29, 1932 was quite surprising, for the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution did not celebrate the new fascist epoch directly, for example, by foregrounding the achievements of Fascism in its first decade of power, but instead sought to represent the history of the revolution from Mussolini's foundation of his newspaper, *Il Popolo d'Italia* (November 15, 1914) to the March on Rome (October 28, 1922). Even more surprising was the protagonist of the revolution-exhibition put on stage: not Mussolini himself, of whom only three images would appear, nor Fascism as such, but Mussolini's mouthpiece, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, which engaged in allegorical conflations of Mussolini, the Italian people, and modernity that dominated every room of the exhibition (figure 3.1).

Mussolini's newspaper not only served as the information source for the chronicle of events selected for representation, but also inspired the principal register of aesthetic unity in the whole exhibition. In fact, the organizers had instructed all architect-painters to "make history literally present" by modulating the relationship between Mussolinian phrases that were extracted from the newspaper's editorials and transposed onto the walls of the exhibition, the figurative-architectural elements created by the artists, and the documents exhibited.[30] Responding to this call, and mixing over 3,000 collected documents with allegorical figurations, photomontages, constructivist cut-outs, analogical representations of *Il Popolo d'Italia*, and enlarged reproductions of Mussolinian phrases taken from his editorials, the artists effectively inverted the semiotic relationship between documents and commentary. Thus,

Figure 3.1 Room A in the MRF; the gigantic enlargement of the first front page of *Il Popolo d'Italia* is visible on the right of the bass relief map of Italy.

historical documents in the MRF functioned as commentary to Mussolini's words embodied in *Il Popolo d'Italia*. According to the exhibition, the Fascist Revolution was not merely a historic event, but also an agent that made history in the present tense. To make things absolutely clear, the central section of the exhibition contained no more documents or facts, but instead, only four symbolic rooms offering the



Figure 3.2 Room S in the MRF with the tabernacle containing Mussolini's first office at *Il Popolo d'Italia* under the large signage DUX. Inside were visible the skull and flag that so much impressed Bataille.

reconstructions of the two historic sites of the revolutionary agent: Mussolini's first and last offices at *Il Popolo d'Italia* (figure 3.2).

All revolutions celebrate their beginning act as "historic," that is, as history-making events that close an epoch and open an unlimited future. What the MRF celebrated in both form and content, however, was clearly not the fascist historic event per se (i.e., the March on Rome), but rather a historic event that had given birth to a historic subject, Fascism. The revolutionary kernel of Fascism was identified with an ontological polarization of the semantic distinction between *historicness*, that is, the sense of unmediated and transtemporal significance of an event (speech or site), and *historical-ness*, that is, the belonging to the past of a fact. Mussolini's movement, so argued the exhibition of the *decennale*, had conceived and presented itself as a historic agent whose acts possessed the qualities of immediacy and unmediated signification we commonly attribute to historic events. The MRF,

therefore, enacted a historic imaginary that declinated history in the present tense and inscribed historical meaning under the immanent rubric of *presence* against the transcendental horizon of historical time.

From a philosophical point of view, the fascist historic imaginary was rooted in the "actualist" philosophy of history elaborated by Fascism's prime philosopher, Giovanni Gentile, in the aftermath of the Great War.[31] According to Gentile, the modern subject had always oscillated between a transcendental-historical notion of "history belonging to the past" and the immanent-historic sense that "history belongs to the present," that is, "it is all present and immanent in the act of its construction."[32] The Great War, however, had produced for Gentile a momentous reorientation of the historical imagination from the historical to the historic pole, which Fascism alone had fully understood, embodied, and valorized. As Mussolini would laconically put it in one of his most famous mottoes: "Fascism *makes* history, rather than writing it!" In fact, below the surface of this typically virilist and bombastic declamation, Mussolini's motto betrayed a coherently modernist vision of history.

Fascism rejected the transcendental conception of history endorsed by both liberal and Marxist philosophies of history while at the same time issuing a direct intellectual challenge to the notion of historical consciousness they both assumed as legitimizing their notions of historical agency and representation. For Marxist materialism, just as for liberal historicism, positivism, and idealism, the modern subject of history was a historical agent in so far as s/he was endowed with a historical consciousness that translated the narrative objects of historical representation into transcendental metanarratives of emancipation ("freedom," "progress," "communism," etc.). Fascism instead conceived the subject as endowed of a historic imaginary that collapsed agency and representation along the lines of the actualist notion of history belonging to the present. This way, Fascism replaced both the diachronic direction of historical consciousness (past to present) and its image in historical representation (narrative) with the idea that only by making the past "present" one could properly make history. No wonder that an acute observer like Bataille would have been impressed by the historic representation staged in the MRF.

Quite aside their different aesthetic solutions, the artists, the representations, and all the rooms of the MRF were unified by a single rhetorical code that the ancient Greeks called *enàrgeia*, the Romans *evidentia*, and we would translate today as palpability, in the sense of a sensory *effect of presence*. They all sought to give presence to the revolutionary past in the mind of the observer, and to thereby elide the medium of narrative between historical agency and consciousness. Although this operation can in no way be reduced to a mere "aestheticization" of history, the modernist form of the exhibition also highlighted something neither Mussolini's historic speeches nor the ritual celebration of the March on Rome could ever have revealed. As the organizers had explicitly requested of the artists, the narrative of events in the MRF was transformed into three "*tempi*" (period/acts) arranged in a "synaesthetic crescendo."[33] The historic encoding of the exhibition was hereby achieved entirely by confounding the viewer's senses while at the same time ensuring an increasing transfiguration of visual stimuli into tactile appropriation. In this manner, the exhibition of the *decennale* was able to reveal the "normative" conception of style that had

sustained the fascist aesthetization of politics in general, and the formation of the fascist historic imaginary in particular.

As Mussolini had made abundantly clear from the earliest years of the regime, the aesthetic horizon of fascism had never been that of creating a specific style in art, in the descriptive sense of creating a fascist style, that is, a distinctive union of form and content identifiable as fascist.[34] Fascism sought to affirm itself as style *tout court*, in the "normative" sense masterfully defined by Ernst Gombrich as entailing, on the side of the artist(-politician), the search for a "synaesthetic" impact activating in the viewer processes of analogic association and, on the side of the audience, the perception of a "consistency and conspicuousness that makes a performance or an artifact—or, we may add, a political movement—stand out from a mass of 'undistinguished' events and objects."[35] Initially this normative conception of style had been ushered in by Italian futurism. Both the futurist "destruction of poetic syntax" and its "reconstruction of the universe" pivoted around the replacement of synthesis by analogy and synaesthesia. And whether in the autotelic birth of futurism from a seven-meters-long phallus—in Marinetti's first novel, *Mafarka le futuriste* (1907)—or in the proposal of the double noun (i.e., "man-torpedo") as the antidote to all adverbs and adjectives, the original kernel of futurist rhetorics of virility was the war against everything that "constituted the multicolored festoons, the trompe l'oeil swags, pedistals, parapets, and balaustrades of the old traditional styles."[36] Using Marinetti's signature device—the double noun—we could say that it was this normative conception of style that gave *futurismo-stile* its peculiar mass-cultural appeal, distinguished it from all other European avant-gardes, and constituted its most significant contribution to fascist modernism.

It was not so much that fascist discourse was traversed by futurist rhetorics of virility, nor that Mussolini brought the subordination of synthesis to analogy to rhetorical perfection in his paratactical speeches, nor even that the Duce tried to incarnate the very idea of a leader who *has style*. What made fascist modernism identifiable with the imaginary horizon of *fascismo-stile*—rather than with any specific contribution of avant-garde artists and movements to fascist image politics—was the relentless pursuit of a politics of absolute distinction founded on the stimulation of synaesthetic processes of reception associated with mass psychology and culture. Although it lacked the driving force of a racial or social utopia, Fascism never contented itself with mere consensus. The modernist kernel of the fascist utopia consisted precisely in giving all Italians *a feeling of absolute distinction* rather than mere identity.[37] Situated at its center of propulsion, the fascist historic imaginary fulfilled this normative utopia by producing ever-changing images of fascist history-making. While this normative notion of style had emerged historically with futurism, and found its political incarnation in Mussolini's definition of the fascist project as aimed at "giving style" to the Italian masses, it was in the synaesthetic crescendo of the MRF that *fascismo-stile* found its most mature aesthetic expression.[38]

The last room of the exhibition's itinerary, the Gallery of Fasces, contained ten pilasters shaped as so many fascists holding up their arms in the Roman salute, each of them representing a revolutionary from "1914 to the ANNO I" (year first of the fascist calendar) (figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 The "Gallery of Fasces."

Was this to be understood as a "synthetic representation" of the revolution, as the catalogue claimed? Hardly—given that the revolution was presented in the exhibition as lasting nine years. More plausibly, it was a self-refential move. In the last room of its historic itinerary, the MRF projected its own celebratory form—the *decennale*—onto time itself. Like faithful soldiers of the revolution, the revolutionary years had taken their place within a new and solely fascist unit of historic time: the decade. As the regime's measure of a historic annulment of time, the mental image of the decade offered an imaginary solution to Fascism's most agonizing problem: the tension between the mortality of Mussolini's body and the seeming immortality of the cult of the Duce. Yet, with this stylization of historical time the MRF also superceded the historic imaginary it had placed upon the stage. In fact, demonstrating the very material impact of the MRF on the evolution of the fascist historic

imaginary itself, the temporal image of the decade of the 1930s became ubiquitous in fascist discourse, ritual, and image politics as a means to project the fascist present towards the future.

Italian Fascism, of course, did not invent the decade; as early as the nineteenth century, Russian intellectuals were refering to their distinct and successive generations in terms of decades ("the men of the 1820s," ". . . of the 1940s" etc.), and American media would refer to the "roaring 1920s" even before that decade was over. However, the fascist decade was neither retroactive nor generational; instead, it represented a stylization of time projected toward the future. In other words, the fascist decade constituted Italian Fascism's answer to the utopian time of its totalitarian rivals: the apocalyptic "one thousand years Reich" of German Nazism and the revolutionary "five-year plans" of Russian bolshevism. Yet with this stylized unit of historic time projected toward the future, the fascist historic imaginary did lose its original connection to "history belonging to the present."

While winning its war against the "historical," the fascist historic imaginary of the 1930s shifted its predicative form from the historic present to the historic infinitive. In so doing, it split right down the middle into, on the one hand, the stylized time of the historic decade projected toward the future and, on the other, the serialization and museification of all past and present time—including the "fascist revolution" itself. Intellectually, this process corresponded to the waning of Gentile's philosophical-political star. And with the fraying of the actualist tightrope that had sustained its formation, the fascist historic imaginary itself began oscillating between the regimentation of the present in the form of the past and the projection of history into the future. Contrary to Gentile's prediction, then, the fascist mind had reoriented itself from history belonging to the past to history belonging to the present, only to find itself oscillating between the present belonging to history and history belonging to the future. Yet it is precisely in this return of the repressed—this oscillation—in a new form, that we may find the most compelling reason to consider the legacy of the fascist historic imaginary on the forms of temporality that have developed in our so-called postmodern era.

Notwithstanding repeated declarations of death for all forms of historical consciousness, and related calls by prominent philosophers and intellectuals to endorse a "postmodern" attitude toward time and life, faith in Enlightenment ideals and historical progress has remained alive at all times since the end of World War II, and is still shared by millions of people—not only in the West. Yet, it is also undeniable that over the past six decades this faith has had to compete with an adversary much more corrosive and insidious than philosophical propositions. What may have initially belonged to the collective imaginary of the Russian intelligentia—the decade—has been appropriated by the fashion-system to become the principal unit by which most people in the West count, segment, and account for the passing of time. The "1950s," "the 1960s" are no longer labels directed to generations of writers, but to specific life forms whose distinguishing referent is always a style (of clothing, hair cut, car, or acting); their common signified is never progress, or historical evolution, but always mere seriality. Fashions simply *follow* rather than *evolve from* each other, and they also always return. Could the stylization of time enacted by the fascist historic imaginary in the 1930s have constituted the crucial step in the

transfiguration of the "generation-decade" into the "fashion-decade" that characterizes what we may properly term the *posthistoric(al) imaginary* of our age?

This question is blatantly rhetorical and provocative. Its verification and transformation into a specific research agenda lies well beyond the scope of this essay. Yet to confirm the plausibility of a very direct connection between the evolution of fascist historic culture and the diffusion of a postmodern sensitivity dominated by the temporality of fashion we do not need to resort to far-fetched alliterations, nor to Susan Sontag's warnings about "fascinating fascism."[39] This connection and collusion is inscribed in the unique place that Italy—that is, "made in Italy"—has assumed in the postindustrial imaginary on a global scale. Whether embodied in design or material products, the idea of *Italia-stile* functions as an antidote and parasitical other to the idea of fashion itself. The bearer of Italian fashion is not simply *in style*; she or he imagines herself or himself as *having style*, precisely in the normative sense of feeling distinct in the mass of seemingly undistinguishable consumers.[40] Lest we want to give in to the ridiculously virilist and profoundly racist notion that Italians have style in their blood, we must recognize this cultural construct as indicative of a normative style imaginary that may well be the most enduring legacy of fascist modernism. Unencumbered by either totalitarian or modernist utopias, the normative conception of style that sustained a fascismo-stile has found globalized fulfillment in the postwar construction of *Italia-stile*. Isn't it quite plausible then to identify the iconization of *Italia-stile* as symptom of a posthistorical imaginary that has responded to the fascist stylization of time with the transfiguration of the decade into a temporality understood as serialized *mode retro*?

While hardly offering empirical evidence for this hypothesis, the symptoms that characterize the formation of a posthistoric form of imaginary offer plausible corroboration. It is hardly disputable that one of the principal traits that separates postwar generations among themselves and from previous ones is their explicit acknowledgment of the role played by historic events in the formation of their imaginaries. The "Holocaust," "1968," the "Fall of the Berlin Wall," just to cite the key events that have marked three successive generations of postwar Europeans, have all been explicitly perceived, described, and treated as "historic"—on different imaginary levels, of course. At the same time, none of them has been transfigured into the birth of a historic agent as was the March on Rome by Italian fascists. On the contrary, the formation of generational imaginaries after World War II has been haunted by a recurrent and obsessive image of "The End" of history—but naturally accompanied by the cinematic promise of infinite new beginnings.

First articulated by Alexander Kojéve in lectures first presented in Paris in the late 1930s but published only after World War II, the quintessential Hegelian trope of "the end of history" has incarnated itself into a series of icons that have percolated at all levels of mass culture.[41] The postmodern (Western) imaginary has been consumed by historic semantics: from Adorno's famous equation of Auschwitz with "the end of poetry," to more recent ones associating it with "the end of the Enlightenment" and modernity, to the popular association of 1968 with "the end of ideologies," to the identification of the Fall of the Berlin Wall with "the end of communism." Successive but repetitive forms of posthistoric imaginaries are driven by the categorical imperative of surviving beyond the end of the Enlightenment, modernity, ideologies, and

history. Yet in the repetitive return of posthistoric semantics to the mental image of the end of history, we may also see a very specific connection between the rise of posthistoric imaginaries and the evolution of fascist historic culture as a whole. The idea of the end of history does not so much refer to the decline of historical semantics. It captures instead the historical demise of the fascist idea of historic agency in fascist historic culture itself. Posthistoric imaginaries institutionalize the historic infinitive projected by Italian Fascism in the 1930s. In the final analysis, the postmodern condition, famously defined by Jean François Lyotard as a widespread "incredulity toward metanarratives" may be more fruitfully reformulated as a posthistoric(al) condition marked by imaginaries that prevent the experience of both historical transcendence and historic immanence.[42]

Notes

* The main argument presented in this essay is fully developed in my book, *The Historic Imaginary Politics of History in Fascist Italy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). I thank the press for allowing me to publish here some material belonging to the book.

1. This letter was first exhibited in the exhibition Raymond Queneau plus intime, held in Paris in April 1978; cf. Carlo Ginzburg, *Myths, and the Historical Method* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 143. It was then published in almost integral form, in original (French) and Italian translation, and with a commentary by the author in Marina Galletti, "Il sacro nell'ideologia del fascismo. Commento ad un inedito di Bataille," *Alternative* 4 (1989): 112–13. Now it has been reprinted integrally in Georges Bataille, *Choix de lettres 1917–1962* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), pp. 80–83.
2. Georges Bataille, "La structure psychologique du fascisme," *La Critique sociale* 10 (November 1933): 159–65 and 11 (March 1934): 205–11. Now in Georges Bataille, *Visions of Excess. Selected Writings: 1927–1939*, ed. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 137–60. All quotations are from this 1985 version.
3. Ibid., pp. 142–43.
4. Throughout the essay I capitalize the word "Fascism" only when referred to Mussolini's movement. I leave it in lower-case whenever its referent is generic.
5. For a brief introduction to Bataille's life and work see Michael Richardson, *Georges Bataille* (London: Routledge, 1994).
6. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hanna Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 218.
7. Marla Stone, *The Patron State: Culture and Politics in Fascist Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 168. The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution has been the main focus of an unpublished dissertation, several articles, and quite a few recent monographs on fascist mass culture. See Libero Andreotti, "Art and Politics in Italy: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution" (Ph.D. diss., Massachussets Institute of Technology, 1989); Giorgio Ciucci, "L'autorappresentazione del fascismo: La mostra del decennale della marcia su Roma," *Rassegna di Architettura* (June 4, 1982): 48–55; Gigliola Fioravanti, ed., *Archivio Centrale dello Stato: Partito Nazionale Fascista—Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista, Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato—Strumenti CIX* (Roma: ACS 1990); Fabio Benzi, Mario Sironi, *Il mito dell'architettura* (Milano: Electa 1990); Diane Ghirardo "Architects, Exhibitions, and the Politics of Culture in Fascist Italy," *Journal of Architectural Education* (*JAE*) (February 1992): 67–75; Libero Andreotti, "The Aesthetics of War: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution," *JAE* (February 1992): 76–86; Jeffrey T. Schnapp, "Fascism's Museum in Motion," *JAE* (February 1992): 87–98; Brian McLaren, "Under the Sign of Reproduction," *JAE* (February 1992): 98–106; Jeffrey T. Schnapp, "Epic Demonstrations.

Fascist Modernity and the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution" in *Fascism, Aesthetics, and Culture,* ed. Richard J. Golsan (Hanover: University of New England Press 1992), pp. 1–37; Marla Stone, "Staging Fascism: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (April 1993): 215–43; Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 102–13; Emily Braun, *Mario Sironi and Italian Modernism. Art and Politics under Fascism* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 132–57; and, finally, *The Historic Imaginary*.

8. On art under Nazism see Sandra Lotte Esslinger "Art in the Third Reich: The Fabrication of National Cultural Identity" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 2000), Peter Adam, *Art of the Third Reich* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1992), and the collection of essays *The Nazification of Art. Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich*, ed. B. Taylor and W. van der Will (Winchester, UK: Winchester Press, 1990).
9. Among the most recent and comprehensive studies are Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001); Braun, *Mario Sironi and Italian Modernism*, Stone, *The Patron State*; Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Jeffrey Schnapp, *Staging Fascism. 18 BL and the Theatre of Masses for the Masses* (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1996), and Karen Pinkus, *Bodily Regimes: Italian Advertising under Fascism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); but also the special issue on "The Aesthetics of Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 31, 2 (April 1996), and the collection of essays edited by R.J. Golsan, *Fascism, Aesthetics, and Culture* (Hanover, NH: University of New England Press, 1992). Finally, for a a visual documentation of fascist aesthetics see images and essays in the catalogues of the exhibitions *Art and Power: Europe under the Dictators 1930–1945 at the Hayward Gallery, London, October 1995–January 1996*, catalogue published by the Hayward Gallery; and *Designing Modernity: The Arts of Reform and Persuasion 1885–1945*, at the Wolfsonian, Miami (Fl), 1995, catalogue published by Themes and Hudson, New York.
10. Compare Adam, "Art," 22–39, to Stone, *The Patron State*, p. 6.
11. Esslinger, "Art in the Third Reich," pp. 1–8.
12. Stone, *The Patron State*, pp. 177–221.
13. Walter Adamson, "The Language of Opposition in Early Twentieth-Century Italy: Rhetorical Continuities between Prewar Florentine Avant-Gardism and Mussolini's Fascism," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (March 1992): 22–51.
14. Barbara Spackman, *Fascist Virilities. Rhetoric, Ideology, and Social Fantasy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), and Walter Adamson, "Futurism, Mass Culture, and Women: The Reshaping of an Artistic Vocation, 1909–1920," *Modernism/modernity* 4, 1 (1997): 89–114.
15. Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, trans. David Maisel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); in particular Zeev Sternhell, with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*, trans. David Maisel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
16. Walter Adamson, *Avant-Garde Florence: From Modernism to Fascism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
17. Walter Adamson, "Modernism and Fascism: The Politics of Culture in Italy, 1903–1922," *American Historical Review* 95, 2 (April 1990): 359–90; and "Fascism and Culture: Avant-Gardes and Secular Religion in the Italian Case," *Journal of Contemporary History* 24, 3 (July 1989): 411–36.
18. Andreas Huyssen, *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
19. On the historical–theoretical relationship between aesthetic and Catholic modernisms see Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch,*

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Chapter Four

The Danish Far Right Goes to War: Danish Fascism and Soldiering in the *Waffen SS*, 1930–1945

Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith

Our objectives in this essay are to demonstrate how fascism and Nazism in the 1930s attracted membership from citizens of even small and relatively stable democratic states such as Denmark. We draw from archival materials that document right-wing activity in Denmark prior to World War II as well as the voluntary enrolment of 6,000 Danes in the *Waffen SS* during the war. We outline the history of the Danish Nazi movement, Danish participation in Nazi warfare on the Eastern front, the social and psychological profile of the Danish *Waffen SS* volunteers, and their political schooling and relationship to Nazi ideology. We then conclude with an assessment of the postwar fate of the Danish *Waffen SS* members and their ideological vision.

Denmark and the Rise of Fascism

The global stock market crash of 1929 had a delayed impact on Denmark in the early 1930s. While the economic crisis triggered social and political unrest throughout the rest of Europe, the years leading up to World War II remained comparatively peaceful for the 3.5 million inhabitants of the small Scandinavian constitutional monarchy of Denmark. A coalition forged between the social democratic party *Socialdemokratiet* and the center-liberal party *Det Radikale Venstre* ruled without interruption from 1929 until the German occupation in April 1940, much to the displeasure of the Danish right. However, among the two major right parties, *Konservative* and *Venstre* (the farmers' party), the latter helped vote through parliament some of the most important laws of the period, mitigating some of the most dire consequences of the economic crisis through a mixture of tight economic policy, social security improvements, and political consensus.[1]

Danish democracy survived intact, but its political struggles were conducted in the shadow of evident success and vitality among the Fascist neighbors to the South, as well as of rapid industrialization among the Communist Soviets to the East. Denmark was pulling through well enough, but many were more impressed by

Hitler's Germany, where economic growth was replacing mass unemployment and hyperinflation. It was, furthermore, a spectacular sight to glimpse media images of thousands of soldiers marching in rhythm and paying homage to their leader; the massive display of machine-coordinated power under Nazism conveyed strength and invincibility. Many Danes felt there was something "slack" about domestic democratic conditions, when compared with the tightly choreographed Nazi party rallies at Nuremberg.

While the leaders of the largest Danish parties, *Socialdemokratiet*, *Venstre*, *Det Radikale Venstre*, and *Konservative* embraced democracy as a form of government, all but *Det Radikale Venstre* struggled to some extent with insurgent elements within their membership seeking to fundamentally change the political system. Numerically, the farmers stood out the most. The LS (*Landboernes Sammenslutning*) crisis movement was the first of several revolutionary movements in the 1930s, expanding its ranks to about 100,000 members. The LS emerged directly out of agricultural hardships and was characterized by hostile attitudes toward the government and a general distrust of democracy, which manifested itself through partial cooperation with the Danish Nazis. It was to a great extent the farmers who supported the organization JAK (*Jord Arbejde og Kapital*), founded in 1931. JAK printed its own money for use within the branches of the movement and granted low-interest loans to hard-pressed farmers. The agrarian romanticism and anti-industrial ideology that inspired the movement gradually assumed a decidedly Fascist inflection and drew close to 35,000 members during the 1930s.[2]

While the rest of Europe seemed to have effectively contained socialism, in Denmark it was in nearly full possession of government power. However, within the ranks of *Det Konservative Folkeparti*, the southern influence was especially evident, extending as far as the *Folketing*, where several party members drew inspiration from Italian Fascism. The party's youth organization, *Konservativ Ungdom* (KU), was quite outspoken in its opinion on these matters, praising one leader for his "Hitler caliber," while young conservatives voiced their resentment of Danish democracy. Even farther to the right were the Danish Nazis, for whom racial theory assumed primacy over attacking democracy and parliamentarianism.[3] However, militant antidemocratic attacks against the system extended beyond the ranks of the right wing. *Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti* (Denmark's Danish Communist Party, or DKP) gained influence in the early 1930s most especially among the unemployed. The DKP wholeheartedly supported the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union, while ignoring the Stalinist atrocities, and furthermore defended forced collectivization, Stalin's ethnic cleansing, the Soviet show trials, as well as the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact established between the Soviet Union and Germany in August 1939.[4] Radical groups never came to dominate Danish politics, but their militant and activist agitation shaped public consciousness to a considerable degree. The victories of dictatorships abroad and the existence of extremist movements at home convinced many ordinary citizens that Western democracies were in a state of political, economic, and cultural crisis and that radical solutions were necessary. This enabled extremist movements to gain authority far beyond their own ranks and wield considerable influence over the contours of the social debates of the 1930s.

Fascism on the Agenda

The social debate of the 1930s revolved not only around whether democracy was a suitable form of government, but also addressed genetics, national patriotism, child-rearing, social morality, and public health—concerns frequently linked with conservative values. Johannes V. Jensen, who received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1944 and was among the most famous authors of the period, embraced several of these tendencies. His best-selling tome, *Den lange rejse* (The Long Journey), consisted of unabashed racist biological paeans to Nordic blood and the achievements of Aryan peoples. In parliament, many expressed approval for the political tendencies of the period. "Fascism is the first clear feature of the new, remoulded Europe," proclaimed prominent conservative Folketing member Ole Bjørn Kraft, and continued, "Instead of freedom, equality and fraternity, we must speak of order, authority and discipline"[5] Publications within the party's youth organization overflowed with such pronouncements, supporting Franco's military uprising against the democratically elected Spanish government and writing enthusiastically about Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. A delegation of KU members visiting the German concentration camp Dachau expressed approval of the order and systematization that characterized the institution. It is striking that the KU experienced explosive growth that parallel exactly the peak in Fascism, with membership in 1935 approaching 30,000 members. The KU's success demonstrated that a policy with fascist qualities held an appeal far beyond Nazi ranks.[6]

Many Danes did not overtly subscribe to Fascism and Nazism but were nevertheless attracted to some aspects. The desire for an active government and a powerful state ruled by "apolitical" idealists was widespread, as was concern about the alleged spread of materialism, immorality, sensuality, and decadence. To many Danes, it seemed as though discipline, militarization, and moral purity imbued the fascist countries with a grandeur that made the seemingly paralysed and pacifistic democracies appear pathetic and hopelessly outdated in their efforts to address critical problems. In several regions, the public was of the opinion that Italy and Germany were achieving results while nothing was happening in Denmark. "Order and discipline" seemed to prevail abroad, in contrast to democracy and indecision at home. Denmark's top athlete, Niels Bukh, left no doubt as to the source of his inspiration: in a newspaper interview in 1933, he disclosed that, were he 20 years younger, he would have liked to assume in Denmark the role that Hitler had filled in Germany. He doubtlessly spoke for many when he continued, "We need to straighten things out. We've become used to having it too easy here at home. It seems to me that we badly need a man with strong and pure ideals instead of the cold and sterile form of government we have at the moment."[7]

Although the Social Democrats and Communists were among the most vigorous opponents of Fascism, they were also influenced by the tendencies of the times. The young Social Democrats and the Communist youth movement militarized their political manifestations in the same manner as did the radical right wing, through marches, parades, and mass meetings attended by uniformed participants and accompanied by a display of party symbols in the form of flags and images of leading party figures. Sexual morality and physical culture were among the areas of agreement

between the extreme right and the political center. The DSU and KU cooperated in combating so-called pulp literature, for example, so-called medical novels, soft-porn fiction, and sexual education pamphlets, all of which they regarded as having a corrupting influence on young people. It was not so much sexual morality, but rather public health that particularly concerned Social Democrat politician K.K. Steincke. Not surprisingly, given the preoccupation with genetic theories during the 1930s, Steincke was especially preoccupied with so-called population issues. Convinced that many social problems, among them alcoholism, were of genetic origin, he feared that high birthrates among the socially most disadvantaged would result in an overall decline in the quality of the Danish population. Like many physicians and researchers of the time, he sought solutions in the practice of so-called racial hygiene, a practice that became the scientific rational for instating a sterilization law in 1929. This law, which placed Denmark at the forefront of the racial hygiene discourse in Europe, targeted a vague social grouping encompassing the mentally and physically handicapped as well as social misfits, all of whom were at risk of losing the right to have children.[8]

From Crisis to War

By the late 1930s, the economic crisis was subsiding without the extremist parties even having gained a serious foothold in Danish politics. Elsewhere, the commencement of World War II had reinforced support for the extreme right and its values. Germany's surprising victories in Poland, in Scandinavia, and over the British and French on the western front once more made democracy appear to be a weak and antiquated system of rule. In Norway, the *Nazi National Samling* came to power, and in France, democracy's crisis of legitimacy resulted in the establishment of a dictatorship, with the very conservative and nationalist Vichy government as formed under Marshal Petain following the German defeat of France. In Denmark, bewilderment over the German victories found expression through a nationalist wave that swept the country in the form of community singing and hiking. A small group of businessmen and intellectuals, members of *Højgaardkredsen* and *Danmarkskredsen*, forged plans to form a "nonpolitical" government of technocrats drawn from the ranks of business and public administration. While their ambition was for "the best men in the realm" to be brought to power not through the *Folketing* but through royal intervention in the form of a government coup, their scheme was unsuccessful.[9]

As the right wing grew stronger, the DKP came under increasing fire from the public. During the 1930s the DKP had established itself in the political arena as a small but well-functioning organization that gained in popularity during mass unemployment. But following a number of international events and social democratic initiatives in the trade union movement, its popularity waned to the point where it was detested by many. The show trials in the Soviet Union, which the party stubbornly defended and which received thorough coverage in the Danish press, were only the first step in series of mishaps culminating in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In response to this pact, the Soviet Union declared war on Finland and annexed the three Baltic states and Romanian Bessarabia—all measures that roused widespread indignation among the Danish people. A wide-scale anticommunist

campaign culminated in mass meetings and the burning of works by Martin Andersen Nexø and other Communist authors. Anticommunism became the popular sentiment of the day.[10]

Thus, many aspects of the public during the 1930s and into the first war years indicate that Fascist attitudes were not without resonance in Denmark. It was not very common to be a Nazi but many expressed sympathy for elements of Nazi ideology and were impressed by the results of Nazi/Fascist power. Those who praised Hitler were neither scorned nor poorly regarded for denouncing the Democratic system. However, with the Nazi occupation of Denmark, many radical rightists turned against Nazism even more so as the German military began to suffer losses after 1943. In fact, many prominent conservatives who had flirted with antidemocratic tendencies went on to join the Danish Resistance. But others who had attacked the system in the 1930s chose to pursue their ideological convictions to the extreme by signing up for German military service, and several thousand were accepted into the *Waffen SS*.

The Occupation of Denmark and the Danish Policy of Collaboration

On April 9, 1940, following brief and very limited resistance, Denmark was occupied by German troops. From then and until late August 1943, Denmark was officially ruled by a democratically elected government drawn from the major parties. The four "old" parties, which commanded about 90 percent of the votes, formed a coalition government shortly after the occupation, and a succession of Danish governments based on this broad coalition maintained a working relationship with the German occupation force throughout and beyond the ensuing three years. This shielded the bulk of the Danish population from the more brutal aspects of rule under occupation. However, the Danish model was also marked by concessions to the Nazis that resulted in internment of around 400 Danish Communists and their supporters following the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Denmark also signed the Anti-Comintern treaty in November 1941, and the Danish authorities actively cooperated in combating anti-German sentiments and acts of resistance. In addition, Denmark was pressured into economic collaboration, exporting butter, fish, pork meat, and other products in exchange for coal and raw materials from Germany after its trade links to Great Britain were severed. On August 29, 1943, after a series of protests against both the Danish government and the Germans, the government declined a German ultimatum that demanded capital punishment for acts of sabotage and submitted its letter of resignation to the king. During the final period of the occupation, Denmark was ruled by an administration of civil servants maintaining a working relationship with the Germans.[11]

Danes in the Waffen SS

On April 23, 1940—exactly two weeks after the German invasion of Denmark and Norway—Himmler ordered the establishment of a military unit, the *SS Standarte Nordland*, to include volunteers from these two countries.[12] With the recruitment of Scandinavians to Nordland the SS sought to overcome the strict limits imposed on

the growth of the *Waffen SS* by the Wehrmacht concerning the drafting of German citizens. Until mid-1941, the criteria for admission of so-called Germanic volunteers into the ranks of the *Waffen SS* were the same as those for German citizens: namely, excellent physical shape and a high degree of ideological commitment. Recruitment to *Standarte Nordland* in Denmark was initially conducted in secrecy in order not to challenge the Danish governmental ban on recruitment into foreign armies. Only two groups were involved in this process: members of the Danish Nazi party, the DNSAP (*Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti*), and the German minority (around 30,000) in Southern Jutland.[13]

In spring 1941 recruitment went public, and shortly after the German assault on the Soviet Union, a new unit for Danes, *Frikorps Danmark*, was set up within the framework of the *Waffen SS*. *Frikorps Danmark* was to consist exclusively of Danes (both men and officers), to use Danish as the language of instruction and command, and to be a nonpolitical entity accepting all Danes interested in combating communism. Similar units—so-called Legions—were organized for Dutch, Flemish, and Norwegian volunteers.[14] While there was never any broad public support behind *Frikorps Danmark*, the start of war against the Soviet Union broke new records for the recruitment of Danes. Over the next years a small but steady flow of Danish citizens enlisted for service and were sent to *Standarte Nordland* in *SS Division Wiking*, *Frikorps Danmark*, and a number of other *Waffen SS* units.

By the time the Third Reich collapsed in May 1945, altogether some 12,000 Danes had volunteered for armed service in Germany, mainly with the *Waffen SS*. However, only 6,000 were actually admitted. The German minority in Denmark contributed about one-fourth of this exclusive group—approximately 1,500 men serving primarily in division *Totenkopf* and *1 SS Brigade*.[15] Our research concentrates on the remaining 4,500 volunteers located mainly in the *Wiking* division, the *Nordland* division (not to be confused with *Standarte/Regiment Nordland*), and *Frikorps Danmark*. We focus on the political and social background of these volunteers, their political outlook, and postwar controversies related to the recruitment of Danes for the Eastern Front.

Profile of the Danish Volunteers

Some of the most interesting insights regarding the background and motives of the volunteers were gathered from studies conducted in the 1950s on *landsvigerne* (literally: *the betrayers of the Fatherland*), those Danes convicted for variously supporting the occupation forces. Criminologist Karl O. Christiansen concluded that, as a group, the "traitors" hailed from a wide spectrum of the broader Danish population, from all areas of the country, from various occupations, and various levels of social status. A subsequent study of so-called recidivism helped illustrate this and surprisingly enough, also revealed that renewed criminal behavior was quite rare among this group as compared to common criminals. The study thus did away with the prevalent perception of traitors as just so many criminals and social outcasts. It was furthermore determined that members of the German minority exhibited the lowest percentage of recidivism, and the group of DNSAP members, the next lowest. These conclusions were also reinforced by psychological and psychiatric tests, indicating

that the traitors did not deviate from the norm with respect to intelligence and social and educational status.[16]

Studies specifically on the volunteer population were never conducted. However, large numbers of registration forms for *Frikorps Danmark* have been preserved, and various statistical data can be compiled from the sentences that ensued from court hearings of the Danish soldiers in the *Waffen SS*. The average age of the *Frikorps* volunteers was 24.9 years on account of the relatively large proportion of older men. Nearly 40 percent of the applicants were older than 26, and as many as 18 percent were 30 or more years old. Among the 77 Danish officers who had reported for German military service by summer 1943, the average age was 33 years. That the group of officers should be somewhat older than the enlisted men was not surprising, but on balance it may be said that the volunteers were more mature than one would expect.[17]

A large percentage of the volunteers—68 percent of all enlisted Danes in the *Frikorps*—came from working-class backgrounds. This fact has to be regarded parallel with the fact that 35 percent of the male population in 1940 was employed in trade and industry. Falling real wages and high unemployment among the working class during the first year of war may have impelled some to enlist as volunteers. Indeed, 20 percent of those interviewed for the aforementioned criminological study cited economic need as a primary cause for entering into German military service. At the same time, it is worth noting that a volunteer's wages in 1941 amounted to merely two *kroner* per day, which was considerably below what could be earned by, for instance, building bunkers for the Germans on the west coast of Jutland.[18] Only 11 percent of the *Frikorps* soldiers were previously employed in farming, which in 1940 employed 30 percent of all Danish men. Recruitment to the *Waffen SS* was essentially an urban phenomenon, for recruitment advertising could be pursued more intensely in the cities and the Danish Nazis, from whose ranks the volunteers generally stemmed, generally had their focal points in the cities.

Among the volunteers for *Frikorps Danmark*, 22 percent had previously held civilian jobs in Germany. German job sites did engage in extensive recruitment propaganda to solicit foreign workers, with Danish volunteers giving talks about the *Waffen SS* and boasting about the battles on the Eastern front. For some Danes, employment in Germany may have later inspired enlistment for the Eastern front. However, among the 100,000 Danes who went to Germany in search of employment, very few ever signed up, with only 2–6 percent estimated to have been Nazi sympathizers.[19] Some recruits had a prior criminal career; among the 654 volunteers for the Eastern front, 14.2 percent in the criminological study had previously served one or several prison terms. Similar results can be gathered from materials from the Danish foreign ministry: among 2,307 *Waffen SS* recruits in 1943, 666 men had been convicted in this manner. Between recruitment process and actual induction, the Germans sought to screen out those with a police record. In November 1941, 44 *Frikorps Danmark* volunteers were sent back because of their criminal records, as was a somewhat smaller group.in March 1942. A German letter written in late 1944 indicates that only 63 Danes with police records had thus far gained accepted into the *Waffen SS*, while all others with previous conviction had been rejected. According to the letter, a total of 1,176 of the 12,180 volunteers had previous convictions. The

German figure seems to considerably underestimate the actual acceptance rate of Danes with a criminal record. For many, recruitment was definitely a means to get a fresh start in life.[20]

The Story of the Danish Nazis

Given the large number of Nazis among the recruits, it would seem appropriate to elaborate on the history of the Danish Nazis. Although there was considerable ideological congruence between Nazism and the right wing in Denmark, the Danish Nazis never gained a strong footing within the population. One would almost think otherwise, given that a total of 29 local Nazi parties were in operation in Denmark prior to 1945.[21] However, only one party, the DNSAP wielded any real political influence, drawing about 43,000 voters at the height of its power in 1943, while the remaining Nazi parties never drew more than several hundred members. The DNSAP was founded in November 1930 and modeled itself after the 25-point program of the German Nazi party, the NSDAP. On the whole, copying became characteristic of the DNSAP. Overall, what distinguished this party from its big brother to the South was the dream of a large and vigorous *Denmark*—not Germany.[22]

After a colossal defeat in the *Folketing* election in 1932, the party's founder Cay Lembcke was removed from office and the physician Frits Clausen was instituted as the new leader. Clausen was a better politician than the fanatical and eccentric Lembcke, but the next *Folketing* election nevertheless ended in disappointment, with the party receiving only one percent of the vote. The poor election inspired the party to change its strategy, with partial success, doubling membership from 2,500 in 1935 to 5,000 in 1939. That same year the Danish Nazis were also elected to the *Folketing* for the first time; with slightly over 31,000 votes, the DNSAP won three seats in the *Folketing*.[23] The very modest election results combined with the DNSAP's admittedly pompous rhetoric and Frits Clausen's somewhat comical mannerism to make it difficult for many people to take the party seriously. That radically changed on April 9, 1940, and suddenly the party became a direct menace to the rest of Denmark. There had already been widespread rumours within the party about an imminent takeover, but the occupation forces derived greater advantage from keeping the parliamentary government in power, while using the existence of the DNSAP as a scare tactic in case the government did not toe the line. Even though the Germans did not confer governing power on the party, the DNSAP's membership began to increase, reaching its heyday in March 1943 with 21,500 members. But the election that same year still was a big disappointment for the DNSAP, which had expected to win up to 19 seats. While its electorate increased considerably from about 31,000 to about 43,000, greater general participation in the election meant that it nevertheless received no more than 2.1 percent of the overall votes. Poor election results, internal disagreements, and irrefutable indications that Germany was losing the war led to the rapid disintegration of the party. The leaders of the Danish Nazis furthermore suffered considerable defeat; Frits Clausen continued as the party's formal leader until spring 1944, but had lost most of his influence in the DNSAP by the summer of 1943. Clausen thereupon signed on with the *Waffen SS* in fall 1943, perhaps hoping that the prestige of being a soldier at the front would

be useful as the basis for a comeback. However, his service in the *Waffen SS* was another fiasco, and his career as a volunteer to the Eastern front ended in a mental hospital in Würzburg, where Himmler had placed him for alcoholism rehabilitation. Returning to Denmark in spring of 1944, Clausen was officially replaced in May by a so-called *førerråd*, a three-member board of leaders. The DNSAP continued to exist during the last 12 months of the war, but was increasingly disrupted by anarchy and internal strife.[24]

The DNSAP and Recruitment

Earlier recruitment to the *Waffen SS* was characterized by a certain ambivalence on the part of the DNSAP, because the party's aspiration to take over the government required retaining as many party members as possible within the country. Therefore, any limited and discrete recruitment was pursued in 1940 until June 1941, but the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 changed everything. The DNSAP began actively inducing its members to sign up with the *Waffen SS* and temporarily relinquished its goal of taking over the government. The *Waffen SS* recruitment represented another means for the DNSAP to gain power, leading the party to bargain for the *Waffen SS* to recognize the DNSAP as the only Danish Nazi party. In return, the party would pursue recruitment wholeheartedly. This promise was not difficult to fulfil.

Although there were some attempts to use recruitment as a means to blackmail the *Waffen SS*, the DNSAP basically stuck to the agreement, placing an appeal to members from party headquarters in Copenhagen early in the summer of 1942 read as follows:

> Our comrades in the Party! The big showdown on the Eastern front is now entering its final phase, and already, thousands of our volunteering comrades are already at the front, prepared to sacrifice their lives for Europe's, and therefore, Denmark's freedom. Now Denmark's military honour shall rise again in the massive struggle against the world's enemy—Jewish Communism. We herewith urge division leaders to call to the attention of all party members (…) that it is their sacred duty to sign up for active service with Frikorps Danmark. Step forward, comrades![25]

For a Danish Nazi there could be no doubt as to what the party demanded of him. Such appeals were printed daily in the national newspaper pages, while the party's internal press and media overflowed with calls for young men in the party to enlist. Later in 1942, another appeal from a DNSAP office in Copenhagen read: "The Party expects every man fit for active duty between the ages of 17 and 40 to enlist immediately. It will be up to the Party in communication with the pertinent political leader to determine who should not go. Almost everyone can be spared from their jobs."[26] The number of Danes volunteering for active service became a success indicator with respect to the German occupation force, while also serving to integrate the party itself. Within the ranks of the DNSAP, a veritable cult sprang up around the volunteers and journalistic coverage about them easily filled the most space in the columns of party organs. The volunteers were idolized while those who stayed home were criticized. A regional newsletter reads: "The best of our people are on active duty at the front on behalf of all of us."[27]

The pressure on able-bodied male party members was considerable. A young man in the DNSAP who chose not sign up with the *Waffen SS* could not look forward to much of a future within the party, socially or politically. If, on the other hand, he answered "the call," he was praised as a hero. The choice to report for duty in the *Waffen SS* may also have been made in reaction to the secret failure of Nazism. The lack of success during the election, the sabotage and unrest spreading through Denmark, and the German military defeat were leaving their mark. Shortly after August 29, 1943, a short-lived but measurable rise can be observed in the number of applicants for the *Waffen SS*.[28] For many DNSAP members, going to the Eastern front may have offered escape from worsening domestic conditions, since the Nazis became quite isolated and were despised by the rest of the Danish populace during the final stages of the war. Most of the volunteers had resorted to moving within narrow circles, and often their only contacts were with other Danish Nazis. This can be discerned from frequent references in the letters of the volunteers to Nazi friends or relatives also serving in the *Waffen SS*, mention of articles and greetings from the "Fatherland," packages from the Nazi support organization *Hjemmefronten*, and family members in other Nazi organizations. For many, the Nazi community was the only existence they knew and could imagine.

Recruitment Propaganda and Constituencies Beyond the Nazi Fold

Until summer 1941, recruitment for the *Waffen SS* was primarily confined to members of the DNSAP and the German minority. After the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the establishment of *Frikorps Danmark*, recruitment for German military service expanded, targeting in particular *Konservativ Ungdom* and Danish officers as two groups that were characterized by Fascist and antiparliamentary attitudes and staunch anticommunism throughout the 1930s. Given the right propaganda, it might be possible to win them over for service in the *Waffen SS*.

Through its network of recruiting offices, the DNSAP quickly came to manage the administrative and publicity aspects of recruitment. In its external recruitment propaganda, the party knew how to soft pedal certain elements of the war while foregrounding others. Large and colorful recruitment posters surfaced across the country, emphasizing anticommunism and nationalism while handling the racist motives more subtly.[29] In one of the best-known recruitment posters, a Viking stood before a Danish flag blowing in the wind, with a *Waffen SS* soldier in battle uniform in the foreground and text reading, "For Denmark, against Bolshevism." Although this poster dated from 1941, the overall style remained unchanged throughout the entire occupation period. During the last year of the war, posters more overtly played upon public fear of the Soviet invasion of Denmark. In spring 1945 the phrase became, "Today the Soviet army is only 95 kilometers away from Denmark." The very last recruitment poster showed a grinning skeleton draped in a Red Army uniform and perched atop a freight train filled with deported civilians headed for Siberia.[30]

Some propaganda clearly conceived of this as a racial war. One of the most prevalent recruitment posters depicts a crowd of caricatured Asiatic people carrying a red banner with a star of David attached to it and rushing forward toward a blonde Danish sword fighter. An advertising flyer for *Frikorps Danmark* made in 1941

contains the Russian bear with a similar star of David painted on it, and posters with antagonistic representations of Jews were sometimes displayed during party recruitment meetings. To solicit interest from candidates beyond the Nazis' own ranks, anticommunism was vigorously emphasized, herein stressing that service in the German military was not incompatible with Danish interests. While large segments of the Danish right wing equated enlistment in the German military service with treason, some interest existed, and in summer 1941 the *Konservative Folkeparti* sent observers to recruitment rallies around the country to determine the extent to which *Konservativ Ungdom* members were enlisting in *Frikorps Danmark*.[31] Their concerns were allayed, as many young conservatives became fervent pioneers in the Resistance movement.[32]

The circa 1,000 Danes who enlisted in the service on Finland's side during the Finnish–Russian war of 1939–1940 also made attractive candidates for the *Waffen SS*. Several were as interested in fighting in the so-called *fortsaettelseskrig* begun by Finland when it joined the war on Germany's side in June 1941. Although it quickly became clear that *Frikorps Danmark* would not be deployed in Finland, several hundred former Finland volunteers nevertheless enlisted in *Frikorps Danmark*. Many of these were presumably Nazis, such as subsequent commander of *Frikorps Danmark*, C.F. von Schalburg. Recruitment likely would have broadened if *Frikorps Danmark* had aligned itself with the Finnish army. The war between Finland and the Soviet Union was exploited in the propaganda as well. A recruitment pamphlet written immediately after the establishment of *Frikorps Danmark* maintained that the Corps would not go to Finland for purely organizational reasons, but asserted, "The struggle on the Eastern front is also a fight on behalf of Finland." Postwar hearings involving former volunteers to Finland indicates that they distinguished between German and Finnish military service. Rather than turn to the *Waffen SS* recruitment bureaus, they chose to travel to Finland illegally or not to enlist at all, with many subsequently joining the Resistance instead.[33]

The Recruitment of Officers and Noncommissioned Officers

The Germans were interested in volunteers with military experience, and the severe shortage of officers within the *Waffen SS* throughout the war made it particularly desirable to recruit Danish officers. The Danish government even permitted members of the Danish army a leave of absence if they wished to enlist in the *Waffen SS*. Before the establishment of *Frikorps Danmark*, and before the ministry of war circulars of June 8, 1941 were issued, legalizing leaves for officers seeking to enter German military service, a small group of officers had already volunteered for *Regiment Nordland*. However, a major influx did not occur until establishment of the *Frikorps* and the majority of the Danish officers who enlisted did so shortly following release of the above-mentioned circular. The first major group of volunteers left Denmark on July 19 and included 26 officers from the Danish army. By July 1943 there were 77 officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in German military service, but very few signed on thereafter.[34]

Soldiers derived a number of benefits from entering German military service. For one, the Danish military had been subject to many cutbacks during the 1930s, and

the army's role shrank even more drastically under German occupation. The prestige of the military had been in decline for years, but during occupation career possibilities plummeted. In addition, the occupation of April 9 had a significant psychological effect on the Danish officer corps, leaving them sidelined and humiliated. For some, the feeling of uselessness and shame was almost unbearable. For a number of officers, the takeover of their country nearly without a struggle contributed to their already considerable distrust of parliamentarianism. The commander of an artillery division in the Danish armed forces, Christian Peter Kryssing, expressed what many officers felt when he wrote his mother on April 9: "What I predicted has happened. What a contemptible a government we have, and how contemptible the nation we belong to, for after all, the government is elected by the nation."[35] In a letter dated ten days later, he remarked: "I keep my distance with all civilians. I see the enemy in all of them, that is, someone never willing to make any significant sacrifice in defence of the country."[36] Less than one and a half years later, Kryssing became the first commander of *Frikorps Danmark*. This was a great coup for the Nazis, for as a high-ranking and respected officer of the Danish army, Kryssing represented precisely the type of non-Nazi radical rightist recruitment efforts sought to target.[37] Yet, owing to the Danish army's hostile attitude toward German military service, recruitment from the ranks of the army, even among common soldiers, remained modest. To the disappointment of the *Waffen SS*, only 29 percent of the volunteers ultimately had any military background.[38]

In evaluating the significance of the government's official support of *Frikorps Danmark* and of recruitment, it is important to remember that many volunteers were National Socialists. Such government approval had no particular influence on that group of "revolutionaries" who hated parliamentarianism to begin with. The Danish Nazis therefore did not enlist in German military service because they had been swayed by the Danish government's attitude toward *Frikorps Danmark*, but rather, in spite of it. This can be verified by surveying the rest of Europe. In July 1943 Himmler received a report about the number of "Germanic" volunteers in the *Waffen SS*. This report evaluated the number of recruits in proportion to the number of the country's inhabitants. In Norway, Denmark, and Flanders the number of volunteers made up 0.10 percent of the total population, while in Holland it was somewhat higher, at 0.12 percent.[39] That recruitment in Denmark took place with the tacit approval of the Danish government did not increase enlistment more than in the other Western European countries under direct German governance or where Nazi governments had been installed. It was primarily extreme right-wing groups that enlisted. The small core of officers represented the one exception, as they were concerned with observing correct procedure with an eye toward subsequent career possibilities in the Danish army. Governmental approval undoubtedly swayed their choices.

In Action at the Eastern Front

As early as the summer of 1941, the first group of *Danish SS* volunteers was deployed in combat in division *Wiking*, which participated in the attack on the Soviet Union. The number of Danes in this division was limited to a few hundred at a time; after two years of service at the Eastern front, most Danes in *Wiking* were transferred to a

newly established *SS* division, *Nordland*. While *Wiking* was fighting in the Ukraine as part of the German Army Group South, a much bigger continent of Danes was still undergoing training in *Frikorps Danmark*. Due to internal conflicts, the *Frikorps* was not ready for action until late spring 1942. Eventually, 1,200 men were sent to Demyansk south of Novgorod, where close to 350 men were wounded or killed in less than three months time.[40] After a one-month refreshment and propaganda leave in Denmark, the corps returned to the front in November 1941. Originally *Frikorps Danmark* was bound to join *1. SS Brigade* in Belorussia in its indiscriminate killing of civilians in areas infiltrated by Soviet partisans.[41] However, given the deteriorating situation at the front, both the *1. SS Brigade* and the *Frikorps* were instead send to frontline duty in the Russian town of Nevel some 400 km. west of Moscow. By spring 1943, following further losses and flagging reinforcements, the corps had been reduced to 633 men and was withdrawn from the front line.[42]

In summer 1943 the Danes from the *Frikorps* and the Danes from the *Wikings* regiment *Nordland* were united in the new *SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland*. The majority of the Danes were placed in one of the regiments of motorized infantry: *24 Panzergrenadierregiment Dänemark*. *Nordland* was first sent to Yugoslavia in order to combine training and anti-partisan combat. In December 1943 the unit was then transferred to the German defense perimeter around the so-called Oranienbaum kettle outside Leningrad. From here the division participated in the German retreat to Estonia and later to Courland in Latvia, whereupon it was sent to Germany in January 1945. The *Nordland* division was one of the last fighting units in Berlin when the war came to an end in May 1945.

Although the Danish volunteers in the *Waffen SS* distinguished themselves militarily during the course of the war, our research has been less concerned to document military tactics than to understand how Danish volunteers with a strong ideological commitment to the Nazi cause fit in among the *Waffen SS*. As numerous studies of the German occupational regime in the Soviet Union have revealed, the German war at the Eastern front was a criminal undertaking. It involved plans for total destruction of the Jews and other "undesirables," deliberate starvation of civilians and POWs, mass killing of civilians under the pretext of anti-partisan combat, looting and destruction of infrastructure, industry, and housing as part of the scorched earth policy, and forced recruitment for labor duty in Germany. The German armed forces played an integral role in implementing these measures by ordering the registration and ghettoization of Jews, starving and killing Soviet POWs, assigning men to firing squads together with the *SS*, and so on.[43] But there was a special dimension to the *Waffen SS*; the men were to become political soldiers, and even men in allegedly nonpolitical units such as *Frikorps Danmark* were subjected to Nazi indoctrination during their training.

Political Schooling of Officers in the *Waffen SS*

Members of the *Waffen SS* underwent various forms of political schooling referred to as *Weltanschauliche Erziehung* in Nazi terminology.[44] This political schooling was supposed to transform not only the soldiers' minds but also their political outlook. According to an *SS* regimental order, political schooling could not be limited to

classroom lessons, it had to be present everywhere. As the German historian Bernd Wegner describes it, "Everywhere and all the time, during march and fighting breaks, in the trenches and in barracks, during military calls and during patrol duty; in short, always."[45] A variety of means were employed toward that end: films, pamphlets and books, classroom lessons, military orders, social gatherings (so-called comrade evenings), officer's speeches, and so on.

The officers were regarded as an especially valuable tool with which to conduct a general Nazification of the men; ideological training was therefore an integral part of the curriculum at the *Waffen SS* officer academies. About 120 Danes served as officers and NCOs in the *Waffen SS;* like their contemporaries from other Germanic countries, most attended one of the military academies of the *Waffen SS*. The Germanic officers were generally trained at the *SS Junkerschule* (Officer Academy) in Bad Tölz, Bavaria, with Danish "cadets" passing through Bad Tölz throughout the war. Students were taught a number of different military subjects, but ideology was given particular emphasis. When it came to final evaluations of the students, *Weltanschauung* and "Tactics" were attributed the most weight. At Bad Tölz in 1944, classroom lessons in *Weltanschauung* took up 5 out of 50 weekly training hours. An eight-week course plan from Bad Tölz in 1944 included very specific directions for the teacher and clearly outlined the content of the classes in *Weltanschauung*.[46] The first theme was "Lebensgesetzliche Grundlage," which involved a thorough introduction to the racist doctrines of National Socialism, including ideologically biased teachings in biology, hereditary science, "geopolitics," and theories of race and *Lebensraum*. This was followed by a number of classes on a pseudo-historical theme, outlining allegedly permanent racial struggles between the "Germanic people" and the "peoples of the East." Later topics included a review of the history of Nazism and presentation of the war as a racial campaign. Logically, the role of Germany in European history was stressed and a major goal was to make non-German students understand that true European unity and peace could only be realized with a strong Germany at the helm. The notebook of a Danish officer attending a course at Bad Tölz in late spring 1941 offers a student's perspective, including small drawings of human skulls with attention to their shape, as part of a lesson in "Phrenology"—a pseudo science that established intelligence according to skull measurements.[47]

These classes were supplemented with ideological input, such as the "Heereswesen" lectures, which were devoted to "the Germanic ideal of arms" and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. The men were also taken on excursions, for example, to the concentration camp in Dachau and to mental institutions where they were lectured on hereditary science. Such demonstrations were managed in a very skilled manner, as illustrated in a letter from the Danish *Frikorps*-officer and eventual regimental commander in division *Nordland*, Per Sørensen, who attended the lectures at Bad Tölz in the winter of 1942. In a letter to his parents, he describes a field trip to Dachau and to an asylum:

> The other day we visited a large lunatic asylum near Munich and attended a lecture on racial science. It was fantastic to watch the mob of human wrecks they'd gathered there. I just wonder why they keep them alive (…) Afterwards we visited the famous concentration camp Dachau and saw it from one end to the other. It was a great experience;

> you all know what one hears about concentration camps in Denmark, but it's lies from end to end. You can't imagine what remarkable order and cleanliness there is here and what incredible work is being performed.[48]

The training was combined with sport activities, occasional classical concerts, and teachings in good manners, in order to promote the racial ideal of a highly civilized moral code among the *SS* (the medieval knight being the great ideal). By cultivating an atmosphere that combined inhuman beliefs with a putative gentleman's morality, officers were mentally conditioned as representatives of the *Herrenvolk* to kill "subhumans" without experiencing a loss of ethos or integrity.[49] The indoctrination of officers into *Weltanschauung* was a high priority, because these officers were supposed to serve as intermediaries between the visions of the higher echelons of the *SS* and the ordinary soldier. Since extensive political schooling was not practical or even possible among the common soldiers, the officers were expected to serve as examples, demonstrating military skill, courage, and ideological conviction. As a relatively small ethnic group within the *Waffen SS*, even closer ties developed between the Danish officers and soldiers.

Ideological Training of Ordinary Soldiers

The political education conducted in Division *Wiking* prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union reveals the highly ideological nature of training among the men. Upon his appointment as leader of this new division, General Steiner ordered the establishment of a branch for ideological training within the divisions staff. During the spring of 1941 the men were given a broad introduction to the ideology of the *Waffen SS*, one containing the essentials of the aforementioned eight-week course for officers. This included Pan-Germanism, racial doctrines, and *Lebensraum* theory. Instructions for conducting ideological education reveal that, due to the large number of Germanic volunteers, it was necessary to strike a balance between emphasizing a future Germanic world order (which appealed to the Germanic volunteers) and stressing the concept of a *Grossdeutchland* so familiar to the *Reichsdeutsche* volunteers from Germany. During May and June, with Operation Barbarossa close at hand, the educational program became more specific; special orders concerning judicial measures were distributed to the officers, addressing the terms under which civilians could be shot without trial as partisans. Especially noteworthy is a nine-page document dispatched on June 11 by the divisional commander Felix Steiner with instructions for the prevention of "Heimtücke und Hinterlist" among the enemy.[50]

In its language, this order was reminiscent of orders dispatched by other German units, forewarning the soldiers that fighting in the East was different, and that all manner of sneak attacks and hostilities could be expected from enemy civilians and POWs. Caution and "rücksichtsloser, frühzeitiger Waffengebrauch" were the best preventive measures. Specific potential scenarios were simulated during training, with snipers in trees and bell towers, children and women carrying knifes and hand grenades, and the possibility of ambushes when soldiers passed through local villages. Not even an elderly married couple sitting in front of their house should be considered free from suspicion: "An elderly couple sits on a bench in town, the windows are open.

In a room or basement a spy with a phone connection to the enemy. Every regiment that passes through is drawn into conversation with the couple, while the spy is listening nearby (common occurence)." These instructions led soldiers to be deeply suspicious of enemy civilians and may have contributed to widespread use of the methods outlined above, involving the taking of hostages and the use of collective repression. Soldiers were encouraged to "ruthlessly destroy" villages that opened fire against passing soldiers. Only days after *Wiking* stepped onto Soviet soil on July 2, members of regiment *Westland* had to apply their new knowledge when SS Standartführer Wäckerle, the regimental commander of *Westland*, was shot dead by a sniper. This resulted in a reprisal against the village where the sniper had been hiding, as noted in the war diary of *Westland's* second battalion: "As retribution, the seventh company was deployed at 2:00 PM against the village where the sharpshooters had hid themselves."[51]

In spring 1942 the *Wiking* division received fresh recruits at its winter quarter along the Mius river in southern Ukraine. A four-week course was designed to prepare them for combat duty in the division; yet even as the division was preparing for a new offensive, time was set aside for *Weltanschaung* education.[52] Privates and officers of *Frikorps Danmark* also received ideological training prior to their transfer to the Demyansk area in May 1942. Although the volunteers in the legions were not expected to be genuine Nazis, the original conditions concerning the *Frikorps* were ignored by the *SS*. There was little resistance among the men, as most were already Nazis.[53] Ideological training involved, for example, screening the strongly anti-Semitic German film, "Der ewige Jude." Songs during corps exercises contained violent racism, as evinced in the official *Frikorps Danmark* songbook from 1942.[54] Among the papers of the *Nordland* division, one titled "What is at stake for us in Russia" and dating from 1943 revealed further aspects of the soldiers' political training. It described the Russian as a mixture between animal and man, and recommends extreme caution when interacting with Soviet prisoners. Soviet POWs were "capable of committing every possible cruelty."[55] Ideological training was not regarded as mere lip service to Heinrich Himmler, but rather was internalized in the daily life of the *Waffen SS*. When a large number of ethnic Germans from Rumania were drafted more or less voluntarily into the so-called *III SS germanische Panzerkorps*, Corps General Steiner specifically stated that NCOs should be selected from among the "racially best types."[56] An order issued in November 1943 by SS artillery regiment 5 in the *Wiking* division at the twenty-year anniversary of the failed "Bierstube Putch" of 1923 reads: "A new day in the lives of the European peoples dawned—an age of social reformation and justice. Then world Jewry began to agitate against this reformation. Now we have been fighting the powers of capitalism and bolshevism for over four years."[57] Danish volunteers were clearly exposed to substantial ideological education, either through direct training or indirectly through film propaganda, songs and pamphlets. But how did the Danish soldiers react to experiences in the *Waffen SS* and to what extent did the volunteers believe this kind of propaganda?

Reactions Among Danish Soldiers

Conditions for the *Waffen SS* at the Eastern Front were extremely harsh. Losses were enormous and, apart from the brutalizing effect of close combat, many *Waffen SS*

soldiers experienced at close range or were personally involved in atrocities against POWs and the civilian population.[58] One might expect that as members of the *Waffen SS* with the aforementioned background and education, Danish volunteers would harbor a deep commitment to the National Socialist cause in their letters and diaries. But this was not always the case. From their letters and diaries, it seems the Danish volunteers basically reacted to the war experience in two different ways.[59] Among most volunteers it is impossible to trace any consistent ideological belief that identifies them as convinced National Socialists. Some volunteers initially joined the corps for personal, that is, non-political reasons, whereas others shed earlier political convictions after witnessing the political machinations within *Frikorps Danmark* or after experiencing the brutality of fighting and the Germans' crude treatment of civilians.

However, National Socialist sentiments can be detected even within this relatively apolitical group of volunteers, revealing that few were actually opposed to the *Waffen SS*. It is also possible that, in their captive state as volunteers, they may have simply succumbed by default to the political cause for which they had enlisted, particularly since they were likely regarded as traitors in the eyes of their fellow citizens back home. Indeed, upon return to Denmark they were condemned to social isolation among an ever-shrinking group of German sympathizers. While some had family and friends in these circles, many had no home to which they could return. Their overall prospects following the war were general public disgrace, sentencing to prison, or even death by firing squad. Although it became increasingly obvious that Germany was losing the war, a number of officers and privates remained actively and aggressively committed to the National Socialist *Weltanschauung*, perhaps because of their educated background. Some were more ideologically motivated from the start than the ordinary volunteer, and their commitment further reinforced by the intensive ideological indoctrination within the *Waffen SS*. Facing an at best uncertain future in Denmark, there was good reason for volunteers in the *Waffen SS* to unconditionally commit all possible mental and physical resources to the National Socialist cause.

After the War

As late as December 1944, some 50 Danes a month were volunteering for the *Waffen SS*, despite the fact that losses were by far outweighing the newcomers, with about 1,000 killed and more released because wounded or due to termination of their contracts (although it became more difficult to obtain release as the war dragged on).[60] At war's end, most Danish SS soldiers still in service landed in captivity with the Western Allies, while some 400 became Soviet POWs. It is not known how many Danes died during the last frantic months, but total casualties among the 6,000 volunteers in the *Waffen SS* are estimated at about 2,000 men.[61]

On June 1, 1945 the new Danish government adopted special legislation concerning collaboration with the German occupiers. The cooperation that had taken place between the Germans and the Danish government/administration was not taken into consideration in the new laws; much concern was voiced about the fact that some activities deemed criminal by the new legislation had not been criminal when the acts were committed. Indeed, at the time when most Danes

volunteered, the Danish government's attitude toward volunteering probably had not been factored into their decision. Although it had not been illegal to volunteer for the German armed service from the summer of 1941 onward, after the war it was identified as a criminal offense. About 3,300 former SS volunteers were sentenced for armed service, typically serving two-year prison terms. Most were successfully reintegrated into society afterward—at least as measured by the infrequency of new prison sentences and their low unemployment rate. The nearly 20-year economic boom that began in 1956 furthermore provided the majority with a job and a place in society.

However, many former volunteers never reconciled themselves to the political climate of post war Denmark. After the war they organized both formally and informally, helping one another with employment and, perhaps more importantly, with coping with the past. The process of reworking their official history was set in motion even while awaiting trial immediately after the war. Dubious aspects of Danish governmental cooperation with the Germans was highlighted and used by the defense: for example, issues such as the governmental policy of sending high-ranking officials to the *Frikorps Danmark* or granting leave from the army to Danish officers who volunteered for German military service. This ideological reworking of the status of the *Waffen SS* gained further momentum during the Cold War and enabled the volunteers to legitimate their previous membership in the *Waffen SS*. This took place not only in Denmark but comprised part of a broader effort among leading former *Waffen SS* generals.[62] The Cold War and the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany contributed to a degree of public tolerance for the former volunteers. It became acceptable to assert that enrolment in the *Waffen SS* had been motivated by a desire to secure Denmark from the fate of the East European countries. This interpretation served to align the entire West in solidarity against the very same threat the volunteers had fought only a few years earlier. As expressed in one postwar account: "He was sentenced for volunteering to serve a country that is now Denmark's close friend. We are enjoying a commodity union with West Germany (…) And the countries are brothers of arms in NATO. Once again Denmark joins Germany in fighting bolshevism."[63]

No neo-Nazi or radical right party ever successfully established itself in Denmark after the war. Rather than try to revive their fully discredited political organizations, many former Nazis and former volunteers concentrated on such seemingly nonpolitical issues as the rehabilitation of their armed service and a certain kind of historical revisionism. But it was impossible for them to distance themselves from other former Nazis who made no secret of their ideological convictions and sought a more radical showdown with the established system. When a memorial stone for fallen volunteers was erected by former volunteers in central Jutland in 1971, other former SS members responded with letters such as the following: "I am very happy to see that National Socialism has not been wiped out after all and is still thriving. I have searched everywhere here in Copenhagen, but could not find like-minded people. I wonder if you could connect me to a possible Copenhagen circle or suggest other ways to engage our cause."[64]

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Danish left agreed to an extent with claims among former volunteers that the Danish establishment had applied double standards

in drawing a distinction between the official and individual collaboration. In an atmosphere of antiauthoritarianism, new scholarly studies appeared, challenging wartime politicians who had claimed that armed resistance by Danish freedoms fighters and the government's cooperative politics were really two sides of the same coin. The public took considerable interest in stories such as the myth about the Rostock Meeting, according to which the German occupation of Denmark had been arranged in advance between the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Munck and Heinrich Himmler at a secret meeting in the German city of Rostock in March 1940. A communist lawyer, Carl Madsen, worked together with former Nazis in compiling material concerning the government's double game, while a well-established leftist writer published a short story in 1978 about a former volunteer who had been "betrayed by his own government."[65] At a more vulgar level, the journalist Erik Haaest wrote a number of colourful and semi-authentic books about the occupation and the Danish *Waffen SS* volunteers—books that enjoyed a wide audience. His compilation of compromising material on the wartime government for his project, the so-called Danish National Archive ("Nationalarkivet Danmark") took place under close cooperation with some of the most active former volunteers.[66]

Today, more than 60 years after the first Danes were recruited into the *Waffen SS*, interest in the topic remains strong and memoirs by former volunteers are frequently published or circulated in unprinted manuscripts. A number of web pages are devoted to the topic and small groups of collectors have been eagerly gathering material from former *SS* soldiers. While these activities are often self-identified as of a nonpolitical and historical nature, they are frequently accompanied by a number of loosely articulated claims to the effect that, (1) the volunteers were made victims of cynical politicians who instrumentalized their war effort in the service of cooperation with the Germans and then turned against the volunteers after the war, and (2) the majority of volunteers were not Nazis but merely idealistic anticommunists, and (3) the volunteers had no share in the atrocities committed by the *SS* and did not actually regard themselves as a part of the *SS* and hence, neither identified with Hitler and Himmler's racial fantasies nor with their implementation. That these claims have survived more or less unaffected by established scholarly knowledge about the war on the Eastern Front and about the character profile of the Danish *Waffen SS* volunteers, testifies to the success of the historiographical battle waged by former volunteers.

Notes

1. This discussion of Danish fascism in the 1930s is drawn from Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog: danskere i Waffen SS 1940–45* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 1998), from hereon cited as *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*. For the most recent account of the antiparliamentarian right movement see Hans Bonde, *Niels Bukh* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2001) and Henrik Lundbak, *Staten stærk og folket frit* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanums Forlag, 2001). For more information about Danish anti-Semitism in the interwar years, see Michael Mogensen, ed., "Antisemitisme i Danmark?" *Arbejdsrapporter fra DCHF* 5 (Hoejbgerg, 2002).
2. Niels Ulrichsen, *J.A.K.—en dansk krisebevægelse* (Copenhagen: Den danske historiske forening, 1978), pp. 39, 62, 96.

3. Erik Jensen, *Mellem demokrati og fascisme* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1983), p. 61.
4. Kurt Jacobsen, *Aksel Larsen—en politisk biografi* (Copenhagen Valby: Vindrose, 1995), p. 110ff., 126f. See also Michael Kjeldsen, "Aksel Larsen og Stalinismen," *Jysk Tidskrift for Historie* 2 (1977): 314.
5. *Konservativ Ungdom*, March 15, 1934.
6. Hans Hertel, *Tilbageblik på 30'erne* (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 1997); Alex Quaade and Ole Ravn, *Højre om! Temaer og tendenser i den antiparlamentariski debat 1930–39: en antalogi* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979).
7. Quaade and Ravn, *Højre om!* p. 51.
8. Lene Koch, *Racehygiejne i Danmark 1920–1956* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1996).
9. Henning Poulsen and Henrik S. Nissen, *På dansk friheds grund: Dansk ungdomssamvirke og de aeldres råd 1940–1945* (Copenhagen: Udgiverselskabet for Danmarks nyeste Historie, 1963), p. 84ff. For a more passionate point of view see Henning Tjørnehøj, *Rigets bedste mænd Gyldendal: da det stare erhverusliv ville tage magten i 1940: om Højgaardskredsen og Haustrupkredsen* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1990).
10. Jacobsen, *Aksel Larsen—en politisk biografi*, p. 258ff.
11. For the most updated account of the occupation see Hans Kirchoff, *Samarbejde og modstand under besættelsen. En politisk historie* (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 2002). Concerning economic collaboration see Phillip Giltner, *In the Friendliest Manner: German-Danish Economic Cooperation during the Nazi Occupation of 1940–45* (New York: Peter Lang, 1998).
12. The Danish National Archives (RA) T.175, reel 59, p. 2574369, Himmler to SS Ergänzungsamt, April 23, 1940.
13. Regarding recruitment of Danish citizens into the *Waffen SS* see *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, p. 31ff.
14. The national legions under *Waffen SS* are treated in Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, Peter Scharff Smith, "Legion Norge. Forskelle og ligheder med øvrige 'germanske' legioner i Waffen SS," *Historisk Tidsskrift* 100, 2 (2000): 419–48.
15. See *Den parlamentariske kommisions beretning*, book 14, vol.1, p. 349ff. (Albertslund: J.H. Schultz A/S, 1950).
16. Karl O. Christiansen, *Mandlige landssvigere* i *Danmark under besættelsen* (Copenhagen: Gad, 1950).
17. Danish National Archives (abbreviated below as: RA), DNSAP's arkiv, Bovruparkivet, box 631–34.
18. Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, Peter Scharff Smith, *Dänische Arbeitskraft-Deutsche Befestigungsanlagen* (Varde Museum, 1997), p. 21ff.
19. T.175, reel 59, p. 2574728ff., "Betr Werbung germanischer Arbeiter", Spring 1942. See also Therkel Stræde, "Deutschlandsarbeiter. Dänen in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1940–45," in *Europa und Reichseinsatz. Ausländische Zivilarbeiter, Kriegsgefangene und KZ-Häftlinge in Deutschland 1939–1945*, ed. Ulrich Herbert (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1991), pp. 140–71.
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25. RA, Bovruparkivet, no. 662, Sysselkontoret, Kultorvet, May 23, 1942.
26. RA, Bovruparkivet, no. 662, Sysselkontoret, Kultorvet, July 10, 1942.
27. RA, Bovruparkivet, no. 662, Sysselkontoret, Kultorvet, October 1942.
28. Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, appendix 1.
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31. Archive of Danish Museum of the Resistance Movement, 23/F.20.
32. Aage Trommer, "Modstandsbevægelsesn rekruttering," Noter, no. 122, 1994: 4–10.
33. *Den parlamentariske kommisions beretning*, book 10, p. 484 ff. (Albertslund: J.H. Schultz A/S, 1950).
34. RA, Defence Ministry, box 90D and box 90A.
35. This and the following letter quotes are from Kryssings private archive in the National Library, Copenhagen. (Ark. Nr. utilgængeligt 842), Det Kongelige Bibliotek. Letter dated April 9, 1940.
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37. Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen, and Peter Scharff Smith, "Kryssing og de østfrontsfrivillige," *Siden Saxon* 1 (1995): 50–58.
38. Christensen, Poulsen, and Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, p. 51.
39. T.175, reel 59, p. 2574712ff., "Betr. Germanische Freiwillige," Gottlob Berger to Himmler July 28, 1943.
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44. BP (Bundesarchiv Potsdam), NS 31/357—October 20, 1942. From Berger to the *Waffen SS* Divisions.
45. Bernd Wegner, *Hitlers politische Soldaten, die Waffen-SS 1933–45*: *Leitbild, Struktur und Funktion einer nationalsozialistischen Elite* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1990), p. 191.

46. BAMA, RS 5 320, Kd. Gen. III (germ.) Pz.Ko.
47. RA, Privatarkiv [Private archive] no. 6926, box 14, folder 12, Notebook marked "SS Junkerschule Bad Tölz 18/5 1941".
48. Author's private archive. Letter from Per Sørensen January 23, 1942.
49. An interpretation also brought forward by Omer Bartov in *Hitlers Army*: See, e.g., p. 68.
50. BAMA, RS 3-5/3, part II: "Betr. Kampf gegen fdl. Heimtücke und Hinterlist," June 11, 1941.
51. BAMA, RS 4/1297, II/SS Rgt. Westland. KTB vom January 4, 1941–May 15, 1942.
52. RA, Privatarkiv [Private archive] no. 6926, box 14, folder 12, Notebook marked "III/SS 10 IR 5/7 41. Wiking."
53. Christiansen, Poulsen, and Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, p. 277ff.
54. *Frikorps Danmarks Sangbog* (Trinitatistrykkeriet, 1942).
55. BAMA, RS 3/11-2, II/freiw. Pz.Gr.Div. Nordland, "Auf was kommt es in Russland an?" June 10, 1943.
56. BAMA, RS 2-3/2, Gen Kdo. III (germ) SS-Pz. Korps Ia: Tätigkeitsbericht vom 26.5. bis 31.3.1944 mit Anlagen, order of September 29, 1943.
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58. Christiansen, Poulsen, and Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, p. 247ff.
59. Claus Bundgård Christensen, Poulsen Niels Bo, and Peter Scharff Smith, "The Danish Volunteers in the Waffen SS and German Warfare at the Eastern Front," *Contemporary European History* 8, 1 (1999): 73–96.
60. Christiansen, Poulsen, and Smith, *Under hagekors og Dannebrog*, p. 49ff.
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62. See early editions of the journal of the former *Waffen SS* volunteers *Wiking-Ruf* (later renamed *Der Freiwillige)*, and Paul Hausser, *Soldaten wie andere auch* (Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag, 1966), as well as Felix M. Steiner, *Die Freiwillige. Idee und Opfergang*, 7th ed. (Rosenheim: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992). For an analysis of the postwar organization of former *Waffen SS* volunteers, see David Clay Large, "Reckoning without the Past: The HIAG of the Waffen SS and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic," *Journal of Modern History* 59,1 (March 1987): 79–113.
63. Foged Harly, *SS frivillig Sværdborg fortæller* (Lynge: Bogan, 1985), p. 91.
64. Author's private archive. Letter dated September 28, 1971.
65. Leif Esper Andersen, *Ridser—70* (Denmark: Gyldendal, 1978), chapter 7, p. 75.
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Chapter Five

Sex and Secularization in Nazi Germany

Dagmar Herzog

In the historiography of the Third Reich, the subjects of sex and religion have generally been considered separately, and the issue of Nazism's impact on processes of secularization has hardly been considered at all. Yet if we are to make sense of Nazism's sexual politics we cannot do so without attending to the fierce struggle that raged throughout the Third Reich between Nazism and Christianity. Conversely, we cannot fully comprehend what was at stake in the combative relationship between Nazism and Christianity without taking into account how much of that relationship had to do with sex. Above all, historians of Christianity need to begin acknowledging how central sexual issues have been to processes of secularization in the twentieth century. Numerous books and articles have been written about the churches under Nazism, but while several of these do mention the Nazi campaign to charge Catholic priests with homosexuality, they have remarkably little to say about any other sexual issues. This is all the more perplexing considering how urgently—and despite the atmosphere of terror and reprisals against those who would disagree with the regime—Catholic spokespersons in particular, though at times also Protestants, criticized the Nazis for their celebration of nudity and strenuously tried to defend Christian marriage against Nazi encouragement of pre- and extramarital heterosexuality. It is also surprising in light of the fact that the competition and cooperation between Nazis and Catholics over sexual mores provided the single most important context for the regime's elaboration of its own particular sexual vision.

Revisiting Nazi attacks on Christian sexual mores forces a fundamental revision of standard assumptions about sex in the Third Reich. Most scholars continue to presume that the Third Reich was characterized primarily by sexual repression. The prevailing view, which remains so pervasive that no one seems to feel the need to document it in detail, holds Nazism to be, at its core, an antisex ideology. As Jeffrey Herf remarked in 1999, most "historians of German society and culture under the Nazis" have proceeded as though "the connection between Nazism and sexual repression" were "intuitively obvious."[1] The Third Reich is routinely described, in a sort of assertive shorthand, as "sex-hostile," "unhappy, lifeless, pleasureless," characterized by "rigid bodily-sexual norms of behavior" and "official German prudery."[2] No less an authority than George Mosse, for instance, took largely at face value Nazi claims to be restoring clean and orderly family life. He argued that the ubiquitous nudes of the Third Reich were in

actuality emptied of eroticism, and suggested that the Nazi movement was preoccupied with sexual propriety far more than sexual liberation. Seeing Nazis primarily as inheritors of a culture of bourgeois constraint rather than that culture's critics, Mosse remained committed to a vision of Nazism as hostile to "all printed material that . . . could produce an erotic effect" and "a movement that made every effort at middle-class respectability."[3] So also Erich Goldhagen, in a pioneering and important essay on Nazi sexual demonology of Jews, marshaled evidence that the visceral intensity of Nazi anti-Semitism had its source in an external projection of "unconscious guilt produced by repressed sexual desires" in "innumerable" Germans.[4]

The two most recent German-language studies claiming to offer a comprehensive overview of Nazism's sexual politics further reinforce these now conventional assumptions. Thus Udo Pini's *Leibeskult und Liebeskitsch* (Body-Cult and Love-Kitsch, 1992) paints the picture of a world in which "eroticism as a sensibility was suppressed," bedrooms were depressingly "gloomy" spaces, "feelings were as coordinated as the organizations," and "whatever Weimar had thought and partially practiced as progress, was radically denied or terminated." Pini even speculated that Germans' willingness to be "distracted away from eroticism and sexuality" was indicative of a deeper and more lasting national sickness, "a political German masochism, a joyful subordination and . . . willingness to deny one's own feelings," and that, in fact, the "extremely uptight" state of affairs lasted "until 1968."[5] Stefan Maiwald and Gerd Mischler's *Sexualität unterm Hakenkreuz* (Sexuality under the Swastika, 1999) likewise announced succinctly that in the 1930s, "in London and Paris, in the German Reich as well as the United States, the prudery of the nineteenth century still dominates people's love-lives. But no state limits the choice of partners as much as National Socialist Germany. The total state leaves no room in German beds for self-determined sex. The subjects of the NS-state have to forfeit their sexuality unconditionally to the regime."[6]

This essay seeks to recast the terms of debate about Nazism's sexual politics, arguing that historians have unjustly neglected the *pro*sex elements of Nazism and the ways the regime deliberately and openly used sexual incitement to consolidate its appeal. There is no question that in its thorough racialization of sex and in its heightened homophobia, the Third Reich's sexual politics represented a definitive and brutal backlash against the progressivism, tolerance, and experimentation possible in Weimar. But as Nazi attacks on Christianity reveal with particular clarity, Nazism brought to much of the populace not only a redefinition but also an expansion and intensification of preexisting liberalizing trends. In part, the liberalization would result from massive disruptions caused by war, labor mobilization, and population transfers, as well as from the general climate of moral anarchy as the mass murders escalated. But we need to take just as seriously the fact that the liberalization of heterosexual mores was actively advanced as part of NSDAP policy long before the war commenced. Indeed, to those broad sectors of the populace that it did not persecute, the regime ultimately offered a great many inducements to pre- and extramarital heterosexuality—not only for the sake of reproduction, but also for the sake of pleasure as well as many celebrations of marital bliss.

German historians have traditionally asserted that it was the disruptions of World War I that separated couples and forced women to acquire greater independence and

hereby ushered in the more sexually experimental era of the Roaring Twenties, only to have the experimentation and freedom cut short by Nazism in 1933. This periodization of heterosexual mores entirely misses the point that the liberalization typically associated with Weimar had already began *prior to* World War I. It is indicative, for instance, that Nazi-endorsed writers and their Christian critics alike both routinely placed the onset of sexual liberalization at the very start of the twentieth century.[7] At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that even as liberalization continued to spread ever further amidst the populace, the beginnings of a conservative (and explicitly Christian-led) countermobilization *against* that liberalization was already underway during the Weimar years.[8]

Nazism, in short, came to power at a time of already conflicting tendencies toward liberalization and renewed restraint. Nazism's interest in promoting heterosexual activity (against a somewhat resurgent but also profoundly besieged Christianity) involved not only hyperventilating attacks on those Christians who were reaffirming conservative mores, but also the effort to strip sexual liberality of its purportedly Jewish, Marxist, and pro-homosexual connotations and to redefine pleasurable heterosexuality as an elite "Aryan," "Germanic" privilege. The writings on sex produced during the Third Reich reveal the traces of this complex negotiation.

While Nazism has been misrepresented as sexually repressive for everyone, what Nazism actually did was to redefine who could have sex with whom. The persecution and torture of homosexuals provided a crucial context for the constant injunctions to heterosexual activity; the abuse and murder of those deemed unworthy of reproduction and life because of their purported "hereditary" or "racial" characteristics constituted the background against which those classed as superior were enjoined to enjoy their entitlements. Central to making this shift in focus seem less reprehensible than it most assuredly was, was the reworking of moral languages. As Geoff Eley recently noted in his introduction to *The "Goldhagen Effect"* (2000), we still do not understand enough about how ideology operated during the Third Reich. Scholars who have emphasized social context and structural explanations rather than ideological factors in making sense of Nazism, Eley observed, have "downgrade[d] the insidiousness of Nazism's discursive power" and lost sight of "the radical extent of [Nazis'] ambitions to reorder social values in Germany."[9] One of the benefits, then, of examining the Nazi-Christian conflict over sex is the insights that such an examination can provide into the workings of ideology under Nazism.

A reading of a broad array of Nazi writings on sex suggests that no prior regime in history so systematically set itself the task of stimulating and validating especially young people's sexual desires—all the while denying precisely that that was what it was doing. My interest, then, lies in making sense of the ways Nazi propagandists embedded inciting solicitations of desire and emphatic celebrations of heterosexual activity and pleasure within a variety of disavowing mechanisms. At the same time, I am interested in the double move by which Nazis both assaulted Christian standards of sexual behavior *and* borrowed from and converted to their own purposes Christian language.

The mid-1930s, a few years into the Third Reich, as the regime was striving to consolidate its hold on the populace, saw a particular efflorescence of discussion of the acceptability of both premarital and extramarital coitus; Nazi-endorsed authors

openly defended both. Often their writings offer evidence of popular beliefs and practices as well. In one widely discussed 1936 essay, for instance, the physician Dr. Walter Gmelin reported on his work evaluating couples' "racial" and "hereditary" suitability for marriage, and also commented on the extant high incidence in Germany of premarital intercourse. Although Gmelin found that less than 5 percent of the women and men he interviewed were virgins—indeed most had begun to have intercourse in their late teens and early twenties, approximately seven years before they married—Gmelin did not find this trend particularly alarming. Although he worried a bit that the majority had had more than one premarital partner (and some had had several dozen), he nonetheless insisted that premarital sexual experience was a good thing, a phenomenon that needed to be read above all as "a healthy reaction against the social inhibitions and against morality-preachers," a sign that "also today—in spite of everything—people at the age of sexual maturity satisfy the drive given them by nature!" In fact, Gmelin remarked in an aside, those few who denied having had premarital experience "certainly did not display above-average hereditary resources [*Erbgut*]."[10] Also in 1936, the jurist Dr. Rudolf Bechert energetically defended extramarital affairs. In the context of explaining a proposed new law that would give illegitimate children the father's name and equal rights with legitimate children to financial support, Bechert ventured the opinion that

> Nonmarital bonds are superior to marriages in many ways. It is not just life-experience that proves that nonmarital connections rooted in sexual love are an unchangeable fact, rather all of human culture teaches that they can represent the highest moral and aesthetic value. Without sexual love no poetry, no painting, indeed, no music! In all cultured nations concubinage is *not criminalized*, with churchy Italy ahead of all the rest. . . . Never can nonmarital sexual intercourse be prevented.

Indeed, Bechert went on to effuse: "Love is the only true religious experience in the world."[11]

Such an emphatic rejection of Christian moralizing, coupled with a glorification of sex, was even more evident in a 1937 book by the physician Dr. Carl Csallner. In Csallner's view, only "unnatural sanctimoniousness" and "clerical cant" had turned the sexual drive, which was "wanted by nature and spontaneously presses toward activity," into something "base and mean . . . a deadly sin"; the sexual drive, in Csallner's view, was "great" and "holy." For Csallner, the human being's "greatest individual experience of bliss lies in the accomplishment of the sex act"; raising the sex act "out of the sphere of naive psycho-physiological sensation" and to "the level of eternal values" in order to "anchor it in the transcendental," actually made for happier and better sex, and allowed the individual to partake of even greater joy.[12]

These authors were hardly marginal figures. Their ideas about the reprehensibleness and unnaturalness of prudery and the transcendental, quasi-spiritual qualities of human sexuality, were made generally available not least through the official SS journal, *Das Schwarze Korps*, one of the most popular weeklies of the Third Reich—printed in hundreds of thousands of copies—and one enthusiastically endorsed by the regime.[13] Written in an aggressive but also highly entertaining style, the paper continually appealed to its readers' earthy common sense *and* feeling of smug superiority over others. It is easy to see why the paper was successful in finding a broad

popular readership. Cartoons, feature pieces, photographs of attractive adults and happy children, and serial short stories alternated with accessibly editorialized reports on political happenings at home and abroad. The overall tone was conversational and informative, and—especially in the prewar years, and continuing into the early war years as the war was still going well for Germany—also decidedly upbeat. Even in the more desperate later years of the war, as the paper joined in with the ever more histrionic clamor of the regime for each and every individual's total self-sacrifice on behalf of the nation, the paper never lost its distinctive ironic touch and acerbic sense of humor. The cheerful tongue-in-cheek approach could not disguise the savagery of the paper's attacks on Jews, the handicapped, homosexuals, "asocial" criminals, and political critics of the regime—all were recurrently thematized—but certainly it contributed mightily to the paper's morally disorienting effect.

Few publications illuminate in such a condensed form the extraordinary sophistication and effectiveness of National Socialist argumentative strategies. *Das Schwarze Korps* reveals at least three (interrelated) features of Nazi ideological tactics. One of these involves the refiguration of moral languages. Another involves the effectiveness of humor. And the third has to do with strategic self-reflexivity—a tactic of ideological persuasion to which scholars have not paid nearly enough attention, and have certainly not explored in relation to Nazism. For one of the most defining characteristics of *Das Schwarze Korps* was that it not only offered its readers "the party line," but continually made room for the voices of critics of the NSDAP—quoting extensively from actual publications while also imagining potential objections that might surface among readers—only then to refute them with gusto. The paper was not silent about Nazism's detractors; instead it routinely replicated the detractors' critiques and then made them look foolish. Self-reflexivity appealed to both the smarts and the sense of humor of its readership; it was also a way of entertaining, even dwelling on, reader's potential doubts about Nazism and then providing a battery of counterarguments. In fact, the paper repeatedly called attention to the possibility of reader suspicion (at one point remarking that "Now there may be some very careful people and doubters, who think they need to mistrust us"), before moving on to marshal more "evidence" for its own point of view.[14]

In the postwar years, antifascist experts as diverse as the Protestant theologian Karl Barth, the Catholic journalist Eugen Kogon, and the Jewish Frankfurt School philosopher Theodor Adorno all assured their readers that Nazis were on the whole a stupid and not especially sophisticated lot.[15] Adorno, specifically in analyzing Nazi propaganda, made the case that its effectiveness had nothing whatsoever to do with any particular astuteness on Hitler's or Goebbels's or any other Nazi's part. Rather, Adorno thought, the effectiveness of the leadership's endless repetitive harangues had a great deal more to do with the similarity in (disturbed) psychic structure between the leaders and the masses.[16] While this kind of self-distancing from and denigration of Nazism served important purposes after the war, emphasizing Nazi stupidity too much in contemporary scholarshp prevents us from appreciating just how skillful some Nazi theorizers were, and just how "normal" were the longings and worries into which the regime inserted itself. Reading *Das Schwarze Korps* can destabilize any sense of instinctive superiority or distance early twenty-first century people might have.

Christian efforts to draw the population away from Nazism, especially by documenting Nazi encouragement of bare-bodied self-display and of pre- and extramarital heterosexuality, provided a running joke for the journal from its inception. Recurrently, the paper reprinted excerpts from Christian complaints about Nazi policies and injunctions, only to repudiate these complaints in the most forceful terms. Simultaneously, the ensuing elaborating remarks actually functioned to confirm aspects of the Christians' criticisms (although they reversed the Christians' assessments); indeed, the paper delighted in including evidence of craven Christian accommodations to Nazism and shared acceptance of Nazi values.

In April 1935, for example, *Das Schwarze Korps* reported on criticisms that had been directed "from the denominational side" (i.e., by a church spokesperson, in this case, a Protestant named Wilhelm Stapel) at illustrations in a regime-approved farmers' almanac. The pictures in question included a drawing of a mother nursing her infant, with naked breasts fully visible, as well as a photograph of nude preteen boys playing at the beach. In rejecting Stapel's criticism of these images, *Das Schwarze Korps*, as was its custom, gestured toward the apparent confusion among conservatives about what the regime stood for in terms of sexual morality, and mocked Stapel as one of those who "in a cramped-up way struggle to do justice to the sense of the spiritual transformation of our days." However, the primary goal was to contrast the kind of "propaganda for nudism" evident during the Weimar era (or, as the journalists expressed it, during "the years of Jewish domination," when "the semitic manipulators" were busy working to undermine "every natural order, such as marriage and family") and the aims of National Socialism, which were to "represent the noble body in its natural shape" ("for the pure and the beautiful were for the uncorrupted German never a sin"). *Das Schwarze Korps* expressly rejected "that prudery . . . which has contributed to destroying the instinct for bodily nobility and its beauty in our Volk," and castigated those who, under the impact of religious teachings, could only regard females as "sinners" and "seductresses" the Nazis perceived themselves as restoring both sex and women to their proper dignity. But the paper attacked "conservative philistines" on an even more sensitive point as well, directly accusing the bespectacled "homebody" Stapel not only of "envy" of the healthy boys scampering freely in the sunshine, but also of being a "rotten lecher" whose ability to see in the mother's breasts anything other than noble sublimity suggested that he was "moved by drives which put him in the category of those who would best be locked away behind bars."[17] Here were the themes that would recur repeatedly in the ensuing months and years: smirking at sexual conservatives' apparent misunderstanding of Nazism's intent, distinguishing between Jewish and Nazi sexual attitudes, attacking prudery while insisting on Nazism's purity and sinlessness, styling oneself as defender of women's dignity while displacing unclean desires onto the critics of Nazism, and, finally, the less than veiled threat of imprisonment that created a jarring but indicative counterpoint to the otherwise jocular tone of the article.

Das Schwarze Korps brazenly—and obsessively—mocked Christian efforts to defend the sanctity of marriage, and aligned itself with young people's impatience with traditional bourgeois mores. "Eager clerical 'moralists' " were accused of having "pathetic complexes"; "*original sin*" was presented as a "foreign" and "oriental" idea; medieval Christianity's dogmatism was described as having been designed to bring

down the "vibrant" and "life-affirming" Germanic and Nordic peoples.[18] Catholicism, the paper said, evinced "an oriental disrespect for the woman."[19] The problem with the clericals was that they "see in the body something fundamentally sinful."[20] And in February 1937, in an article actually self-consciously entitled "The Same Thing Again," *Das Schwarze Korps* contrasted the Germanic peoples' lofty notion of woman with the Catholic church's derogatory notions. The paper chastised Catholicism for "seeing in the woman nothing but a creature that stirs the most base instincts, before which hysterics fled into the desert and, in their abnormality, believed themselves to be wrestling with the devil, when they felt themselves to be tortured by 'fleshly lust.' "[21] When a female author remonstrated in another Nazi journal about the way men treated women as objects, and tried to argue that old Germanic tradition had demanded respect for an unmarried woman's chastity, *Das Schwarze Korps* rebuked her and rebutted her version of history. The paper declared that what she thought to be Germanic tradition was nothing but another example of "the pathological tendency to Catholic virginalism."[22] In discussing a case in which a court had ascertained that the "seduction" of a fifteen-years-and-eleven-months-old girl (i.e., still technically a minor) could be construed as an infringement on the honor of the girl's father, the paper made known its own views on honor. "Nature" just could not be locked into legal "schemes," *Das Schwarze Korps* proclaimed. Instead: "It is honorable when two young people are attached to each other in love and when they stand by their love."[23] The paper attacked in no uncertain terms "the denominational morality . . . that sees in the body something to be despised, and wants to interpret what are natural processes as *sinful drives*." Indeed, this radical rejection of homosexuality was conjoined not with a more general sexually conservative attitude but rather with an intensified incitement to premarital heterosexual activity. The paper explicitly blamed bourgeois and Christian moralists for damning "healthy drive-forces" and thereby redirecting these drives into "unnatural" paths, and went so far as to brashly defend sex with "frivolous, immoral" girls as much less dangerous than "youthful aberrations towards one's own sex."[24]

Rounding out the case against Catholicism was another essay attacking a Catholic journal for proudly claiming that Catholics in Germany had a higher birth rate than Protestants and thus were doing the most to meet National Socialist requests for a rise in reproductivity. Here as elsewhere, *Das Schwarze Korps* was able to "document" Christian genuflexion before Nazism, while repeating its charge that Catholicism, whose "overt rejection of '*fleshly communion*' " was so evident in its glorification of celibacy, could not possibly take credit for any raised reproductivity. Foreshadowing the sort of argumentation that would subsequently become even more prevalent, the paper described the healthy power of the German *Volk* as resistant to the blandishments of Christianity: "How strong and untamable [this power] is, is shown by the way it can neither be repressed by 'original sin' nor the threats of eternal hellfire."[25]

Sexually conservative Nazi publicists did exist, and for them references to Jews functioned as a negative counterpoint to underscore the value of a sexually conservative agenda. Thus, for instance, one Nazi-identified physician railed that "the demand for the full living-out of sexuality is a typical Jewish-liberal one, and the news should gradually have gotten around that everything that on the Jewish side has become a battle cry, solely serves disintegrative and not constructive aims." Yet this

same author had to acknowledge that the majority of his fellow Nazis and the non-Jewish German masses did not agree with him. Although the populace had largely converted to Nazism in political terms, and the majority of Germans maintained an anti-Semitic stance in other aspects of their lives, they were, as he put it, still ensnared in "Jewish" attitudes about sex. Apparently Jews had managed to transform the "erotic deep-structure" of the German masses through a persistent insistence that "the purpose of sexual activity is pleasure, nothing more and nothing less." How, this doctor demanded to know, could people reconcile "their enthusiastically presented National Socialist worldview" with their ongoing "sexual Bolshevism"? Sex was the site at which it was "apparently the most difficult to be a good National Socialist." "There are no two sides to the Jewish question," he fumed, "and it is not admissible to damn the Jew in his political, economic, and human manifestation while secretly, for personal convenience, to maintain the customs he has suggested in the realm of love- and sex-life."[26] Other sexually conservative Nazis similarly blamed Weimar era Jewish writers and filmmakers for "the glorification of adultery and sexual uninhibitedness," or complained that Germans continued to "repeat the Jewish or Jewish-influenced vulgarities concerning the relations of the two sexes. . . . It is astonishing how little our great National Socialist revolution has moved forward in this area!"[27] Along related lines, a military officer tried to convince the NCOs under his command that any man who displayed a double standard of sexual morality "still has the poisonous substances of the Jewish moral perspective . . . sitting in his bones. Out with them!"[28] Yet as these arguments themselves already imply, sexual conservatives were not exactly winning the day. Although overtly attempting to mobilize racism for sexually conservative ends, they clearly were having trouble dissuading non-Jews from remaining attached to those purportedly "Jewish" pleasures. Paradoxically, this was not a form of anti-Semitism in which Jews were abjected, but rather one in which what Jews supposedly stood for appeared as something quite desirable and as something deeply rooted also within non-Jewish Germans.

Just as sexually conservative Nazi mores found expression through anti-Semitism, so too did the Nazi versions of sexually emancipatory ideas. Yet *Das Schwarze Korps* handled the purported "Jewishness" of sex far more subtly than did sexual conservatives. In its attack on Stapel, the paper deliberately contrasted the kind of "propaganda for nudism" evident during "the years of Jewish domination" with its own celebration of "pure" and "healthy" nudity. In other essays, the paper repeatedly denied that it was advocating "free love" (which it associated with Marxism) and insisted that Nazism was supporting and restoring marriage (in opposition to what it described as Jewish attacks on this institution). Yet, simultaneously and often in the very same articles, the paper unapologetically defended both illegitimacy and nonreproductive premarital and extramarital heterosexual intercourse. Along related lines, in two full-page photo-spreads in 1938, *Das Schwarze Korps* showcased the "beautiful and pure" nudity advocated by Nazism, exemplified by pulchritudinous naked women luxuriating in sun, sand, and sea and juxtaposed this with the "shameless money-making" of the previous "cultural epoch." Once more, as in its frequent attacks on Christian sexual conservatives, *Das Schwarze Korps* sharply chastised those who "campaign against the supposed immorality of National Socialism." The paper accused the regime's critics of playing into the hands of Nazism's enemies, labeling

them "vermin" whose invocation of "the cultural will of the state" for their own prudish agenda was an "insolence," whose dangerous machinations only "the police" could curb.[29] Not only the continual self-labeling as "pure" and "clean," but also the fiercely hyperbolic attacks on Jews, Marxists, and Weimar era cultural arbiters for their purported advocacy of extramarital sex, pornography, and nakedness served to distract attention from the Nazis' advocacy of those very same things. In short, *Das Schwarze Korps* expressly disavowed the very activities in which it was engaged. Incitement and disavowal were inseparable.

Indicatively, Christian writers did *not* interpret Nazism as sexually repressive. On the contrary, they noted with regularity that the Third Reich had disappointed them in the realm of sexual mores, and/or angrily attacked Nazism's defenses of disrobement and of pre- and extramarital sexual activity. In this vein, for instance, Ernst Krupka, an evangelical missionary and journal editor in Württemberg, charged that "*fleshly lust*" and a "*spirit of uncleanness*" were at work in the Third Reich. While—strikingly—he went out of his way to validate some aspects of Nazism, suggesting that the Third Reich's "message about *race, blood and soil*" was at least in part "valuable and true," Krupka also expressly bemoaned the fact that although "at first we believed that morality would improve in the Third Reich—today this hope reveals itself more and more as false."[30]

Similarly, the Catholic priest Dr. Mathias Laros, author of the 1936 advice book, *Die Beziehungen der Geschlechter* (The Relations of the Sexes), praised the Nazis for their dedication to race and *Volk*, but also held Nazism directly responsible for escalating loose sexual mores: "The era has succumbed to a horrifying barbarism and overstimulation of the sexual drive, especially since all inhibiting barriers of tradition have been trampled." Laros observed that the new Nazi encouragement of coed sports at the workplace was not exactly innocent. As male and female coworkers did their morning exercises together in a half-clothed state, women and girls were forced "to reveal their female secrets to a great extent": "All talk of naturalness and the beauty of the body cannot do away with the consequence, that on the male side an intensified sex drive results, and on the female side, if she has retained her true femininity, the most delicate bodily shame has been damaged and moral feeling deadened." Laros challenged readers to resist such "methods of the culture of nudism." Tellingly, however, Laros shared the Nazis' stereotypes of Jews, insisting that "the church, unconcerned by all semitic or anti-Semitic fashions of the day, holds fast to the biblical account of creation and the Pauline teaching of the Christian structure of marriage."[31] Among Christian critics of the regime, then, the association between Jewishness and sexual liberality was a given.

Other Catholics also blamed the Nazi regime for deteriorating sexual mores. For instance, in a 1936 study that the Catholic publisher blurbed as "a way out of the spiritual misery of our days," a Catholic jurist writing under the pen-name Johannes Ehwalt declared that the state was having an "ever more destructive effect" on marriage, that divorces were rising at an unprecedented rate, and that the era was dominated by an "animalistic" perception of marriage as "in the first instance a controllable process for racial breeding." Ehwalt found it particularly appalling that in the Third Reich undereducated young people with "good figure, physical racial advantages, athletic ability and youthful exuberance" were being held up as models

for everyone.[32] And in an essay published in 1939, Catholic commentator B. van Acken criticized the way in his time "the free intercourse of the two sexes has become so *unbridled* that really no normal human being still sees noble naturalness in it." In truth, he argued, the "much-vaunted 'unembarrassedness' " of the era "is nothing but *shamelessness* in the fullest sense of the word." But van Acken also played upon Nazi anxieties in an effort to advance his own more conservative agenda, and in so doing, reinforced racist and nationalist values rather than challenging them. In this vein he contended that "there is no question that sexual morality is in bad shape in all strata of our *Volk* and that the physical health and the strength of the *Volk* is threatened by it. Indeed, moral degeneration has progressed so far that it will necessarily lead to the death of the nation, if a moral renewal of our *Volk* does not take place."[33]

Although some Protestants also complained that the new Nazi paganism involved, in Stapel's words, a "tendency towards nudism," they were not quite as sure of themselves with respect to sexual matters as Catholics were, and were generally placed on the defensive by the alternate "theology" that Nazism provided.[34] Protestant theologians and pastors repeatedly articulated confusion about how best to respond to the pseudo-spirituality of Nazism, with its "romantic, idealistic" search for God in "the language of flowers and sounds or the wealth of our spiritual inwardness."[35] They expressly encouraged each other not to be too dismissive of the Nazi worldview. Aware that many regarded Christianity as depressing and downbeat, they struggled to put across Christian values in a more appealing and inspiring way.[36] According to Protestant commentator Adolf Köberle, students 20 years earlier were confronted with materialism, Marxism, and atheism. The student of the late 1930s, however, "feels religious, romantic, idealistic, God-believing. His question to Christianity is: 'Do we even need the gospel, in order to recognize God, to live out of God? Do we not have other sources of revelation, that are just as pure and marvelous, that are furthermore geographically and racially [*völkisch*] much closer to us than the figure of Jesus Christ? Are not nature and soul, reason and conscience, music and the soil of the *Heimat* entirely adequate for us to be joyous and sure of God? Why do you Christians make access to God so narrow?" And: "Christianity, is that not something depressing, weak, abstract, certainly not a perspective for strong, unbroken, existence-affirming human beings! To these . . . people we must prove that the God of biblical revelation is not a God hostile to life. God has given us this whole rich creation to make joyful use of. We may take everything the Creator gives us but we should take it in such a way, that we remain grateful. . . . Without the bond with God we fall into an intoxication that, although it intensifies our life for short moments, in the long run destroys it."[37] Along related lines, in the pages of the Protestant journal *Seelsorge*, the theologian Adolf Allwohn summarized the contribution of his colleague Alfred Dedo Müller toward understanding the National Socialist phenomenon of " 'natural theology.' " Müller, Allwohn advised, could help pastors understand "the natural search-for-God of the contemporary human being": "For our pastoral stance towards those who have become alienated it is decisive that we do not 'simply dogmatically condemn to death' the natural theology of our time, for example the religious conception of *Volk* and race, but rather come into 'a genuine conversation and true meeting' with it."[38]

Nazi jurist Bechert's idea that "love is the only true religious experience in the world" was also central to the overall rhetorical strategy at work in *Das Schwarze Korps*. The paper advocated reproduction of healthy, "racially" desirable children, but frequently coupled its call for increased reproductivity with paeans to the delights of love. To read this as mere tactical embellishment of what was actually a narrowly reproduction-oriented agenda would be to overlook how Nazi advice-givers inserted themselves into the most elemental desires for personal happiness. Indeed, Nazism's appeal lay (in a Foucaultian sense) in the positive rather than negative workings of power, even as the glorification of heterosexual romance provided the context for (and distracting counterpoint to) defenses of the most horrific aspects of Nazi politics.

One of the major goals of *Das Schwarze Korps* was to rework ethical concepts by detaching religious ideas from religious institutions and appropriating them for "racial" purposes. Numerous other Nazi publications did this even more elaborately, speaking of "guilt" and "sin" against the race, the "sanctity" of racial purity, the "salvation" of Germany, and so forth. *Das Schwarze Korps* could take this discursive background as a given among its readership.[39] They understood what was meant in one especially succinct passage that combined its usual apologia for premarital heterosexual activity with a redefinition of morality as a racial matter; the obligation was not to God but to the *Volk. Das Schwarze Korps* held up as an ideal the man who does not "throttle down healthy feelings because of an otherworldly mentality," but rather "joyfully affirms" these feelings and "out of this affirmation compels himself to honor those boundaries that are demanded of him by his sense of responsibility toward the *völkisch* community." Not coincidentally, this same essay, while minimizing the dangers posed to young men by sexually available girls, rigorously denounced homosexuality as an "aberration" that could inflict "profound damage to the whole of the *Volk*," even while self-reflexively acknowledging that opportunities for homosexual desire were enhanced by the sex-segregated aspects of Nazi youth organizations.[40]

The refiguring of religious concerns was most evident in the campaign for forced sterilization waged in the pages of *Das Schwarze Korps*. As early as April 1935, the paper ran a long article taking issue with an essay that had appeared in the Catholic journal *Katholisches Kirchenblatt*. The Catholic article was a critique of a Berlin exhibit entitled "The Miracle of Life" that introduced viewers, through photographs, artworks, and accompanying texts, to Nazi racial theory. In the words of *Das Schwarze Korps*, the exhibit included a "train of horror," photographs of "the hereditarily less valuable, whose fathers were unfortunately *not* sterilized in time." Here *Das Schwarze Korps* challenged the *Katholisches Kirchenblatt* as to whether it really believed "that these figures of horror represent the will of the Creator?" The exhibit had also included such slogans as "Immaculate and holy is the conception out of worthy love, immaculate and holy is the birth of life of a healthy type." At once a mockery, an imitation, and a redefinition of the Catholic praise-song for the Virgin Mary, the slogan exemplified the Nazi strategy of appropriating-while-rejecting Christianity, embedding an assault on the disabled and those of other "races" in the midst of a pious celebration of both wed and unwed motherhood. The *Katholisches Kirchenblatt* had singled out this slogan as especially "dangerous" (*not*, let it be noted, because of its anti-handicapped

sentiment or its racism, but rather) because it "opens the door wide to individual interpretation" and because "many an unhappy girl, who has today become an illegitimate mother" could draw comfort and a sense of entitlement from this slogan. *Das Schwarze Korps* liked the slogan so much it reprinted it in bold as a caption to the reproduction of one of the exhibit's paintings. But it also sought once again to redirect moral inquiry, fulminating against the way the Church gave its blessings to marriages between "Jews, Negroes, etc. on the one hand and members of European races on the other." It was these encounters, not those between the unwed, which *Das Schwarze Korps* regarded as the relationships that produced "bastards."[41]

By 1937, *Das Schwarze Korps* was advocating not only sterilization but also euthanasia. Not coincidentally, the tactic employed was to criticize Christianity as cruelly endorsing pain and suffering. *Das Schwarze Korps* reprinted a letter purportedly written by a father of nine children, eight of whom were vibrantly healthy, one of whom was severely disabled and had lived in excruciating agony for a decade before dying. As the father wrote, "Which love is greater: that, which let the little child suffer ten long years, let it suffer without pity, or that which would have saved it from its undeserved agonies through a quick death?" The father was especially angry about what his erstwhile pastor had said: " 'It's a pity, it's a pity,' he said when he saw the little child, '*but*,' he added smiling, 'there you also have something to remind you of God.' " With great bitterness and sarcasm, the father remarked on this and other Christian counsels to accept suffering as God's will: "Really, that's a nice God . . . you've got!"[42]

Secularization was indispensable to Nazi success; the dynamic already long underway was deliberately extended and intensified by the regime. Matters of sex and reproduction were absolutely central to these processes of secularization. In 1937, *Das Schwarze Korps* expressed the problem with its usual acuity: "One can't shake off the suspicion that the Catholic woman, who in the morning receives the Saviour in the sacrament, cheats Him in bed at night." What was meant here was that the same woman who went to church and took communion, nonetheless also used birth control despite church prohibitions against it. As the paper elaborated: "Religion has lost all inwardness as far as concerns the broad mass of the *Volk*. The practice of religion has become external and habitual. One goes to church because one has always done so and because it's traditional custom and because if one didn't go, it would be noticed. . . . In many cases Christianity has power only over a person's exterior, it has nothing anymore to say to the inner person. The eternal reprimand of the church against limitation of births falls upon deaf ears. 'It's easy for the priest to say, he should try it himself,' that's the sentence that constantly recurs when believers comment on the reverend's reminder about birth control."[43] *Das Schwarze Korps* was not alone in its opinion. The Protestant writer Theodor Haug reported in the late 1930s that "Today birth control of some sort is nearly universal, even among Christians." Indeed, Haug also reported that birth control was not just for married people; Christians in his day were not exactly resistant to engaging in premarital sex and it was birth control that made premarital sex so appealing: "Since with the use of protective means pregnancy does not have to be feared as it used to be, ['friendship' including bodily relations] is widespread also in circles that once hardly knew of it. It has also become an issue for those living in a Christian environment. Why

shouldn't sexual needs during the long waiting period before marriage be resolved in this way?"[44] Catholics did not disagree with Haug's assessment of general trends. As Austrian Catholic church official Theodor Bliewies noted, "the majority of girls lose their innocence around the age of sixteen."[45]

Both believing and nominal Christians were torn between acknowledging and resisting church teachings on such matters as premarital sex and birth control. They struggled to combine ongoing faith in God and/or lingering attachment to church community with their own patched-together version of personal values and, furthermore, wrestled with their own discomfort, ambivalence, and anxiety about the issue of disability. As such, this population was clearly vulnerable to advice from nonreligious sources, not least because they were already busily translating their physical and emotional desires into available moral languages. For secularization is not just about increasing numbers of people disaffiliating themselves from churches or rejecting church teachings; it is very much also about a reworking of languages and attitudes, a sort of compromise formation, in which earthly matters are treated as having a quasi-divine significance. In the early twentieth-century context of conflicting impulses toward secularization and the search for existential purposefulness, the yearning for romantic love in both its more immediate delights and in its enduring joys was increasingly invested with truly existential import. Psychotherapist and medical doctor Hans von Hattingberg put the point eloquently in a book published in 1936: "After so much of faith has been destroyed, faith in love is for a growing number of people the only faith to which they still cling."[46]

As religious language was appropriated to describe interhuman relations, and since human love, or the longing for it, was felt by many to be the only spiritual, transcendent content left in people's lives, what emerged was a kind of proto–New Age banal sentimentality that intersected with deistic Nazi nature-loving racism *and* with what people genuinely experienced as involving their deepest longings and most supreme experiences of happiness. When *Das Schwarze Korps* proclaimed romantic love to be "the highest this-worldliness of life-fulfillment," Christians were at pains to explain what might be wrong with this idea.[47]

However, Christians were also eager to prove that Christianity was not just anti-sex. The Catholic church official Bliewies, for instance, not only called for church-sponsored sex education that would reinforce the idea that only married people were permitted to have sex (even formal engagement did not make sex acceptable), but also referred to "the God-given sex drive," praised a teacher who told her students that "in itself the sexual is good, holy and something beautiful," and noted self-critically of Christians that "our prudery and dishonest shamefulness are co-responsible for the way year after year thousands of young girls run into disaster."[48] Similarly, Catholic van Acken, responding to pervasive attacks on Christian morality, agreed that prudery was a problem and that those morally outraged by all that was openly sensual were unhealthy. "Their nature is laden with a humid sensuality, they dwell in an atmosphere of sensual inhibition. This is quite obviously a case of repressed sensuality. Prudery in this case is nothing but the masking of an inner unfreedom vis-à-vis the sexual."[49] And Protestant Haug not only referred to "the gift that God has given us in the powers of sex," but also expressed concern that Christians were often too uptight and fixated on sexual sins to the exclusion of others: "According to the

judgment of Jesus we should actually see and treat sins of sex as milder [than other sins]. Jesus spoke much more serious words against the rich than against whores. The exclusive focus on sexual problems has brought much harm and inhibition into Christianity."[50] The success of both popular *and* regime efforts to liberalize sexual attitudes and to validate sexuality as a legitimate and joyful realm of human activity was observable not least in the extent to which Christians too absorbed this message, while retaining their own distinctive insistence that sexuality be confined to marriage.

The war years reduced the influence of Christian publications, but did not temper Nazi disdain for Christian mores. Race theorist Hans Endres, for example, told an audience of high-ranking Nazis and their guests in 1941 that, "We have been raised in criminal bigotry, because the Oriental Christian mentality has suppressed our healthy Germanic instincts in sexual matters. Our younger generations . . . must become proud of their bodies and enjoy the natural pleasures of sex without being ashamed."[51] The war years also witnessed a further deployment of the anti-Semitic strategy of disavowal: blaming Jews for non-Jewish Germans' sexual licentiousness even as in the same breath that licentiousness was defended as normal and natural.

The military doctor Joachim Rost, for instance, in a 1944 essay on "Sexual Problems in the Field," directed jabs at Sigmund Freud and a certain "Viennese school" for their efforts to locate the roots of all drive-life in the sex-drive. He declared that in the aftermath of World War I, "the demand for free love, nurtured by the parasites on our *Volk* . . . went hand in hand with a denigration of higher ethical feelings." But simultaneously, Rost also defended the sex drive as a powerful and important force, wondering aloud whether "one can ever demand of a grown human being the mastery of the strongest of all drives, the sex drive?" and furthermore announcing that "male natures with strong drives" are "prevalent among good soldiers," and they "naturally find a limitation of sexual activity oppressive."[52] Rost openly discussed the difficulties officers encountered convincing men that Nazi racial laws prohibited sex with women in the occupied nations. Potential sex partners, he admitted, were "of course easy . . . to find, especially among citizens of the occupied country," and the men challenged their officers to let them have their fun with enemy civilians, repeatedly invoking the joking declaration—as Rost summarized it—"that relations between the sexes are international law and therefore have nothing to do with war."[53] Rost felt that, given most soldiers' interest in for sex, military bordellos were the best solution for preventing venereal disease. The difficulty, however, was the psychological problems they induced in men, because they robbed men of the opportunity to actually woo the women with whom they had intercourse. Rost thus favored soldiers' romantic liaisons with German girls and women stationed near bases in military support functions. For the majority of soldiers, he further noted, adultery did not induce a crisis of conscience. In an extended analysis of the ways military men spoke amongst themselves about the legitimacy of adultery, Rost noted that quite a few contended that sexual activity outside of marriage was acceptable as long as no emotional attachment developed with the sex partner.[54]

Military leaders also directly encouraged soldiers to engage in sexual activity. Raunchy joking was standard fare not only between soldiers, but also as a form of official entertainment sponsored by the Wehrmacht.[55] One man, a Protestant

pastor's son and a serious Christian himself, recalled his service in the Wehrmacht as a teenager and his acute discomfort about the pressures exerted by fellow soldiers and officers who felt every young man must be sexually active: " 'Every little Hans must have a little Sabine [*Jedem Hänschen sein Sabinchen*],' that was the motto. It was disgusting. The Nazis constantly insisted that sex before marriage or outside of marriage was morally acceptable, even necessary."[56] But others experienced the official encouragement as wonderful. One man, a young officer during the war, recorded in his memoirs the delight he and his comrades had in the final weeks of the war when, stationed in a Western-occupied nation, the division of soldiers that had been assigned to them was sent to the Eastern front, and was replaced by a contingent of 21 girls and young women. The lieutenant-major made a speech before the assembled soldiers and females, which the young officer paraphrased. Gesturing toward the overwhelming sense of impending catastrophe, summarized at the time in the oft-repeated slogan "Enjoy the war; the peace will be awful," the lieutenant-major told his young charges: "Nothing should be noticed by the outside world. On the other hand, one cannot forbid fucking. . . . Obviously, there must be no violence, no fights or jealousies, and girls should take measures not to become pregnant. And furthermore, no sex in the normal sleeping barracks (so that the goody-two-shoes will not be disturbed). But so that you can bang away, we have prepared an extra barrack with ten straw sacks, that is for ten couples!" As the memoir recorded, "These encouraging words let everyone hit the high point of relaxed euphoria."[57] Looking back on these days from the perspective of an old man, this former young officer said: "It was paradise."[58]

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Scholars of "*Alltagsgeschichte*" (daily life history) have pointed out that developments within the so-called private sphere change according to rhythms quite different from those of high politics, and that the contours of quotidian activities such as shopping, socializing with coworkers, or childrearing transform in response to events and pressures not always self-evidently linked to what political regime happens to be in power. In some ways, sexuality conforms to the *Alltagsgeschichte* model, but in other ways it does not, especially because Nazis ascribed such tremendous importance to sex and were determined to reshape sexual mores. Ultimately, the majority of the population did not experience the Third Reich as a sexually conservative time, but rather as an era in which the general liberalization of heterosexual mores ongoing since the early twentieth century was experienced as progressing further and accelerating under the combined pressures of official Nazi encouragement and—eventually—the disruptive impact of total war. Under Nazism, this growing liberality was handled in a dual manner: it was *both* decried as Jewish *and* celebrated as an Aryan prerogative.

Finally, by taking seriously the sexual liberalism of Nazism, and assessing the manner in which sexual discourses became inseparable from the assault on a narrow version of Christian morality, we may come to understand why so many Germans found Nazism fundamentally appealing (although others clearly also found sexual liberalization threatening). Acknowledging the sexually liberalizing aspects of Nazism

may also explain why the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party in the postfascist period of the early Federal Republic placed such an emphatic emphasis on sexual propriety. At the same time, however, the anti-Semitic, eugenic, and homophobic assumptions shared by Nazis and Christians alike during the Third Reich also help explain the complicated combination of both departures *and* continuities that characterized sexual mores in postfascist culture. One of the most disturbing phenomena throughout the 1950s and 1960s may be the persistence of eugenic and homophobic arguments that were refurbished and revalidated in the name of Christianity.

What happened to the imaginative connection between sex and Jews? After the war it was the Judeocide that Christian commentators above all worked to link rhetorically with sexual matters. In the aftermath of the war, Christians were desperately on the defensive, eager to win back a largely secularized population, particularly with regard to sexual matters. As the conservative Protestant theologian Paul Althaus worried openly in 1949, Christianity had acquired a bad reputation for being anti-sex. Christian ethics, he confessed, had for centuries "not done justice to the meaning of sexual love," and "many of our contemporaries are full of mistrust against Christianity precisely in this area."[59] Catholic commentators, too, repeatedly emphasized their acute awareness that issues of sexuality were precisely the site at which secularization took hold in people's souls. Thus, for instance, the Catholic doctor O.B. Roegele in 1948 named as an "open secret" the fact "that sexual issues move human beings more than anything else, qualitatively and quantitatively," and that it is this matter, more than any other, that "estranges them most frequently from religion."[60] The progressive Catholic theologian Franz Arnold complained directly about what he saw as the Nazi stereotype that Christianity encouraged a "negation of nature . . . a defamation of eros and sex," and lamented that this "widely held notion" had "survived the downfall of the Third Reich and its blood-mythos."[61] Yet at the same time, with the installment of Konrad Adenauer as chancellor, and with U.S. encouragement, the Christian churches were on the upswing and exerting remarkable political and cultural influence despite popular skepticism. The role of the West in pressuring western Germany to come to some kind of terms with the Judeocide is also crucial for understanding ensuing moral renegotiations conducted under the auspices of the Christian Democratic government in the 1950s.

Christian commentators in the immediate postwar years, both Protestant and Catholic, presented sexual propriety as *the* cure for postwar Germany's moral crisis, thereby negotiating a striking and telling displacement with the implication that sexual immorality, not mass murder, had been the source of crisis.[62] Catholics were the most vocal in recommencing their criticisms of the Nazi regime for having been derogatory toward virginity and having driven the unmarried into "libertinage."[63] Some Catholics articulated a deeper and, in its own way profoundly perceptive, link between the Third Reich's mass murder and its sexual licentiousness. In this vein, for instance, the Catholic physician Anton Hofmann in 1951 not only criticized the way "NS-schools and the like" had forced "premature sexual contact" on young people under the guise of " 'natural-free experiencing' of the erotic event." He also directly linked Nazi encouragement of sexual activity with Nazism's other crimes, and urged reflection on "the paradoxical matter that the same person who raises the body to dizzying heights, in an instant can sacrifice the bodies of a hundred thousand

others."[64] Other self-identified Christians simply linked sex and murder for their own sexually conservative purposes. In 1950, CDU representative Maria Probst, for instance, opposed the liberalization of abortion laws not only on the grounds that childlessness reduced the impulse to work and be thrifty, but also maintained that legalizing abortion would induce "naked materialism" and "uninhibited sexuality" and lead "to a new Auschwitz."[65] In 1964, the CDU politician Hermann Kraemer went so far as to declare that the pornographic moments in Ingmar Bergman's *The Silence* reflected "the same spiritual stance" as "the concentration camp Auschwitz." Referring explicitly to the trial of Auschwitz perpetrators that was taking place in Frankfurt at that time, he argued: "The degradation of human beings is nowhere so clear at this moment as in this trial. This degradation finds its continuation in the sexual acrobatics of the Swedish filmmaker."[66]

There are various ways to think about why the mass murder of European Jewry was deployed for a sexually conservative postwar agenda. One point that needs to be made, as Anton Hofmann's remarks imply, is that there really was in the Third Reich a concrete connection between the detabooization of heterosexual liberality and the detabooization of genocide. Sexual libertinism and idealization of the Aryan body and brutality and mass murder had quite literally gone hand in hand.[67]

Yet there are at least two further possible interpretive points that could be made. First, the sexually conservative Christians could fairly represent themselves as enacting a moral reaction against the type of Nazi incitement to nonmarital sexuality exemplified in the pages of *Das Schwarze Korps*. In this Christian self-representation, Christianity could bring salvation and a return to proper mores in the aftermath of Nazism's sexual licentiousness. Interestingly, the consolidation of this conservatism during the 1950s could also be viewed as the ultimate realization of a promise once made but not kept by the Nazis.[68] They had promised to clean up what Weimar had wrought, but did not succeed; now, the clean-up could finally be accomplished. Christians, while styling themselves as opponents of Nazism, could effectively stimulate the same punitive antisexual affects that had made possible the rise of Nazism in the first place. Second, by emphasizing a new and strict sexual code and placing themselves at the spearhead of the campaign against Nazism, Christian conservatives could erase from view and from popular memory their own profound complicity with Nazism, once expressed in shared views on nationalism, anti-Bolshevism, and, not least of all, anti-Semitism.

Notes

1. Jeffrey Herf, "One-Dimensional Man" (review of Herbert Marcuse, *War, Technology and Fascism*), *New Republic* (February 1, 1999): 39.
2. Joachim Stephan Hohmann, *Sexualforschung und -aufklärung in der Weimarer Republik: Eine Übersicht in Materialien und Dokumenten mit einem Beitrag über den frühen Aufklärungsfilm* (Berlin: Foerster, 1985), p. 9; Sabine Weissler, "Sexy Sixties," in *CheSchahShit: Die sechziger Jahre zwischen Cocktail und Molotow*, ed. Eckhart Siepmann (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1984), p. 99; Christian de Nuys-Henkelmann, "Wenn die rote Sonne abends im Meer versinkt," in *Sexualmoral und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Anja Bagel-Bohlan and Michael Salewski (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1990); Scott Spector, "Was the Third Reich Movie-Made? Interdisciplinarity and the

Reframing of 'Ideology,' " *American Historical Review* 106, 2 (April 2001): 472. On the emergence in the 1960s of the idea of Nazism as above all sexually repressive, see Dagmar Herzog, " 'Pleasure, Sex, and Politics Belong Together': Post-Holocaust Memory and the Sexual Revolution in West Germany," in *Intimacy*, ed. Lauren Berlant (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

3. George Mosse, *The Image of Man*: *The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 175–76.
4. Erich Goldhagen, "Nazi Sexual Demonology," *Midstream* (May 1981): 11.
5. Udo Pini, *Leibeskult und Liebeskitsch: Erotik im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1992), pp. 9–11.
6. Stefan Maiwald and Gerd Mischler, *Sexualität unterm Hakenkreuz: Manipulation und Vernichtung der Intimsphäre im NS-Staat* (Hamburg and Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1999), pp. 57, 60.
7. For example, cf. Hans von Hattingberg, *Über die Liebe*: *Eine Ärztliche Wegweisung* (Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1936), p. 10; and Mathias Laros, *Die Beziehungen der Geschlechter* (Cologne: Staufen-Verlag 1936).
8. For example, see Derek Hastings's research on Catholics in Weimar (completing Ph.D. at the University of Chicago) and Tim Kaiser's work on Protestants in Weimar (completing Ph.D. at the University of Michigan). Both have found evidence of significant Christian anti-masturbation campaigns, and more general social purity mobilization. Julie Stubbs (also a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan) and Julia Roos (who has just completed hers at Carnegie Mellon) have both researched the topic of prostitution in Weimar, and found both religious conservative purity activists and eugenically minded social workers and doctors elaborating more conservative sexual programs in the late 1920s and early 1930s. My own reading of primary documents from late Weimar confirms that across a whole range of issues, e.g., whether men are obliged to provide for their female partners' sexual pleasure, whether doctors are obliged to provide birth control information and devices, conservative views were certainly receiving a hearing, such that a defensive tone surfaces in the writings of sexual liberals.
9. Geoff Eley, "Ordinary Germans, Nazism, and Judeocide," in *The "Goldhagen Effect"*: *History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German Past* ed. Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 22–23.
10. Excerpts from Medizinalrat Dr. Walter Gmelin's essay "Bevölkerungspolitik und Frühehe" (published in the *Deutsche Ärztezeitung*) in "Mütterheim Steinhöring," *Das Schwarze Korps* (hereafter *DSK*), January 7, 1937, pp. 13–14.
11. Excerpt of Rudolf Bechert's essay from *Deutsches Recht*, Nr. 23/24 (December 15, 1936), in "Mütterheim Steinhöring," p. 14.
12. Carl Csallner, *Das Geschlechtsleben, seine Bedeutung für Individuum und Gemeinschaft* (Munich: Otto Gmelin, 1937), p. 10.
13. Launched in March 1935, the paper's subscription did not draw exclusively from members of the SS; over the ten years of its existence it was widely read by the general populace, eventually achieving the second highest circulation of any weekly in Germany. Within a few years, 500,000 copies were printed weekly; by 1944 the total was more than 750,000. See Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich* (Munich: Beck, 1989), pp. 101–04, also p. 71; William L. Combs, *The Voice of the SS: A History of the SS Journal* "Das Schwarze Korps" (New York: Peter Lang, 1986). By the paper's own report, although it was very much a "men's paper," "hundreds of thousands of women" read it as well, and the paper repeatedly opened its pages to female columnists. Editorial note to "Wie eine Frau es sieht," *DSK*, July 13, 1944, p. 4.
14. "Österreich erwache!," *DSK*, February 25, 1937, p. 6.
15. Karl Barth, "The Church between East and West," and "The Christian Message in Europe Today," in *Against the Stream* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), pp. 136, 139, 168; and Eugen Kogon, "The Psychology of the SS," in *The Theory and Practice of*

Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1960).

16. Theodor Adorno, "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda" (1951), in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 132.
17. "Ist das Nacktkultur? Herr Stapel entrüstet sich!," *DSK*, April 24, 1935, p. 12.
18. "Anstössig?" *DSK*, April 16, 1936, p. 13. Although *Das Schwarze Korps* reserved a special disdain for Catholics, this particular article involved an attack on a Protestant pastor for complaining about a picture of a naked woman in the Nazi paper *Völkischer Beobachter* (special issue of March 1936).
19. "Erbsündenlehre—volkstümlich," *DSK*, January 28, 1937, p. 12.
20. "Das uneheliche Kind," *DSK*, April 9, 1936, p. 6.
21. "Das gleiche noch einmal," *DSK*, February 18, 1937, p. 12.
22. Dr. Hans Lüdemann, "Neues Stadium der Frauenbewegung?" *DSK*, June 19, 1935, p. 10. Lüdemann is criticizing Marie Joachimi-Dege's essay in Will Vesper's journal *Neue Literatur*.
23. "Verführung—Beleidigung?" *DSK*, March 25, 1937, p. 2.
24. " . . . Unzucht in der Soldatenzeit," *DSK*, March 5, 1936, p. 6.
25. "Es gibt keine katholische Fruchtbarkeit," *DSK*, October 24, 1935, p. 9. Another slap at Catholics for trying to butter up to the Nazis by arguing that the rise in the birthrate was due to Christian teachings (apparently an article in the Catholic journal *Germania* had again made this claim) can be found in "Oesterreich erwache!" p. 6. In another case, a Protestant is reproached for pandering to Nazism by arguing that his institute for the disabled had done so very much for the cause of "eugenics," and all "without any fuss": see "Witzecke für Schwachsinnige," *DSK*, November 14, 1935, p. 17.
26. Ferdinand Hoffmann, *Sittliche Entartung und Geburtenschwund*, 2nd ed. (Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1938), pp. 13, 21, 24–25, 34. Hoffmann was a Regierungsmedizinalrat.
27. Paul Danzer, "Die Haltung zum anderen Geschlecht," in *Streifzüge ins Völkische: Ausgewählte Lesestücke für deutsche Menschen aus dem "Völkischen Willen"* (Berlin: Rota-Druck, 1936), pp. 5–6; Dr. Knorr, "Eine noch nicht genügend beachtete weltanschauliche und bevölkerungspolitische Gefahr," *Ziel und Weg: Organ des nationalsozialistischen deutschen Ärtzebundes* 7, 22 (November 1937): 570.
28. Major Dr. Ellenbeck, "Der deutsche Unteroffizier und das Thema 'Frauen und Mädchen,' " *Die Zivilversorgung* (October 15, 1942): 281–82.
29. "Schön und Rein," and "Geschäft ohne Scham," *DSK*, October 20, 1938, pp. 10, 12.
30. Krupka's remarks in *Weg zum Ziel* Nr. 18 (1935), quoted and discussed in "Pikanterien im Beichtstuhl," *DSK*, June 26, 1935, p. 5.
31. Laros, *Die Beziehungen der Geschlechter*, pp. 166–67.
32. Johannes Ehwalt, *Eheleben und Ehescheidung in unserer Zeit* (Berlin: Germania, 1936). The pen-name Ehwalt was a play on the words for "honor" (*Ehre*) and "lawyer" (*Anwalt*).
33. B. van Acken S.J., "Prüderie—Distanzhalten," *Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift* (Linz a.d. Donau), 92 (1939): 77–78.
34. Wilhelm Stapel, " 'Neuheidentum.' Ein Brief und eine Antwort," *Deutsches Volkstum: Monatsschrift für das deutsche Geistesleben* (April 1935): 293.
35. Adolf Köberle, "Unter den Studenten," in *Christus lebt*!: *Ein Buch von fruchtbarem Dienst in Lehre und Leben*, ed. Hans Dannenbaum (Berlin: Furche, 1939), p. 325.
36. For example, see Lisa Reinhardt, "Frau und Mutter," in *Christus lebt*!, pp. 199–200.
37. Köberle, "Unter den Studenten," pp. 325–26.
38. Adolf Allwohn, "Zu unseren Beiträgen," *Seelsorge* (Dresden), 15 (1939): 67.
39. Erich Goldhagen suggests that Arthur Dinter's book *Die Sünde wider das Blut* (The Sin *Against the Blood*) (Leipzig: Matthes & Thost, 1920), which had a big impact on Hitler when he wrote *Mein Kampf*, is the Ur-text of this "spiritualization" of racism. See also Christina von Braun's interpretation of Dinter and Nazism more generally, and her

intriguing suggestion that Nazism was not just antireligious, but rather itself an alternative religion, and that indeed the intensity of the combative rivalry between the two religions lay not least in their sibling similarities, a central aspect of which was the shared anti-Semitism. Christina von Braun, in *Der ewige Judenhass*, ed. von Braun and Ludger Haas (Berlin: Philo, 2000).

40. " . . . Unzucht in der Soldatenzeit," p. 6.
41. "Offene Antwort auf eine katholische Kritik," *DSK*, April 17, 1935, pp. 1–2. The original Catholic critique of the exhibit can be found in, "Ist das schon 'Das Wunder des Lebens'?" *Katholisches Kirchenblatt* (Berlin) March 31, 1935, p. 10.
42. "Was ist 'humaner?' " *DSK*, April 1 1937, p. 13.
43. "Oesterreich erwache!" p. 6.
44. Theodor Haug, "Die sexuelle Frage in der Seelsorge," *Zeitwende*, 15 (1938/39), pp. 609, 614.
45. Theodor Bliewies, "Mädchen in Not: Eine Fragestellung zur geschlechtlichen Aufklärung," *Der Seelsorger* (Vienna), 14: 210.
46. Von Hattingberg, *Über die Liebe*, p. 15.
47. "Frauen sind keine Männer!" p. 1.
48. Bliewies, "Mädchen in Not," p. 212.
49. Van Acken, "Prüderie—Distanzhalten," p. 74.
50. Haug, "Die sexuelle Frage," p. 542.
51. Endres quoted in George W. Herald, "Sex is a Nazi Weapon," *American Mercury* 54, 222 (June 1942), p. 661.
52. As more sexually conservative Nazi moralists had done before him, Rost blamed Jews for non-Jews' interest in sex. Rost tried to argue that, despite the "gratifying progressive development" initiated in 1933 one could not expect to overcome overnight the habit-forming belief that "everything that is pleasing is permitted." See Joachim Rost, "Sexuelle Probleme im Felde," *Medizinische Welt* 18 (1944): 218–20.
53. On the other hand, Rost also counseled his medical colleagues that racist arguments were more effective in dissuading military men from having sex with racially inappropriate civilians. Thus, "the dangerous fertility of the East and the growing black subversion from the West" was a more effective warning than the potential risks to their own health from venereal disease.
54. Rost, "Sexuelle Probleme."
55. See Lore Walb, *Ich die Alte, ich die Junge*: *Konfrontation mit meinen Tagebüchern 1933–1945* (Berlin: Aufbau, 1997).
56. Conversation with E.I., 1994.
57. Memoirs of G.C.
58. Conversation with G.C., 2002.
59. Paul Althaus, *Von Liebe und Ehe*: *ein evangelisches Wort zu den Fragen der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1949), pp. 3–4.
60. O.B. Roegele, "Ein heikles Thema . . . Geburtenbeschränkung und Ehenot," *Rheinischer Merkur* 3, 22 (1948): 3.
61. Franz Arnold, "Sinnlichkeit und Sexualität im Lichte von Theologie und Seelsorge," *Universitas* 2, 10 (1947): 1155, 1158.
62. Thus, e.g., one Protestant synod, in a call to its postwar flock to reject the godlessness of Nazism, expressed far more concern about "neglecting respect and modesty between man and woman . . . the crumbling of chastity," which made Germany a "laughing-stock" among nations, than concern for what it euphemistically referred to as the expropriation of the Jews. Along related lines, one Catholic priest, acknowledged that "we have a terrible war behind us, a war which has left behind demolished churches and houses and a multitude of dead," yet maintained that this was not what was "ruining" Germany; instead, he argued, "we are dying once more at the hands of our women and girls, who every day throw what is most sacred in them into the dirt." See "Wort der ausserordentlichen

Landessynode der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in Oldenburg an die Gemeinden Oktober 1945," in *Kirchliches Jahrbuch für die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland* (Gütersloh, 1950), p. 43; Johannes Leppich, " 'Thema 1,' " in *Pater Leppich Spricht*, ed. Günter Mees and Günter Graf (Düsseldorf: Bastion, 1952), p. 43.

63. See Leppich, " 'Thema 1,' " p. 46; Maria Jochum, "Frauenfrage 1946," *Frankfurter Hefte* 1 (June 1946): 25.
64. Anton Christian Hofmann, *Die Natürlichkeit der christlichen Ehe* (Munich: Pfeiffner, 1951), pp. 9–10, 38–39.
65. Probst quoted in *Perlonzeit: Wie die Frauen ihr Wirtschaftswunder erlebten*, ed. Angela Delille and Andrea Grohn (Berlin: Elefanten, 1985), p. 124.
66. Kraemer quoted in Heinz Ungureit, "Bernkastels Landrat vergleicht 'Das Schweigen' mit Auschwitz," *Frankfurter Rundschau* (June 24, 1964): 22.
67. See on this point also Sophinette Becker, "Zur Funktion der Sexualität im Nationalsozialismus," *Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung* 14, 2 (June 2001): 139, 143.
68. Conversation with Martin Dannecker, July 2002.

Chapter Six

The Fascist Phantom and Anti-Immigrant Violence: The Power of (False) Equation

Diethelm Prowe

The specter of fascism has survived the collapse of communism in Europe. Recurring incidents of racist violence, sporadic electoral triumphs of radical-right parties in local elections, and their double-digit percentages among national elections conjure up visions of a return of Nazi and fascist dictatorships. In fact, many political analyses still identify the xenophobic outbursts that have taken place in post–Cold War Europe with fascist movements spawned between the world wars, during an era of dictatorships, totalitarian war, and mass murder.

Yet in recent years a consensus has been emerging among scholars that the radical right movements of recent decades represent an essentially different phenomena from the fascism of the interwar period.[1] To be sure, there are generic similarities that define all radical right movements. At the simplest level there is always a virulent ultranationalism that rejects people and ideas that are different from those of the in-group and that threaten or appear to threaten the in-group's familiar life patterns, unquestioned customs, and values—be they defined in local, kin, regional, ethnic, or even religious terms. This can build to a violent hatred aimed ultimately at the elimination of the others. Such aggressive intolerance tends toward a totalist mentality, subordination to dictatorial leadership, and construction of conspiracies with which to explain one's own weaknesses. Certainly, this last characteristic also holds for radical leftists or any other extremist groups.

Beyond this basic definition, any political ideology or movement is embedded within a specific material and cultural context. No political movement develops in a vacuum. Rightists, too, have responded to particular historical contexts. As one recent comparative study of the extreme right in twentieth-century Europe summates: "The persistent comparison with the fascist context obfuscates the analysis of the contemporary phenomenon, which is based on a radically different conjuncture of socioeconomic, political and international factors."[2]

The radical political movements that identified with fascism in the interwar years grew out of a variety of national traditions—traditions diverse enough that Gilbert Allardyce even mounted a quixotic attack against the very term of fascism as a legitimate historical concept.[3] Yet these fascisms grew out of a common European sense of profound crisis at the turn of the last century—"an epoch of general crisis, with a strong tendency toward a dynamic disequilibrium in all major systems of thought

and action," in the words of Arno Mayer[4]—which erupted into terrible violence in World War I. That war, regarded by many intellectuals of the time as a *Befreiungsschlag*, a war of deliverance, led instead to the broken world of the European civil war between classes and "nations" perverted into imagined biological entities called "races." The roots of interwar fascism reached back into the prewar crisis years of the new mass politics of imperialist racism and anti-Semitism in Barrès's and Maurras's France, Lueger's Vienna, Langbehn's and Houston Stewart Chamberlain's Germany, and the Russia of the forged "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." But fascists and their interpreters—from Mussolini himself to the prophet of "the new consensus," contemporary British historian Roger Griffin—have always regarded as inherent to the definition of fascism that it was fathered by the Great European War. "It was the war that made room for a political phenomenon, which was, so to speak, its very own child, a child which by innate law strove in turn to engender another war," as Ernst Nolte put it in his groundbreaking *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*.[5]

The best definitions of fascism reflect this essential historical context. The various list definitions include (1) the bitter rejection of the nineteenth-century optimistic, triumphalist Enlightenment liberalism and conservatism, and their replacement by prophetic myths of secular spiritual rejuvenation, myths that grew out of the pre–World War I crisis and were propagated by the "Prophets of Yesterday," whose brightest star was Friedrich Nietzsche; (2) the identification with ultranationalist male martialism, which came out of the World War I trenches and the embittered home front; and (3) the anticommunist, anti-internationalist, and anti-Semitic crusade of destruction born of the despair of the broken postwar society.[6] Nolte's elegantly comprehensive definition of fascism places these historically formative factors on three levels of metapolitical abstraction: (1) "anti-Marxism" as "a radically opposed yet related ideology" with "nearly identical although typically transformed methods"; (2) a "life-and-death struggle of the sovereign, martial, and inwardly antagonistic group"; and (3) "resistance to transcendence."[7]

For a historical analysis, however, the order of Nolte's three characteristics of fascism would appear to be chronologically backwards. Both the resistance to "theoretical transcendence," which is a religious-metaphysical "reaching out of the mind beyond what exists and what can exist toward an absolute whole," as well as the parallel resistance to "practical transcendence" grew out of the later nineteenth century. The "practical transcendence," which Nolte views as encompassing the fundamental, essentially revolutionary expansion of political and material freedoms and responsibilities, was a project of the nineteenth century endebted to the political–cultural shift forged by the French Revolution.[8] The radical resistance against "practical transcendence" germinated in the pre–World War I years, according to Gerhard Masur, and was born of a disillusionment about the "inevitable progress" and "the stress of triumph."[9] Maurice Barrès was perhaps the most striking embodiment of the rebellion against triumphant liberalism. He experienced a political conversion from the uncompromising individualism of "ego-worship" to an anti-individualism founded on the concept of ethnic-nationalist rootedness (*enracinement*). In this worldview, progress would come about through ethnic "rebirth" and "completion" of the nation, whose mission was rooted in a mythical past.[10] George Mosse observed a similar strain

of thinking in his research on the late nineteenth-century German concept of ethnic rootedness that led to Nazism[11] with its grand dream of a vast imperial *Lebensraum* based on modern, eugenic social-scientific principles.[12]

Nolte himself linked his second-level definition, "life-and-death struggle of the sovereign, martial, and inwardly antagonistic group," to World War I. When Ernst Jünger called the war the father of all things—"it hammered us, it chiseled us, it made us what we are"—he identified the war as the progenitor of an essentially fascist world view, one closely aligned with his own.[13] The cult of the front soldier, the fallen soldier, and the war veteran dwelled at the heart of fascism.[14] These images were mythologized in the 1920s and 1930s, but also remained immanent and real memories that shaped fascism.[15] The war had even militarized old, aristocratic conservatism, stirring it into an activist, bellicose dynamism that moved the younger, radical fringes toward fascism.[16] If the prewar revolt against the triumphant liberal project of "practical transcendence" laid essential ideological foundations for fascism, the war experience created the preconditions for the mobilization of a populist mass movement.

A final impetus for all of the interwar European fascist groups can be found in Nolte's first-level definition, namely "anti-Marxism," which provided the fascists with a counter-model to create a systematic "radically opposed yet related ideology" operating under "nearly identical although typically transformed methods." However, I do not concur with Nolte's later assertion that the turn from a historically entrenched anti-Semitism to the murderous Holocaust received its initial impetus from the Bolshevik terror and the first Soviet gulags. The brutal racism of imperialist rule, the suppression of revolts, and the cruelty of World War I itself were clearly more important in the debasement of public morality. However, without anticommunist sentiment, the fascists could never have achieved a significant position of power within the political structures of any country, let alone seize power. In fact, the Bolshevik seizure of power provided the first model for any number of radical groups, which, after a century of social and political consolidation, hoped that gaining control of states now possessed of modern instruments of police power might once again be possible. Most importantly, during a time of crisis, the specter of communism allowed the fascists to attract significant support or at least complaisance from the elites without whom a seizure would have been impossible within modern and essentially intact states. Nolte employs the term "anti-Marxism" in his definition because he believes the Soviet Union conformed to Marxism through its essential goals of achieving industrial emancipation through "a higher world process"; however, his notion of anticommunism was really defined by opposition to Leninism and ultimately Stalinism, which concretely threatened all established elites.

Among those defining characteristics of fascism that were critical in mobilizing the interwar radical right, both the martial, antagonistic legacy of World War I as well as anticommunism have now vanished. The only remaining feature is really a version of the oldest catalyst of (pre-)fascism, comprising a vague discomfort with triumphant internationalist liberalism, which is perceived as violating traditional ethnic-national cultural habits. Yet even that element has been dramatically transformed. The basic liberal-democratic order in Europe is no longer questioned by discontented groups nor by the established rightist parties and their sympathizers;

only a few marginalized groups occupy still place of disaffection. Instead, resentment has been directed at global migration flows and the manner in which global corporations, most especially the financial industries, have infiltrated the internationalist liberal-capitalist trading world. While protesters against these two manifestations of internationalization are often identified with opposite ends of the political spectrum, they are really part of the same rebellion that has defined our recent *fin de siècle*.

Classic fascism and the recent radical right thus share common roots in the increasingly intense interaction of Europeans with the rest of the world. But classic fascism grew out of the dizzying European drive for world domination of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which led to strained resources and uncontrolled cycles of rising violence, and undermined public morality. Imperialism intensified and transformed traditional racism and injected it into internal social and political conflicts spreading throughout Europe. In contrast, the radical right phenomenon of recent decades is a consequence of fierce decolonization struggles that ultimately drove Europeans into an often bitter defensive. More importantly, the consequences of decolonization—namely, the transformation of the colonized–ruler relationship into one of economic dependence—combined with the Western European economic boom to draw unprecedented numbers of immigrants to Europe. This created new forms of social and ethnic conflict.

Both historical movements of the extreme right during two distinct eras were fueled by major disorientations that accompanied the domestic transformation of social and culture life within Europe. However, the nature of these two crises and the severity of the threat to individual lives were distinctly different during respectively the interwar years and the recent decades of relative peace and prosperity. The prevailing source of trauma in the interwar years was class struggle resulting from the industrialization and urbanization of the second half of the nineteenth century. The crass reality of class conflict only became fully evident following World War I, which swept aside the struggles between dynastic monarchies and classic liberal concepts of popular sovereignty. By challenging even property-based class structures, the trench war intensified class-war politics. This last defensive line of status and privilege was alternately attacked by working-class socialists and fiercely defended by the propertied sections of society. Even anti-Semitism was translated into the terms of a class war and presented Nazis and fascists alike with a flattery subject position: "If it weren't for us National Socialists," the later Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in *Der Angriff* in the early 1930s, "the Bolshevist tide would have long swept all across Germany and annihilated the rotten and depraved bourgeoisie."[17] This genuine fear of Communism harbored by the "depraved bourgeoisie"—a grouping that included not only much of the political–economic elite but also the broad middle classes of small holders of property and status—compelled even these groups to regard fascist violence as a justifiable means for the most radical anti-Marxists to combat the common enemy of Communism.[18]

The radical right of more recent decades, in contrast, has been primarily engaged in a *cultural war*, to adopt the term from Samuel Huntington's controversial and ingenious book.[19] Clashes along still unblended cultural front lines have become symptomatic of multicultural and prosperous European societies emerging since the declining years of the Cold War. The emergence of multicultural societies, whose

localized concentrations of migrant populations in some instances exceed 50 percent of the general population, marks a critical watershed for Western and East Central Europe. Among voters on the extreme right, a pluralistic society is still the primary point of contention, although cloaked as political campaigns against crime and calls for "law and order." In polls conducted following the 1986 French legislative elections, 38 percent of Le Pen voters identified immigration as their greatest concern (as against only 8 percent of the electorate as a whole). Meanwhile, only 19 percent of the same votership regarded unemployment as the biggest problem (as against 28 percent for the total electorate), even though the Lepenists attracted a disproportionally high number of unemployed.[20] Interviews with German REP voters suggest similar conclusions.[21] Although the immigration issue appears to have faded in urgency in more recent elections, two-thirds of *Front National* voters—well over twice as many as within the electorate as a whole—consider the issue a top priority.[22] In Germany, the correlation between radical right vote totals and arrivals of new foreign residents is most evident.[23]

To be sure, this historical transformation within the right wing has occurred gradually. In the first decades after World War II, fascism lingered on as a sentiment among many believers and followers. Their organizations fed off the ideologies of the violent post–World War I and Depression years, and leadership drew almost exclusively from the former fascist and Nazi parties. For example, one of Mussolini's closest associates in the Republic of Saló, Giorgio Almirante, became the long-term leader of the Italian neofascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI).[24] Oswald Mosley and A.K. Chesterton reemerged as leaders of the Union Movement and the League of Empire Loyalists in Britain; Nazi officer Otto-Ernst Remer cofounded the first regionally successful neo-Nazi party, *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (SRP) in Germany; and the *Action Française* continued to play a key role in French rightist circles. Not surprisingly, the glow of Mussolini and even Hitler faded only slowly, not least because the physical and social conditions and political culture of Europe did not change nearly as dramatically after the war as many have assumed. Inflation and depression remained strong and triggered profound fears about the economy and about social stability and furthermore held nationalist sentiments strong and potentially explosive.

Yet, the generational shift during the 1960s and the attendant transformation of political structures and social life within a prospering and stable democracy, left little room for the old nationalist right and classic fascism, which faded to a marginal phenomenon. By the early 1970s, the younger revolutionary generation were taking the defeat of interwar authoritarianism and fascism so fully for granted that they protested against the *liberal* democratic order and demanded an end to all limitations on total and direct democracy—limitations that they blamed on capitalist economic power and traditional state authority—the so-called *Stamokap* "totalitarianism." They even associated the established liberal constitutional order with fascism, regarding both governing systems as ultimately forms of bourgeois rule, and reasoning that even the earlier Weimar Republic had proven disturbingly vulnerable to a fascist takeover in the face of economic crisis and the challenge of radical socialism.[25]

Rejecting their parents' social and cultural order, the "New Left" also rebelled against international capitalism as a system driven by US-American economic and

material domination and disseminated through cultural hegemony. The French and German ideologues of 1968 theorized about a great cultural revolution on the scale of the political and economic revolutions of 1789 and 1917, and drew inspiration from American "counterculture," even while seeking to move far beyond it in the European revolutionary tradition.[26]

The 68ers also identified with various decolonization wars of "national liberation" waged against European rule and American domination. The American "colonial war," the Vietnam War, quickly took center-stage for the European New Left, which was consistently influenced by the American counterculture of protest. In 1969 the senior interpreter and mentor of both the American and European "New Left" student rebels, Herbert Marcuse, provided an ideological foundation for this alliance between students and the "Third World." "The National Liberation Fronts threaten the life line of imperialism; they are not only a material but also an ideological catalyst of change . . . More than the 'socialist humanism' of the early Marx, this violent solidarity in defense, this elemental socialism in action, has given form and substance to the radicalism of the New Left; in this ideological respect, too, the external revolution has become an essential part of the opposition within the capitalist metropoles."[27] From this position, it was easy to blame the 68ers when those populations suffering European–American exploitation and hegemony migrated to Europe.

The first stirrings of a new right appeared within this same period of generational change and economic recession when the 68ers were mounting their protest. The long period of peace, relative economic security, well-rooted democracy, and the last main stage of decolonization had reshaped both the left and the right, with the left exerting more influence and maintaining greater visibility. While the left took democratization for granted and demanded more, the radical right parties embraced the current democratic arena as the final generation of veteran fascists were joined and ultimately transplanted by leaders from the younger generation. Thus, the West German National Democratic Party (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, NPD), which had been created in 1964 by members of the tattered postwar neo-Nazi *Deutsche Reichspartei* (DRP), proclaimed their loyalty to the system by incorporating the word "democratic" into their party name. This was a momentous shift for the German right, which had historically decried the word 'democratic' as "unGerman."[28] The Italian MSI increasingly sought cooperation with the Christian Democrats,[29] and with the fall of John Tyndall in 1975, control of the British NF "was shifted from away ex-Nazis to non-fascist and ostensibly more democratic elements."[30] Le Pen was similarly eager to gain acceptance as a middle of the road political figure.[31]

The social–economic and cultural transformations accompanying the new generation were also associated with ideological modernization. The new right increasingly defined itself in direct opposition to the dramatic triumphs of the 68ers, who had drawn so much media publicity.[32] There was a rivalry and a competition between the two political ends of the spectrum, both in the radicality of political and intellectual assertions and in the street battles alternately waged by *Chaoten*-anarchists and neo-Nazis. The political and intellectual thrust of indignation within the radical right's rage was directed in particular against the New Left's apparently successful transformation of political culture during what German 68ers called their

"march through the institutions." Both the New Left and the new radical right were initially driven by a resistance to the internal transformations taking place within society and the trauma of humiliation during the violent decolonization wars. Oddly enough, both the radical left and right shared the same hatred of American hegemony. But their goals naturally stood in contradistinction to one another, with the left seeking to level society, while the right called for a renaissance of a largely imagined purity of the nation that would extend to communities and neighborhoods.

Within that context, France represents a special case, for the trauma of decolonization had created a deep national crisis bearing closer comparison to the interwar crises than did contemporary upheavals in neighboring European countries. This crisis reawakened and energized old fascist networks first established during the Vichy period and recruited a younger generation into circles still infused with the interwar fascist ideology of anticommunism and holding the intention for rebirth of the nation out of the despair and decay of a disastrous war. At the same time, large numbers of *pieds-noir*—European residents who had resided for generations within the colonies—streamed to France together with Africans and Asians who fled with the departing French colonizers. Their arrival instilled the first fears of immigration overwhelming the nation. The link between interwar fascism and the new radical-right movements resisting the development of a multicultural society was immediate and concretely evident in France. It was perhaps most strikingly personified in Maurice Bardèche—brother-in-law of one of the key "pure" aesthetic fascists, Robert Brasillach—who not only forged continuities with post–World War I intellectual fascism, but also served as ideological mentor to the younger leaders of the new radical right, whom Jean-Marie Le Pen assembled into the *Front National* in 1972. While Bardèche fraternized with Oswald Mosley and the Italian MSI,[33] in other countries the linkage between interwar fascists and post-decolonization anti-immigrant populists such as Enoch Powell in Britain developed less directly. In France "the Algerian conflict was a landmark, an event that helped individuals define themselves"[34] whether it be to the right or to the left of the events of 1968. Thus, in France, where leading theorists from Hannah Arendt and Ernst Nolte to Ze'ev Sternhell claim to locate the deepest roots of fascism (while assigning the most brutal behavior to the Germans)[35] the cells of the *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* formed during the Algerian War provided the strongest network for the most successful radical-right movement against multicultural Europe.

The new right defined itself in opposition to the broader liberalized front of 68ers, whose hegemony was largely of an imagined nature. It experienced a significant surge in popularity of that directly correlated with an increase in immigration and the accompanying specter of a multicultural society. Even the much-mythologized violent radical-right OAS conspiracy against the new post-decolonization and modernizing French Fifth Republic maintained, at best, feeble proportions until the onset of dramatic increases in immigration throughout Western Europe in the early 1980s.

In France the first shot rang out in 1983 in the midsize industrial town of Dreux, where the candidate for the *Front National* (FN) won 16.7 percent of the vote. This was roughly equivalent to Le Pen's shocking 17 percent in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, which put him in second place to square off against the incumbent Gaullist Jacques Chirac. Dreux was a town experiencing industrial decline

amidst an increase in its foreign immigrant population, comprised mostly of unskilled workers attracted by industrial expansion, from 11 percent in 1975 to 21 percent in 1982, when the local economic boom went bust. Fear of the growing numbers of foreigners crowded into inadequate housing developments had escalated steadily since the early 1970s.[36] This trend quickly spread to French nationwide elections throughout the 1980s, during which time Le Pen and the FN consistently garnered more than 10 percent of the votership.[37]

In Germany, both the NPD and the *Deutsche Volksunion* (DVU), the latter led by Gerhard Frey, editor of the extreme-right paper, *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, used antiforeigner campaigns to capture votes in the course of the 1980s. However, the most successful new electoral force of the nationalist right was the new protest party, the *Republikaner* (REP), which placed the anti-immigrant message at the very core of its program: "The German Federal Republic . . . is not an immigrant country. It must remain the land of Germans."[38] While German vigilance regarding Nazism and the Holocaust did not permit the kind of meteoric rise of a nationalist party that Le Pen's FN achieved, the *Republikaner* gained nearly 7 percent in the 1989 elections in West Berlin, utilizing an openly anti-Turkish campaign in this "third-largest Turkish city," and subsequently claiming between 7 percent and almost 10 percent in four additional state and regional elections that year.[39]

This trend was spreading through Western European countries experiencing significant immigration even before the fall of the Iron Curtain reawakened nationalism in Eastern Europe. Virulent campaigns against immigrants contributed to the triumphs of the Danish *Fremskridtpartiet*, which claimed over 9 percent of the vote in 1988. In 1991 the Dutch *Centrum Demokraten* and *Centrum Partij* used an anti-foreigner ticket to respectively claim 6 and 7 percent of the vote in the three largest cities in the Netherlands. Most dramatically, the Swiss *Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat* (National Action for People and Homeland) in 1985 received 15 percent of the vote in Bern, Geneva, and Zurich by using an anti-immigration platform.[40] In Italy, the immigration issue was confined to the north, at least throughout the 1980s, and was seized upon by Umberto Bossi's regional Lombard League. With characteristically provocative bluntness, Bossi declared the "multicultural society as being like hell."[41]

The radical right parties of Western Europe thus first gained a foothold in the 1980s, establishing themselves as part of a movement resisting the emergence and legitimation of a pluralistic society. The rage and violence of rightist gangs have become twin phenomena directed against both those foreigners different in their appearance and in their cultural habits, and against the growing and increasingly official support for a multicultural society. Discomfort with the multicultural society among wider sections of the population provided the political space for this radical right, just as the traumatic experiences of World War I and the class war that it intensified "made room for a political phenomenon," as Nolte put it.

In contrast to historical fascists, the contemporary radical right has been less focused on the workplace, unemployment, and the material struggle over the fruits of production; instead, they have dwelled upon the social–cultural realms of housing areas, the leisure-time places of recreation and action, and struggles over entitlements.[42] Recent Swiss and German scholarship has denoted this phenomenon as "*Wohlstandschauvinismus*."[43] The leading German researcher on the radical-right

youth, Wilhelm Heitmeyer, calls this an "ideology of free (leisure) time."[44] In her remarkable study on Dreux, Françoise Gaspard furthermore concretely describes youth violence against foreigners as a reflection of "new forms of urban pathology" expressed by youth dwelling in isolation from commuting families and the world of work.[45] In times of extended international peace, such as those that have marked the life experiences of most Europeans since 1945, and certainly since the early 1960s, social anxiety seems to coalesce around the control of living spaces defended against alleged intruders, who, as a group, tend to be weaker and more vulnerable. Such exertions contrast with the centuries of international wars waged over border disputes and national expansion and the international resistance to communism. The grand scale of the nationalist and ideological conflicts of the interwar and Cold War periods have since faded; and the fascist mythic core of national rebirth or palingenesis, as Roger Griffin put it, has moreover become largely irrelevant to the anti-multicultural agenda of the radical right. Yet their cultural war against foreigners in defense of their perceived traditional national identity is as virulent as that of the interwar fascists.[46]

Although violent street fighting waged against immigrants is initiated primarily by young males, as were the street battles between fascists and communists, this generation lacks the cult of youth, which had accompanied the post–World War I myth of national rebirth. Today, the nations of Europe are composed of predominantly aging societies. It is increasingly evident that immigrants are indispensable to rejuvenation, continued prosperity, and the long-term welfare of the old. Those youth harboring antiforeigner sentiment thus increasingly find themselves in an untenable stance. While conservative members of the older generation clearly share some of their discomfort with multicultural developments, they nevertheless indulge the marvelously varied palette of consumer goods immigrant cultures have introduced onto the market.

It bears mentioning that anti-Semitism is no longer a central issue among anti-immigrant radicals, who primarily target Africans and Muslims as the new citizens and immigrants of Europe who are numerous and recognizable. As early as 1988, a German poll found that 20 percent of those surveyed rejected Turks as neighbors, whereas 12 percent had similar feelings against Jews.[47] If there is a common denominator across the anti-immigrant radical right, it is hostility toward Muslims. The "Elders of Zion" forgery has been replaced by dark rumors of an African Muslim conspiracy, embodied in the mysterious "Mustapha Letter," which surfaced in Dreux in 1981: "Dear Mustapha, by the grace of all-powerful Allah we have become the lords and masters of Paris. I wonder why you hesitate to join us."[48]

So why are the old fascist slogans and symbols still so widespread throughout Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe? One of the premier theorists on fascism and the radical right, the British intellectual historian Roger Griffin, has recently even called for "retaining 'fascism' as a conceptual tool" for understanding "contemporary 'authoritarian movements,' " that is, the radical-right anti-liberal movements. He explicitly questions what he concedes to be "the prevalent assumption (is) now that, while it is legitimate to extend the term's range of application to interwar phenomena clearly cognate with Fascism . . . , 1945 marked such a radical caesura in the evolution of the extreme right that its use beyond this point only confuses the issue."[49]

The survival of the fascist phantom with its verbiage, emblems, kitschy trappings, and even that mysterious mythic core of national or racial rebirth, can be explained as a "mimetic" (Griffin) and nostalgic fascism led by former adherents and minor leaders and which endured well past 1945. Many later observers have underestimated continuities with the basic social structures and cultural mentalities of the later 1940s and 1950s. If there is any consensus about the new radical right representing a very different political phenomenon from fascism, the critical caesura would have to be located in the 1970s, rather than in 1945, and can be regarded as reaching its zenith in the early 1980s in tandem with the emergence of a multicultural Europe and its international counterpart, globalization. Yet it also undeniable that post-1950 mimetic and nostalgic fascism has survived even beyond the 1980s and gained in visibility and notoriety as a notably internationalized, "metapoliticized" ideology.[50] The ardent faith proclaimed within the many cells and websites of the mysterious palingenesis should not be considered harmless, despite their relatively small numbers, for such intense belief in radical national/racial rebirth always been highly charged with nihilism, demanding total destruction of the existing, necessarily imperfect society. Few as they are, these firebrands do kill.

Despite their continuing existence and violence, these mimetic fascist minigroups, which have at times created tightly organized, armed conspiratorial networks, remain a lunatic fringe that has very little to do with the broad radical right and its anti-foreigner hatred. For the nostalgic cells of fascism, the grand expansionist dreams of heroic military conquest and colonialism remain alive, and anti-Semitism still shows its hateful grimace in gang hideouts and Internet web pages or chat rooms. All the rebirth-myths, rituals, and symbols of fascism are still there, but lack the buttressing of significant political movements.

There is a second, more troublesome reason for the resilience of the fascist phantom. In their relative powerlessness and isolation, the radical anti-immigrant groups seek legitimacy and a sense of power by identifying with the fascists, invoking the once triumphantly powerful symbols, slogans, and published ideas of Mussolini, Hitler, and Nazi generals. This has given populist protest groups protesting multicultural trends a great deal more media attention than they deserve. Especially Germans, partly in fear of international reactions, have all-too quickly associated antiforeigner activity with a renewed Nazi danger and the Holocaust. But after the 17 percent vote for Le Pen in the 2002 presidential elections in France, many hysterical voices portended fascism and anti-Semitism to be on the rise. Such reactions just reinforce a sense of power and importance among violence-prone youth.

Finally, in their largely localized activity and diffuse lack of cohesion, anti-immigrant groups have also borrowed from the ideological and organizational structures of past fascists regimes. The French and Italian fascist intellectual tradition and the organizational continuities of groups like the *Action Française*, Italian MSI, and, in particular, the Algerian fascist-military cells. This symbiosis has clearly contributed to the consistent successes of the *Front National* and the *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), which emerged from the transformation of the MSI. Both exhibit an efficient organizational structure and offer an effective modern program for voicing their opposition. Damir Skenderovic has shown that the old extreme-right forces in Switzerland have been critical "in holding the various groups and scenes together."[51] Their German

counterparts, the NPD and DVU, which—in contrast to the quickly fading *Republikaner*—also have ideological cadres (especially the NPD) and communication and financial networks (especially the DVU), have been less successful; Hitler's long shadow has doggedly held them hostage to heavy Nazi dogmas that have severely restricted their appeal and broader acceptability. This has also hindered them from generating effective modern leadership figures such as the suave and modern Gianfranco Fini and the calculatingly blunt Le Pen.

Several elements make the German situation particularly instructive for demonstrating the essential difference between historical fascism and the contemporary radical right. In Germany, not only did fascism reach the zenith in power and violence through Hitler's war of conquest and the Holocaust, but the Federal Republic has also accommodated the largest waves of immigration since the 1960s. In addition Germany has experienced the most dramatic transformation in political culture in all of Western Europe, from a thoroughly authoritarian tradition—metamorphosing with disturbing ease into a murderous totalitarianism—to a liberal democratic consensus by the end of the 1960s. Nowhere was the caesura of 1968 and the early 1970s felt more deeply. Even if the violence of 1968 was more dramatic in France and Italy, its enduring impact in Germany was so great that many historians have called it the second founding of the West German Republic. That period bears most comparison not with Paris 1968, but rather, with the impact of the Algerian War on France and the subsequent founding of the Fifth Republic.

Not surprisingly, these extreme discontinuities within twentieth-century Germany can also be traced within the radical right. Empirical research on protest and violence by neo-Nazi groups and by anti-immigrant activists demonstrates that these are two separable, essentially different phenomena. More importantly, as Ruud Koopmans has shown, traditional extreme-right protests, which typically embrace and imitate old fascist mentalities, have remained at remarkably stable and low levels since 1945. In contrast, antiforeigner disturbances, which are comparatively less organized, more spontaneous, and more violent, began to spread in the 1980s and then rose sharply in the 1990s.[52] Thus, I would conclude that the threat posed by the contemporary extreme right is primarily preoccupied with the issue of immigration. Equating it with the Nazi right or remnants thereof is not only inaccurate, but furthermore leads to poor, ineffective policy decisions as indicated in the recent debate over outlawing the NPD in Germany.[53]

This development of an anti-immigrant radical right, which committed a higher number of violent acts (primarily arson and gang beatings) within Germany than elsewhere in Western Europe,[54] has not resulted in the emergence of an enduringly successful party or the transformation of an old one to respond to this anti-multicultural mood, as occurred in neighboring France, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland. In the latter countries it was Jörg Haider's Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP) that celebrated major electoral triumphs in the late 1990s and took up residence in the political establishment of those countries. The SVP even surpassed the shocking successes of the other parties with 22.5 percent of the vote, making them the strongest Swiss party.[55] The surprising absence of such a party in Germany is likely attributable to the horrific taint of the Nazi past. A key factor that has apparently all but destroyed the *Republikaner*, was the rather minimal Nazi

background of the party's charismatic leader, the former popular TV-host Franz Schönhuber, who had not only served in the elite *Waffen-SS* in World War II, but proudly acknowledged that past in his best-selling memoirs.

In contrast to parties within Germany, the *Front National* and *Alleanza Nazionale* have succeeded in shedding the fascist label in public. By modernizing their parties, they have transformed into a radical opposition force operating within the established democratic system. They have adapted to the modern democratic context, accepting the prevailing political rules and conventions, integrating these into their own authoritarian mentalities of "law and order," which are directed against those who were not yet members of a previously homogeneous nation. The FN, AN, and their counterparts in smaller countries such as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and some of the Scandinavian countries are, of course, a relatively new phenomenon. A number of studies have tried to locate these parties in European political history and contemporary politics. The most commonly used terms are radical right, extreme right, right-wing radicalism, far right, and (radical) right populism. Recently, the term "extreme right" seems to be preferred, but with Herbert Kitschelt[56] and others I am choosing to employ the term "radical right" simply because it rolls off the tongue better in English, just as "*Rechtsextremismus*" works better linguistically in German.

In 1996 Roger Griffin, who led the drive to identify and promote a "new consensus" in the definition and interpretation of fascism,[57] advocated the appellate "democratic fascism" to classify this increasingly established radical right, and urged the public to take seriously the restructuration and reform of the old MSI into the *Alleanza Nazionale* in 1995.[58] No doubt, the mentality of classic fascism still haunts the radical right scene. But the critical characteristics of the contemporary radical right are too removed from interwar fascism to make a label like "democratic *fascism*" useful. In a relatively prosperous European society grounded in broadly accepted democratic political institutions run by economic elites unsympathetic to any violent or revolutionary nationalist movements, "a *non-fascist* radical right has crept up on European society, one which is potentially of considerable virulence, not in its ability to destroy liberalism from without, but to contaminate it from within," as Griffin put it in 2001.[59]

This is a rather ominous warning. As the most fundamental opposition to multicultural society, this radical right will inescapably remain an ugly element of European politics. But it also has essential weaknesses. While anti-immigrant activists feed off the discomfort, many Europeans feel amidst the rapid changes in their social and ethnic environment, they must confront the irreversible shift to a multicultural society clearly supported by the economic elite, and recognize that aging European societies do need immigration. This "normative power of the factual" is leading to a growing acceptance of multicultural society. Recent polls in Germany show that hatred against foreigners is declining. Among youth between the ages 16 and 25 in Berlin, who are hostile toward foreigners, 50 percent believed there were too many foreigners in the city in 1998, while in 2001 only 26 percent harbored this sentiment. Meanwhile, 80 percent claim they would accept a foreigner as a marriage partner in 2001.[60] In the eastern German state of Brandenburg, which is beset by high unemployment, the number of students in the ninth through thirteenth grades who rejected radical-right propaganda rose from 80 to 87 percent

within the same years.[61] Fluctuations in this pattern will no doubt continue, but conditions indicate that frictions with foreign immigrants will gradually stabilize to levels comparable to the United States.

Notes

1. For example: Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Roger Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (London: Penguin, 1996), esp. pp. 348–58; Peter Merkl/Leonard Weinberg, *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties* (London: F. Cass, 1997); Edward G. DeClair, *Politics on the Fringe: The People, Politics and Organization of the French National Front* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1999; Diethelm Prowe, " 'Classic' Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts," *Contemporary European History* 3, 3 (November 1994): 289–313.
2. Othon Anastasakis, "Extreme Right in Europe: A Comparative Study of Recent Trends" (The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, London School of Economics & Political Science, Discussion Paper No. 3 November 2000): 10; available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/European/hellenic/FPublications.htm.
3. Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept, "AHA Forum, *The American Historical Review* 84, 2 (April 1979): 367–88. Cf. also Gilbert Allardyce, ed., *The Place of Fascism in European History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971), and Stanley Payne's response in the AHA Forum, *The American Historical Review* 84, 2 (April 1979): 390.
4. Arno J. Mayer, *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The "Final Solution"in History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 3. Mayer compares "Europe's age of catastrophe" (pp. 19–35) with the much discussed *General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: The Thirty Years' War*, Ivan Roots and D.H. Pennington (London: Audio Learning, 1970–1979).
5. Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 5. The German original was published in 1963.
6. Cf. especially Pierre Milza, *Fascisme français: Passé et présent* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), pp. 55–59; and the most recent and best of the lists in Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 7, which is grouped by "ideology and goals, fascist negations, style and organization."
7. Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, p. 429.
8. Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), esp. pp. 10–16, 213–36.
9. Gerhard Masur, *Prophets of Yesterday: Studies in European Culture, 1890–1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).
10. Cf. most recently the excellent summary discussion in Peter Davies, *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present Day: From de Maistre to le Pen* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 67–73. Also Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, 52–53; and the standard work since Nolte: Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The Case of Maurice Barrès* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
11. Beginning with George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), this theme runs through several of his works, most notably *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975); *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (New York: H. Fertig, 1978); *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: H. Fertig, 1999).
12. Götz Aly, Peter Chroust, and Christian Pross, *Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Götz Aly, *"Final*

Solution": Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). On exterminationist racism and the conception of the modern, cf. also Richard Weikart, "Progress through Racial Extermination: Social Darwinism, Eugenics, and Pacifism in Germany, 1860–1918," *German Studies Review* 26, 2 (May 2003): 273–94.

13. Ernst Jünger, *Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925), p. 2.
14. George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
15. George L. Mosse, *Nazi Culture* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966); Jay S. Baird, *To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
16. For example, Robert J. Soucy, "French Fascism and the Croix de Feu: A Dissenting Interpretation," *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991): 165.
17. Cited in Wolfgang Zank, "Mord auf dem Bülowplatz," *Die Zeit* (August 23, 1991): 13.
18. Richard Bessel, "Political Violence and the Nazi Seizure of Power," in ed. *Life Richard Bessel, in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 8–14.
19. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
20. IFOP statistics as cited in Jean Chatain, *Les affaires de M. Le Pen* (Paris: Editions Messidor, 1987), p. 168 and Martin A. Schain, "The National Front in France and the Construction of Political Legitimacy," *West European Politics* 10 (April 1987): 237–38. Cf. surveys and individual interviews on reactions to the immigration issue in Jacqueline Blondel and Bernard Lacroix, "Pourquoi votent-ils Front National," in: Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, *Le Front National . . . découvert* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1989), 150–68, esp. 152–55. Nonna Mayer, "Le vote FN de Passy . . . Barbès (1984–1988)," Mayer and Perrineau, *Le Front National*, 250–56; Milza, *Fascisme français*, pp. 402–07.
21. Claus Leggewie, *Die Republikaner: Phantombild der neuen Rechten* (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1989), pp. 17–18, 79–86.
22. DeClair, *Politics*, p. 135.
23. Ruud Koopmans, "Alter Rechtsextremismus und neue Fremdenfeindlichkeit: Mobilisierung am rechten Rand im Wandel," in *Protest in der Bundesrepublik: Strukturen und Entwicklungen* ed. Dieter Rucht (Frankfurt & New York, 2001), pp. 117–23.
24. Luciano Cheles, " 'Nostalgia dell'Avvenire.' The New Propaganda of the MSI Between Tradition and Innovation," in *Neo-Fascism in Europe,* ed. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan (London and New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 43–44.
25. The clearest statement of this position was Reinhard Kühnl, *Formen bürgerlicher Herrschaft: Liberalismus—Faschismus* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1971).
26. Cf. Sylvain Zegel, *Les Idées de mai* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968): "The bourgeois revolution was juridical, the proletarian revolution was economic, ours is social and cultural; for man can become himself and is no longer content with paternalist and humanist ideologies."
27. Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81–82.
28. Richard Stöss, *Politics Against Democracy: Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany* (New York: Berg, 1991), pp. 142–58.
29. Cf. Roberto Chiarini, "The 'Movimento Sociale Italiano': A Historical Profile," in *Neo-Fascism*, ed. Cheles et al., pp 34–36.
30. Richard Thurlow, *Fascism in Britain: A History, 1918–1985* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 283.
31. Milza, *Fascisme français*, pp. 344–47.
32. Diethelm Prowe, "National Identity and Racial Nationalism in the New Germany: Nazism vs. the Contemporary Radical Right," in *German Politics and Society* 15/1 (Spring 1997): 4, 13–19; Damir Skenderovic, "The Swiss Radical Right in Perspective: A Reevaluation of Success Conditions in Switzerland," Manuscript of paper for the

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33. Eatwell, *Fascism*, pp. 304–05.
34. Davies, *The Extreme Right*, pp. 123.
35. Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986).
36. Françoise Gaspard, *A Small City in France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), esp. ix, pp. 47–59.
37. Complete table in Pascal Perrineau, "Les étapes d'une implantation électorale (1972–1988) in: Mayer and Perrineau, *Le Front National*, p. 59.
38. *Die Republikaner, Programm der Republikaner*, 1989 (Munich, 1989), article 10, p. 9.
39. Richard Stöss, *Die Republikaner: Woher sie kommen, was sie wollen, wer sie wählt, was zu tun ist* (Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1990), pp. 92–97.
40. "The Far Right in Europe: A Guide," *Race and Class* 32/3 (1991), pp. 127–46.
41. Eatwell, *Fascism*, 265. Eatwell cites Umberto Bossi, *Vento dal Nord* (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1992), p. 141.
42. Peter Fysh/Jim Wolfreys. *The Politics of Racism in France* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998), esp. pp. 143–45; generally: Prowe, "National Identity," pp. 5–10.
43. Skenderovic, "The Swiss Radical Right," 7. Cf. also Michael Minckenberg, *Die neue radikale Rechte im Vergleich: USA, Frankreich, Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998); Piero Ignazi, "The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey," in *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, eds. Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 47–64.
44. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Einig Vaterland—einig Rechtsextremismus? Sortierungsüberlegungen zu unübersichtlichen Rechtsextremismuspotentialen im vereinten Deutschland," in *Rechtsextremismus im vereinten Deutschland: Randerscheinung oder Gefahr für die Demokratie?*, eds. Christoph Butterwege and Horst Isola (Berlin: Ch. Links, 3rd ed., 1991), pp. 126–127.
45. Gaspard, *A Small City*, pp. 72–75.
46. Cf. DeClair, *Politics*, pp. 204–05.
47. Gerhard Paul, "Der Schatten Hitlers verblaßt: Die Normalisierung des Rechtsextremismus in den achtziger Jahren," in *Hitlers Schatten verblaßt: Die Normalisierung des Rechtsextremismus*, ed. Gerhard Paul, 2nd rev. ed. (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1990), pp. 36–38; cf. also the excellent article by Sabine von Dirke, "Multikulti: The German Debate on Multiculturalism," German Studies Review 17/3 (October 1994): esp. 522–23.
48. Gaspard, A Small City, pp. 117–18.
49. Roger Griffin, " 'Fascism': An Ex-paradigm? Reflections on the Taxonomy of Contemporary 'Authoritarian Movements'," http://www.brookes.ac.uk/schools/humanities/Roger/2457/ex percent20paradigm.htm (2001): 1.
50. Ibid., pp. 3–8.
51. Skenderovic, "The Swiss Radical Right," pp. 12–13.
52. Koopmans, "Alter Rechtsextremismus," pp. 106–10.
53. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
54. Ruud Koopmans, "Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities?" *European Journal of Political Research 30* (1996): 185–216.
55. Skenderovic, "The Swiss Radical Right," pp. 10–11.
56. Herbert Kitschelt's is also one of the best overviews: cf. note #1.
57. Cf. esp. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) and Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus* (London: Arnold/Oxford University Press, 1998).

58. Roger Griffin, "The 'post-fascism' of the Alleanza Nazionale: A Case Study in Ideological Morphology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1/2 (1996): 123–45, quotes 141–42.
59. Griffin, " 'Fascism': An Ex-paradigm," p. 9. My italics.
60. "Positive Haltung: Jugendliche mögen Ausländer und Multikulti: Umfrage zeigt aber 'gewisses Verständnis' für Rechtsradikale," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 10 March 2001.
61. Martin Klesmann, "Neue Studie: Zahl rechtsextremer Schüler deutlich zurückgegangenJugendforscher hält hohe Ausländerfeindlichkeit weiter für Problem," *Berliner Zeitung*, 24 January 2002.

Chapter Seven

Fascism, Colonialism, and "Race": The Reality of a Fiction

David Carroll

[In the late 19th century], the Jew found his function. Through the effect of repulsion, he is the revealer of national identity. To be French, it was said then, is, par excellence, not to be Jewish.

Michel Winock, *Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France*

Racism is the generalized and definitive valorization of real and imaginary differences for the accuser's benefit and at his victim's expense, in order to justify a privilege or aggression of the former.

Albert Memmi, "Qu'est-ce que le racisme?"

It seems to me justified to conclude that racism illustrates, summarizes, and symbolizes the colonial relation.

Albert Memmi, *Le Racisme*

Race as Ideology

I begin by asserting what has been obvious to biologists and geneticists and, I would hope, to humanists and social scientists for some time now. Namely, that race is an imaginary social construct that may appear self-evident and natural, yet, in fact, has no grounding in scientific evidence. Yet race as a discursive category continues to perform obvious social and political functions and to exert concrete effects. It is still commonly invoked as a means of identifying differences between peoples as well as a means of affirming collective identity, that is, of asserting that one belongs to a particular group, community, or collectivity and is proud of this identity and this heritage. When operating as a social category, race thus continues to have both negative, "racist" connotations and positive, identificatory connotations (at least to the extent that identificatory connotations are of a positive valence).

In a speech entitled "Biologie–Racisme–Hiérarchie," the eminent French biologist François Jacob argued not only that the concept of "race" carries no scientific value whatsoever but also that it constitutes a serious "ideological" reduction of what he

states is the undeniable richness of collective diversity:

> Biology is able to affirm the following [about race]: the concept of race has lost all operative value and can only freeze our vision of a ceaselessly changing reality; the mechanism of the transmission of life is such that each individual is unique, that individuals cannot be hierarchized and that the only richness is collective: it is constituted by diversity [not sameness]. Everything else is ideology.[1]

Because it has no operative scientific value, Jacob argues that the use of the term "race" is itself the sign of ideology, whether invoked for constructive or destructive ends, whether to justify current or past injustices and crimes, or alternately, in an effort to rectify them. Jacob's sweeping assertion gains greater acceptance in the context of extreme, overtly racist constructions and applications of race—under fascism or colonialism, for example—than in other, seemingly more innocent, "nonracist" uses of the term. However, in his catchall phrase, "everything else," Jacob clearly classifies all applications of the term as ideological.

No one would deny that many extremist nationalist ideologies—first and foremost the different varieties of fascism—are grounded in and dependent on what Etienne Balibar has called "fictive ethnicity,"[2] or what I shall call the fiction of race. Extremist ideologies more overtly and directly evoke and legitimate actions pursued in the name of the fiction of race than do political theories and systems, where racial distinctions exist only as secondary differences among the diversity of groups, cultures, peoples, and "races" that constitute humanity. The problem remains, however, as to how to think the diversity of the collectivity without reinserting the "bad," exclusive, hierarchical, racist notion of identity into what many would propose as a "good," multicultural, egalitarian, nonracist notion, one which in the name of respecting ethnic or cultural diversity still seems to imply an acceptance of racial (or cultural) predetermination. This is especially crucial in trying to understand better the role of race in fascism and its contemporary "legacies."

It could be argued that fascism, along with other forms of overtly racist ideology, is rooted and has taken form in a general ideological space dependent upon the myth or fiction of race. This is a space that sustains and promotes racisms by postulating that different races do exist and then determining the parameters for each race: how it is to be represented, and what racial differences ultimately signify both symbolically and in existing or ideal sociohistorical realities. The ideology of race postulates perceived and imaginary differences among individuals and groups that are transmitted through racial inheritance as being the determining factor in individual and collective identity. It thus treats what could be called the "racial legacy" of individuals and groups as their destiny. It subjects all individuals to their racial identity and thus makes subjectivity itself a question of race.

Race as Social Reality

However, it may be easier to identify and critique "race" as a product of ideology, than to effectively eliminate the effects of the ideology of race within discourse and

social institutions and practices. Race, regardless of how fictive or ideological we recognize it to be—or perhaps precisely because it is imaginary and therefore arbitrary, assuming different forms in different contexts—is nevertheless an undeniable social reality. It is at once fiction and social reality. This is precisely what Claudette Guillaumin argues in an essay with the provocative title, " 'I know it's not nice, but . . . ': The Changing Face of 'Race' ":

> Simply rejecting the notion of race is not enough. Denying its existence as an empirically valid category, as the human, social and ultimately natural sciences are trying to do, can never, however correct the intention, take away that category's reality within society or the state, or change the fact that while it may not be valid empirically, it certainly exerts an empirical effect [. . . .] While the reality of "race" is indeed neither natural and biological, nor psychological, [. . . .] it does nevertheless exist [. . . .] The legal inscription of race and the practices that accompany it certainly do exist. And they are precisely the reality of race. Race does not exist. But it does kill people. It also continues to provide the backbone of some ferocious systems of domination [. . . .] No, race does not exist. And yet it does. Not in the way that people think; but it remains the most tangible, real and brutal of realities.[3]

The fiction of race is for Guillaumin a brutal reality inscribed in laws and legal proceedings and evident in social practices of different sorts, a reality dependent on the institutions and social practices that make it real, that assign to it real functions with decidedly real effects. To expose its fictional, ideological status will never be sufficient. It is also perhaps to miss the mark, especially if the ideology of racism continues to produce different versions of the fiction of race and if institutions and social practices continue to be based on them. Regardless of how often race is shown to be fictitious. Or even because it is fictitious.

Etienne Balibar makes a similar point when he talks about the necessity for all forms of nationalism—whether "good" or "bad," egalitarian or racist, open or closed, democratic or totalitarian—to institute in history what he refers to as the imaginary unity of a people. He argues that without such historical institutionalization, nationalism, in any or all of its forms, cannot exist:

> No nation, that is, no national state, has an ethnic basis, which means that nationalism cannot be defined as an ethnocentrism except precisely in the sense of a fictive ethnicity. To reason any other way would be to forget that "peoples" do not exist naturally any more than "races" do, either by virtue of their ancestry, a community of culture or preexisting interests. But they do have to institute in real (and therefore historical) time their imaginary unity against other possible unities.[4]

The institutionalization of fictive ethnicity in history constitutes the way a people represents itself to itself and institutes itself as a unity. This may help explain why the notions of people, culture, and race are constantly being interchanged and confused with each other, for they are all different versions of the same fiction and dependent on the same historical processes for their reality.

Balibar argues that there are predominantly two ways by which the fiction of ethnicity takes on the appearance of a natural entity. Expressed differently, there are

two predominant disguises used to hide the fabricated nature of ethnicity: race and language (that is, culture).

> How can ethnicity be produced? And how can it be produced in such a way that it does not appear as a fiction, but as the most natural of origins? History shows us that there are two great competing routes to this: language and race. Most often the two operate together, for only their complementarity makes it possible for the "people" to be represented as an absolutely autonomous unit given in itself. Both express the idea that the national character [. . . .] is immanent in the people.[5]

Even if there are several ways to create the immanence of the national identity of a people, one alleged to have always-already been in the people and passed from generation to generation, Balibar argues that the fiction of national identity most "successfully" passes as reality when race and culture operate in collusion and the differences between them are deemed irrelevant. This takes place when a fictive ethnicity defined in racial terms is represented as a closed linguistic/cultural community.

The politicization of national identity—whether defined in terms of race or language (culture), or both—thus constitutes a mobilization of the fictive ethnicity generated by the nation as part of a process of self-legitimation. In the most extreme cases, particularly that of fascism, a real or imagined crisis in national identity may be used to justify direct and massive intervention by the state over both public and private spheres. This control is presented as the sole means available to protect the fictional unity of the people against the alterity or alterities alleged to threaten from both without and within.

Fascism has always received at least partial justification through some perceived or hypothetical threat to the people's fictive unity, hereby impelling people to act collectively and mobilize in its own defense. This perceived threat also serves as a justification for employing whatever means and paying whatever costs necessary to preserve the unity already achieved by the people and to move toward a deeper, more profound unity always projected as attainable in the future. Of course, this unity is achieved at the expense of "the Other," who is posited as both the enemy threatening a people from the outside and the enemy within that must be purged from the "blood" of the people and/or its language and culture.

The fiction of the preexisting, original racial/cultural unity of the people serves as a model for present or future unity and, in extreme cases, as a justification for ethnic and racial violence and for the institution of that violence in laws and social practices. The "true people" can always be portrayed as being under siege, because it, in fact, always is. Violence against others for the sake of the unity and well-being of the race, culture, or people is always presented as inevitable by movements, groups, parties, and states directly engaged in such national violence. Violence and repression are thus staged as part of an eternal struggle waged between good and evil, as a cultural war of civilization against barbarity, or as a holy war of God against Satan. Fascism, of course, is rooted in racial myths of the natural origin of the people and the inevitable and necessary nature of violence against those represented as its enemies. It could also be claimed that all such myths, in whatever form they are evoked today, are thus connected in some way to the broader legacies of fascism and of fascist racism in particular. These highly contradictory myths of origin and

violence originate in an ideology of fictive origins, in the fiction of race as the origin of the people.

The ideology of race is, in part, able to exert such a powerful influence because it cannot be located in any single history or historical series, or in one geographic area of the globe. It is also difficult to locate on the political spectrum, especially when politics are defined in terms of left and right, for racist ideology has played a significant role within both political traditions. The notion of "race" is the exclusive claim of neither the left nor the right. Instead, "race" manifests itself in different forms in different political contexts at different historical moments and with different and often contradictory political effects.

Balibar claims, in fact, that it is the ideology of race—"racism"—which "represents one of the most insistent forms of the historical memory of modern societies. It is racism that continues to effect the imaginary 'fusion' of past and present in which the collective perception of human history unfolds."[6] Balibar thus considers racism to be a formative element of modern history itself, of the birth and development of all modern nations, providing what could be called a narrative means through which collectivities remember and/or invent their past. Racism plays a role, even if not necessarily in all instances the dominant role, in legitimating the way nations treat an idealized version of the past as if it were their past, and thus, how a people constitutes itself as "different from"—which usually translates as "superior to"—other peoples.

Any political system in which the state, by decree, law, or practice, ensures that a particular group or collection of groups within the state, whether defined in terms of their "race," ethnicity, religion, language, culture, or national origin, are not only denied specific rights but also denied the right to rights, shares something essential with fascism. It ultimately makes little difference whether the threatening, alien other is presented as invading from outside, or on the contrary, as a foreign element corrupting from within the body of the nation and the people. No matter how "pure" the race or culture purports to be, the real threat to it is that it can never be quite pure enough.

It is thus in the name of some form of fictive ethnicity, that is, in the name of (the fiction of) a race, a people, a culture, or even a religion, that holy wars are fought to punish, if not destroy "the Other," and that crimes against the enemies of the people within the people are perpetuated and justified. The notion of total war, of a war on, across, and within all boundaries, is thus the extreme but logical consequence of the ideology of race or fictive ethnicity. For when a people's life and destiny are represented as at risk, nothing can stand in the way of its defense of itself. All forms of injustice, violence, or terror are justified; everything is possible under total war against "the Other." In the face of "evil," no compromise is ever possible; all solutions need to be final.

The Logic of Racism and the Paradoxes of Assimilation

Although it is implicit in what I have written and in the quotations discussed in this essay, it is important to stress that racism is not fundamentally an irrational prejudice, a pathology, a violent, hateful delirium. Of course, in specific situations, concerning

specific individuals and groups, or even entire communities, it may assume such a pathological form. Based on the fiction of race and on a universal ideal of humanity that derives from it—no matter how irrational, violent, hateful, or unjust we might consider that ideal to be—racism proposes to explain and give order to the world through the differences and hierarchies it projects and establishes among peoples. It attempts to legitimate and explain (away) social inequalities and oppression as necessary and inevitable. Racism treats violence against minorities as either historically necessary or part of the natural order, rather than an aberration from or failure in the historical mission of a people. There is always a logic to racism, a rationale for and in the madness.

My recent research has led me to consider more directly the question of "race" not just in fascist contexts, as in my previous work, but in colonialist, neocolonialist, and postcolonial contexts as well. It seems inconceivable not to pose the question—especially with regard to the specific case of French colonialism in Algeria—of what, if any relation colonialism bears to fascism, and what, if any, relation colonialist racism bears to fascist anti-Semitism.

Albert Memmi, after having asserted that racism is at the very heart of the colonialist system, that "racism illustrates, epitomizes, and symbolizes the colonial relation" as such,[7] echoes Colette Guillaumin's comment in the following argument regarding the rationale for racism in the colonies: "*The biological indictment, despite its scope, at least among our contemporaries, is not the essential aspect of racism*. It is, rather, merely a pretext or an alibi [. . . .] Beyond the delirium of the racist, beyond his incoherences and contradictions, racism has a function. In general, it both highlights and legitimates domination [. . . .] [There is an] *organic connection between racism and oppression*."[8] For Memmi, then, racism is not primarily a hideous, irrational, hateful passion, a pathology to which some individuals, groups, and even entire states have fallen prey or joyously given themselves over. Memmi see racism as a functional element within a coherent system of oppression. It is perhaps this "rational function" of race, more than anything else, that links fascism to colonialism and reveals the dependency of each on the fiction of race.

I have repeatedly argued against treating fascism primarily as an expression of political irrationalism, as predominantly or exclusively a challenge to the rational, progressive movement of history. I would similarly challenge assumptions that fascism is fundamentally antimodernist or even antihumanist. Such categories are much too broad and in fact ignore or trivialize the logical, rational, modern, and even humanist assumptions, characteristics, and projects of different fascisms. They also simplify the powerful appeal fascism held for many in the past and the potential dangers neofascism may pose in the present or in the future.

I would maintain that the same is true for colonialism. It has never been merely or primarily an irrational, antimodern, antihumanist aberration within the progressive and rational humanism of enlightened modernity. Rather, colonialism constitutes an inextricable element within the project of modernity itself; it is part of the history of nation-states, the development of democracy, the expansion and defense of civil rights, and the respect for "the rights of man." Memmi's point, while often ignored, is crucial, especially when specific examples of the injustices and crimes of colonialism (and fascism) are stressed while overlooking the logic and coherence of

the systems behind this oppression. This occurs when racism is personalized and viewed as the irrational expression of deranged minds, rather than as a fundamental contradiction within rational and progressive modernity itself.

The twin historical phenomena of colonialist racism and fascist anti-Semitism in certain contexts directly overlap with and support each other, and in others conflict with and rival each other. An assessment of their similarities and differences can enhance our understanding of race as a necessary fiction within each system of oppression and, furthermore, reveal how their legacies overlap. In particular, it will be useful to compare treatment of the "Jewish question" in colonialist Algeria and in metropolitan France during the colonial era, and in the process, establish how "Jew" and "Arab" in the colonialist context were at different times distinguished from as well as identified with one another. It seems evident that the categories of "Jew" and "Arab" were clearly contrasted with that which was represented and institutionalized as "French".

It is well known that a long tradition of anti-Semitism existed in French colonial North Africa. Edouard Drumont, author of the anti-Semitic best-seller, *La France juive,* was, as the French say, "parachuted" into Algiers in 1898 and easily elected to the Chambre de Députés on a militantly anti-Semitic platform. Max Régis, one of the most outspoken and virulent anti-Semites in all of France, convinced Drumont to run in Algeria and himself became mayor of Algiers in the same year. Anti-Semitic riots marked highly visible and disruptive moments throughout much of Algeria's colonialist history, but especially during and immediately after the Dreyfus affair. The distinguished historian of Algeria, Charles-Robert Ageron, claims that the anti-Semitism of the Europeans in Algeria was in fact

> one of the essential characteristics of colonial mentality from 1871 to 1944. Native French, neo-French, and Spaniards formed against the Jews what they called the Union of Latin Races. They organized 'anti-Jewish leagues' and increased the number of anti-Semitic journals [. . . .] All of them denied absolutely to Jews their status as citizens."[9]

For a substantial part of the population in Algeria, to be "French," even if one was only "neo-French" or "Spanish" (which was actually the case for most "Europeans" in Algeria), meant to be anti-Semitic. The act of denying the rights of citizenship to the Jews of Algeria effectively affirmed French Algerians' own right to citizenship and one's national identity as antithetical to that of "Jews."

Throughout the Third Republic, colonialist racism and the anti-Semitism that would later form a fundamental component of French fascism coexisted with and even mutually supported one another. For "the Other" in French North Africa was either "Arab" or "Jew", or both "Arab" and "Jew" at the same time. Colonialism relied on both colonialist racism and anti-Semitism to ensure that "the Other" would remain both other and subservient, with each racism acting in collusion with the other to perpetuate and justify the oppression at the very heart of colonialism. At the same time, the "Jewish question" in Algeria was never identical with the "Jewish question" in France or in a wider European context. Under colonialism in North African, the manner in which the "Jewish question" was handled reveals how arbitrarily not only Jews but also Muslims (both Arabs and Berbers, which together are often referred to simply as "Arabs") were defined as a race, and furthermore indicates

how race was constructed and institutionalized in the colonies to distinguish "the French" from "the non-French" and even from the "non-French French."

Paradoxically, it was largely in the name of the overall assimilation of others into French culture that colonialism in North Africa, as well as elsewhere, was represented not as an oppressive system of exploitation, but rather, as part of the progressive, "civilizing mission" of an enlightened republican people. Colonialism was understood not as the repression of the rights of others but as the sign of an openness to others, a way to help them overcome the alleged backwardness and oppressiveness of their sociopolitical situation. Colonialism pretended also to aspire to incorporate these others into French culture, which in principle meant granting them the rights of citizens of a republic governed by rational, secular laws and institutions, and holding them equal with all other citizens before the law. Colonialism thus presented its agenda as that of liberating "backward" and "enslaved" peoples and facilitating their entry into modernity.[10]

For the colonized dwelling in a racist colonial system, however, assimilation meant not only converting to another culture but also converting "races"; to cease being "a native," whether Arab, Berber, or Jew, and to become "French." Practice fell far short of principle, no matter how questionably eurocentric and blatantly racist the principle itself. But a discrepancy between principle and practice was not the only contradiction within the justificatory logic of colonization, a logic that enabled even progressive democrats of the Third Republic to defend in "democratic" terms this profoundly antidemocratic practice dwelling at the very heart of democracy itself. One particularly striking example of the discursive construction of "race" in the colonies can be observed in the method by which different "races" were determined and recorded. In censuses drawn from the population of Algeria, both before and after Algeria's division into three *departements* and its official establishment as an integral part of France ("la France d'outremer"), the population was divided (as in other colonies) into two groupings that were counted separately and which held decidedly different legal and civil status: "French" and "Native" (*Indigène*). Until 1870, the category of "Indigène" indicated that segment of the population living in Algeria prior to French conquest of the land and the colonization of the peoples living there.

In reality, this "native" population consisted not only of Arabs and Berbers, but of Jews as well. The Jewish population of Algeria itself was diverse. Some had come to North Africa as early as 1492, when the Jews were expelled from Spain, while others arrived much later and only as the result of colonialism itself. The term "native" was thus used to refer not only to the "original inhabitants" of Algeria, that is, non-French inhabitants living in Algeria before the French, but also to those who came to Algeria after the arrival of the French, yet who were not deemed European in origin. In a sense, the idea of a "united Europe" and, therefore, of an extra- or transnational "European identity" has been extant since the nineteenth century, at least in the colonies, for to become a French citizen of Algeria was contingent upon evincing European, though not necessarily French, origins.

The discourse of assimilation was furthermore used to justify policies of nonassimilation and discrimination, for those of non-European origin were perceived as less capable of assimilating to French culture than Europeans and had to disprove

this assumption. The *Indigène* thus stood as the non-French, non-European Other against which a European (whether of French, Spanish, or Italian origin) could be recognized as French and granted legal status in the French colonies. To be French in the colonies meant quite simply to be European and not native.

The term "native" was thus anything but neutral. The category encompassed not one people or ethnicity (or "race"), but several, and also encompassed different religions and cultures, which overlapped with one other and mutually informed one another and yet also remained radically distinct. What all natives, of whatever religion, culture, language, or "race," suffered in common was a restriction of rights in relation to those enjoyed by true French citizens. Even when natives chose to renounce and abandon their culture and religious laws, the official process of assimilation was difficult if not impossible for the overwhelming majority. Nor was it necessarily desired by them. For it required renouncing and abandoning what made them "native" in the first place: the fact that they belonged to a different, culture, practiced a different religion, originally spoke a different and non-European language, and adhered to different religious laws. For most "natives," assimilation was a myth more than a reality or a concrete possibility.

The category of "native" was created and institutionalized by colonization itself. It was a category comprising several ethnicities, linguistic groups, religions, and cultures that were legally and bureaucratically redefined as "native." In spite of these internal differences, or because of them, these different facets of identity were classified and represented under a single inferior identity, a nonidentity, that of the Other. This is how classification has always operated within racist ideology: by drawing multiple signifiers of difference under a single overriding sign, that of "race." Charles-Robert Ageron has pointed out that in the late nineteenth century, decades after Algerian Jews had been granted citizenship, large portions of the Jewish population of Algeria were still "referred to scornfully as natives and even called 'Arabs.' "[11] Under the terms of colonialist racist ideology, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers, despite their myriad differences, were treated and represented as one and the same "race": the "native race."

Early twentieth-century geographer René Lespès researched the urban history of Oran for a book he titled *Oran: Etude de géographie et d'histoire urbaine*.[12] Published to celebrate the centenary of French colonialism in Algeria and included in a series entitled "1830–1930 Collection du Centenaire de l'Algérie," the book constitutes a triumphant defense of colonialism. It displays the myths and contradictions dwelling at the heart of colonialism and reveals its racist underpinnings. Citing official census records that trace as far back as 1831 when the French conquered and occupied Oran, Lespès explains that the city is inhabited by two categories of people: "It is possible to distinguish in the population of Oran two principal categories: the native element, the one we found established in 1831, that is, Muslims and Israelites, and the element imported from Europe, of French and foreign origin."[13] The census thus only reaffirms for the French a self-evident reality, the fundamental difference between "them" and "us."

As Lespès's description indicates, each of the two principal categories could, in turn, be subdivided into two further categories, with Muslims and "Israelites" comprising the category of "the native element," and French and European foreigners

constituting the category of "Europeans" (and eventually "French"), those who constitute the imperial "we" Lespès uses throughout the book. However, the difference between Muslim and "Israelite," and the difference between French and European are both less significant to the social, economic, and legal practices and institutions of the city of Oran and the three *departements* constituting French Algeria as a whole than the essential distinction between "Native" and "European."

As might be expected, Lespès calls special attention to Oran's census of 1872, where out of a total population of 41,130 inhabitants, 35,834 are listed as Europeans and 5,296 *Indigènes*—the latter category having decreased by 3,500 since the census of 1866. However, Lespès parenthetically mentions that the European count should be "in reality 30,534 without Israelites [en réalité 30,534 sans les Israélites]" (O, 103). By the time of the second census, the Jewish population of the city (and throughout Algeria) had been officially transferred from the status of *Indigènes* to that of Europeans. On October 24, 1870, the Décret Crémieux granted full citizenship to all Algerian Jews, at which moment the Jews of Algeria were thus redefined and legally recreated or reborn as "French."[14] Of course, neither Arab nor Berber components of the "native" category were granted the same privilege, and could still only become French on an individual basis by formally renouncing their adherence to religious law—the same means by which individual Jews had accessed French citizenship until 1870.

Thus, regardless of how obvious the differences between "native" and "French" might have appeared to a French-Algerian geographer writing in the 1930s, as a sociopolitical distinction and a construct of colonialism and the ideology of race, the definition of "the native" could and did radically change, as evinced in the decree that rendered the Jews of Algeria French citizens. They were no longer, at least no longer legally, treated the same as Arabs nor did they share the same social status or reality. However, the actual consequences of the decree were more complex and controversial. Assimilation and full citizenship would remain the exception among those still classified as "natives," and would be reserved for individuals who could prove their assimilation by abandoning their religious practices and their adherence to Islamic law. This highly arbitrary and unnatural process of naturalization would resurface later in Vichy France as the "Certificat de non-appartenance à la race juive," the French equivalent of the "certificate of aryanization," required in order to prove, if suspected, that one was not Jewish but "French." The Crémieux Decree of 1870, a measure that, on the one hand, expressed the State's approval of mass assimilation and represented a progressive action with regard to the enfranchisement of Jews, only further reinforced colonialist oppression for those who remained "natives" or "Arabs." Inevitably, it was also a measure that Algerian anti-Semites resented and repeatedly sought to have rescinded.

Indeed, anti-Semitism did not disappear with the Crémieux Decree; on the contrary, it was fueled by it and continued to coexist with colonialist racism, each continuing to support and reinforce the other, even if, or precisely because Jews were now legally French citizens. For anti-Semites, the decree changed nothing; Jews could never truly be "French," and that would not alter what anti-Semites perceive as a fundamental difference between Jews and themselves. The original colonialist categories of classification and the laws and social practices they supported continued

to live on symbolically and institutionally long after their putative legal erasure. This made it impossible to separate completely the two forms of racism in North Africa, even after the Jews of Algeria had been granted citizenship. It also made it impossible to distinguish the anti-Semitism that was already a fundamental component of extremist forms of nationalism and soon to form the core of fascism from the racism that structured and served as the ultimate justification for colonialism.

One of the first acts of the Vichy State on October 7, 1940 was to abolish the *Décret Crémieux* and render the Algerian Jews who had been citizens for 70 years once again stateless people. They thereupon carried the same status as the "Arabs" of Algeria and were even worse off than they had been before 1870.[15] The rescinding of the Crémieux Decree, which accompanied the passage of two other anti-Jewish statutes, meant that Algerian Jews were again "legally" reverted to members of the "native race" of Algeria. The two statutes lowered Algerian Jews, now classified as "Juifs indigènes," to the status of an inferior race within an inferior race, a people with no rights and with no right to demand rights.[16]

It is immaterial whether the Crémieux Decree was rescinded and the two anti-Jewish statutes passed and defended under the auspices of "biological," religious, cultural, or political principles, or some admixture thereof. The fiction of a "Jewish race" was given legitimacy by Vichy law and carried immediate economic, cultural, and political consequences for the Jews of Algeria and of metropolitan France. Whether recently naturalized or French citizens for centuries, all Jews officially became and were treated as foreign elements within the State. Nowhere is there a more striking example of the overlapping of colonialist racism and fascist anti-Semitism. Even if Vichy was not strictly speaking a fascist state, its policies against the Jews, pursued on its own initiative for internal French reasons and in the name of the National Revolution, certainly indicated one of the areas where Vichy policies and fascist doctrines and practices overlapped as well.[17]

A numerus clausus was imposed on all schools in Algeria, and the great majority of French citizens who had been forcibly reverted to the status of French nationals or "native Jews" were denied the rights to a State education and removed from school. It is worth noting that, when Allied soldiers liberated North Africa in the fall of 1942, Vichy's anti-Jewish laws were not immediately repealed and Jewish schoolchildren were still treated as "native Jews" in accordance with Vichy terms and thus prohibited from returning to school. This dramatically illustrates the manner in which legal codes and social practices are often sustained beyond the tenure of the political systems that originally instituted or enforced them; indeed, they often have an afterlife within democratic institutions and practices themselves, although not necessarily expressed in the same form or with the same effects.

The above example verifies that both colonialist racism and the anti-Semitism at the core of traditionalist nationalisms and fascisms admitted the possibility of assimilation, at least in principle. However, legal codes and practices in most instances closely monitored and controlled assimilation so that only exceptional elements of the "native" or "foreign" populations were actually permitted to assimilate. The experience of Algerian Jews also reveals that what could be granted by decree could also be taken away by decree; "race," and identity were contingent upon a legal and civil status that was as fragile and unstable as the politics of the moment. If the terms of

one's identity as a "native" could change as easily as a decree could be rescinded, then what it meant to be considered "French" was just as fragile and arbitrary a construct. Indeed, the entire oppressive edifice of racism was undergirded by a series of arbitrary and interchangeable signifiers.

Vichy's anti-Jewish statutes themselves constitute another example of the legal process through which the fiction of race acquired its contradictory reality. Xavier Vallat, first General Commissioner of Jewish Affairs in the Vichy state, during his postwar trial defended what he and others influenced by Charles Maurras and the Action Française called "rational," State anti-Semitism. Vallat claimed that this form of anti-Semitism did not merely seek to prevent the assimilation of alleged Jewish foreigners among the French people, but also served as a device for rescinding the citizenship many Jews had already achieved within metropolitan France and its colonies via the republican ideal of assimilation itself. "Rational" or "State anti-Semitism" was understood as a systematic means of bringing the laws of the State into closer conformity with the laws of "nature." Vallat claimed that it was for this reason that Jews, whether French citizens or not, were categorized as foreigners, for that was, with few exceptions, what "rational anti-Semitism" determined them to be: always other and always unassimilatable, regardless of appearances to the contrary.[18]

In Vallat's terms, it was the Jew's universal fidelity to "Mosaic law" over the laws of France (or other European nations) that made it necessary to deny them citizenship and the full protection of French law. This same line of reasoning was applied in the colonies, where a fidelity to Islamic law was interpreted to explain Muslim refusal to assimilate and constituted the primary legal grounds under which they were denied citizenship and prevented as a people from assimilating and claiming the rights of full French citizens. Vallat repeated after World War II the same claim he had used as justification for the anti-Semitic legislation he sponsored during the Occupation: the general failure of Jews to assimilate and become fully French could not be explained by racial factors as such. Rather, it resulted from cultural and religious differences. Over centuries, Jewish fidelity to an "alien" law had allegedly created a Jewish ethnic or cultural homogeneity, one purportedly indistinguishable in its nature and effects from a hypothetical racial (racist) homogeneity. It was this religious ethnicity that the Vichy statutes chose to recognize.

In using language that categorizes Jews as a nomadic people, Vallat links all Jews, regardless of their origins or history, whether Ashkenazi or Sephardic, directly with a racist cliché associated with the Arabs of the French colonies. Attributing to the Jews this nomadic lack of roots, Vallat alleges them to be constitutionally unwilling and unable to give up their foreign ethnicity and cultural identity. In effect, he assigns the Jews themselves responsibility for the necessity of instating the Vichy anti-Semitic statutes:

> It is precisely this fidelity [to Mosaic law] that made unassimilatable foreigners of them in whatever country they pitched their tent, and that gives birth in their hosts to a suspicion of and hostility toward them of which they complain [. . . .] They persist in constituting a solitary and homogeneous ethnic body [. . . .] While other elements seem to be in great haste to have themselves be adopted as soon as possible through interbreeding with the native population, the Jewish element jealously protects its ethnicity.[19]

Judaism, understood as the fidelity to "Mosaic law," is imputed to constitute a rival ethnicity to French and other European ethnicities—a "Jewish ethnicity" or "race" produced through religion, tradition, and culture, rather than biology. Within the logic of the anti-Jewish statutes, past refusal of some Jews to assimilate, that is, to change their "cultural-religious ethnicity" or their "race," combined with their cultural difference to pose a threat to the French. This threat was most effectively contained by denying the Jews rights, segregating them from the "true French," and preventing any future assimilation.

The "Aryanization" of all aspects of French society was thus allegedly instigated because of the successful assimilation of other foreign peoples (and a very limited number of exceptional Jews as well). Severe economic, political, and cultural restrictions were placed on both foreign and French Jews in order to ensure that they would stand out and could be recognized as a foreign presence within France that could not be assimilated. Jews were defined and then treated by law and institutional practices as an unchanging foreign body presenting a serious risk to the well-being of the French nation, its economic and political health, and its cultural integrity. As Joseph Billig expresses it in his remarkable study of Vichy anti-Semitic laws and practices, "it is under the direction of Vallat that the Jewish minority of France will little by little be transformed into a body entirely detached from the nation."[20] I would add that it was also under Vallat that Jews were defined and treated as an unassimilatable "race" by the Vichy State, transforming the fiction of a "Jewish race" into a reality.

This is perhaps the fundamental paradox or double-bind of racial legislation of this sort—a group defined by law as different and unassimilatable is thereupon prevented by law, because of this difference, from being anything but different, and furthermore denied virtually all rights because it cannot be anything else but what it is. As was the case for "natives" in colonialist Algeria, the principle of assimilation under Vichy statutes legitimated the identification and oppression of all races determined by law to be unassimilatable. As under colonialism, laws and regulations were enacted making it practically impossible for these groups to assimilate. According to this logic, because they hadn't already assimilated, they couldn't be assimilated in the future, and therefore they would not be allowed to assimilate. In the context of colonialist racism and Vichy anti-Semitism, the discourse of assimilation served as the basis of and justification for racist discrimination and oppression. Acknowledging difference within these two contexts is equivalent to affirming the superiority of one "race" over another or over several others. As in less obviously racist contexts, separate clearly does not mean equal. On the contrary, the social, economic, and political reality attributed to ethnic and cultural differences determines who one is and what one's legal status is and should be. The fiction of "race" determined in Vichy France and French Algeria whether one was or ever could be "French."

Fascisms, Nationalisms, and the Essential Supplement of Race

In strictly historical terms, fascism was defeated in World War II and is now perceived as a phenomenon of the past, just as French colonialism is considered to be "of the past" following the birth of an independent Algeria in 1962. And yet the "Vichy Syndrome"[21] continues to affect French political life and has become increasingly

confused with and inseparable from what could be called an "Algeria Syndrome." The enduring impact or "legacies" of both colonialist racism and anti-Semitism in the contemporary postfascist and postcolonial world are abundantly evident in the ex-colonies, the ex-colonizing nations, and the Americas. Consider, for example, the discrimination against illegal immigrants in Europe and the Americas, and the formation and growth of ultranationalist, anti-immigrant political parties; the often violent suppression of ethnic or religious minorities in nations around the world, even within the independent ex-colonies themselves; the continuing neocolonial injustices and violence within the Middle East; and more recently both global terrorism and its repression.

Whether fascism and colonialism are perceived as practices of the past or are acknowledged as legacies, it cannot be denied that "race" remains a contested issue for modern nations today. Etienne Balibar claims that "the discourses of race and nation are never very far apart," and that "at least in already constituted national states, the organization of nationalism into individual political movements inevitably has racism underlying it."[22] While racism "is not equally manifest in all nationalisms or in all moments of their history," Balibar also argues, "it nonetheless always represents a necessary tendency in their constitution. It all goes back to . . . the very production of the 'people' as a political community taking precedence over class divisions."[23] Arguably, even today there is no nation, no nation-formation, that does not have "race" as part of its constitution and history, its very form and legacy.

However, it is important to stress that Balibar does not equate nationalism and racism or derive either nationalism from racist ideologies or racism from nationalist ones. But he does argue that their constant interrelation in history is far from accidental and constitutes rather a "cycle of historical reciprocity"[24] in which racism is not "an 'expression' of nationalism, but *a supplement of nationalism* or more precisely *a supplement internal to nationalism,* always in excess of it, but always indispensable to its constitution and yet always still insufficient to achieve its project."[25] For this reason, the "good form" of nationalism, in which the nation is the foundation for and context of democracy and the guarantee of the rights and civil liberties of its citizens, is never fully separable from the "bad racist form" of racism. Modern nations and all nationalisms are therefore still implicated in the legacies of colonialism and fascism, even if, the end of the nation-state would not necessarily result in the definitive eradication of any of these legacies either. Indeed, the reverse could occur in the "New Europe" or the era of post- or transnationalism.

In his more recent writings, Balibar has focused on the common properties of all forms of racism, both the explicit forms rejected by democratic societies and the implicit forms that persist within those same societies. What democratic nations share with fascism and colonialism, is the violence that inheres in relations of domination: "Fascism and racism are violence in a reactive, self-destructive form. But there are other forms of social violence: structural, conjunctural violence, the violence of domination and of despair that the 'order' and 'consensus' of right-thinking political discourses want to stifle. This means that our society has to conquer violence, and first of all in itself—instead of repressing it and instrumentalizing it."[26] This would seem to imply that resistance against neofascisms and neocolonialisms, or at least the most violent and oppressive legacies of fascism and colonialism, is

inseparable from the struggle against the violence inhering within democracy itself, a struggle to be waged against the laws, institutions, and practices that foster or instrumentalize violence against those constituted as "other."

More today than at any other moment in recent decades, society's conquest of the violence dwelling within itself appears to be a noble but impossible task, indeed, a utopian endeavor that can never succeed in its entirety. However, this need not detract from the critical force or political efficacy of such an endeavor. It does suggest, however, that merely to denounce the racism and anti-Semitism of the past and within contemporary society is insufficient if racism and anti-Semitism continue to be considered primarily as signs of the barbaric, irrational behavior of others. This is ultimately a way of ignoring the racism and violence within the modern nation-state, as expressed through its social, economic, and political relations with segments of its own population and those of other nations. It is to ignore the legacies of fascism and colonialism within the legacies of nationalism and even within the legacy of democracy.

The denunciation of racism, anti-Semitism, fascism, and colonialism, and, increasingly also of militant religious fundamentalism, is too easy and self-serving. It places us in a position of moral superiority at a remove from these vilified practices. This is a temptation of which all those critically and academically preoccupied with fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism need to be mindful, given the number of essays and books that have been written from such a perspective. For no one stands untouched and above or outside these legacies. No one possesses absolute moral or political authority.

The borders between inside and outside, between "them" and "us," and even between past and present, simply don't hold when it comes to racism and anti-Semitism. This is one of the reasons why the discussion of borders is such a crucial one for Balibar and why he focuses so much of his attention on frontiers and borders, both internal and external. The complexity of these issues is magnified in a post-colonial world and global economy in which, as Balibar says, "the heritage of colonialism is, in reality, a fluctuating combination of continued exteriorization and 'internal exclusion' "[27] of those represented and treated as "other" and as a "racial" exteriority. Colonial conquest and occupation and, subsequently, the liberation of colonized peoples that has been attended by increasingly massive immigration from the ex-colonies into the ex-colonizing states, have resulted in what he refers to as an "interiorization of the exterior which marks out the horizon against which the representations of 'race' and 'ethnicity' are played out [and which] cannot be separated, other than abstractly, from apparently antithetical forms of exteriorization of the interior."[28] This does not simply mean that "the other" is already inside, but also that "the self" is already outside or other than itself. The violence of anti-immigrant groups is aimed primarily at denying and reversing this displacement of the collective, national self outside itself and the inclusion of others within. In any case, representations of race and ethnicity now occur within a context where borders between inside and outside are not and cannot any longer be clearly delineated.

Even if we acknowledge that to speak of "race" (as ethnicity, religion, or culture) is to speak of a fiction, it is still necessary to study how "race" is represented and institutionalized in modern democracies as well as in ethnic and religious fundamentalist

movements and states. Critical attention needs to be focused also on how exterior and interior borders between "us" and "them" continue to be erected, policed, and defended, and how violence is perpetuated in the name of suppressing the "illegal" or "unjustified" crossings of these borders. It is thus still our task today to investigate critically how the fiction of race is sustained in modern society and to challenge the very real social and political effects of this fiction. That is the critical legacy I would propose as a possible response to the various legacies of fascism and colonialism after their demise, legacies persisting not just in totalitarian on fundamentalist societies, but within our own democratic societies as well.

Notes

1. François Jacob, "Biologisme–Racisme–Hiéarchie," in *Le Racisme: mythes et sciences*, ed. Maurice Olender (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1981), p. 109. All translations from the French, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
2. Etienne Balibar defines "fictive ethnicity" as follows in "The Nation Form" in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities,* trans. Chris *Turner* (New York: Verso Press, 1991): "I apply the term 'fictive ethnicity' to the community instituted by the nation-state. This is an intentionally complex expression in which the term fiction [. . .] should not be taken in the sense of a pure and simple illusion without historical effects, but must, on the contrary, be understood by analogy with the *persona ficta* of the juridical tradition in the sense of an institutional effect, a 'fabrication.' No nation possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the populations included within them . . . are ethnicized—that is, represent in the past or in the future as if they formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which transcends individuals and social conditions" (96).
3. Claudette Guillaumin, " 'I know it's not nice, but . . . ' The Changing face of 'race,' " in *Racism, Sexism, Power and Ideology*, trans. Andrew Rothwell and Max Silverman (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 106–07.
4. Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, p. 49.
5. Balibar, "The Nation Form," p. 96.
6. Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," p. 45.
7. Albert Memmi, *Le Racisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 43, trans. Steve Martinot as *Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 35. Hereafter, page references to the French edition are given first and those for the translation, which I have frequently modified, given in brackets.
8. Ibid., p. 92 [92–93].
9. Charles-Robert Ageron, "Français, juifs et musulmans," in *L'Algérie des Français* (Paris: Seuil, 1993), p. 109.
10. See Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890–1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). Even though the focus of her study is not North Africa but West Africa, see especially Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). Conklin's book is especially interesting for it studies the Third Republic's various attempts "to reconcile its aggressive imperialism with its republican ideals" (1) and focuses on how the French "managed to obscure the fundamental contradiction between democracy and the forcible acquisition of an empire" (2). More specifically, Conklin defines her objective in the following way: "Without ever denying the reality of French racism, [it is] to understand its particular course and permutations [. . .], as well as its ability to coexist unproblematically—at least in the eyes of contemporaries—with republican values in the first place" (9).

11. Charles-Robert Ageron, "Français, juifs et musulmans," *L'Algérie des Français*, p. 109.
12. René Lespès, *Oran: Etude de géographie et d'histoire urbaine* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1938).
13. Ibid., p. 107.
14. The *Décret Crémieux* states: "Native Israelites of the departments of Algeria are declared French citizens: as a consequence their legal status and personal status will be, with the promulgation of the present decree, regulated by French law: all the rights acquired on this day will remain inviolable. Every contrary legislative provision, decree, rule, or ordinance is abolished" (cited from Michel Ansky, *Les Juifs de l'Algérie: Du Décret Crémieux à la Libération* [Paris: Editions du Centre, 1950], p. 38). The Decree was signed in Tours on October 24, 1870 by members of the Government of National Defense, which included Crémieux and Gambetta among others.
15. The first two articles of the law rescinding the *Décret Crémieux* read as follows: "I, Maréchal of France, Head of the French State, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, decree: Article 1—The decree of the government of National Defense of October 24, 1870 is repealed in so much as it determines the political rights of the native Jews of the departments of Algeria and declares them French citizens. Article 2—The political rights of the native Jews of the departments of Algeria are governed by the texts that determine the political rights of Algerian Muslim natives" (Ansky, *Les Juifs de l' Algérie*, p. 88). The text was signed in Vichy on October 7, 1940 by Maréchal Pétain and the Vichy Minister of Justice, Raphaël Alibert.
16. Charles-Robert Ageron claims that French–Algerian anti-Semites were rarely if ever successful in stirring up Arab–Algerian anti-Semitism: "Certainly Algerian Muslims did not forgive Jews for their sudden elevation to the rank of French citizens and their definitive rallying to the French Republic. But they manifested no explicit satisfaction when Jews were humiliated in 1940 and lowered to the condition of natives to whom even the right to be naturalized was refused, a right recognized for all French subjects of Algeria since 1865" (Ageron, "Français," p. 110).
17. See, of course, Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton's monumental work, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York: Schocken Books, 1983).
18. For a more developed analysis of Vichy anti-Semitism and the role played by Xavier Vallat in the development of its anti-Semitic laws and policies, see my "What it Meant to be 'a Jew' in Vichy France: Xavier Vallat, State Anti-Semitism, and the Question of Assimilation," in *SubStance* #87, "The Occupation," 27, 3 (1998): 36–54.
19. Xavier Vallat, *Le Nez de Cléopâtre: souvenirs d'un homme de droite (1919–1944)* (Paris: Les Quartre Fils Aymon, 1957), pp. 224, 226.
20. Joseph Billig, *Le Commissariat général aux questions juives (1941–1944)* (Paris: Editions du Centre, 1955–1960), p. 11.
21. See Henry Rousso, *Le Syndrome de Vichy: de 1944 à nos jours* (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
22. Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," p. 37.
23. Ibid., p. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 53.
25. Ibid., p. 54.
26. Etienne Balibar, "Contre le fascisme, pour la révolte," in *Droit de cité* (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1998), p. 143.
27. Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," p. 43.
28. Ibid., 43.

Chapter Eight
Fascism and the New Radical Movements in Romania

Maria Bucur

In this essay I explore the phenomenon of fascism in the Romanian context—both the historical fascism of the interwar period, as well as its "legacies" in contemporary culture—by comparing its features with more familiar fascist movements in Western Europe, for example, in Italy, Germany, and France—movements that have already been subjected to more thorough analysis by academic scholarship. Inflected by local particularities, fascism flourished in Romania during the interwar period; yet despite the widespread popularity of the Iron Guard as Romania's largest fascist political movement during the 1930s, it only managed to hold political power for a few months between October 1940 and January 1941. It might therefore seem surprising to learn that, since 1989, there has been a revival of interest in the Iron Guard, which at first glance might appear as a benign force in contemporary Romania. The ensuing paragraphs elaborate the historical background of the fascist movement in Romania and situate it in relationship to broader definitions of fascism and its origins in modernism. In the process of understanding the new extreme right surfacing in post–Cold War Europe, I furthermore seek to distinguish between elements that represent a strain of continuity or a legacy from the past and those features that can be identified as new and only marginally linked with the past.

Fascism in the Romanian Context

In order to grasp the significance of fascism in Romania, it is imperative to understand the country's historical, political, and cultural context. The most important clue to understanding the political culture is that the nation's pre- and post-communist political scene does not include a significant left wing, despite 50 years of communism.[1] Prior to 1945, the ideology of the left across the spectrum from socialist to communist played at best a marginal role in the political arena.[2] While some politicians and economists of the early twentieth century, such as Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, expressed an interest in socialism, these developments never led to the establishment of a sizeable indigenous left-wing party or labor movement as occurred in neighboring Hungary and Bulgaria.[3] Romania had a Social Democratic Party with small representation in Parliament. However, the Peasant Party and, subsequently, the National Peasant Party were the only important political force that included programs

of social welfare that Western scholars of modern political ideology would associate with the left. These included programs promoting greater state involvement in both education and welfare, such as public health measures and assistance for the elderly. However, these programs were articulated in a language that was implicitly and sometimes explicitly nationalist and anti-Hungarian. Furthermore, they drew less from the ideology of socialism than from that of Russian populism, blended with important elements of Christian theology.

Between 1945 and 1989, the Communist Party stood as the exclusive, officially sanctioned political force in the country. Political culture was radically shaped along Marxist-Stalinist lines during the early years, with a shift toward a form of nationalist populism under the Ceausescu regime (1965–1989).[4] After the 1989 December Revolution, the Communist Party disappeared virtually overnight and several "social-democratic" parties began to emerge in its aftermath. They perpetuated some of the legacies of the communist regime through their antiliberal, statist programs that also included elements of social welfare associated with the left in Western Europe. Yet these parties were all nationalist: mostly anti-Hungarian and anti-Russian, many anti-Semitic and anti-Roma, and quite a few displaying clear signs of general paranoid xenophobia.[5] In fact, it would be difficult to identify these parties as "left wing" according to the same definitions used to identity the left in Western Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth century. One close observer of this phenomenon, political analyst Michael Shafir, contends:

> Although the applicability of the Left-Right continuum to the post-communist states has been questioned by most scholars, the continuum was implicitly reintroduced via the back door by dwelling on either "successor parties" or on parties that were alternatively labeled "right wing" and "right," "far right," "extreme right," or "radical right."[6]

Just as the Romanian left-wing movement defies easy compliance with our Western definitions, similar challenges arise when assigning labels to local political activities that—to Western observers—would seem indicative of an extreme right. In the Romanian context, mainstream political parties and their attendant ideologies have generally dwelled somewhere to the right of what constitutes the political mainstream in France or Germany. For this reason, it is clear that fascism occupies a different place within Romanian politics and culture than within Western Europe. The contrast is evident even with closer neighbors, such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia, where a broader political spectrum from left to right existed even before the rise of the radical right in the 1930s and, indeed, resurfaced in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of underground opposition movements.[7]

We must also consider another important particularity of political culture in Romania: its anti-Semitic inclinations since the nineteenth century. Although the issue never claimed a central place in Romanian history, virulent displays of anti-Semitism surfaced repeatedly during the political crises faced by the young Romanian state after 1864.[8] This was especially evident after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which made the recognition of Romania's independence by the great powers conditional upon granting Jews in Romania the possibility of becoming citizens.[9] With regard to the tenor of public expressions of anti-Semitism, it is important to

note that while some of the most prominent writers and intellectuals without great political ambitions spoke publicly in strong anti-Semitic terms, there was no prominent faction to critique these excesses, save for a few intellectuals of mostly Jewish descent. This served to reinforce the anti-Semitic discourse as "mainstream" or even "normal," while rendering its critique a narrow, particularistic Jewish retort.

In contextualizing Romanian fascism, two more aspects of the twentieth-century political and social context must be drawn into consideration. For one, Romania emerged as a small and relatively new country during the period of nationalism and imperial expansion. As Milan Kundera has remarked elsewhere, like other Central Europeans, Romanian intellectuals suffered (and many continue to do so today) from an inferiority–superiority complex characteristic among small peripheral and transitional countries, where the challenge to survive as a state seems great when observed from the inside, but goes unrecognized by the greater states.[10] Cultural production becomes a means to distinguish oneself, and yet recognition by the outside world is often accompanied by a rupture of the artist/intellectual or his/her work from local moorings. Who today still remembers that Constantin Brâncuşi was once Romanian?

Another social particularity of Romania derives from the near absence of an ethnic-Romanian entrepreneurial middle class. Before 1918, Jews, Greeks, and Armenians made up an important segment of the entrepreneurial classes.[11] After 1918, Hungarians and Germans prominently joined the ethnic mix, dwarfing even more the proportion of ethnic Romanians among the middle classes and marginal Romanians who were not white-collar state employees. This class disparity along ethnic divisions fueled the xenophobic trend within political ideology and within broader Romanian middle-class culture.

Historic Fascism

Having provided a broader context for the rise of fascism in Romania, I turn now to its development as political ideology and as a wider cultural phenomenon. Most scholars working on this topic have focused primarily on the organization and activities of the Iron Guard as a political movement, or on the figure of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu as its charismatic leader.[12] One important departure from this trend is the detailed and, to this date, most comprehensive work on the Iron Guard, Armin Heinen's *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien. Soziale Bewegung und Politische Organisation*.[13] Tracing the institutional development and political fortunes of the Iron Guard in the electoral battles of the 1930s, the author engages important questions about the broader nature of fascism and what the Romanian case offers for understanding this wider phenomenon. In the process, he challenges some theories about, for instance, the outcome of World War I and political radicalism, while reinforcing other theories about the connection between radical extremism and the recent expansion of political rights.[14] Heinen also explores social aspects of this movement and the cultural context of fascism in Romania, albeit as a side issue.

However, Heinen and most other scholars of this topic have skirted the issue of whether Romanian fascism constituted a response to the crisis of classical modernity.[15] My own unsatisfactory answer to this question is "yes and no," for it depends

upon our definition of both "classical modernity" and "response." As I have suggested above, Romania—in contrast to Germany and France—did not experience "classical modernity" in the century preceding the rise of the radical right. It was only in the last two decades of the nineteenth century that Romania entered a period of "accelerated modernity" in the socioeconomic and cultural realms.[16] Romanian intellectuals were certainly familiar with the modernist critiques that emerged around the turn of the century in both the art and political worlds, but such critiques were out of step with Romania's overall development.

Those who identified with the critique of "classical modernity" sought to reappropriate this critique within the Romanian context, especially after 1918. Others responded by trying to prevent the crisis of modernity from even taking place. A eugenics movement rose out of this latter interpretation of the crisis of modernity, and itself became a modernizing movement.[17] For others, the crisis was already underway, assuming the form of foreign encroachment (e.g., the Jewish businesses or Hungarian elites in Transylvania), calling for a resolutely nationalist response, one that was aggressive and radical, but not modernist in the sense of challenging the established sociopolitical order as did the new right in Germany or Italy.

In its first years the movement coalesced around the figure of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, who was to become the leader of Romania's largest fascist movement, the Iron Guard. It claimed legitimacy on the basis of its conservative ideas and it links with other existing movements, such as the anti-Semitic National League for Christian Defense led by A.C. Cuza, herein evincing similarities to the Nazi movement in its early years. Consider, for example, Zelea-Codreanu's claim that the liberal professions and public sphere were being taken over by Jews who profited from the war at the expense of poor Romanians who had sacrificed themselves in the war. In the absence of a large ethnic-Romanian entrepreneurial middle class and given the prominence of the anti-Semitic discourse in Romanian politics, such a claim rang true or at least unproblematic for many other ethnic Romanians. However, what could be identified as genuinely radical in these early years was the prefiguring of a total state, much stronger than Romania had ever known, in which a corporate social structure would be reinforced by state institutions and from which Jews would be excluded.

However, other important differences already separated Codreanu from his Western European counterparts. He made no pretenses about the "socialist" nature of his movement. His was a Romanian movement against Jews and other "foreigners," conflating "Romanianness" with the lower social strata, especially the peasantry. Without a strong socialist movement in existence, there was no need to construct a discourse that would incorporate its claims in order to attract more followers, as Mussolini and Hitler sought to do. A strong pro-peasant image did make more sense in the Romanian context, since over 90 percent of the population lived in rural regions where men (although not women) had gained full political rights in 1918. Codreanu cultivated an image of himself as a peasant youth on a white horse, not only for the aesthetic appeal but especially for the clear message this image conveyed to other young, recently urbanized students: he was one of the people, for the people—a true Romanian.[18]

Another important difference between the Romanian and other European fascist movements is to be found in the Iron Guard's close link with the Orthodox

Church.[19] From the very beginning Codreanu's speeches invoked notions of Christian sacrifice, drawing parallels between Christ and the Romanian people on the one hand, and their respective victimization by Jews, on the other hand. Religious rituals began and ended political meetings, and the first name taken by Codreanu's organization was the League of the Archangel Michael, clearly identifying this fascist organization with notions of both Christian sacrifice and also revenge. The Nazis also appropriated religious rituals in their meetings, but did so in order to construct a Nazi spirituality independent of links with any existing religion, rather than as a claim to be the "ultra-Christian" movement within their country, as was the case with the legionnaires in Romania.

The Orthodox Church never officially endorsed this link, and even issued statements indicative of a desire to distance itself as an institution from the Iron Guard. Many Orthodox priests nonetheless became members and even leaders of the legionary movement, some learning about this movement while still in seminary schools; the Church did not exert any sort of reprimand toward them.[20] However ambiguous the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the legionary fascist movement, it is clear that the latter drew some of its ideological and cultural content from a certain interpretation of Orthodox theology, a type of "born again" orthodoxy. This was by no means a modernist component of Romanian fascism, but rather a conservative, antimodernizing one. The legionnaires wanted to rescue the values of Orthodox Christianity from encroachment by contemporary materialism. Its leaders made vows of purity and self-sacrifice and, at least during the 1930s, generally adhered to them.

Another important and radical element was the movement's emphasis upon youth; it was organized along generational lines, with the young men's organization (which was led by university students) at the center and three other organizations comprising older men, women, and Romanians from abroad supporting it. This generational division contributed to the initially spectacular growth of the organization in the large university centers—Iaşi, Bucharest, and Cluj. The Iron Guard's institutional structure also revealed the deep chasm that separated generations, as young people displayed a lack of trust toward the older generation that had led the political destiny of Romania before and during the war. This rift became even deeper when Codreanu broke with A.C. Cuza despite the similar ideological stance they shared, on grounds that Cuza was too much of an "old-fashioned" politician, content to operate within existing Parliamentary constraints.[21] He was a man of a previous generation, whom Codreanu did not feel he could trust.

The fascists' focus on youth also highlights the one important link between Romanian fascism and modernity, one that can be traced in the decision of a generation of brilliant, dissatisfied modernist intellectuals to align themselves with this dynamic movement. Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, and Constantin Noica, just to name the three most famous members of this generation, sympathized with Codreanu's movement and with fascism generally as a response not only to a socioeconomic crisis of external origins, but also to a deeper identity crisis, a reaction against some of the results of modernization while fully comprehending the modern condition. Too young to have fought in the war, this generation came of age at a moment of great promise (the creation of Greater Romania) and great challenges

(forging a new nation and rebuilding ties with a Western Europe shaken by war and internal crises). In an effort to come to terms with these challenges, Emil Cioran read anarchist literature, while Mircea Eliade traveled to India in search of a spiritual mysticism he found lacking in Romania.

The emergence of the League of the Archangel Michael in 1927 and its congenial relationship with the philosophy professor, Nae Ionescu, who served as a charismatic mentor to many students, drew the interest of the younger generation by offering intellectually appealing and aesthetically stimulating solutions. In line with the modernist reconstruction of spiritual renewal, Ionescu focused upon the highly personal, existential definition of spirituality.[22] The "new generation," as Eliade and others began to call the cluster of restless young writers, also sought to cultivate a new virility in Romanian culture.[23] This group included not only sympathizers of the Iron Guard but also some prominent Jewish writers, the most important name being Mihail Sebastian. That the relationship between Sebastian and Eliade remained warm and collegial even throughout the 1930s is testimony to the complex relationship that existed between the generations; the new generation sought to pursue its the vague aspirations in resistance against the older generation, while nevertheless forging common ideological alliances.[24]

The new generation's response to the crisis of modernity found primarily literary expression, as evinced in the rise of a new type of novel—more intensely psychological and personal—and a focus on mysticism, especially in Eliade's writings. Yet a slippery slope led from fictional writing to essays of an increasingly political nature. While Eliade initially started out publishing fiction feuilletons in *Cuvântul*, a newspaper largely controlled by Nae Ionescu, by the late 1920s he was writing political essays that betrayed sympathies for the newly created League of the Archangel Michael.[25] In a similar vein, Cioran, while initially shunning political allegiances, in 1936 published a "flamboyant . . . manifesto," *Romania's Transfiguration*.[26] As other critics have noted, this manifesto did not make mention of Codreanu or his party, instead offering a vague, apocalyptic, and at the same time perversely utopian view of Romania's future: "I wish a fanaticized Romania, a Romania in delirium, a Romania with the population of China and the destiny of France."[27] Though Cioran later refuted affiliation with the Iron Guard, in an interview taken in 1972 he stated: "The Iron Guard was considered a sort of cure for all the ills and for boredom—even for the clap . . . I learned then on my own what it means to be carried away by a wave without even the slightest conviction. To this kind of thing I am now immune."[28]

This primarily aesthetic and philosophical response gave way to more aggressive support for the extreme right and a rift in the "new generation." Some writers assumed official positions within the short-lived legionary regime (September 1940–January 1941), while a few others attempted to take a critical stance. A saddened Sebastian wrote with a great deal of pain about his friends on the eve of legionary rebellion in January 1941: "[Cioran] was named a cultural attaché in Paris [by the legionary regime] . . . He is an interesting man, remarkably intelligent, without prejudices and a double dose of cynicism and cowardice, reunited in a funny way."[29] Many others, among them Eliade and Ionescu, sought ways to leave Romania through diplomatic and other governmental posts facilitated by the legionary regime. In January 1941 the legionary rebellion was defeated and many of

its members imprisoned. A significant number were able to flee into exile in other fascist countries (Germany and Spain, especially), while some sympathizers who were not "card-carrying" members successfully negotiated the transition into the wartime military dictatorship. In any case, the tribulations of the "new generation" were not shared among most followers of the legionary movement. While no definitive study has been undertaken to determine the likely motivations of most members who joined the Iron Guard, it is clear that the ideology espoused in its own propaganda and publications[30] focused on Orthodox Christian values and anti-Semitism as central tenets of "guardist" philosophy.[31]

During the war the Ion Antonescu regime ostensibly opposed the Iron Guard, particularly its generational and social radicalism, but nonetheless appropriated some of the rhetoric of the Iron Guard, especially with regard to the Bolshevik threat, identifying Romanian identity with Christian Orthodoxy, and targeting Jews as the enemy within.[32] World War II became the crusade against Bolshevism, with Bolshevism being understood as a regime fundamentally supported by Jews. While not all anti-Bolsheviks were anti-Semitic, nor were they all pro-fascist, the facile conflation of the defensive (read patriotic) goals of the war with a much more aggressive racist rhetoric nevertheless made any reasonable mainstream discourse impossible.

Fascist Traces in the Nationalist Discourse under the Communist Regime

How important was the fascist movement and its short-lived regime for Romanian society? The fundamental social transformation fascists had envisioned did not actually occur until the communist takeover. However, the nationalist discourse developed by the fascist movement and, in particular, the mystical spiritual connections forged by intellectuals of the new generation, did leave an indelible mark on the cultural underground, on national identity, and on the development of communist nationalist propaganda, especially after the mid-1960s. The postwar "new generation" of intellectuals, effectively an educated underground counter-elite, claimed Eliade, Noica, and Cioran as their idols. Cultural survival and opposition to the communist regime blended with a relatively uncritical worship of these writers, particularly of Noica, who attracted a small but very important circle of disciples within his town of internal exile, Păltiniş.[33] Eliade and Cioran also exercised considerable influence, even in exile, by means of reconstructed discourses on spirituality and renewal.

The communist regime vilified fascism in a similar manner as other communist bloc countries, namely, in an overtly ideologized and censorial fashion.[34] Information about the fascist movement was controlled by the government; the official party line permitted only a two-dimensional portrayal of the right wing as unequivocally anti-Semitic and at the same time un-Romanian.[35] The reverse corollary maintained that true Romanians were neither anti-Semitic nor supporters of the radical right, but that any sympathizers of the fascist movement could be successfully rehabilitated within the Romanian cultural patrimony to become once again "true Romanians." Constantin Noica's works, which appeared during this era, were exemplary of this vein of thinking and were marked by a virulent, if sophisticated nationalism.[36]

By the same token, followers of the Iron Guard imprisoned and persecuted especially in the early years of the communist regime came to regard communism as a foreign influence and themselves as martyrs of its evil reign. Some even maintained links with exiled members of their movement.[37] Their alternate memory of the interwar period, of the war, and of their own steadfast opposition to the current regime generated a following of secret sympathizers. While this following by no means constituted a mass phenomenon, it was significant enough to contribute to the rebirth of a radical right-wing movement after 1989.

According to several critics of the communist regime, by 1989 Nicolae Ceauşescu was cultivating important relations with legionary exiles and furthermore permitted important changes in the official discourse regarding the radical right.[38] These included an apologetic revisionism of Antonescu as tragic and patriotic leader of Romania during World War II, a reinscription of his image that diverted attention from the military dictator's actions against the Jewish population. This paradoxical admixture of right-wing and leftist ideology within the communist regime was key in preparing the way for the development of new radical politics after 1989.

Radical Politics in Post-communist Romania

A few days following Ceauşescu's flight from Bucharest in December 1989, I attended a meeting that claimed to be the beginning of a student union, but turned out to be an overture for a new radical movement. The organizer was Marian Munteanu, who later became a self-styled heir to the legionary movement and leader of a "radical return" faction, the Movement for Romania [Mişcarea pentru România].[39] Other political organizations and publications harboring increasingly unabashed sympathies toward the fascist movement of the interwar period also sprouted beginning in 1990.[40] Yet the most important phenomenon in the arena of radical politics was the Greater Romania Party (PRM), which represented itself as an "heir to the national-communist tradition."[41] Its initial success was limited, especially if we focus on participation in the Parliament, which only reached 3.9 percent in both houses.[42] But a glance beyond such statistics toward the political discourse of the transition years, in particular popular views of pluralism, democracy, and globalization, suggests that the post-communist radical parties claim an important place within Romanian society.

Is this a new development? Is it neofascist and what are its links to the interwar period? Is it part of a postmodern ethos? In seeking to answers these complex questions, there are a few issues to bear in mind. In the discussion of post-communist politics, one must understand that political parties and other groupings with clear and open sympathies for the Iron Guard do not refer to themselves as fascistic or extreme right. They simply perceive themselves as identifying with a strong nationalist stance. While their ideas may bear some resemblance to what scholars refer to as the "extreme right" in Western Europe, some of these movements actually draw a strong following from among old apparatchiks of the Communist Party. As Michael Shafir points out, theirs is a complicated relationship that precludes a clear identification with the right or the left. Instead, they can be more easily identified as

"radical" movements, and in the case of the ultranationalist parties tracing ties back to the communist regime, "radical continuity" parties. Shafir distinguishes these from the "radical return" parties, which draw upon the ultranationalism of older ideologies and parties such as the Iron Guard.[43]

The most important radical movements in post-communist Romania are indisputably those of "radical continuity," which sometimes utilize images once affiliated with the Iron Guard, but now connected more closely with the more recent communist past. They often invoke the language of cultural conservatism, for example, calling for a return to the Orthodox values of the pre-communist period. Yet they have less in common than their fascist predecessor with the nationalist movements to which they sometimes make reference. Their audiences draw from relatively well-educated urban populations whose fears of economic insecurity may initially seem reminiscent of the sentiments harbored by fascist followers in the 1930s. Yet their fears are actually distinctly different, for the global economy and the political institutions within those countries that largely control it bear little resemblance to circumstances in the 1930s. PRM and other radical parties have been unsuccessful in maintaining a political platform that advocates an inward-looking autarkic attitude toward economic development and political order; in order to maintain at least some of their following, they have had to pay formal allegiance to, for instance, NATO and EU expansion.

In spite of these important differences, or maybe because of them, the radical post-communist movements have made reference to the ideas, organization, and even leadership of the interwar fascist movement. Identification with the pre-communist radical right varies across the spectrum. Its most general form has found expression in the historical revisionism that seeks to construct Marshal Antonescu as patriot and defender of the fatherland during World War II, a viewpoint especially promulgated among the "radical continuity" movements. Although PRM has repeatedly and aggressively campaigned for the rehabilitation of Antonescu as a great patriot, a closer look at nationalist discourse of the 1980s indicates this to be merely a more overt expression of a view already upheld semiofficially during the communist period. More recently, a host of veterans' groups as well as nongovernmental organizations in which veterans and ex-secret police agents participate, have become the most active institutions promulgating this revisionism. Indeed, recently a journal with the name *Mareşalul Ion Antonescu* recently appeared, drawing some criticism from the press but also garnering enough support to sustain publication, now numbered at three issues.

There are also nongovernmental groups, of which some are essentially ad-hoc assemblies of legionaries who meet regularly and seek to publicly commemorate dates that were important for the interwar fascist movement. December 2 marks the assassination of Codreanu, a date that fortuitously falls the day after Romania's national holiday; for Codreanu's followers the two dates have become coalesced into one celebration of nationalism, while in the general press the focus on December 1 has tended to obscure December 2 commemorations. Another important form of nonpolitical reconnection with the interwar extreme right is evident among student groups that model their organization and sometimes their language and goals after those of the legionary groups of the late 1920s. While Marian Munteanu's Movement for Romania in the early 1990s was perhaps the most radical, the

organization's significance has faded as its members were swallowed by other more overtly political groups.[44] Another form of mobilization took place in the mid-1990s among theology students at Bucharest University, who pushed for some radical changes in the classroom, including the placement of crucifixes or icons in each room, the addition of an Orthodox Chapel inside the University, and other symbolic changes that would reflect a more overtly Orthodox Christian orientation; their efforts met with resistance from the university leadership and other students.

In the resurgence of the radical right, the xenophobic and racist platform of political parties and attendant "cultural" organizations have played a far more significant role. The most influential has been the Greater Romania Party (PRM) that was established in early 1990 through the efforts of several ex-Securitate activists and Petre Roman, who subsequently became a leader of the Democratic Party. PRM rose from a meager 3.9 percent representation in the Parliament in 1992 (16 seats) to receive almost 25 percent of the popular vote in the 2000 presidential elections and a fivefold increase in seats in Parliament, namely 84. This spectacular growth is, in part, indicative of a growing sense of political and economic crisis among the Romanian population, but it is also indicative of a political culture out of step with the critique of xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and fundamentally antirational discourses that has gained currency among Western mainstream politicians and political observers of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century.

Interestingly, PRM draws most of its support not from the lumpenproletariat of the post-communist transition, but rather from both urban and rural areas, blue-collar and white-collar workers, and a surprisingly large number of individuals with higher education—teachers, army officers, and even some engineers and other professionals.[45] However, in contrast to the interwar period, when an anti-Bolshevik discourse united many supporters of fascism, the intellectuals, officers, and professionals constituting the leadership of today's party offer not so much a counterpoint to the previous communist regime as a disturbing continuity with it.[46] Corneliu Vadim-Tudor, the president and cofounder of this party, was an important court poet of the Ceauşescu regime. His influence is evinced in the party's view of Ceauşescu, who is now celebrated alongside other great leaders protecting the Romanian nation against foreign threat. Most other party leaders were either high-ranking military officials or members of the secret police before 1989, many of whom witnessed their status fade after 1989; however, many successfully negotiated the transition by retaining either their professional position or economic power.

The most important ideological position of this party has been its xenophobia, one inflected as anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and anti-globalization.[47] The Greater Romania Party continues to attribute the lack of economic growth, the peripheral position of Romania in Europe, and other domestic concerns about poverty and instability to the diversion of investment funds and international interest from Romania into Hungary, an activity for which the Hungarian state and the Hungarian minority in Romania are considered responsible.[48] The specter of Hungarian territorial revisionism in Transylvania is a current theme as well, focusing on the radical discourse of the right-wing parties in Hungary. The various forms of nationalism endorsed by the Victor Orbán regime in Hungary have provided much fuel for the inflammatory anti-Hungarian discourse of the PRM.

Jews are another favorite scapegoat. While the discourse of anti-Semitism resembles that cultivated by the interwar extreme right, the marginal presence of Jews within Romania—there are estimated to be fewer than 50,000 Jews among a total population of 24 million people—renders the contemporary situation distinctly different: in effect, an anti-Semitism without Jews.[49] Any potential enemy can be transmogrified as a Jew, for there is no real Jewish community to be distinguished from the myth of the Jew. Although this anti-Semitism might appear less dangerous, after all no substantial communities exist anymore to be threatened by it, as once did in the interwar period, it is actually far more insidious. It took most Romanian intellectuals and politicians a decade to realize this and to stop reacting to the anti-Semitic diatribes with dismissive surprise ("they are not talking about us or any existing population, so why should we bother with such absurd accusations?"), and begin to develop an engaged commitment to concepts of personal liberty, cultural diversity, and human rights. And still, PRM scored a frightening percentage at the polls in November 2000.

Finally, anti-globalism also constitutes an important component of the ideology of the PRM.[50] Perhaps anti-globalism in this context should rather be understood as a form of nationalism, a search for autarky in a period where such a position has become untenable. This anti-global perspective does not engage the problems of economic and attendant political globalization (EU and NATO expansion in the local context) in a realistic fashion. PRM obscures the real, pragmatic issue of how foreign investment has affected the Romanian economy, politics, and ecology, instead stirring up a cloud of bombastic nationalist parallels between current problems and those of Romanians during the Middle Ages. Instead of offering a counterposition to globalization that would encourage economic growth and stability by other autarchic means, they cast a nostalgic gaze toward an imagined past that never existed. There is nothing postmodern about this position; it is reactionary and fundamentally out of step with the contemporary moment.

However, anti-globalism does ring a common chord with many Romanians, and the recurring criticism of globalization leveled by PRM may explain in part the popular support for its presidential candidate in 2000. There is a general ambivalence among Romanians about the benefits reaped in the transition period, especially in the economic sphere. Most people would like to draw upon the benefits involved in becoming a member of the EU and NATO, but they understand only vaguely the requirements for such membership. They are much more familiar with the facile negative statements made by EU and NATO representatives in Romania, and their immediate consequences, such as the humiliating visa restrictions. The negative opinion of globalization has been further augmented by sordid stories about foreign investment firms that have done little for the growth of the Romanian economy and operated in complicity with corrupted local authorities.

There is less evidence available to the public about the rationale for making the economic sacrifices required by the EU as a condition of Romania's membership, and suspicion is rampant regarding new forms of economic imperialism and marginalization. The conflictual drama that plays itself out among those who support the need for economic sacrifices in order to attain future goals is that they, on the one hand, identify with Europe, yet are denied any acknowledgment by EU functionaries

operating within Romania. The complexity of the issue of globalization, particularly with regard to its economic impact, has had important political and cultural consequences, as evinced in support for the unproblematic and categorical albeit irrational rejection of globalization by the PRM.

While some might view the ideology and behavior of new radical political factions in Romania as part of the broader postmodern ethos, I would tend to disagree.[51] The post-communist transitional political scene has been dominated by an attempt to "return to history" rather than to "exit" from it into the realm of post-historical postmodern relativization. Michael Shafir has maintained that it is wrong to regard post-communist politics as a return to history, since the communist bloc "had never absented from history."[52] This is one way to view the matter, but for Romanian politicians and their constituencies operating on the "inside" as it were, the communist regime has been openly acknowledged since the 1990s as a farce and the last 50 years a deviation from normal historical development; in effect, then, the end of communism signaled a return to normalcy, to a history worthy of documentation. This perception and the ambiguities involved in attempting to match Romanian politics against the left–right spectrum of the Western political paradigm are evidently incommensurable with the Western viewpoint on the post–Cold War, where the most important challenge has consisted in trying to reconstruct the left—both the parties themselves and the overall ideology. The West has undergone a transition from well-defined distinctions between the left and the right into the dissolution of especially the center, and a concommitant relativization of political ideology. In the post-communist countries parties and electorates are rediscovering the left and the right, while their counterparts in Western Europe are having difficulty retaining these labels as markers of specific platforms and values.

What has been the impact of the new movements of radical return and radical continuity? The 2000 electoral victories of the PRM in Parliament and their large percentage in the presidential elections give us pause to reconsider the significance of radical politics in contemporary Romania. Since the election, this party has become an important component of the opposition, sometimes joining unlikely allies (e.g., the National Peasant Party or the Democratic Party) in critiquing the current regime. Its continued semblance of civility in the Parliament enables followers and other sympathizers to look beyond the crass critical discourse of PRM. Generous funding, some of it from émigrés with connections to the radical right prior to World War II, has furthermore enabled this party to operate freely despite the many libel compensatory suits against its leader, Vadim Tudor.

Many political observers and critical intellectuals regarded the electoral votes in November 2000 as symptomatic of the general sense of economic crisis and the current void in political authority. They seemed to indicate that PRM did not have a stable strong following, and other parties could certainly regain lost voters if they addressed the critical issues raised during the elections; however, this reform has not been forthcoming. On the contrary, the National Peasant Party, which suffered the greatest losses in that election, has seen further splintering; the National Liberal Party has not grown significantly. With political power in the hands of a party that considers itself "social-democrat" although it is effectively a nationalist statist party, and with significant opposition resting in the hands of a party that believes that what is

right for the nation is to eliminate all foreign and internal enemies alike, the political mainstream in Romania still dwells much further to the right of that in Western Europe; it furthermore lacks a strong liberal center and has, at best, a relatively weak social-democratic left. The short term prospects are not promising.

In this essay I have sought to elaborate why the Romanian fascist movement cannot easily be integrated into a Western framework that views it as an expression of modernity and a response to the crisis of classical modernity. Only some of the followers of the fascist regime, a small but significant group of intellectuals, clearly responded to the appeal of fascism because of a perception of this movement as both a spiritual and at the same time modernist response to Romania's postwar challenges. Therefore, I cannot regard the radical right-wing movements since 1989 as a specific articulation of postmodernity, but rather as a reactionary response to the challenges of the post-communist new liberal international "order." In fact, seeking links between the new right and postmodernity does not enable us to understand much about the specific local context (both present and historical) of the new radical parties in Romania.

The particularities of the Romanian case have far more to do with the specific development of political culture before and during the communist period, when illiberalism was the norm and the dialectic of the Enlightenment did not unfold in the same way as it did in Western Europe. Therefore, the shift from modernity to postmodernity and the attendant crises and respective responses cannot be viewed as either linear or unambiguous. The whole meta-narrative subsumed within this framing of the historical question defies any rational application to the Romanian case. In Romania and in other regions of the post-communist world, the rise of radical political movements represents the attempt to "return" to history, rather than the end of a historical meta-narrative and the beginning of postmodern relativization of this narrative.

Notes

1. For useful critical discussions of Romanian history in the twentieth century see Vlad Georgescu, *The Romanians* (Columbus, Ohio: University of Ohio Press, 1985) and Keith Hitchins, *Rumania, 1867–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
2. A dated, yet still useful discussion of Romania's political life particularly in the interwar period is Henry Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951).
3. The Romanian communist historiography contains numerous volumes on this subject, which was very near to the project of legitimating communist rule after 1945. One can read more distanced and nuanced analyses in Philip Eidelberg, *The Great Rumanian Peasant Revolt of 1907. Origins of a Modern Jacquerie* (Leiden: Brill, 1974), a book that discusses peasant populism and its links with other contemporary leftwing peasant movements. See also Joseph Love, *Crafting the Third World. Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), for a discussion of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea's links with socialist thinkers of his time, especially the Russian populists.
4. Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
5. Michael Shafir, "The Mind of Romania's Radical Right," in *The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

6. Michael Shafir, "Radical Politics in Post Communist East Central Europe. Part I: 'Reds,' 'Blacks,' and 'Blues,' " *East European Perspectives* 1, 1 (November 3 1999) [http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/1999/11/01-031199.html].
7. For a discussion of left-wing critiques inside the Soviet bloc, see Raymond Taras, ed. *The Road to Disillusion. From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992).
8. See Leon Volovici, *Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); Carol Iancu, *Jews in Romania, 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation* (Boulder, CO.: East European Monographs, 1996)
9. William Oldson, *A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991).
10. Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," in *The New York Review of Books*, trans. Edmund White, (April 26, 1984): pp. 33–38.
11. Hitchins, *Rumania*.
12. Francisco Veiga, *Istoria gărzii de fier, 1919–1941. Mistica ultranaţionalismului* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993); Radu Ioanid, *The Sword of the Archangel. Fascist Ideology in Romania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Ewald Hibbeln, *Codreanu und die Eiserne Garde* (Siegen: J.G. Herder, 1984); Bela Vago, *The Shadow of the Swastika: The Rise of Fascism and Anti-Semitism in the Danube Basin, 1936–1939* (Farnborough: Saxon House for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1975); Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others. A History of Fascism in Hungary and Romania* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1970); Martin Broszat, "Die Eisern Garde und das Dritte Reich," *Politische Studien* 9 (1958); Florea Nedelcu, *De la restauraţie la dictatura regală* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia 1981).
13. Armin Heinen's Die Legion "Erzengel Michael," in *Rumänien. Soziale Bewegung und Politische Organisation* (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986). My references to this work are drawn from the Romanian translation, *Legiunea* "Arhangelul Mihail." *O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1999).
14. Heinen, *Legiunea*, pp. 462–72.
15. One important exception is Sorin Alexandrescu, *Paradoxul român* (Bucharest: Ed. Univers, 1998) and especially Privind înapoi, *modernitatea* (Bucharest: Ed. Univers, 1999).
16. Andrew Janos provides a compelling demonstration of this argument in the economic realm, with its attendant social changes in "Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective: The Case of Romania," in ed. *Social Change in Romania, 1860–1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation* Kenneth Jowitt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
17. Maria Bucur, *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002).
18. Although this description may lead one to define the Iron Guard as a populist movement, Armin Heinen is right to point out that this organization was much more radical in its ability to militarize and mobilize its followers than other populist movements at that time. See Heinen, *Legiunea*, p. 465.
19. Ibid., pp. 127–29.
20. Ibid., pp. 384–85.
21. Ibid., pp. 118–25.
22. Several historians have written about Ionescu's influence over the Iron Guard, though an in-depth study has yet to be published. See, e.g., Alexandrescu, *Paradoxul*, pp. 223–25, Zigu Ornea, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească* (Bucharest: Ed. Fundaţiei Culturale Române, 1995), esp. pp. 403–10.
23. Mircea Eliade, "Apologia Virilităţii," *Gândirea* 8, no. 8–9: 352–59.
24. See, e.g., Mihail Sebastian, *Jurnal, 1935–1944* (Bucharest: Ed. Humanitas, 1996), pp. 85–87, 234–36.

25. Mac Scott Ricketts, *Mircea Eliade. The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)
26. Matei Calinescu, "'How Can One Be What One Is?' Reading the Romanian and the French Cioran," *Salmagundi*, 112 (Fall 1996): 193.
27. Ibid., p. 199; quote from Emil Cioran, Romania's Transfiguration.
28. Ibid., p. 198.
29. Sebastian, *Jurnal*, p. 287.
30. Cuvântul was never identified directly as a newspaper of the legionary movement, but only as a publication sympathetic to it.
31. Part of the problem with making any sweeping assertions is the paucity of sources. There is a disproportionate amount of information available regarding the "young generation" intellectuals ideas about the Iron Guard, in contrast with a dearth of information about the far larger number of followers who did not identify with this "young generation" group. Armin Heinen is sensitive to this issue, so he abstains from focusing too much attention on this group. See Heinen, *Legiunea*, pp. 163–66.
32. See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania. The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), esp. chapter 10.
33. One of the central texts of this underground anticommunist elite culture was Gabriel Liiceanu, *The Păltiniş Diary: A Paideic Model in Humanist Culture* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000). The Romanian original lacks a subtitle. On the conflation between anti-communism and humanism and the incorporation of important elements of the interwar new generation's ideas by the younger generation of intellectuals of the late 1960s, see Verdery, *National Ideology*, esp. chapter 7.
34. See Vladimir Tismaneaunu, *Fantasies of Salvation, Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 106–07.
35. For relevant discussions on fascism in Romania before and during World War II, see Heinen, *Legiuinea*, pp. 21–25; Victor Eskenasy, "The Holocaust and Romanian Historiography: Communist and Neo-Communist Revisionism," in *The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry*, ed. Randolph L Braham (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 173–236; Randolph L. Braham, *Romanian Nationalists and the Holocaust: The Political Exploitation of Unfounded Rescue Accounts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), esp. chapter 2.
36. See Verdery *National Ideology* and especially Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, *Filozofie şi naţionalism. Paradoxul Noica* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998).
37. An impressive number of works by exiled members of the Iron Guard appeared during the communist period, some of them read in secret by sympathizers and ex-members inside Romania. See among others, Victor Puiu Gărcineanu, *Din lumea legionară, Colecţia* "Omul nou," 1 (Salzburg, 1952) [reprint from a 1937 edition]; Faust Bradesco, *La Garde de Fieer et le terrorisme* (Madrid: Editura "carpatii" 1979); Chirilă Ciuntu, *Din Bucovina pe Oder, Amitirile unui Legionar* (Rio de Janeiro si Madrid, Editura Dacia: 1967); Stefan Palaghiţă, *Garda de Fier, Spre reînvierea României* (Buenos Aires,: Stefan Palaghiţă 1951).
38. See Braham, *Romanian Nationalists*, esp. pp. 40–53 and Sharif, "The Mind," p. 215.
39. On Marian Munteanu's links with the new radical right, see Michael Shafir, "The Revival of the Political Right in Post-Communist Romania," in *Democracy and Right-Wing Politics in Eastern Europe in the 1990s*, ed. Joseph Held (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1993), pp. 166–71 and Shafir, "The Mind," pp. 220–23.
40. The post-communist period has witnessed a flood of publications by loyal supporters of the Iron Guard, from memoirs and journals from the 1930s and early years of communism, when many were imprisoned, to essays about "guardism" as a philosophy, to histories of the Iron Guard movement itself. See, e.g., Ovidiu Guleş, *Cum am cunoscut Legiunea Arhangelul Mihail* (Timişoara: Ed. Gordian, 1992); Grigore Traian Pop, *Garda, căpitanul şi arhangelul din cer. O istorie obiectivă a mişcării legionare* (Bucharest: Ed.

Eurasia, 1995); Nicu Cracea, *Dezvăluiri legionare* (Bucharest: Ed. Fundaţiei "Bunavestire," 1995); Stefan Palaghiţă, *Istoria Mişcării Legionare. Scrisă de un legionar* (Bucharest: Ed. Roza Vânturilor, 1993); Constantin Petculescu, *Mişcarea legionară. Mit şi realitate* (Bucharest: Ed. Noua Alternativă, 1997); Stefan Palaghiţă, *Garda de Fier şi reîntregirea României* (Bucharest, Ed. Roza Vânturilor, 1993); Nistor Chioreanu, *Morminte vii* (Iaşi: Institutul European, 1992)

41. Iris Urban, "Le Parti de la Grade Roumanie, doctrine et rapport au passé: le nationalisme dans la transition post-communiste," *Institut Roumain d'Histoire Récente. Cahiers d'etudes*, 1 (2001).
42. Ibid., p. XIV (Annex 2).
43. Michael Shafir, "Radical Politics in East-Central Europe. Part II: Taxing Taxonomies or 'Why Radical?' " *East European Perspectives*, 1, 2 (November 17, 1999), [http://www.rferl.org/eepreport/1999/11/02-171199.html]. See also Shafir, "The Mind."
44. Shafir, "The Mind."
45. Shafir, "Radical Politics in East-Central Europe. Part VIII. Radical Continuity in Romania: The Greater Romania Party," *East European Perspectives* 2, 16 (August 16, 2000) [http:///www.rferl.org/eepreport/2000/08/16-160800.html]; and 17 (September 13, 2000) [http:///www.rferl.org/eepreport/2000/09/17-130900.html].
46. Urban, "Le Parti," esp. pp. 41–67.
47. Ibid., pp. 22–28.
48. Ibid., pp. 48–50.
49. Tismaneanu, *Fantasies*, p. 97.
50. Urban, "Le parti," pp. 48–49.
51. Iris Urban gives a similar answer, but argued rather differently. She does not view the Greater Romania Party as neofascist, but rather "fascistic" in its methods, and sees a contradiction in terms between "fascism" and "postmodernism," based on her definition of postmodernism as "the rejection of an ideology, of any project of historical of political legitimization, and contrary even to totalitarianism, the last avatar of modernity in the eyes of Adorno." See Urban, "Le Parti," p. 69.
52. Shafir, "Radical Politics in East-Central Europe. Part I."

Chapter Nine

The Right-Wing Network and the Role of Extremist Youth Groupings in Unified Germany

Joachim Kersten

Introduction

What follows is a descriptive analysis of the scope of youth participation in German right-wing extremist activities today. I assess right-wing criminality carried out, for the most part, by groups of young men, and evaluate the youth groupings, associations, and political parties that constitute the wider organizational context for Germany's extreme right. Over the last decade countless waves of surveys conducted among German secondary school students indicate varying degree of identification with extremist issues, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. As is the case with right-wing voting preferences, such survey data tell us very little about the origin, the significance, and the dynamics of the phenomenon. While my thesis on the subject matter is not grounded in any field study in the strictest sense, I seek to link organizational structures to displays of extremist behavior and determine who participates in which activities at which times. Can we distinguish between different concerns among the diverse groups and organizations that form the right-wing network? What historical developments in the eastern and western states contributed to a post-unification right-wing lifestyle among a visible segment of the population? What is the criminolological nature of right-wing violence? Finally, what are the reactions of state and society and will they be able to come to grips with this phenomenon?

The Extent of the Problem

Since German unification, outbreaks of racist violence and open displays of xenophobia and anti-Semitism have been narrativized as the reemergence of Germany's ugly fascist and militaristic past. This has raised fears about the country's political stability. While a neutral stance allows for a less pessimistic assessment of unified Germany's political state of affairs (Turner 1999), the debate inside the country is indicative of anything but self-assurance. The 1992 pogroms of Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in East Germany, which were followed by fire bomb attacks on buildings housing German citizen of Turkish origin in the cities of Solingen and Moelln in West Germany, have confronted Germans and their neighbors in Europe and overseas with Germany's historical tradition of racist violence.

In the early 1990s hate crimes associated with displays of right-wing extremism met with varying responses. Police and the criminal justice system of the new *Länder* (federal states) have been accused of underestimating the danger and of treating perpetrators too leniently. Meanwhile Germans in the West organized candle light marches, and since 1993 the Federal Government has poured millions of *Deutschmark* and *Euros* into an Anti-Aggression Youth Program intended to curb violence and xenophobic actions. At the turn of the millenium most experts agree that neither the candle light processions of the "good Germans" nor the social work programs dealing with youth groups primarily in the former East but also in the old *Länder*, have been effective in eradicating extremist violence and preventing hate crimes. Some argue that social work projects have actually been instrumental in drawing together networks of extremists like "groups of comrades" (*Kameradschaften*) and other subcultural groups in the new *Länder*.

Researchers and critics alike are aware of the very limited territorial scope of "ethnically cleansed regions" (*National befreite Zonen*); indeed, the very existence of and verbalization of the concept is difficult to stomach for most citizens of unified Germany. Right-wing skinheads, neo-Nazis, and symbols of the fascist past are rarely conceived as an ugly but only partial reality of Germany's political life and culture as would be British or Belgian racists, or Polish, Czech, or other eastern European Nazi-skins. In unified Germany, however, symbols of the fascist past still function as a "marker" of a German Nazi master status: Germany's past remains the antithesis of civilized society and the idea of its potential reemergence feeds the fear and the disgust of civilized people in Germany and elsewhere.

While my research is not particularly focused upon developments and statistics associated with the extreme right, a few numbers may be useful for comparative purposes and to put the dimensions of the German right-wing extremism into some sort of perspective. The total right-wing extremist membership is estimated at 51,400 persons (Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2001), which constitutes about 0.06 percent of Germany's population. In comparison, 2–3 percent of Germany's Muslims are members of *Milli Görus*, an antidemocratic organization of Political Islam (Seidel et al. 2000, 33). Nearly 10,000 German right-wing extremists have violent orientations or propagate direct violence against targeted groups, and 85 percent of those prone to violence are skinheads, of whom 5,000 live in the former East. They are the force behind what has been termed the "hegemonic status of the extreme right" (*alltagskulturelle Dominanz der Rechten*), which refers to the localized but very visible dominant position of right-wing emblems, attitudes, and opinions in quotidian German culture. It is a criminological rule that police statistics should be handled with suspicion (Holzberger 2001, 28ff.), for in the absence of German victim survey data, little is known about the size of unreported racist crime and intimidation. In Germany, the police and the criminal justice system have traditionally been accused of turning a blind eye to the violence of right-wing extremists, while actively hunting down leftists. However, counting has become more accurate due to the public attention right-wing violence and propaganda have gained within the country.

In the year 2000, according to official data presented by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz 2001), there were about

Table 9.1 Germany's right-wing network (total membership: 50,900 in 144 organizations OPC 2001)



16, 000 right-wing criminal offences out of which nearly 1,000 or 6.3 percent were registered as violent crimes. Approximately 3,500 were of a xenophobic nature. Two-thirds of these offences were *Propagandastraftaten*, involving the display of prohibited Nazi emblems (swastika, SS signs, *Hitlergruss*, etc.), and 320 offences were reported threats/intimidation of a criminal nature. Estimates of the total number of hate crime homicide victims in the 12 years since unification differ between 38 (criminal justice system data) and 117 according to German media. In the year 2000 hands-on criminal violence included 2 homicides. One victim was a migrant from Mozambique, the other a homeless person; both offenders were apprehended and received life-long prison sentences, while their accomplices received terms of between 3 and 12 years. In the same year there were 15 attempted homicides, nearly 900 cases of assault, 56 cases of desecration of Jewish cemeteries, 41 cases of arson, and 7 cases of detonating explosives. Half of the criminal violence was committed in the former East. This means the Eastern regions are definitely overrepresented in hate crime activity, given that the new *Länder* constitute just over 20 percent of the German total population. Furthermore, the East German regions have a comparatively low

migrant population (between 1.2 and 2.5 percent). Cities like Hamburg or Stuttgart have 15–20 percent non-German born residents. The prevalence of right-wing phenomena including both violent dispositions and actual offences is dramatically higher in the region that used to be the German Democratic Republic (see table 9.1).

On every single occasion when members of Germany's "National Resistance Movement" (*Nationale Widerstandsbewegung*) have organized protest demonstrations, which seems to occur roughly 50 times per annum, it has been accompanied by nationwide nightly news coverage of young men with skinhead outlooks or Nazi habitus, DocMartens boots, and black pilot shirts. They march through the streets, their faces full of hate, screaming their favorite slogans, "*Wir sind der nationale Widerstand*" ("We are the national resistance") or "*Ausländer raus*!" ("Foreigners out!"), without meeting heavy resistance from the police or anti-Nazi protesters. Generally, the media seem to use skinheads and young neo-Nazis as a marker for the right-wing movement. Since the early 1990s national and international media coverage has focused upon a specific habitus, particularly boots and skinhead appearance, to signify the rise of Germany's right-wing problem. The consensus that has been built around this image locates the roots of extremism not in the societal mainstream but in an extremely identifiable subculture and herein allows for pedagogues and other "good Germans" to express a type of solidarity of disgust with little ultimate political bearing.

In reality, things are more complicated. Although right-wing skinhead groupings are a problem for society and the criminal justice system, they constitute neither the origin nor the organizational core of Germany's new xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism. The above graph is split into "groupings" and their "displays" to indicate the differences and the similarities between subcultural groupings, party organizations, and the less organized associations of groups of comrades (*Kameradschaften*) that are located somewhere in between. In order to thoroughly explain the related violence, a third dimension could have been added to include situational factors, for example, circumstances that are often instrumental for outbreaks of violence. The result would have been a pop-up "Haunted House of Right-Wing Activity Book" far beyond the artistic skills of this author. Some of the situational aspects will be dealt with later in the case studies of recent xenophobic violence.

In the graph, the groupings are vertically ordered according to their political significance for the overall scenario. To a less systematic extent, the same applies to the vertical order on the "display" side. In a nutshell, the list is compiled in order of increasingly serious impact of a given phenomenon. On the left side ("groupings"), right-wing affiliation can be observed among some Germany soccer fans inclined toward violence. On the whole, they are not very interested in politics, but violent groupings on the political right and soccer have frequently formed a nexus in German politics. In effect, high-end soccer games and soccer club loyalty are the smallest common denominator of groupings with a nationalistic orientation. One of the more infamous songs by the former Skinhead band "*Böhse Onkelz*" (misspelled "Mean Uncles") is titled "*Türken raus*!" ("Turks out!") and has been frequently chanted in German soccer arenas. The game of soccer is certainly not the cause of racism, nationalism, and masculinist hysteria, but it offers an ideal opportunity to publicly stage such sentiments, because the actors can remain anonymous in the

mass of screaming and shouting fans. In marked contrast to American or Australian football or rugby, soccer has an extremely territorial logic but lacks the scoring possibilities structured into other ball games. It is about penetration (of the enemy's goal) or nothing. Soccer, more than other ball games, resembles nationalistic warfare, and therefore, at least in the European context, serves as a metaphor for regionalism, nationalism, and racism.

While most skinheads are attracted to soccer, only some hooligans flock to right-wing rock concerts. The Federal Republic's C-hooligans ("C" being a criminal justice marker for soccer fans who are registered as having committed multiple assaults) number about 3,000, while other subcultural groupings that are expressly right-wing are estimated at 10,000, of which 85 percent are right-wing skinheads. While youth and subculture theorists have traditionally conceived of the skinhead cult as basically apolitical or outspokenly nonpolitical, this is a misleading assumption, at least within the new *Länder*. The majority of East Germany's *Glatzen* may not be politically organized but they are definitely *nationalgesinnt* (nationalistically minded) and willing to carry this sentiment to the streets and to protest demonstrations. West German skinhead affiliations can be more heterogeneous. To the left of the *Oi* faction skins who apparently just turn out for fun, beer and two-tone music, there is a minority component of SHARP skinheads (Skinheads Against Racist Prejudice) and even for Redskins who, in contrast to the rightist affection for Hitler and Hess, try to keep alive the memory of Joseph Stalin. The miniscule SHARP faction, Redskins, and Gayskins are by far no match for the post-unification proliferation of Naziskins or "boneheads," as they are referred to by outsiders.

Skinheads may be soccer fans but they are even more interested in right-wing rock concerts, and other festivities, most prominently "Rudolf Hess days," birthday parties for Hitler, or the recently resurrected Germanic custom of BBQs at summer solstice. *Nationalgesinnte* skinheads join right-wing demonstrations, mainly organized by the NPD party. Skinheads also join *Kameradschaften*, the loosely knit regional right-wing amalgamations of neo-Nazis, NPD/JN members (see below), *Nationalgesinnte* and otherwise dissatisfied young males. The latest Federal estimate counted 150 of these associations in the whole of Germany, with 5–20 members each. Neo-Nazi membership is estimated at 2,200 in 60 organizations. While many of them become members of the NPD/JN, they also join the right-wing fraternities of *Kameradschaften*, and like other extremists, they communicate via electronic channels, cell phones, and the Internet. Their main incentive is to gain visibility at protest marches, as when 5,000 of them paraded through Munich, the former capital of the Nazi movement (referred to as *Hauptstadt der Bewegung*) to demonstrate against the *Wehrmachtsausstellung*, an exhibition of documents about the war crimes of Hitler's army.

Kameradschaften regard themselves as the foundation of the National Resistance Movement. In principle, their organizational set up is quite similar to that of the Leninist revolutionary cells in Tsarist Russia and during the civil war. These right-wing cells in Germany have authored the call to ethnic cleansing (*National befreite Zonen*), although the latter term was first coined by the rightist intelligentsia, the *Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund*, the student organization of the NPD. The regional distribution and latitude of such "zones" is rare and miniscule, often

occupying a street corner or a children's playground. Yet this right-wing idea has received widespread attention, and media reporting and public disgust have helped to spread the term *National befreite Zonen* throughout the entire republic. The more the rhetoric of East German politicians and criminal justice representatives has denied the existence of such ethnical cleansing, the more professors, social workers, and other "Good Germans" feel obliged to publicly proclaim their sincere worries about this virtually non-existent problem. The term *National befreite Zone* has become the linguistic equivalent of the visual image of the violent right-wing skinhead. Both verbal and visual constructs bear little value for an actual analysis of present right-wing strategy and activities. Nonetheless, they rarely fail to serve as a device for evincing the mental hygiene of morally outraged Germans. While the "zones" are hard to find, a "right-wing lifestyle" is a much more visible aspect of contemporary Germany, particularly in the former GDR. Postwar developments in both regions of Germany have led to the emergence of right-wing sentiments and lifestyles.

Total right-wing party membership now amounts to 37,000, most belonging to Dr. Gerhard Frey's German People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion* DVU). Frey, who has family ties to the well-known Bavarian fashion outfitter Loden-Frey, is a wealthy Munich-based publisher of right-wing books and journals, including the oldest extremist and anti-Semitic weekly *National- und Soldatenzeitung*, a prominent mouthpiece of revisionism exhibiting the most acerbic nationalistic and xenophobic journalism in Germany. Despite its financial weight, DVU is basically a one-man enterprise. The main strength of DVU is its professional campaigning, which draws from populist and xenophobic sentiments. Although none of the three right-wing extremist parties scored much above the 1–2 percent margin at the federal election, these parties have scored occasional successes during *Länder* parliament elections, with the DVU particularly successful in Sachsen-Anhalt where they received 13 percent of the votes. Yet, even after their spectacular outcome, DVU lacked local party representatives that could be presented to the media and had to consult Dr. Frey in Munich personnel decisions and the selection of political issues.

While Frey and his DVU have been identified with an openly racist and anti-Semitic agenda, the *Republikaner* party is a more moderate vehicle of the right-wing movement, very analogous to Haider's Freedom Party in Austria. Not all members foster extremist views. Many *Republikaner* members and voters participate as a form of political protest, dissatisfied with the mainstream parties, migration politics, and unemployment. But besides these populist sentiments there are factions of the party that are more explicitly extremist. Accordingly, members of the *Republikaner* are not permitted to be employed as civil servants, for example, as members of the police force. Although the NPD has the smallest membership of all German parties on the extreme right, it is perceived as the most significant threat to German democracy. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the NPD basically served as an organization for aging Nazis. In the 1990s, the party succeeded in attracting a clientele younger and much more violent than the previous Brown Boys' network. The new party platform also addresses issues of ecology, anti-globalization, and anti-capitalism, as well as promulgating a less explicit racism through theories of cultural apartheid, and emphatically rejects the politics of European unification.

After serving a prison sentence of nearly twenty years, Horst Mahler, a lawyer and former Red Army Faction terrorist trained in Palestine, presented himself as the anchorman of right-wing intellectualism. Meanwhile, NPD chairman Udo Voigt, a former army officer, remains the spokesman for the proletarian NPD electorate and the party's skinhead and young neo-Nazi supporters. NPD has stressed the "street fighting" component of its long-term strategy, which is precisely what has attracted young people, skinheads, and neo-Nazis to this organization. During such "street campaigns," NPD supporters and youths have had extremely violent clashes with anti-fascist protesters and also with riot police. Ever since the German Ministry of Interior Affairs took legal and criminal justice action against the German division of "Blood & Honor," a racist and anti-Semitic skinhead music agency operating out of the United Kingdom and founded by Ian Stuart Donaldson, NPD/JN organizations have assumed responsibility for organizing right-wing rock music festivals. Music can obviously function as a highly effective vehicle for recruitment, for it conveys powerful sentiments and fosters *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*, a feeling of common belonging, much more compellingly than either verbal rhetoric or printed material ever could.

Hooligans and skinheads are action-oriented young males with a masculinist orientation toward risk-taking behaviors. They express rather few strategic goals and a very superficial ideology of ethnic or racial superiority. Visibility in the form of media representation is also a common aim of extremist parties, skinheads, and neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften*. What they have in common with youths with nationalistic leanings is a strong desire to stake out territory that is not dissimilar to the ideology of U.S. street gangs and minority neighborhood cliques in most postindustrial societies. However, only the Nazis, the extremists, and their parties share a mutual inclination towards organizational structures.

Mainstream Theories

There have been numerous attempts to explain (a) the reemergence of right-wing extremism after unification and (b) the more pronounced problem with East German skinheads and hate crimes. Theories have fluctuated between traditional macro and micro approaches. Most prominent in the macro department is, "disintegration" theory, which views globalization and the forces of modernity in a critical Neo-Marxist light. The term "Bielefeld School" for this theoretical direction is in no way linked to historians around H.U. Wehler at Bielefeld University, but rather to sociologists and social pedagogues of the same tertiary institution. In the early 1990s, a 900-page scholarly tome offered a vulgarized Marxist vein of theory that determined unemployment to be a causal factor, and to the astonishment of sociologists and criminologists, neglected any consideration of gender as a critical factor. While this first Bielefeld study of right-wing extremism (*Bielefelder Rechtsextremismus Studie*) has been proven inaccurate from a number of angles, a series of empirical studies have brought forth the so-called disintegration theory, which remains the most popular explanatory model for youth violence generally, and for right-wing youth violence, specifically. Although mainstream theorizing has also turned to more complex causal models, disintegration theory remains the dominant paradigm, probably because the Bielefeld research, while based on rather anecdotal material, is

practically the only published study on the subject based in the time period just prior to and immediately following unification.

In the micro department a vulgarized version of Horkheimer and Adorno's conceptual framework of the "authoritarian personality" has been utilized to explain the East German origins of the problem. The authoritarian structure of East German society, early childhood separation of children from their mothers, and "potty training" served as explanatory vehicles of a very limited range. "Potty theory" derives from the allegation that GDR children were forced into collective toilet training sessions in child care and traces back to Columbia University's cultural anthropology research in the 1940s, where it was utilized to explain Japanese violence during the Pacific War and in U.S. prisoner-of-war camps. Ruth Benedict took an immediate dislike to the mixture of cultural theory and crude psychoanalysis promoted by her student Margaret Mead and British researcher Geoffrey Gorer. Empirical studies after the war failed to prove that Japanese babies were exposed to premature toilet training, but Margaret Mead's theory has nevertheless been used to explain collective brutality within an "us" vs. "them" dichotomy (Geertz 1989).

Micro/macro approaches exemplified in the "disintegration" and "authoritarian personality" paradigm suffer from various flaws; they are inapplicable to practical circumstances, they fail to differentiate, and are gender blind. Authoritarian attitudes, violent, xenophobic, right-wing extremist orientations, and support for violence must be distinguished from actual acts of hands-on violence, arson, or pogrom-like riots, particularly in their consequences for victims. Both theories fail to account for situational factors, context, and very obvious gender differences in Germany's post-unification hate crimes against people of different skin color and ethnic background, as well as against homosexuals, the homeless, or otherwise marginalized people.

Aspects for Consideration when Assessing Violence Amid East German Youth

Anti-Semitism and xenophobia are both orientations prevalent among dissatisfied citizens. Nationalism and German patriotism have always been linked to chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism. German national pride ("*Ich bin stolz Deutscher zu sein*!") reappeared after 1989 and spread from the subcultural right-wing margins into the mainstream. An increased revisionism, rhetoric of denial, and historical falsification ("denial boom") has spread from rightist intellectuals into the rightist main stream. There are decisive differences in the anti-Semitic sentiments expressed within the East and the West. The GDR fostered an ideology of antifascism that eradicated (or suppressed) dissenting prejudices and worldviews. GDR society was founded on the ideologies of antifascism, resistance to the Nazis, and the idea of a fresh start grounded in the ideals of socialism. Jews and the Holocaust occupied a marginal role within GDR historiography of the Nazi past, and never became elements invoked in the disinterment of the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) that gained momentum in West Germany beginning in the late 1960s (see table 9.2).

Bergmann (1997) terms the GDR habitus toward the Holocaust as "freedom from guilt." This is a helpful metaphor for explaining the outbreak of anti-Semitism

Table 9.2 Right wing lifestyle and anti-Semitism

Year	*FRG (West)*	*GDR (East)*	*Political climate*
1950–1969	*Anti-communism/re-nazification* (reintegration of Nazis into elites), followed by antitotalitarianism (1968 rebellion)	*State-socialist Stalinist dictatorship* official antifascist ideology defined by "freedom from guilt"; at the same time victim status (lost the war; reparations,	Authoritarianism
	Victim status (divided, threatened by USSR & GDR communism)	no freedom, violent repression of 1953 rebellion and opposition movements)	Divided nation
	Democratic welfare state 1970s-1980s widespread anti-Nazi education;	Split psychosocial economy in the 1980s growing skepticism and hooliganism among GDR	Private public sphere in the East
1970–1989	marginal right-wing groupings/Skins and secondary anti-Semitism; the successful and "good" German as identity but continuation of victim status (still divided); ambivalence about status as migration society	youths; formation of subcultural soccer, punk and skinhead groupings; increased victimization through wall, border, Stasi secret police; prevalence of "public private sphere" (Kupferberg); climate of institutionalized parochialism	"Good Germans" in the West
Post-1990	End of victim-status, no longer divided from brothers/sisters; remergence of right-wing youth and organizations; Reemergence of the burden of the past: *Historikerstreit; Goldhagen, Wehrmachtsausstellung, Nationalstolz Debatte*	Continued victimization because of 2nd-class citizen status, colonialism of the West; loss of "GDR" culture and social networks; visibility of Nationalgesinnte youth groupings and right-wing lifestyle; nationalism/ parochialism	Crises of post-war identity; "new" national identity; ambivalence about migration/multi-culturalism

and xenophobic hate crimes after unification and the arbitrariness of the subject of hate. In West Germany, postwar de-Nazification was followed in the late 1960s by wholesale re-Nazification of the judiciary, the police and health professionals, and, most prominently, academia. It was only with the student rebellion of the late 1960s and the resulting change in public sentiment that Auschwitz became a central topic within education, politics, and evolving West German identity.

Right-wing ideology transfer from the West to the East increasing assumed the form of a perceived legitimization of violence and intolerance in East Germany, a transfer further fueled by the German asylum debate (*Asyldebatte*) covered in such popular media as *Oer Spiegel* in the early and mid 1990s. There was an obvious hate crime activist transfer during "Rudolf Hess" days, birthday parties for Hitler, and demonstrations against the *Wehrmachtsausstellung* (an exhibit about the war crimes of the German Army and their participation in the Holocaust).

During early unification both formal and informal mechanisms of social control as well as certain ideological discourses once enforced within the GDR (such as the

perception that anti-Semitism was a secondary symptom of fascism) underwent a degree of erosion. Anomie resulting from the lack of social control coincided with a gender-specific crises of hegemony within the political elite, the police, and the army and a high level of perceived threat in the form of unemployment, competition with West Germans, and the encounter with migrants. A form of secondary anti-Semitism began to spread, one that substituted "others" as the objects of hate and dehumanization in the absence of a significant Jewish population. *Ausländer* (foreigners) became the functional equivalent of what traditionally used to be the Jew.

Subcultural and Lifestyle Factors Reconsidered: The Hate of Skinheads (*Glatzenhass*)

It has been pointed out by Watts and others that skinheads can be best understood as a mediated subculture of "anti-authoritarian authoritarianism." At the same time they also serve as an emphatic symbol of rebellion. Nazi skinheads are the antithesis of what stood as a positive postwar (and post-unification) German identity. By way of example of the "semi-isolation of other specialized symbolic environments," extreme subcultures gain visibility in musical culture and everyday lifestyle. However, the skinhead lifestyle romanticizes and promotes violence. Watts has termed this the "romantic rebel image" to refer to a general identification among youths with a certain victim status that legitimizes aggression and the dehumanization of others. Typical skinhead symbolism invokes crucifixion or refers to a flock of sheep. The style as such is perceived as basically apolitical and indicative of rebellion and self-assertion (Watts 1997, 162), which goes some way in explaining the leniency of the justice system in the immediate post-unification era. However, the consequences of skinhead xenophobia and hate crimes for the German nation at large can hardly be termed apolitical.

Skinhead popularity and their posture of resentment are both mediated effects, in which identification with a right-wing lifestyle is based on imitation rather than on any sort of rational discourse. Many skinheads identify with an "Aryan" masculinist working-class culture of an earlier era. It has been observed that stylistic epiphenomena tend not to result directly from structural factors. Although the disappearance of a material basis for a white working men's culture is indeed a structural factor, structural factors such as unemployment do not determine whether right-wing lifestyle elements become acceptable or even attractive. Identification with an aggressive skinhead style and masculinist habitus (posturing, symbolic violence, actual fights) are associated with an acceptance of violent means. This, in turn, makes such youths and their *Kameradschaften* a "natural ally" of ideological groups on the extreme right (Watts 1997, 154). The fact remains that skinheads are not an organizational phenomenon.

The politically right-wing lifestyle in Germany today seems beset by resentment, a diffuse sense of threat, and hostility. For rather obvious historical reasons, these sentiments are more prevalent in the former East. However, with unemployment at an all time peak and an aporetic migration problem, similar feelings are palpable in the West. But in contrast to 1933, there is no coherent ideology in either portions of Germany. Parties on the extreme right serve as symbolic reference groups, but not as a primary form of extremist association. The primary forms at present are neo-Nazi

and skinhead *Kameradschaften*, both of which have a high potential for mobilization through the Internet, mobile phones, and so on. The most likely offenders are male youths under age 21 with a very limited association with right-wing scene or parties, in contrast to the adult unemployed SA storm troopers of the 1930s. Manifest violent behavior is greatly dependent on situational circumstances, and is currently spreading and radicalized within a subpopulation. In other words, political racism in unified Germany is put into action by rebellious elements of a marginal part of the youth culture. In this climate, the parties have gained symbolic impact and changed their agenda and content from that of the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The politico-cultural environment has to be understood as the demand side of the opportunity structure, with aggressive youth styles representing the supply side of the outbreak of fascist-like xenophobic violence.

Situational Factors

A 2001 qualitative study carried out by one of my students (Mackert 2001) looked at reported cases of right-wing (xenophobic/anti-Semitic) hate crimes in Karlsruhe, a city in the southwest of Germany, using prosecutor's files. He studied 15 cases, among which 8 constituted offences of aggravated assault, and 9 could be classified as xenophobic acts. However, in a significant number of cases, situational factors triggered the outbreak of hands-on violence. Four of the cases are classifiable as mundane conflicts. Initially, the altercation did not start as a xenophobic act but, as in most public conflicts between young males, involved honor and territory. However, since the victim was an *Ausländer*, the offence fell under the category *fremdenfeindliche Sraftaten* (xenophobic offences).

Two-thirds of all cases involved more than one offender. Again, as in many cases of violence taking place between young males, group dynamics are an essential factor. Only four cases involved a single offender. In summary, spontaneous and group-related factors have to be taken into account, together with the fact that many such incidents take place in public and, as such, represent displays with a territorial and masculinist aspect. The altercations took place in the evening or at night. In most cases, alcohol functioned as the principal stimulator; alcohol was absent in less than one-third of the cases. In most crime incidents, violence occurs between people who know each other; yet only one case here involved a previous victim-offender relationship. Nearly all altercations originated as verbal conflicts, with the initial trigger stemming from *en passant* provocations. The escalation into hands-on violence feeds on situational circumstances and group dynamics. Among 22 offenders, 18 had a previous record with the police. Skinheads as offenders are not only the most aggressive actors, they are also most likely to be multiple offenders. Furthermore, in cases where skinheads are involved as perpetrators, lack of empathy with the victims and lack of regret for their wrongdoing are regularly observed.

State Response and Outlook

In this essay, I have illustrated that visible subcultural expressions of post-unification right-wing extremism in the form of a right-wing lifestyle or rightist organizations

must be understood as separate phenomena from xenophobic hate crimes or crimes against minority members. The public, media, and state response after 1990 have not sufficiently differentiated between these phenomena. Some criminal justice practitioners have regarded youth violence, even when directed against minority members or asylum seekers, as a somewhat routine feature of juvenile crime and therefore have not changed their rather lenient sentencing practice. Others, particularly former radical leftist academics, have regarded Nazi skinhead behaviors and hate crimes committed by young rightists as an intolerable attack on their postwar German identity and have insisted on harsh and punitive reactions by the criminal justice system.

During the last decade, the German state has begun to react much less leniently. As a result, juvenile prisons in the former GDR are crowded and have turned into right-wing cadre institutions, whereas the same institutions in the old *Länder* continue to handle primarily asylum-seeking youths. It is difficult to determine whether harsher sentencing has resulted in a reduction in hate crimes. Given the relatively small numbers of hands-on crimes, any causal effects are difficult to prove. Effects that have been clearly demonstrated include copycat effects after spectacular acts, particularly arson and rioting, which seem at least indirectly traceable to narratives in the media. Moral outrage among educators and the dissemination of information pamphlets regarding the crimes of the Nazis and the suffering of Holocaust victims seem ineffectual in curbing xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts among group offenders and skinheads. One must bear in mind that right-wing extremist subcultures and their lifestyle are marginal aspects of Germany's contemporary political culture. Skinhead lifestyle is confrontational and risk seeking. Nazi emblems remain the ultimate provocation and violent group action is regarded as utmost proof of a masculinist rebellion.

The nation's sensitivity about the historical past and German guilt have rendered the provocative potential of racist and anti-Semitic symbolism very high, and therefore, very attractive for subcultural expression. More often than not, xenophobia and, to some extent, hate crimes committed by groups of young males are triggered by situational factors. A self-proclaimed victim status, a masculinist orientation, high alcohol consumption, combined with territorial, situational, or "honor" disputes are proven causal ingredients in violent altercations with foreigners or minorities. This has been demonstrated above and repeatedly documented in similar research carried out with much larger samples (e.g., Cornel 1998). Ultimately, the criminal justice system and police have proven unsuitable vehicles for preventing such situations from escalating, nor has investiture of millions of Marks into antiaggression youth programs met with much success.

Paying police informants to join right-wing parties and groupings has been one traditional intervention employed routinely by the state. However, it is causing tremendous problems in the state's efforts to outlaw the NPD party. Quotes from officials employed by the state agencies (*Länder* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution) have been used in the court files, which has led to major flaws in constitutional court proceedings. In a few *Länder*, undercover police officers have infiltrated right-wing groupings and Nazi skinhead subcultures. While this may have helped prevent a few crimes, surveillance is difficult to establish within subcultural

groupings of young males. Therefore such criminal justice measures are directed primarily against the organized portion of the right-wing network. More recently, exit programs in Scandinavian countries have been successful in assisting some young Nazis to leave their groupings and are now being tried on an experimental basis in Germany. In some instances, these progams have even helped particularly high-ranking members to leave their groupings. It remains to be seen what effect this will have on the overall occurrence of hate crimes and xenophobic rioting in Germany.

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Chapter Ten
Football, Hooligans, and War in Ex-Yugoslavia

Ivan Ćolović

The story of the collapse of Yugoslavia, in a frenzy of hatred and war, in honor of the gods of ethnic nationalism and premodern militarism, may also be described as the story of the evolution of violence in Yugoslav sport, especially among football hooligans, and of the gradual transference of that violence, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, into the domain of interethnic conflicts and "greater-nation" politics, and thence onto the battlefield. It is a story of the ostensible opposition of sports reporters to overt nationalism among supporters, of the consecration of the Red Star football club in the role of one of the most important symbols of "serfdom," of the "spontaneous" organization of the supporters of that club into a group under the name of the Warriors and, subsequently, of their transformation into volunteer soldiers and their being sent to war. It is an, as yet, unfinished story, but one of its possible ends may be glimpsed: the victory of the hooligan tribes and the founding of a new, vandal-warrior tribalism.

At the Gates of Hell

Judging by articles published in the sports press from the mid-1980s on, the violent behavior of supporters in Yugoslavia (football fans, above all) was increasingly manifested in the form of insults, incidents, and conflict on a so-called national basis. Through the expression of adherence to their club, or independently of any such adherence, supporters increasingly demonstrated a sense of national allegiance, just as the greatest aggression was shown toward teams and supporters from different national centers. In the years that preceded the outbreak of armed conflict in Croatia, supporters at sports stadiums, and most of all at football grounds, began carrying placards bearing political messages, portraits of national leaders and saints, national coats of arms and flags; they also began chanting Chetnik songs and using the Ustasha initials and greeting.

Such an increasingly obtrusive and increasingly radical transformation of the supporters' enthusiasm into nationalistic hatred and aggression was met with the unanimous condemnation of the sporting press of former Yugoslavia. Between 1989 and 1991 the Belgrade press printed a large number of commentaries full of dramatic warnings of the danger presented by the spread of chauvinistic passions in sports

stadiums, and appeals that something be done to put a stop to such a development.[1] The titles of some of these articles convey the tone in which they were written—for example, the titles of commentaries published during 1990 and the first half of 1991 in the organs of the Red Star (Crvena zvezda) and Partizan clubs include "Politics as pollutant," "Nationalistic war games," "Spectators outplay politics," "The championship and war games," "No politics in the stadium!" (*ZR*); and "At the gates of hell," "Distorted support," "Demons of evil," "Love instead of hate," "The abuse of sport," "Falangists among sportsmen," "Supporters turn wild," "National warriors," and "Threat to the principles of decency and strength of spirit" (*PV*).

In these texts, the sports journalists' tone ranges from moral indignation to didacticism and ideological judgment. "Nationalism," writes one of them, "is the greatest ill that could befall a multinational community" (*PV*, March 3, 1990). Another considers that the word "chauvinism" is more appropriate, describing it as "an expression of impotence, behavior which has nothing to do with education and intellect. But it is precisely with that vice that young men arm themselves when they go to the stadium with the desire to break, burn and beat." They are "destroyers of everything progressive" (*ZR*, June 1990). A colleague laments that "we are living at a time of the unbelievable raging of almost all the irrational delusions of the past, in which—in our Yugoslav space—the "vampirization" of national chauvinism has become so rife that we are threatened not only with general civilizational disintegration, but a return to a time when the guillotine, the knife, and harassment were in everyday use" (*PV*, February 3, 1990).

In these articles, both sportsmen and sports officials were accused of nationalism, because "in all of this the people who occupy positions of responsibility in sports organizations are by no means innocent" (*ZR*, September 1990). What is more, some sports commentators did not refrain from criticizing political leaders, that is, "the nebulous politics of Nazi chauvinists and the ruling political bureaucracy." For this dangerous "cry of the blood of the nation . . . is launched by no small number of the current holders of power in our country" (*PV*, February 3, 1990). What was at stake was the "bestial abuse of sport on the part of people who are powerless to respond to the challenges of the contemporary world, exchanging creativity for the callous struggle for bare power, based on intrigue and international manipulation" (*PV*, February 17, 1990).

As a rule, in these texts the main cause for sounding the alarm about "the demons of evil" and the "bestial abuse of hatred" was the behavior of supporters outside Serbia. Thus in one article, examples of the "aggressive and fascistic behaviour of the spectators" occurred exclusively in Trogir, Mostar, Dubrovnik, Split, Zagreb, and Ljubljana (*PV*, February 17, 1990). "Pro-fascist cries" were loudest in the stadiums of Maksimir in Zagreb and Poljud in Split, and there was even a reference to "the twilight of Maksimir nationalistic rampaging" (*ZR*, June 1990).

Belgrade sports commentators generally found examples of the worst "rampaging" among supporters of Dinamo (Zagreb) and Hajduk (Split). According to one journalist, at the Dinamo-Partizan match in Zagreb on March 25, 1990, the supporters of Dinamo were overcome by a real "bestial madness." "Like beasts, they smelled blood in the air, they wanted blood to be spilled so that their basest instincts could be satisfies" (*PV*, June 9, 1990). The picture painted of Hajduk supporters is no better, since "in them the instinct of the wild beast has superseded human reason" (*PV*, June 6, 1990).

Among the sportsmen cited as bad examples of abandonment to nationalistic passion there is not a single one from a Belgrade club in the corpus we are analyzing here. The worst offenders are the Cibona basketball player Arapović (*PV*, March 31, 1990) and the Dinamo footballers Boban, Šalja, and Škerjanc (*PV*, May 26, 1990).

In the unanimous opinion of Belgrade sports commentators, the cause of the distortion of support for sport into nationalistic outbursts and conflicts occurred first, and in its most extreme form, in "the northern republics," above all Croatia: "For the sake of their egotistical aims, obsessed with nationalistic hysteria and unbridled hatred of everything Yugoslav, the holders of power in Croatia and Slovenia have finally reached out to sport, too." In the same place, the commentator attacks "the organic national arousal and nationalistic blustering of the leadership of the ruling parties—DEMOS in Slovenia and HDZ in Croatia" (*PV*, August 24, 1990). At the end of a commentary devoted to "nationalistic raging" after the Dinamo-Red Star match of May 13, 1990, the author also mentions "an element among the Star supporters, who did not lag behind their Zagreb peers in their chauvinist delusions and actions." However, these were not real Red Star supporters (as suggested by the title of the article "They are not all Warriors"), but are described as, "groups of varying size which demonstrate that they do not come to football grounds in order to watch a competition, but in order to compete themselves—in hooliganism" (*ZR*, June 1990).

When the nationalism of Belgrade supporters was not an imitation of others' nationalistic "raging," then it was the work of provocateurs from the ranks of some Serbian nationalistic opposition parties. As the author of "They are not all Warriors" writes, "In Serbia too there are parties which threaten with daggers, which seek to erect monuments to war criminals on Ravna Gora,[2] which respond to nationalism with nationalism." These parties endeavour to shift into sports arenas "political marketing, particularly of an ill-fated and bloody spirit that once raged through Serbia. In the Second World War the Chetniks were the national disgrace of the freedom loving Serbian nation. . . . Red Star has taken on a difficult task. It has publicly distanced itself altogether from such mad political ideas and political marketing" (*ZR*, September 1990).

Among the politicians whom the commentators of *Partizanov vesnik* and *Zvezdina revija* accuse of chauvinism in 1990 and 1991, in addition to Tudjman, Rupel, and Rugova, one Serbian politician is also mentioned: Vuk Drašković. There is not the slightest allusion to the role of the ruling SPS party or its leader (Slobodan Milošević); there is no attempt to connect the atmosphere in sports stadiums with the similar atmosphere at political rallies in Serbia and Montenegro between 1988 and 1989; nor is there any mention of the striking similarity between the slogans, songs, and placards that were appearing both in the stadiums and at political rallies, the main focus of which—in both cases—was Slobodan Milošević, to whom supporters in the stadiums and participants at rallies would frequently chant: "Serbian Slobo, Serbia is with you."[3]

Serb-haters and Football-haters

When armed conflict began in Slovenia and Croatia, the sports journalists took over from their colleagues, the political commentators, the main topoi of war-propaganda

discourse. The reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia, the outbreak of war, and the consequences of such a situation in the realm of sport, can be explained with the help of "arguments" offered by the state media. One article devoted to the cancellation of the start of the football league championship in Yugoslavia in 1991 began: "The national football championship did not begin as expected on the first Saturday of August. In Croatia with the Ustasha-like policies of Tudjman's HDZ party, vicious war games are being played, in which the Serbian population is suffering. Suffering precisely because it is Serbian." The article also mentions "Croatian fighters in Slavonia and Krajina" who "keep attacking the Serbian inhabitants . . . who are defending their homes" (*ZR*, August 1991).

Similarly, the decision of UEFA (the European football association), made in August 1991, to ban matches in European competitions from being held in stadiums in Yugoslavia, was interpreted as part of "the general hypocrisy towards Yugoslavia, and, it seems, particularly towards Serbia" (*ZR*, September 1991). It was explained by one commentator in *Sport* as "the whim of a Serb-hater and football-hater." He attributed the main role in dismantling Yugoslav football to the "German lobby." "UEFA, obviously German-led, is doing all it can to destroy Yugoslav football" wrote this author, adding that this was increasingly reminiscent of a return to the "the rallies of 1933, 1939, and 1941." The fundamental idea behind his commentary is suggested by its title: "A slap in the face of the Germans" (*S*, 14 December 1991). In another place, the role of the "fiercest and most frenzied destroyers" was attributed to Austria (*ZR*, January 1992). This "anti-Serb lobby" also included Hungary, which, in article about the Red Star-Anderlecht match, played in October 1991 in Szeged instead of Belgrade, was referred to as "a country which is, in any case, ill-disposed to the Serbian nation in Croatia" (*ZR*, November 1991).

The exclusion of Yugoslav teams and clubs from international competitions was also interpreted with reference to the international isolation of the Serbian regime as described by the state media. According to their interpretation, Milošević's Yugoslavia was exposed to international isolation and was under economic embargo and other United Nations sanctions because the main voice in the international community was that of enemies of the Orthodox Serbian nation, and above all the influential German and Vatican lobby. The enemies of the Serbian nation, it was argued, hated Serbia because Serbia was in every way better and more righteous than they were, and so, in accordance with this logic, they imposed sanctions in sport in order to disable a nation that was far in advance of all others in this field. The author of the article "Europe's petty spite" put it succinctly: "they want to spite us because we are the best" (*SŽ*, December 21, 1991).

Such an explanation for the introduction of sporting sanctions against Yugoslavia was put forward by Milan Tomić, the general director of Red Star, in a statement to *Zvezdina revija* (September 1992): "We represented a particular kind of danger for world sport. . . . We would have found ourselves in the center of events at the Olympics, and that means that we would have been on the victors' podium in every team sport. The world could not bear that. Especially those who have pretensions to power. For example, in team sports Germany means nothing. And nor does Great Britain. And if individual sports represent the civilizational premise of a nation, team sports are its spirit—a spirit which those nations lack. . . . For all of these reasons,

I am convinced that many of the pretentious sporting nations could not tolerate our increasingly obvious domination in sports . . . and that it is nothing other than the desire to deliver a blow to Serbian sport where it has attained the highest international achievements. That is an appalling strategy."

This ostensible endeavor on the part of Western sport to eliminate Serbian competitors was, it was claimed, only the latest episode in a war that had lasted for two millennia. "Besides," Tomić continued, "as early as the time of Cornelius Sula in the first century AD, the West had already reduced the Olympic spirit to its lowest, circus level, to the level of gladiators and blood. The nobility of Athenian athletes and Olympic victors was lost for a long time thanks to the Latin need for games in blood."

The coming of footballers as refugees from Croatia into Belgrade clubs was also an opportunity for sports newspapers to reach for imagery from war propaganda. Thus one former player from Osijek was quoted as saying "I could not remain in a city where people were killed just because they were Serbs and Orthodox." According to the journalist conducting the interview, "all the evil suffered by the Serbian nation in Slavonia could be seen in his eyes." Another of the footballer's statements was chosen as the title of the article: "I always crossed myself with three fingers" (*SŽ*, December 5, 1991).[4]

Their adherence to "Serbdom" and to the Orthodox Church was also cited as the reason why Serb trainers suffered innocently in various Catholic countries. At the end of 1991, the football club Espagnol in Barcelona broke off its contract with the trainer Ljupko Petrović, and at the same time the basketball trainer Božidar Maljković also found himself out of work. "Both of them," explained the author of one article, "paid the price for their adherence to Orthodoxy. The Catalonians could forgive them all their successes and failures but not their origin. Is that the reason why, even today, yet another Serb, Radomir Antić, is working in Real with a knife at his throat" (*SŽ*, December 31, 1991).

Serbian Star

When faced with the international isolation of war, involvement in sport—playing and supporting football, particularly abroad—acquires an exceptional patriotic value. In the opinion of sports journalists, Red Star and its fans were participating in the defence of "Serbdom" and Serbia whenever they went to matches played by the Serb cup-winners outside Belgrade, in Szeged or Sofia. In one report of a match between Red Star and Panatinaikos, played in Sofia in Mach 1992, the fans were praised for their exemplary patriotism, comparable to that shown by the Serbian army in the most glorious moments of Serbian history. "The Army of the Warriors," stated the report, "was as numerous as the Serbian army led by the Mrnjavčević brothers into battle at Marica.[5] . . . A team persecuted and damned by UEFA did something which no one else has ever succeeded in doing . . . In the international 1991–92 football season, the miracle called FC Red Star can be compared only with the Serbian army in the First World War. That Army, also despised and humiliated by its allies, and driven out of the homeland by a more powerful opponent, survived and was victorious on a front that was 'always out of town.' . . . There is no hope for us, we must

win." The sentence spoken by Nikola Pašić[6] in 1915 appears to have become the war of life of FC Red Star.

To follow Red Star on this thorny road represented the supreme act of patriotism: "Star's supporters display unparalleled patriotism. They clutch that one bright national and internationally acknowledged phenomenon, FC Red Star, as a drowning man does a straw, regretting neither time nor expense, neither effort nor unjustified absences from school nor the reprimands of their bosses or threats by the directors of their firms." To be with Red Star in those difficult times was the real education for the young, far more important than that imposed on them by their teachers. The author of the article quotes several examples in support of this opinion, including the following: "One father from Belgrade took his eleven-year-old son to the Star-Panatinaikos match in Sofia. The child missed two days of school, after which the father went to see his son's teacher and said: 'Madam, I took my son to the Red Star match in Bulgaria in order go give him some practical lessons in patriotism, and it is up to your conscience to decide whatever to consider those lessons administratively justified or not' " (*Te*, March 25, 1992).

In the sports press, in the course of 1991 and 1992, particularly in *Zvezdina revija*, the idea became firmly established that the greatest value of this club was its Serbian identity, and that supporting Red Star meant, in fact, supporting "Serbdom" and Serbia. Thus one article in *Zvezdina revija* in August 1991 claimed that Red Star was "a European club in its results, but in its origin and through the allegiance of its fans, supremely Serbian." Particular emphasis was given to the fact that "for Serbs from Croatia, Red Star is practically a part of their national identity! They did not dare to say out loud that they were by nationality until recently, but they could say who they supported—always!" "Red Star is more than a football club, it is a symbol of the Serbian being" is a quotation from one of the last issues of *Naša riječ* (Our Word), the newspaper of the Serbian nation in Croatia. "In Cetina, near Knin, every single child and young man knows the Red Star anthem, but few of them know the Orthodox Lord's Prayer," was recently reported in *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Free Dalmatia). In the reception center for refugees from Tenj, Borovo, Mirkovci, Bršadin, and Vukovar, "some fifty youngsters, boys and girls, housed in Kula, asked for footballs as they chanted 'Zvezda, Zvezda!' directly into the television cameras."

In addition to the journalists, the club's officials also participated in the definitive shaping of the Serbian character of Red Star, its consecration in the role of one of the most important symbols of "Serbdom," that is, the Serbian national identity. Thus Vladimir Cvetković, the general manager of FC Red Star (later also a minister in the Serbian Government), in an interview published in August 1992, was at pains to deny any connection whatsoever between his club and Communism and the previous Communist regime in Serbia. "First of all," said Cvetković, "the Star is not a symbol of Communism, we have no hammer and sickle in our coat of arms. . . . If we were to roll the film back a little, it would be clear that we were never a club that was closely connected with the government" (*Te*, August 12, 1992).

Had Cvetković really been inclined to "roll the film back" he would have found in the monograph *Crvena Zvezda*, published in 1986 at the time when he was secretary of the club, information about the 15 political and military leaders who were presidents of the club between 1948 and 1992. He would also have been reminded

that the introduction to this official publication was written by Dragoslav Draža Marković, one of the most influential people in the Serbian government of the time, and he could have read in that introduction that the name of Red Star "was associated with the five-pointed star under which we spilled our blood in the course of the revolution."

Politically inclined writers also appeared to bear witness to the Serbian identity of Red Star. The literary critic Petar Džadžić recalled in 1989 that: "In the seventies, my friends and I identified only four such representative institutions of recent times in the current social life of the Serbs: the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the daily newspaper Politika, the publisher 'Prosveta,' and Red Star" (*P*, January 30, 1989). In an interview in *Sport*, the writer Brana Crnčević gave apparently contradictory information about himself, that is that he was "a Partizan fan, who supported Red Star." In fact, there was no contradiction, because for Crnčević, too, Red Star was a symbol of Serbian identity. The poet Matija Bećković once explained that he had begun to support Star because "national allegiance was expressed through support" for that club (*ZR*, March 1992).

Hooligans or Patriots?

Before the crisis in Yugoslavia, the collapse of the federal state and the outbreak of armed conflict in some parts of the country, the most fanatic Yugoslav supporters, especially of football, belonged to the great international family of hooligan fans. For them, as for groups of other European fans who were beginning to attract public attention through their violent behaviour, their models were English and Italian fans. Following their example, Serb fans also chose provocative names, gathered around belligerent leaders, attended matches equipped with the requisite props for supporting their club and, more importantly, for fighting. They threw firecrackers onto the pitch, lit flares, made enormous flags, and, above all, aimed to settle scores with the supporters of opposing teams and to cause havoc in the towns where they went to encourage their club.

What is striking is the attitude of these hooligan fans and their hostility to society and its official representatives—an attitude that usually extended to the club's officials. Defying the established order and overturning the hierarchy of official social values, the fans developed a kind of subculture. They practised, or at least praised, alcoholism, barbarity, vandalism, madness, sex, and a pornographic vocabulary.

Above all, it seems that the real target of the hooligan fans' provocations was the ruling authority in their immediate social environment. When they were aggressive toward visiting supporters, they provoked the local community leaders and organs of public order above all, and when they behaved destructively at away matches, they were competing with the local hooligans rather then currying favor with the chauvinists back home.

A substantial proportion of the supporters' "folklore" consisted of songs of a "hooligan" character, that is, songs in which, in order be provocative, the fans consciously took on the role of antisocial types, social drop-outs, alcoholics,

madmen. This hooligan defiance on the part of the "Gypsies" (Red Star fans) and "Gravediggers" (Partizan fans) is expressed in the following lines:

As long as the Earth revolves round the Sun
Star's hooligans will never die.
Thousands of Gravedigger hooligans
will give their lives for Partizan.

Following the example first of English, then of Italian fans, they usually gave themselves names that emphasized that role: Vandals, Maniacs, Bad Boys, Evil Hordes. One group of Red Star supporters called themselves BAH (Belgrade's Alcohol Hooligans). Their anthem was:

Alcohol, alcohol, that's the real thing,
If you don't like alcohol, you're not all there.

Hajduk (Split) favored this verse:

The dawn breaks, the day grows light,
the whole north is blind drunk,
everyone drunk, everyone drugged,
we are Hajduk supporters.

Taking on the role of social outcasts and rebels, the fans developed forms of "warlike" behaviour and discourse. One group of Star's supporters called themselves "Zulu Warriors." The fans were "at war" not only with foreigners or their neighbors, or with "other nations," but most readily with rival local clubs. Partizan and Star supporters exchanged threats full of death, blood, axes and slaughter. When the first group shouted "If you're happy, kill a Gypsy", the "Gypsies" had a ready response:

Axes in hand
and a knife in the teeth,
there'll be blood tonight,
Gravediggers, Gravediggers,
you're nothing now,
you'll be like the Frogs
against Liverpool.
38, 38 died then
hurry home, hurry home,
there'll be dead now too.

The vocabulary and phraseology of confrontation used by the hooligan fans consisted equally of elements from repertoire of the language of violence and death, and from the arsenal of obscene, pornographic words and phrases of abuse. Here, if "slaughter" and "fuck" do not mean precisely the same thing, they are at lease equally offensive. In the following example there are two characteristics of the hooligan fans that became unacceptable at the time when internation hatred and preparations for war began to flare up: abuse directed at a "same nation" opponent, combined with

solidarity with a club of a "different nation," and a pornographic vocabulary unworthy of a disciplined national fighter.

> Oh Star, you fucked-up tart,
> Let Hajduk fuck you, let them all,
> specially the Gravediggers.

For the fans, going to the stadium and supporting their team meant "release," liberation, throwing off restraints and rules. "Dad started taking me to matches as a kid," says Mihailo (a Partizan supporter, aged 22), "and I simply began to like that experience of a crowd; it's a special kind of release. There's a kind of beauty in hating the others, those who don't support the team you support. Also, you can shout your head off. . . . I like that, everything else in life has rules" (*Questionnaire*, January 20, 1990).

But, in Serbia and Montenegro, there began increasingly to appear among the supporters those who looked for a kind of patriotic justification for their provocative and aggressive behavior, especially at matches where their team was playing against a club from a "different center." Thus Goran, 23, the leader of the "Vandals" gang of Partizan supporters, said that "one should give the fans due recognition, because they were the first to support Serbia in these changes." "I think" he added, "that it all began in the stadium. People always knew that Star and Partizan were Serbian teams, and Hajduk and Dinamo Croatian, and that's all there is to it. End of story" (*Questionnaire*, May 8, 1989).

In the supporters' folklore in Serbia (songs, slogans, placards, flags, coats of arms, etc.), the theme of ethnic identity, until then sporadic and illegal, became the predominant content from the mid-1980s, at the same time as the theme began to appear in political communication and propaganda, especially at the populist mass political rallies that set the tone of political life in Serbia and Montenegro in the course of 1988 and 1989. The supporters wanted, above all, to present themselves as belonging to "their nation"—Star and Partizan supporters as Serbs—and at the same time to see opposing clubs as representatives of different nations, inimical to them.

According to one Red Star fan, preparations for going to Zagreb for the Star-Dinamo match of May 21, 1989 included one feature, obligatory for all. Every supporter, including Partizan fans, had to have tattooed on their arm the four letter "S"s from the Serbian coat of arms.[7] "Imagine the scene," he said, "when we all roll up our sleeves and begin to wave our arms!" (*Questionnaire*, May 7, 1989). At the same time, there was a similar evolution toward the national self-determination of supporters in Croatia, too, also under the influence of the development of political circumstances there, that is, the establishment of a nationalistic regime.[8]

Star supporters, especially when they found themselves in the stadium of their opponent's team, emphasized above all their allegiance to Serbia and its leader Milošević:

> We are the Warriors from proud Serbia
> Come onto the terraces, greet the Serbian race
> From Kosovo to Knin, Serbs stand shoulder to shoulder
> Serbian Slobo, Serbia is with you

Who says, who lies, that Serbia is small?
it's not small, it's not small, it gave us Slobodan!
Manastirka, manastirka, Serbian brandy:
That's what warms the Serbian army, Slobodan!

At the beginning of 1990, Star supporters would also on occasion shout the name of Vuk Drašković, a this example shows:

Star Star in one voice now,
Vuk Drašković supports us.

But equally, Star's greatest urban rival, Partizan, and particularly its supporters, did not want to stand aside from this movement toward national identification. Among the supporters' slogans and songs the following lines could be heard:

Partizan, Partizan, that's Serbian team.
Slobodan Milošević is proud of them.
The whole of Yugoslavia dances rock-and-roll,
Only a true Serb supports Partizan.[9]

Nor did Partizan fans want to leave the name Warriors to Star supporters:

Partizan loves only warriors,
warrior heroes of proud Serbia,
may their name shine forever,
long live Partizan and mother Serbia.

The Star fans would not have that, and responded to such words from the "Gravediggers":

Partizan, Partizan, well-known Muslim team,
Azem Vlasi, Azem Vlasi, is proud of them.[10]

Nevertheless, this folklore bears witness to the overriding endeavor among supporters of both these clubs to establish ethnic solidarity, so that at some matches they chanted "Serbia, Serbia!" together. The equivalent in Croatia was the sense of fraternity between Dinamo and Hajduk supporters, who were able to forget their internal conflicts and sing together:

Dinamo and Hajduk are of the same blood
it doesn't matter which of them is first,
Dinamo and Hajduk are two brother clubs,
the whole of Croatia is proud of them.[11]

In the years preceding the outbreak of war in Croatia, Star and Partizan supporters often found their inspiration and material for slogans and songs in Chetnik folklore, which reappeared in general circulation at that time, especially in the form of records and tapes that were freely sold by street vendors in Serbia. Since one of the

main demonstrative functions of supporters' folklore is to achieve the maximum degree of provocation and to touch the opponent with the worst possible insult, in the supporters' variations of the lines of Chetnik songs there is more blood and slaughter than in the texts of the "originals" on which these variants were based. This is confirmed by these examples:

The emblem on my beret
is shaking, shaking,
we will murder, we will kill
all who are not with the Star.
Prepare yourselves, Gravediggers,
it will be a fierce battle,
heroic heads will fall
well slaughter our Ustasha (Gypsy) brothers.
The Serbian army is on the move
heading for Zagreb, heading for Zagreb,
we will murder, we will kill
all are not with us.

These examples show that the Chetnik folklore from World War II offered suitable material for creating supporters' slogans and songs. For this purpose, bellicose, threatening cries were particularly useful, as was the theme of sacrifice.

The Departure of the Warriors to War

At the end of 1990 the sports press, and particularly *Zvezdina revija*, began to write about positive changes in the behaviour of Red Star supporters, changes that were attributed to the influence of their leader—Željko Ražnatović Arkan—a man who was increasingly forcing himself onto the attention of the broader public. He was credited with reconciling the management of Red Star with a section of the unruly supporters, with establishing order and harmony between the mutually antagonistic groups of fans, and, most importantly, with succeeding in separating support for the club from political passions and interests.

In the first article about Ražnatović, published in *Zvezdina revija*, he is described as "a man close to Star, with an excellent understanding of events in the 'Marakana' stadium, who was helping 'The Warriors' to leave politics in the political arena." It also said that Star's management proclaimed him its savior when he succeeded, through his personal authority, in reconciling the warring factions (*ZR*, December 1990). Beside this article there appeared a photograph of a group of supporters, "The Warriors," with Željko Ražnatović who was wearing, like all the others, a supporter's cap and trainers.

With the coming of Ražnatović among "The Warriors," it appears that the danger of their displaying "political intoxication in general, particularly of the Chetnik type," to which *Zvezdina revija* had previously drawn attention, receded (*ZR*, September 1990), because from that time on the paper wrote about Star supporters in a different way, praising their behavior. The club itself hurried to repay the Warriors for their obedience to the supporters' commissar Ražnatović, by paying for

some eighty of the most passionate supporters to go to Glasgow for a match against Glasgow Rangers, with Ražnatović as the leader of the expedition (*ZR*, December 1990).

Another commentary in *Zvezdina revija* from December 1990, "Spectators get the better of politics," was devoted to "The Warriors." Here it stated that in Belgrade there had been "aggressive attempts to politicize sport," although "significantly fewer than in other places," for the simple reason that "Belgraders were traditionally great lovers of true sport contests." There was, nevertheless, a danger, since "it is not difficult to poison the souls of these young people" and "party leaders, with the aim of winning at the elections at any price" (meaning the parliamentary elections of December 1990) "most frequently try to imitate only what is worst in the arsenal of Western democracy." Thus it happened that Belgrade did not escape the attempt to introduce national paraphernalia, and at one time relations between a section of the misguided young men and the Red Star management became strained. "But then Ražnatović came on the scene, or rather, as it stated here, 'The Warriors' reorganized themselves."

There is no doubt that in these articles the introduction of "national paraphernalia" and everything else that the supporters took with them into the stadiums was not so much in dispute as those in whose hands such paraphernalia were found, that is those who had control over the aggressive chauvinistic passions, and therefore a monopoly over their use for political or military ends. And the war in Croatia and Bosnia was on the horizon.

Ražnatović made the decision to begin preparing Star supporters for real war, as he said himself, after the Dinamo-Star match of May 13, 1990 in Zagreb. "The match took place on the thirteenth," he was to say some years later, "we began to organize immediately after that. . . . I could see war coming because of that match in Zagreb, I foresaw everything and I knew that the Ustasha daggers would soon be slaughtering Serbian women and children again."[12]

At the end of 1990, Ražnatović came to public attention as a man who was arrested in Dvor on the Una (in Croatia) and spent six months in prison accused of going to Krajina[13] in order to help the Serbs there, who had begun to offer armed resistance to the new Croatian government in a protest known as the "long revolution." Just before his arrest, Ražnatović had founded the Serbian Volunteer Guard, although not much was known about it publicly.

When he came out of prison, the leader of the Warriors and commander of the Serbian Volunteer Guard became involved in armed conflicts in Slavonia, which, in the course of the summer of 1991, turned into real war. The core of his volunteer army consisted of Red Star supporters. In an interview for *Srpsko jedinstvo* (November 1994), recalling those days of war in Slavonia, Ražnatović talked about the way he and his fighters had prepared: "Well, remember that, as supporters, we had trained first without weapons. . . . From the beginning I insisted on discipline. You know what football fans are like, they're noisy, they like drinking, clowning; I put a stop to that at a stroke, I made them cut their hair, shave regularly, stop drinking and—it all took its own course."

In December 1991, *Zvezdina revija* published a short "note from the front" about the legendary Željko Ražnatović Arkan, the leader of the Star Warriors and commander of his "Tigers, who distinguished themselves in the liberation of Vukovar," but it was only after the March 1992 issue that this paper began to write

more extensively about the Star supporters on the Slavonian battlefield. A report "Rifles in their hands, flags in their thoughts," accompanied by a photograph, described "a day with the Warriors in the Serbian Volunteer Guard."

All with neatly cut hair under their black military berets, they set off to the song "We are the Serbian Army, Arkan's tigers, all to a man volunteers, we'll let no one have Serbian land." The beat of their footsteps seemed to give rhythm and strength to the melody. They disappeared into a wood, but it rang with the words: " 'To battle, to battle, to battle, rise up my Serb brothers, do not leave your hearth, Serbs are protected by glory and God!' I wind back the film of my memories and distribute these brave boys through all the stadiums of Europe. I know exactly where each of them stood, who first started the song, who first unfurled his flag, who first lit the torch. Arkan's warriors. . . . They occupy every line of the new issue of 'Star.' The best supporters in the world. . . . The Warriors have left their supporters' props somewhere under the arches of our Marakana stadium and have set off to war with rifles in their hands. Fearless fighters, heroes to a man" (*ZR*, March 1992).[14]

The Red Star footballers did not forget their supporters at the front. The captain, Vladan Lukić, was praised in one issue of *Srpski žurnal* (Serbian Journal) for having gone "in his Mazda 323 four times to Erdut to visit the wounded," and for the fact that he was planning to spend New Year's Eve with them. He was quoted as saying: "Many of our loyal supporters from the north end of Marakana are in the most obvious way writing the finest pages of the history of Serbia" (*SŽ*, December 25, 1991). His teammate Siniša Mihajlović complained that thinking about the war stopped him from concentrating on football: "Our supporters are at the front . . . my people are dying and bleeding, and how can I play. I even caught myself thinking that it was actually indecent for us to play and enjoy ourselves when there are so many victims" (*Te*, December 11, 1991).

The fighter-fans did not forget their clubs or their songs. It turned out that between supporters' songs and war songs, themes and component elements could easily be exchanged. Many of the supporters' songs, which had come into being as improvisations on the basis of Chetnik and patriotic folklore, were simply restored to their original form. However, there were "authentic" supporters' songs, that is, those for which external models were not identifiable, which featured only supporters, their antisocial violent behaviour and the requisite props. These "hooligan" texts were the shared heritage of various groups of supporters, who adapted them to their needs in "performance." They included the following two verses:

> Tonight there's going to be trouble,
> tonight will be a madhouse
> the hooligans are moving
> through the streets of Belgrade (Zagreb, Split)
> Let axes ring out,
> let chains rattle,
> here come the Gravediggers (Gypsies)
> the greatest madmen of all.[15]

As they went to war, in paramilitary volunteer units, supporters from Serbia adapted their "hooligan" songs to their new function, turning them into patriotic and war

folklore. That is how this song, published in the Pale weekly *Javnost* in October 1993, came into being:

There will be hell again,
there'll be a madhouse again,
the specials are on the move,
from the streets of Foča.
The Chetniks are on their way,
the fighters are on their way,
Ćosa's men are on their way[16]
Serbian volunteers
They do not fear Allah,
they do not fear the faith,
they do not fear Alija,
and all his Turks.

Sport as Military Training

The example of the organized departure of a group of supporters to war, combined with the fact that they did not lose their supporters' identity in the war, sheds new light on the question of the relationship between violence, sport, and society. Over the last two decades, this question has usually been posed as the problem of the anti-social, destructive, and violent behavior, but often also the criminal behavior, of extreme groups of hooligan football fans. In peacetime, in countries faced with the growth of aggression among groups of supporters, appropriate (political, police, sport-related, educational, etc.) measures are sought to put an end to what is seen as "a social evil," that is, attempts are made to "pacify" the supporters.

However, the episode of the Warriors going to war demonstrates that in one country, as in many others, in which hooliganism among supporters was obtrusively present, in wartime the fans' aggression became for the state a valuable "capital of hatred,"[17] and the fans became welcome "cannon fodder." The state did not have any need to repress the violent behaviour of the fans, partly because in wartime there was little opportunity for it to be manifested in the usual way. On the contrary, it was in the interests of the state that this "capital of hatred" among supporters should be conserved in order to use it for the realization of war aims.

Those who study the state in the twentieth century have already noted that it is interested in sport and physical culture on the whole as a kind of military training. That is particularly true of states that show features of a totalitarian order, and states preparing for war.

In Communist states, too, the main motive for the great interest in sport was the conviction that sport was an important means of political propaganda and preparation for potential war. That was how sport was perceived in former Yugoslavia. In a paper prepared for the founding meeting of the Red Star Sports Club, held on March 4, 1945, Zora Žujović defined two main tasks for sport in the new Communist state: "First, to strengthen the body for the forthcoming reconstruction of the country, and secondly, accessible to all, it should gather and unite all our young people, regardless of their age or position. Its greatest and most sacred duty is to provide wholehearted and fraternal help to the front" (Ršumović, 37).

The idea that support for sport was a preparation for war (should it be necessary) can be found in Yugoslavia also in the time after Tito's death. In a book of patriotic sports songs by Nedeljko Neša Popadić, *Srce na travi* (Hearth on the Grass), which was published in 1982 by Sportska knjiga (Sporting books) in Belgrade, there is a poem called "The Fan." The character of the fan includes the following features:

I am one of those
who sings far into the night after a victory.
And who will punch the nose
of my opponent's supporter,
one of those who will go tomorrow to the front
and swap my club's flag
for a rifle in my hand . . .

These patriot fans, together with their favorites—footballers—make up Tito's army:

And therefore . . . Before the well-known whistle blows
and the signal to start the match is given,
remember the land of the Partizans
and know: now it is you
who are Tito's army!
. . .
Forward for the homeland . . . for the house of Flowers . . .[18]
Forward for the tricolor . . . Forward, forward, for Tito!

The Hooligan Revolution

On the eve of the outbreak of armed conflict in former Yugoslavia, war propaganda on the Serbian side, above all through sports journalists, succeeded in directing the aggressive energy of the supporters toward the battlefields, giving to the new forms of its manifestation the meaning and value of patriotic sacrifice, if not for Tito and the House of Flowers, then certainly for the new or renewed symbols and ideals of the national collective. In other words, unlike peacetime endeavors to pacify gangs of hooligan supporters, here was an example of their militarization.

The well-documented, significant presence of hooligans from sports stadiums and others, seen in conditions of peace as antisocial and criminal groups, among the "heroes" of the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia, is one reason why these wars can be described as the vandalistic, destructive campaigns of hooligan-fans, taken over by the state for the aims of its war policy, disciplined, supplied with "props," that is, armed, and sent to fight with the "enemy" as though it were a question of inter-supporter confrontation at some football match.

But how is it possible to transform unruly hooligan-fans so quickly into disciplined soldiers ostensibly fighting for the state and nation? Is the essence of the behavior of hooligan fans, as some believe, their testing of unbridled, excessive freedom, "rampaging," chaotic abandonment to "their basest instincts"? In that case, the transformation of fans into soldiers (though military drill, cutting their hair, getting them to come off drugs and limiting alcohol) would mean their undergoing a fundamental metamorphosis in order to be transferred forcibly from the chaos of unbridled freedom to the cosmos of military order.

There is reason to dispute such an explanation. Thanks to some new sociological and ethnological research, we know now that in the apparently ungoverned, chaotic world of extremist fans there is order. Their behavior is, in fact, governed by unwritten rules, codes, protocols, hierarchy, and discipline.[19] With this in mind, it is possible to explain logically why it is precisely some groups of supporters who lend themselves most easily to being transformed into volunteer military units: such groups are already imbued with the spirit of organization and subordination. The transformation of fans into soldiers is only a reinterpretation of the already existing structure of the supporters' group, and that is why it is possible for the essential identity of the group, as fans, to be retained (Arkan's volunteer Tigers did not cease to be Warriors) and also, as in the example quoted, for the supporters' folklore to be preserved.

However, even if that were not the case and one accepted that, as they themselves said, hooligans really did celebrate crime, drunkenness, chaos, and madness, their involvement in war would not have to entail any fundamental change. There was nothing to say that short-haired, disciplined supporter-volunteers were forbidden from hating the enemy passionately, nor did anyone prevent them from reveling in that hatred and in destructive and murderous revenge to their hearts' content. And that means that the taming of the unrestrained behaviour of the hooligans, now soldiers, could merely be illusory, that it was perhaps only in war that they could taste the full pleasure of the free transgression of fundamental human prohibitions imposed on them in peacetime, including even the most aggressive behavior in the stadium. The grim stories that emerged from the war in Croatia and Bosnia, of sadistic orgies orchestrated by people in military uniforms engaged in military actions, suggest that the freedom of abandonment to the most gruesome forms of violence offered by war cannot be compared to that tasted by sports fans at their "wildest."

The phenomenon of fighter-fans in the war in former Yugoslavia calls into question the thesis of the positive sociopsychological functions of supporters' violence. Authors who promote this thesis seek to distinguish between the ritual, symbolic, carnival manifestation of violence and "real" violent behavior, explaining those instances when supporter violence becomes real as isolated incidents, extreme phenomena. According to this interpretation, by deflecting the manifestation of mass aggression onto a symbolic plane, and by transforming it into a spectacle, a ritual, an image of violence, sporting events, and especially football matches, have the prophylactic function of catharsis. A football match is war, but a "ritualized war," and not only because journalists describe it using military vocabulary but because the supporters' props, flags, drums, and uniforms suggest that it is a kind of symbolic warfare.

Some observers attribute to contemporary sport the function of the ritualization of violence, that is, the channeling of intensity and a way of expressing it, analogous to the function of ancient bachanalia and medieval tournaments and duels. In these views, ritualized eruptions of violence in sport help channel aggression and preserve society as a whole from an all-consuming violence. Other authors consider the phenomenon of ritually controlled violence in sport and among supporters as a product of modern, industrialized society. Starting from Herbert Spencer and his followers (e.g., Norbert Ellis), according to whom, by contrast with premodern,

militaristic society, modern society is characterized by the constant transformation of open, uncontrolled violence into regulated and controlled violence, P. Marsh came to the conclusion that violence in sport appears in just that modern, controlled, ritualized form, and that it is a matter of an illusion of violence, of apparent violence.

Our example reveals, however, that it was in fact one group of hooligan fans that showed itself particularly susceptible to recruitment and re-qualification into a war unit, and that had no difficulty in exchanging the stadium and conflict with the supporters of different teams for the battlefield and slaughter in the name of the nation-state. The ritual, symbolic warfare of aggressive fans in sports stadiums, which after all sometimes becomes bloody confrontation between groups of fans, does not appear to offer effective protection from the flaring up of violence "in real life."

Does this mean that war could be the real solution to the problem of hooligan violence? It does not certainly create the possibility of transfer, that is, it offers a good opportunity to channel that violence so that its target is no longer authority and established social values, against which the aggression of hooligan fans is usually directed in peacetime, but external enemies of the nation. The regime in power acquires fighters, demonstrably; fierce and fanatical, who, according to a widely held belief, are better able to carry out the "dirty" business of war than the regular army, and at the same time it offers an opportunity for such hooligan-fan-fighters to redeem their peacetime transgressions and, sacrificing themselves for the Fatherland, to return to the fold and earn the love reserved for the penitent prodigal son. This would mean that, thanks to war, the state redeems the aggression of hooligan fans (and, on the same model, other antisocial groups) by giving them a chance to become socially useful, or, as it would be put today, to contribute to "positive energy," the foundation of postwar life.

Or is it perhaps closer to the truth that war—particularly the kind of warfare in which the Red Star supporters stood out, becoming first Warriors and them Tigers—is an opportunity for the ultimate victory of the hooligan revolt, a continuation and conflagration of values of civil society? For the hooligan subculture, as B. Perasović would say, by transforming the leaders of hooligan fans into national heroes, seeks to become the dominant culture of the social elite. History knows of several examples of the successful revolution of such project, the creators of which, whether on the left or the right, are usually called revolutionary. We are today on the way to granting history yet another fine example of the realization of the hooligan-revolutionary dream.

Notes

1. The examples quoted here are taken from the following sports papers: *Sport* (hereafter *S*), *Sportski žurnal* (*Sports Journal*, *SŽ*), *Tempo* (*Te*), *Partizanov vesnik* (*Partizan Herald*, *PV*), and Zvezdina revija (*Star Review*, *ZR*).
2. Translator"s note: A reference to the monument to World War II Chetnik leader, Draža Mihailović, erected at the instigation of Vuk Drašković.
3. "Slobo Srbine, Srbija je uz tebe!"
4. Translator's note: The Orthodox way of making the sign of the cross.
5. Translator's note: The Mrnjavčević brothers are historical figures who have taken on a new life in the traditional oral epic songs. Both were killed at the Marica in 171 (?), at a battle that was decisive in the Ottoman advance into the Balkans.

6. Translator's note: Political leader and prime minister of Serbia between the wars.
7. The Serbian coat of arms consists of four Cyrillic letters "c" s ("s"s) arranged in a cross.
8. A brief history of sports support and hooligan supporters' groups in Yugoslavia was written by the Split sociologist Dražen Lalić. Particularly interesting for us are the places where the author reconstructs the changes that took place in the early and mid-1980s, when the behavior of the supporters became ever more openly violent, "losing its earlier symbolic character" and turning into serious mutual conflict and confrontation with the police, that is, ever since that kind of support "virtually lost any connection with playing ball." According to the author, that trend continued also at the end of the 1980s, with the difference that "the basic model of excess become political"; 91990: 124–29).
9. This couplet, a variation on the text of a famous hit by the Belgrade rock-group "Electric Orgasm," was also taken up by supporters of Hajduk: "The whole of Yugoslavia dances rock-and-roll, only a true Dalmatian supports Hajduk" (Ivo, 23, Hajduk supporter, *Questionnaire*, May 14, 1989).
10. Translator's note: Azem Vlasi, ethnic Albanian; in the late 1980s, member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Previously President of the Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo.
11. Quoted from Perasović, 18–19.
12. Srpsko jedinstvo, the organ of the Serbian Unity Party (Stranka srpskog jedinstva), No. 1, November 1994.
13. Translator's note: Part of Croatia where there was a large Serbian minority
14. After Slavonia, in the summer of 1992, Arkan and his "Valiants" participated in the military campaign in Bosnia. Rade Leskovac, one of the commanders of the Serbian paramilitaries, remembers those days nostalgically: "Always now in my dreams about what I once was, I se a dusty village road and the Serbian flag carried by Ražnatović and his boys together with the Star supporters' flag. They always trumpeted their way through our villages, shouting one after another "Arkan, Arkan!" (Svet, September 6, 1993).
15. The variant "Tonight there's going to be trouble, tonight will be a madhouse, the hooligans are moving through the streets of Zagreb" is quoted in Perasović: 19.
16. Translator's note: Brana Ćosović, "Ćosa," leader of a unit of specials.
17. For the "capital of hatred," see Čolović, 1993: 93–98.
18. Translator's note: Tito's mausoleum in Belgrade.
19. This is one of the conclusions reached, among others, by the French ethnologist Christian Bromberger, studying the behaviour of supporters of Olympic (Marseilles) and Juventus (Turin) (1987: 13).
20. The ritual aspect of football and its support has been discussed in Serbia by, among others, Ivan Kovačević and Vera Marković. V. Marković quotes some interesting examples of the ritual behavior of supporters at Belagrade stadiums, taken from observations in the spring of 1987: singing the club anthem, greeting the state flag, waving flags and passing them from hand to hand across the stands, greeting groups of supporters, throwing live hens onto the ground, kneeling and bowing (1990: 142–43).

Chapter Eleven

Justifying Violence: Extreme Nationalist and Racist Discourses in Scandinavia

Tore Bjørgo

This article offers insight into the rhetoric and discourse by means of which racist and xenophobic groups conceptualize their various enemies.[1] They have targeted those they consider to be aliens to the ethnic in-group, such as immigrants, asylum seekers, and ethnic minorities, as well as political opponents within their own ethnic group, such as antiracists, the media, and legal and political authorities. By analyzing statements, verbal exchanges, texts, and other forms of communicative interaction produced within such groups and movements, we may gain insight into how they, to use Berger and Luckman's formulation, "construct their social realities,"[2] and how they try to influence social realities through these discursive practices. It is mainly through the discourses employed by extremist groups or movements that we are able to draw conclusions about their ideologies, political cultures, and behaviors. Discourses can be said to constitute empirical objects open to direct observation in ways that cultures and ideologies are not.

The concept of discourse is employed differently by various authors.[3] In my research, it is understood to refer to the process of communicative interaction via speech, texts, and other social practices, by means of which people codify and reflect on their experiences. In the process of developing specific ways of speaking about certain topics, these discursive practices "systematically form the objects of which they speak," as Michel Foucault puts it. Discourses are products of our experiences but are also constitutive of the social realities in which we live and the truths with which we work.[4] When ideas and arguments are exchanged within a group or a moral community, these notions may gradually become "common property." In the course of this process of communicative interaction, sets of conventionally linked concepts are established, determining premises for interpreting situations and making decisions. Such conclusions and choices may appear logical and justified within the context of the relevant discourse and the moral community sharing it. To outsiders who do not reason in terms of this discourse, however, the same behaviors and choices may seem irrational or even reprehensible. Therefore, statements and texts from these groups and activists will be cited at some length in the present study, to foreground the structure of their reasoning and offer glimpses into their constructions of reality.

The concept of rhetoric here refers to a special form of discursive practice tasked to persuade audiences.[5] Successful rhetoric renders the audience's experience meaningful by creating a context; the rhetorician must be able to capture and "tune in" to the concerns and experiences of his audiences. Political rhetoric normally seeks to promote certain interpretations of current events by presenting them in the light of specific constructions of reality, and herein convincing the audience to act in accordance with these conceptions and values.

A direct causal link between ideology and rhetoric and subsequent action cannot always be proven, and, indeed, most rhetoric leads to little or no real action. Nor does ideology and rhetoric always and necessarily precede action. In many cases, action comes first; only subsequently, does the actor try to work out a convenient justification. Many acts of racist violence are perpetrated by individuals and small groups—often petty-criminal youth gangs—that are neither operating within an explicit ideological framework nor have any direct affiliation with political organizations. Frequently, perpetrators of racist actions are approached by anti-immigrant or racist organizations only after they have carried out an arson attack or similar spectacular action. At that stage they may suddenly find themselves hailed as patriots or "white resistance fighters"—an image they often eagerly adopt as their own.[6]

Varieties of Nationalism in Scandinavia

During the last decades, we have seen two main types of extreme right-wing movements in Scandinavia: anti-immigration groups driven by a radical nationalism or ethnocentrism, and groups disseminating a neo-Nazi or explicitly racist ideology. Historical analogies and traditions play an important role in both groups, but they have each aligned themselves with highly distinct—even opposed—historical and ideological traditions: One group draws inspiration from the anti-German resistance movement of World War II, while the other draws upon the historical discourses of anti-Semitism and National Socialism. Yet despite the contrasting idiomatic content of their respective rhetoric, the fundamental structure of each remains virtually identical. The anti-immigration movement views itself as the new resistance movement, combating Muslim invasion and national traitors, while the neo-Nazis have proclaimed themselves a white/aryan resistance movement fighting the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG) and racial traitors. The first category of activists claim a civil war will break out unless their warnings are heeded, while the ZOG ideologues claim the racial war has already begun. To varying degrees, both groups utilize a rhetoric that justifies the use of violence.

Given the divergent historical experiences among the Scandinavian countries, most Norwegians and Danes relate to national symbols and feelings in significantly different ways than do most Swedes, with important consequences for how extreme nationalists must exploit or appropriate national symbols. Swedish nationalism has been shaped by that country's status as an expansive power in Northern Europe, particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when it was strongly influenced by the political culture of Prussia/Germany. The reputation of Greater Sweden was hailed within influential circles well into the twentieth century, and certainly into World War II. The strength of their state enabled Swedes to take their

national identity and independence for granted. In contrast, the Norwegian national identity emerging during the nineteenth century was predominantly a liberation nationalism linked to the process of winning independence from first Denmark and then Sweden. Danish national identity, in turn, received a blow to its status as great power during the seventeenth century, herein characterized by the realization that "Denmark is a small country," one at times threatened by an aggressive neighbour to the south.

During the twentieth century, World War II had the single most significant impact on the development of nationalism in Scandinavia. The wartime experiences of occupation and resistance in Norway and Denmark made national feelings a legitimate and uniting force in ways bearing no corollary in Sweden, which never suffered occupation. The Swedish people never went through a national crisis in which patriotism and national feelings could be mobilized in the struggle for freedom and democracy. To many Swedes today, nationalist sentiment and its attendant symbology seem problematic, even dubious.

When compared with most other occupied countries, a large number of Norwegians actively collaborated with the German occupation forces. The leader of the Norwegian fascists, Vidkun Quisling, literally gave treason a name. But Norway also had a strong civilian and military resistance movement, and the government actively continued the struggle against Nazi occupation from exile. Denmark had less active collaboration, but also a weaker resistance movement and a government which, at least until 1943, followed an accommodating policy in relation to the occupation forces. After 1942, however, popular resistance increased. Sweden was able to avoid German occupation by following an accommodating form of neutrality during the first years of World War II. However, there were also strong pro-German and even pro-Nazi elements within leading circles of Swedish society and politics. While these forces lost influence as Germany began to lose war, an outright purge of Nazis in Sweden never took place after the war. In contrast to occupied Denmark and Norway, Swedish Nazis were never regarded as traitors to their country.

These divergent historical experiences within the three Scandinavian countries have to a large extent determined which types of nationalism and national symbols extreme nationalist groups seek to invoke or successfully appropriate. Swedish history, strongly characterized by great power traditions and ambitions, lends itself to a more aggressive and chauvinist version of nationalism than does the history of Denmark or Norway. Present-day extreme nationalists in Sweden have oriented themselves in relation to this tradition of a "Greater Sweden." The notion of a brotherhoods of arms, war heroes, and the worship of "martyrs" have become discourses central to groups like the neo-Nazi Vitt Ariskt Motstand (VAM, White Aryan Resistance), Nationalsocialistisk Front, and Svenska Motstandsrörelsen (Swedish Resistance Movement), the "folk socialist" Riksfronten (National Front), and the nationalist-xenophobic Sverigedemokraterna. Since the political mainstream in Sweden seems to harbor minimal interest in such national symbols as the flag and the national anthem, they have been appropriated with enthusiasm by extreme nationalists. At least in principle, National Socialist and anti-Semitic symbols and ideas were never incompatible with Swedish patriotism, whereas in Norway and Denmark the memory of Nazi occupation and of local Nazi traitors has been held

alive by most especially the older generation. As a result, extreme nationalists in Norway and Denmark have faced many more obstacles in their attempts to ideologically colonize such national symbols as the flag, the national anthem, national holidays, and royal traditions. These symbols continue to be unanimously embraced by the broader populace and the political establishment and furthermore remain firmly linked with anti-Nazi and democratic traditions. However, from the late 1980s onward, anti-immigrant nationalists in Denmark and Norway have launched a strong offensive to try to capture a very central set of national symbols, namely, the Resistance Movement against Nazi occupation and against local war traitors.

Anti-Immigration Discourse: "Resistance" Against "Invaders" and "National Traitors"

Central to the rhetoric of organized anti-immigrant activists in Norway and Denmark was the desire to establish themselves as the new "resistance movement" whose mission was to fight "foreign invaders" and present-day "national traitors." They tried to achieve this by aligning themselves with a number of patriotic symbols and values once held in high esteem by the great majority of the population.

The discourse of "the new resistance movement" and its enemies, "the national traitors," drew symbolic capital from an anti-Nazi (and therefore presumably antiracist) movement which—at least in Norway—was once tasked to defend the legally elected institution of democracy.[7] Contemporary anti-immigration activists have transformed this symbolic material so that "the resistance movement" now represents a nationalism and patriotism directed against foreigners (particularly Muslims), which threatens violence or other forms of reprisal against institutions and elected civil servants involved in determining and administering current immigration policy. By linking their rhetoric to a symbolic material that enjoys general support and evokes powerful emotions among much of the population, particularly the older generation, these activists hoped to mobilize extensive support. However, most people find the analogy between resistance against German occupants and resistance against immigrants and asylum-seekers to be entirely illegitimate; indeed, those who experienced life under Nazism firsthand during the war are deeply offended by the analogy. Only a small minority of the population seems to have embraced the analogy and supports the notion of "the new resistance movement" against immigrants and so-called traitors.[8]

Arne Myrdal, the former head of Folkebevegelsen Mot Innvandring (FMI, the People's Movement Against Immigration),[9] split off to establish the more militant Norge Mot Innvandring (NMI, Norway Against Immigration) and held a lengthy criminal record.[10] Until he retired from political activism for health reasons in the mid-1990s, he was the leading proponent of a violent rhetoric calling for civil war and violent reprisals against political opponents, whom he reproached as national traitors because of their stance on immigration issues. Myrdal was by no means unique among leaders of anti-immigrant organizations in Scandinavia. Leaders of other nationalist organizations have publicly voiced similar opinions, although rarely as bluntly as Arne Myrdal with his romanticized notions of a heroic civil war. The common denominator among leaders has been a discourse grounded in metaphors

or analogies that present the immigration to Norway of refugees from less-developed countries as an invasion of the same sinister dimensions as Nazi Germany's invasion of Norway (and Denmark) in 1940. Anti-immigration activists claimed for themselves the status of heroes in "the resistance movement," while antiracist activists were often branded as "red Nazis," and politicians and civil servants painted to be national traitors who will be held accountable for their treason, just like Vidkun Quisling and his party, Nasjonal Samling (NS, National Unity) were convicted of treason after the end of World War II.

FMI spokesman Jan Høeg used every opportunity to stress his active participation in the Resistance during World War II. He played an important role in developing a common discourse among Norwegian and Danish anti-immigrant activists.[11] Commenting on Norwegian immigration policy in the periodical of the sister organisation Den Danske Forening (DDF, The Danish Association), he wrote:

> Twenty to thirty years from now, Quisling's treason will probably appear relatively insignificant compared with what [prime minister] Gro Harlem Brundtland has commenced in Norway. . . . Gro Harlem Brundtland's name [will also] be remembered as the name of the traitor who removed Norway's boundary barriers and opened the gates for a free invasion of asylum parasites, deserters, and drug mafias by the thousands. . . . Unless the course is altered very soon, we must unfortunately conclude that Norway has got its second traitor government within the span of a few years. (*Danskeren*, No. 5, December 1989)

Invoking the resistance movement serves two important rhetorical purposes. First, it lends the nationalism of anti-immigrant activists an aura of patriotic legitimacy, with which to counter claims that anti-immigrant activists are racists colluding with neo-Nazis. Second, the analogy seeks to legitimize the use of violence and other forms of reprisal against the so-called foreign invaders and national traitors (landssvikerne) in similar measure as the Resistance movement during the war had to resort to extremist measures against collaborators. In an interview, Arne Myrdal, the FMI/NMI leader, has declared this in very unambiguous terms:

> The Norwegians will no longer accept this national treason. When politicians provoke the population, young people will seek recourse in violence. First against the immigrants, then against those who promote immigration, and finally against the politicians and the System. Then civil war will break out. It's too bad that the immigrants will be targeted—it is not their fault. They [i.e. the young militants] should rather go for the politicians.
>
> [Interviewer:] How?
>
> By beating or killing them. The people will rise against them with violence. The government and the Storting (the parliament) are out of touch with the people. If they do not govern the way we want, things will escalate to a civil war. There are many resistance groups, and the boys are armed. I know everything about this, I direct the resistance all over the country. There have been many weapons thefts [from military depots] during the last few years. These weapons end up with the resistance groups. It is not our intention to use the weapons against the immigrants. It is our own national traitors we have to fight against.[12]

In apparent contradiction to this argument, Myrdal also described immigrants and asylum seekers as "pioneers" in a Muslim army of conquest. According to this theory,

the so-called refugees have come to establish "bridgeheads" in Norway as part of an evil conspiracy to establish global Islamic rule.

> . . . all those foreign intruders who came here . . . have not come to save their lives, as they have tried to make us believe. They have come for nothing less than to take over our country, to become so numerous as to make the Norwegians a minority in their own country. The Pakistanis, in particular, are highly determined in this respect. The FMI is a very unpleasant obstacle to their attempt to achieve this goal. It is therefore no wonder that they try to fight us with all possible means.[13]

Thus, the argument goes, the resistance struggle must also involve "resistance" against Muslim intruders:

> The Muslims have come to conquer Europe. I believe there will be civil war in three years time. We can either surrender and let them take over our country—rape our country! Or we can prepare ourselves for resistance, and that is what we are doing right now.[14]

Several key players in the anti-immigrant organizations did, in fact, play active roles in the wartime resistance movement. This historical link to the Resistance has constituted an important rhetorical resource among both Danish and Norwegian anti-immigration activists, one heavily exploited to lend legitimacy to their anti-immigrant views and militant initiatives, and extreme nationalism. The secretary of FMI, Gunnar Øi, mailed a series of harassing letters to the female secretary of a local antiracist organization in Norway, Brumunddal pa nye veier (Brumunddal on New Paths). In one of these letters, he wrote:

> Hello, Judas! . . . The writer of this letter took an active part in the resistance struggle through the war and consequently has had extensive experience in dealing with small national traitors of your calibre.

Arne Myrdal also attempted to exploit the legitimacy of the Resistance movement, albeit with some credibility problems:

> In my family, a cousin of my mother was a member of Milorg [the military resistance organization]—and they still dare to call me a Nazi! Such libel makes me worry that we will have to take recourse to weapons in the future.[15]

In 1992, Arne Myrdal and the so-called Landsforeningen mot landssvikere (the National Association against Traitors), which maintained links to neo-Nazi activists, intensified work on constructing what they termed a "Traitor Register" (Landssvikerregister). Myrdal even applied to the Data Protection Registrar (Datatilsynet) for a license, but (not surprisingly) was turned down. All the same, he and his partners continued to register enemies. During the autumn of 1992 his organization, Norway Against Immigration (NMI), sent a form to a large number of individuals whom they wanted registered in their "Traitor Register"; recipients were asked to fill in the form themselves (!) "to save us the work," as the accompanying letter explained. While one could regard the whole matter as a very poor joke, many

recipients found it threatening to be registered by extremists and to be informed that they were under surveillance. The letter also explained who was to be deemed a "traitor":

> When foreign troops invaded and occupied our country in 1940–45, Norwegian traitors who assisted and cooperated with the foreigners were registered in a traitor register by good Norwegians and patriots. This register was later used during the treason trials.
>
> Today it has again become necessary to register new traitors who take service for the enemy. . . . It is useful to assign and register such traitors in three categories:
>
> 1) Governmental officials: Major state/regional/municipal officials who by their acts or statements aid foreigners, make possible further occupation, and aggravate the situation of Norwegian patriots (ministers of state, government employees, civil servants, etc.).
> 2) Political traitors: Politicians and extremists in parties/groups/organizations actively undermining the efforts of Norwegian patriots or assisting foreigners in the occupation of Norway (left-wing extremists, Blitz activists [an autonomous group], organized antiracists, etc.).
> 3) Other traitors: Individuals who by clear acts and statements serve the enemy (e.g. "pro forma" wives of foreign immigrants,[16] dishonest journalists, frequent contributors to newspaper letter-columns, etc.).[17]

These registration and harassment activities bear evident resemblance to the so-called Anti-Antifa lists that have circulated among German neo-Nazis, who have maintained close connections to similar groups in other countries, including Denmark and Sweden, Germany, Austria, and Britain.

The ZOG Discourse: The "White Resistance Movement" against the "Zionist Occupation Government"

Whereas Norwegian and Danish anti-immigrant activists have compared their struggle to the anti-Nazi resistance, neo-Nazi groups such as the Vitt Ariskt Motstand (VAM, White Aryan Resistance) have taken the opposite approach in their rhetoric. They regard their campaign as a direct extension of Nazi Germany's struggle against Jewish influences. Swedish neo-Nazis (and their less numerous Norwegian and Danish counterparts) base their ideas of a "Great Race War" waged against the "Zionist Occupation Government" and its lackeys upon earlier notions of a Jewish world conspiracy aimed at destroying the white race and subjugating the entire world. In the late 1980s, local Swedish neo-Nazis followed the path of highly violent revolutionary and terrorist doctrines developed by North American racist movements during the 1970s and 1980s. The ideological novel *The Turner Diaries*, and the U.S. terrorist group, The Order, have served as important sources of inspiration for European racists.

The ZOG ideology is perceived as part of a strategic plan by Jews in an alleged and ongoing race war against the Aryans, one involving the dissemination of perverted humanistic ideas of "a common human race," tolerance of racial mixing, and a multicultural world. There is a strong apocalyptic character to these perceptions; those that

harbor them perceive themselves as the only ones able to recognize the truth about what is taking place, with no other choice than to resort to drastic, violent methods to prevent catastrophe. The pervasive feeling of fear that their racialized identities and the social world as they once knew it, are threatened with annihilation, is apparent in the following quote from an editorial in the magazine *Storm* (No. 7–8, 1992):

> Our wonderful race is on the brink of total extermination. It is our assignment to salvage the remnants from amidst the decadence and misery of the present situation and restore it [i.e. our race] to its former honour and greatness. This can only take place in one way, by struggle!

The perception that it is really the Jews who have instigated waves of immigrants and refugees has been fundamental to the way most neo-Nazis perceive the issue of immigration. This view was also shared by the less militant Norwegian organization Zorn 88:

> As National Socialists we are more concerned with exposing the worldwide Zionist activities of deceit and banditry, and attacking the actual cause of the immigration problem, rather than turning against the individual immigrant.[18]

Militant activists of the Nazi scene furthermore claim that in this race war it is more important to fight the Jews and their obedient servants within politics, the bureaucracy, and the media than to go after individual immigrants, who are merely the pawn in a larger game. The Swedish terrorist-oriented cell Werwolf declared in its magazine:

> Let us once and for all state clearly that the primary targets of the national revolution are not refugee camps or individual niggers. Attacks on these are generally a waste of our resources. Attacks must be aimed at newspapers, politicians, journalists and the police/prosecuting authorities. They are the ones who constitute a significant but not insurmountable obstacle in our fight for freedom. For too long have these traitors escaped punishment for their misadministration of Sweden, which has led to the phenomena of mass immigration, widespread homosexuality, assaults on minors, and selling out Sweden to the EC, etc.
>
> Following the publication of every article that harasses national movements, heavy attacks must be aimed at the responsible newspapers and journalists, employing everything from bomb threats to grievous bodily harm and murder. We shall extract bitter revenge for every national soldier who is sentenced to imprisonment. We shall attack judges, jurors, prosecutors, witnesses and policemen.[19]

The virulent racism and anti-Semitism of the ZOG discourse has attracted support from only a very marginal part of the population; for most anti-immigrant activists and "moderate" nationalists, this discourse is far too extreme.[20] Thus, their symbolic capital is unsuitable for creating a rhetoric with the potential to win support from larger segments of the population. However, this is not the objective of militant national socialist activists anyway. Within Nazi groupings and among young people attracted to this type of rebellion against society, extremist discourses serves as a means to cull out the soft-hearted from the strong.[21] These groups actually prefer to

be an elite rather than a mass movement. However, their rhetoric is not directed at society at large but at a small segment of the populace who are alienated from society and its predominant values.[22] Extremist discourse herein serves as a banner for rebellion and a boundary marker against the rest of the society. The reactions of disgust among surrounding citizens merely strengthen group identity and solidarity. But as a basis for more extensive political mobilization aimed at winning political influence on the public arena, the ZOG discourse is totally unsuitable, as its values and symbols are not shared by the ordinary public.

Although a marginal phenomenon, the Nazi-affiliated ZOG discourse has won greater support among racist and nationalist youth groups in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark.[23] This may be due to the fact that in Sweden it is not a contradiction in terms to be both a patriot and a National Socialist. Swedish wartime National Socialists were not considered traitors. On the other hand, in Norway and Denmark, where many still remember the Nazi occupation and the local collaborating Nazis during the war, it has been far more difficult to "sell" Nazism and patriotism under the same banner. Nazism is still too firmly associated with treason. However, an important development was the increasing acceptance of the anti-Semitic ZOG discourse among young militant nationalists and anti-immigration activists in Norway and Denmark during the mid- and late 1990s. It seems like the historical experience with Nazism is gradually loosing its immunizing power. Still, the ZOG discourse remains a marginal phenomenon, though.

In comparison, the rhetorical discourse that draws an analogy between present-day resistance to immigration and the Resistance movement against Nazi occupation bears greater potential for mass mobilization—even to the point of being adopted by some politicians within influential right-wing populist parties like Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party) and Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress Party) in Norway.

Conclusion

Although nationalist anti-immigration activists and racial revolutionary neo-Nazi groups differ in their ideological tenets, the content of their rhetoric and their agendas for action are strikingly similar. Today's situation is defined as an invasion/occupation, where local traitors are supporting foreign occupants. These alleged traitors are identified as part and parcel with the political establishment, whose immigration policy has laid the country open to foreigners pillaging it away from the indigenous population. The media, antiracists, or anyone takes a stand against racism or in support of immigrants and refugees, as well as local women romantically involved with foreign men are all considered traitors leading the nation/race towards annihilation. The only force that can stand up to this "conspiracy of evil forces," is a resistance movement of true patriots. To save the nation/race from total disaster this resistance movement will, if necessary, wage a civil war/race war, partly against the "foreign invaders," but primarily against the "traitors."

The content and the structure of this rhetoric are almost identical, whether displayed by nationalist anti-immigrant activists or by racial revolutionaries such as the neo-Nazis. The primary distinctions trace to the sources of their rhetoric, the grounds on which they legitimate their political platform, and whom they target as

the foreign enemy. Nationalist anti-immigration activists in Norway and Denmark have assumed the anti-Nazi resistance during World War II as their model and legitimizing point of reference. Racial revolutionary groups all over Scandinavia, on the other hand, draw ideological material and symbols from National Socialism and related racist movements. The first type of right-wing extremism stresses nationalism, while the second places more emphasis on racialized differences within the population. Although discourses of nation and race often become intermingled, the new generation of racists increasingly seek to ground their identity and their cause internationally by proclaiming solidarity with the white or Aryan race. Nationalist anti-immigration activists feel threatened by the phenomenon of cultural mélange, while among neo-Nazi and racist ideologists it is racial mixing that is perceived as the greater threat.

There is, in fact, a fundamental dilemma built into all nationalisms whose ideology contains racist elements: should defense of race or nation take precedence? The tension between these two contradicting ideological principles has been a source of discord and division within the National Socialist movement since its very inception, leading to collaboration and treason as illustrated by the behavior of Nasjonal Samling and Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti during the Nazi occupation, and the praise many British nationalists extend to Britain's arch enemy, Adolf Hitler. With regard to identifying a coherent profile for the perceived foreign enemy, national socialists and other racial ideologues claim we are facing a Jewish conspiracy to annihilate the white race and gain world domination, while anti-immigrant activists alternately claim it is a Muslim conspiracy that seeks to conquer Europe and subjugate it under the rule of Islam. Neo-Nazis and other radical racial ideologists share with the nationalist anti-immigration activists the conviction that immigrants and refugees are merely instruments in a larger malicious scheme. However, they disagree about whether these immigrant groups are to be imputed as independent actors or as passive agents of the actual schemers. Accordingly, there is also some variation as to the extent to which immigrant groups are regarded as the primary enemy in the approaching racial/civil war, even while concurring that they must be expelled from the country—by violence, if necessary. However, both varieties of right-wing extremists seem to concur in their fervent conviction that on the day of retribution, true patriots shall direct their wrath at the national/racial traitors who have laid the country open to foreign invasion.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this article has been published in Tariq Moodood and Pnina Werbner, eds., *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community* (London: Zed Publishers, 1996). A more comprehensive version of the study has been published in *Terror from the Extreme Right*, ed. Tore Bjørgo (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 182–220, and in my doctoral dissertation *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia* (Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug, 1997), chapter 8.
2. P. Berger and T. Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality* (London: The Penguin Books, 1985).
3. See, e.g., "Introduction," in *Language and the Politics of Emotion,* ed. C.A. Lutz and L. Abu-Lughod (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Randi Karhus, "Diskurs som analytisk begrep," *Norsk antropologisk tidsskrift* 2, 3 (1992).

4. Michel Foucault, The *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), p. 49; C.A. Lutz and L. Abu-Lughod, eds., *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, pp. 9–10.
5. Whereas the term discourse implies communicative interaction, the term rhetoric is often regarded as referring to one-way communication speeches rather than dialogic conversations. There are various definitions and approaches to the concept of rhetoric and of rhetorical analysis. For further discussion, see Heradstveit and Bjørgo, *Politisk kommunikasjon: Introduksjon til semiotik og retorikk* (Oslo: TANO, 1992); Robert Paine, ed., *Politically Speaking*: *Cross-Cultural Studies of Rhetoric* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981).
6. For more detailed analysis of these processes, see T. Bjørgo, "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and Refugees in Scandinavia: Patterns, and Motives" (chapter 3) and "Role of the Media in Racist Violence" (chapter 7), in *Racist Violence in Europe*, ed. Tore Bjørgo and Rob Witte (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).
7. In Denmark, however, these institutions were to some extent discredited because of their compliance with the German occupation forces.
8. The nationalist, anti-immigrant parties that have instrumentalized this discourse have never managed to muster as much as 1% of the vote in national elections in Norway. They have, however, won single seats in a few municipal councils and regional assemblies. In Denmark, Stop Indvandringen (Stop Immigration) lists attracted up to 2.4% of the votes in some localities in the 1989 local elections. Extreme nationalist and racist parties are too small to qualify for parliamentary elections in Denmark. However, more moderate right-wing populist parties like Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party) and Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress Party) in Norway have been highly successful in exploiting anti-immigrant sentiments among the population.
9. Arne Myrdal was squeezed out of the FMI leadership in April 1991; he had become an embarrassment to the organization for his not-so-subtle incitements to violence and his record of violence (cf. next note).
10. Myrdal was sentenced to one year in prison for preparing to blow up an asylum center in 1989, and was sentenced to seven months in prison (reduced to four months on appeal) for inciting and leading a band of followers to attack a group of antiracist demonstrators with sticks and clubs in 1990. Arne Myrdal, born in 1935, has had a varied career, although limited formal education. He has been a low-ranking military officer, an unsuccessful businessman (convicted several times of economic offences), and the author of a highly controversial book on local history. He was also a rebellious local councillor of the Labour Party—from which he split off to establish a competing local party that failed to win any seats in the subsequent election. Myrdal retired from political activism in 1994/1995 due to failing health.
11. An example of the manner in which Danish and Norwegian anti-immigration activists have developed a common discourse is exemplified in the notion of "red Nazis," a term coined to denote leftist and militant anti-racists. Whether this notion was originally coined in Denmark or in Norway is not clear, but it is much used by activists in both countries.
12. Quoted from this researcher's interview with Arne Myrdal, June 23, 1989.
13. Arne Myrdal, *Sannheten skal fram* (*The Truth Must be Told*) (Oslo: Lunderød Forlag, 1990), pp. 3–4. This theory is a recurrent theme in Myrdal's book, as mentioned, e.g., on pp. 12, 17, 25, and 31.
14. Quoted from my own interview with Arne Myrdal (August 12, 1989).
15. Arne Myrdal quoted in Verdens Gang (VG) November 10, 1991, after his unsuccessful "popular meeting" in Oslo where 10,000 people literally turned their backs on him in a massive demonstration of disgust.
16. In many instances, women romantically involved with male foreigners have also been subjected to systematic harassment. This is a central focus of "School Edition" of Myrdal's

FMI periodical Norge Er Vårt ("Norway Is Ours"):

> "Women who had affairs with Germans [during the war], we used to refer to as 'German whores' and 'German mattresses'. Today, women who have relations with asylum immigrants should be spoken of as asylum mattresses. Remember that!"

Among some white men, these relationships seem to elicit primitive feelings of possessiveness regarding "our women" being stolen and defiled by strangers. Many cases of racist street violence have taken the form of assaults on "foreign men" who have gone on the town in the company of local, white girls. In such situations, racist dimension tends to come to the surface much more strongly than in other types of conflict between locals and immigrants. Violence may be directed both at the foreign man and the local woman.

17. Quoted verbatim from the note dispatched with a "Traitor Register" form mailed to this researcher, with a request that it be filled in "to save us the work" (!).
18. Erik Rune Hansen, editor of the Zorn 88 periodical *Gjallarhorn* 1, 1 (Autumn 1989). The name Zorn means "holy wrath" in German, 88 is a common Nazi code for twice the eight letter of the alphabet, "H H" as the acronym for "Heil Hitler." Zorn 88 later changed its name to Norges Nasjonalsosialistiske Bevegelse (Norway's National Socialist Movement).
19. Cited from *Werwolf,* No. 9 (1992)
20. Norwegian and Danish anti-immigrant parties and organizations like FMI, DDF, Fedrelandspartiet og Stopp Innvandringen painstakingly avoid using concepts like Jews, Zionism, and race in order not to be linked to the discredited Nazi tradition. There is no trace of anti-Semitism in the public statements of these organizations.
21. Cf. *Storm,* 5–6 (1991): 16.
22. This is evident from the fact that these extremist groups have been conducting very active and organized recruiting activities among prison inmates [cf. *Storm*, 7–8 (1992): 17].
23. Providing reliable figures on the size of such scenes is very problematic because participants are involved to different degrees, in different activities, hold different ideological views, and drop in and out of the scene. Many groups do not have formal membership, or do not disclose how many members they have. The number of activists, members, and sympathizers of the Swedish racist counter-culture was estimated at between 500 and 600 in 1993 (Helene Lööw, "The Cult of Violence: The Swedish Racist Counter-Culture," in Bjørgo and Witte, *Racist Violence*, p. 62) and gradually growing to around 1,000 activists (and an unknown but much larger number of sympathizers) by the end of the decade. Swedish "White Power" bands produced up to 30–35 CDs annually in volumes of 1,200–6,000 copies each (first printings). Twelve% of Swedish pupils (aged 12–20) sometimes or frequently listened to such racist music, according to a survey (Hélene Lööw: Vit matktmusik BRÅ-rapport 1999: 10). Thus, the Swedish racist scene has developed a very sophisticated and effective propaganda infrastructure, with a large "market" for its products. This is very unlike the situation in Norway, where the size of the so-called Nationalist Scene (which consisted of both non-Nazi and Nazi-oriented young nationalists) has varied during the 1990s from less than 100 to a peak of 3-400 persons around 1995, and declining to 1-200 or even less by the early 2000s (this is based on my own estimates as well as assessments by the Norwegian Security Police). In the earlier part of period, the majority of participants were predominantly nationalist and anti-immigrant in their ideological orientation, but the proportion of young racists who subscribed to the ZOG and Nazi discourse became increasingly dominant during the 1990s. The Danish situation is comparable in numbers to the Norwegian, or even lower.

Chapter Twelve

Racism, the Extreme Right, and Ideology in Contemporary France: Continuum or Innovation?

Michel Wieviorka

Emergences

Until the 1960s, in Western Europe more than anywhere in the world, the acute awareness of the horrors to which Nazism had led fostered a conviction that racism in general, and anti-Semitism in particular, would surely disappear or at least decline to become marginal phenomena. This idea was reinforced by the widespread impact of decolonization—a process that remains as yet incomplete, as France, in particular, still maintains a number of odd territories in various parts of the world. However, the major wave of decolonization is generally understood to have achieved completion in 1973 with the Revolution of the Carnations in Portugal, during which that country relinquished its massive colonial empire. By far the majority of countries in Western Europe claim to adhere to democratic principles, with the past trauma of Italian fascism and German Nazism alike perceived as historical events driven by extreme-right political ideologies. It is true that dictators continued to rule a small number of countries in Western Europe until as recently as the 1970s—Franco in Spain, Salazar and then Caetano in Portugal, and the Colonels in Greece—yet, the first two dictators are generally perceived as residual elements from an earlier era, and the latter an epiphenomenon in relation to political life on the continent.

In Western Europe during the late 1960s, neither racism, nor anti-Semitism, nor the extreme right as a political phenomena constituted an organizing force to be reckoned with in discussions about European societies. However, in several European countries, the extreme left, which was very active at the time, considered the existence of extreme-right movements a cause for concern and opposed them politically and even physically (on university campuses). In the mid-1970s, Italy was earnestly concerned about the possibility of a rightward drift of the type that had already occurred in Chile. Extreme-left terrorism had its counterpart in an extreme-right movement, so much so that a "historical compromise" began to take shape between the Communists and the Christian Democrats to guard the country against any leanings towards fascism. Yet on the whole, Europe at that time appeared to be entering an age in which, once its last dictatorships were finally purged, it could prepare to debate issues far beyond those of racism, anti-Semitism, and the attraction of extremism.

Racism and the Extreme Right in Europe Today

The reemergence of racism in the 1980s and 1990s seems to have spread from Great Britain to France, Belgium, and Germany, arriving in Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal) in the 1990s. This racism should be distinguished from that of an earlier era, when racism claimed to be grounded in a scientific rationale drawing upon the physical and biological attributes (real or imagined) of the groups targeted. The "new" form of racism, formulated by Martin Barker, is grounded in allegations about the intellectual or moral aptitudes of particular groups. It refers to the cultural characteristics of groups and individuals and posits these characteristics as irrevocably different from and incompatible with the dominant values of society. Thus cultural racism, sometimes referred to as "differentialist" racism by the specialists, no longer justifies itself through scientific theorization, as once exemplified in the discourse of physical anthropology. When specific groups are targeted, it is no longer with the motive of making them feel inferior and exploiting them further (e.g., on the factory floor), but rather with the intention of maintaining these groups at a distance and rejecting them in the name of their putative threat to national culture. This new European racism is similar to a phenomenon American psychologists and political scientists have coined "symbolic racism." The term references a shift from a direct, scientific, and biological form of racism, to one targeting particular groups, such as Black Americans, and crediting them with a culture that does not conform to the national credo of family values, work ethic, and personal ambition.

Anti-Semitism has not been a central theme during this resurgence, not among the working class and middle class, where an obsession with immigrants, Blacks, Arabs, and Muslims has become more prevalent. Anti-Semitism remains a subject that is to a large extent taboo. However, there are two points worthy of note. For one, anti-Semitism has been a political platform among the leaders of the extreme-right movements. For example, a questionnaire circulated among Front National members participating in the congress in Cannes in 1989 revealed that anti-Semitism comprises a central tenet of their ideology. Simultaneously, anti-Semitism is also spreading among working-class immigrants for reasons that find their corollary within the United States, where working-class Black Americans and even more, the Black middle class, have cultivated a resentment of Jews variously exploited by Louis Farrakhan. I directed a research study during the 1990s in the French town of Sarcelles, which revealed this type of anti-Semitism to be prevalent among young people of Caribbean origin and of North African immigrant origin. These young people expressed jealousy toward the Jewish population as a powerful local community organized and capable of exerting effective pressure on the local political groups in which many participate. The Jewish population incarnates this capacity to function as a community, exhibiting an inclination lacking among populations of Caribbean and North African origin. They furthermore personify affluence, are supposedly more closely linked with the media toward which many immigrants harbor an ambivalent relationship, and are often loyal to Zionism and the State of Israel, which poses a conflict of interest for immigrants who identify with Arab culture, Islamism, and the Palestinian Struggle.

During the 1980s and 1990s several countries in Europe witnessed a rise in the power of radical groups. Some developed into respectable political parties, while

others became demonstratively violent. Here we must be careful to distinguish between the instances in which extreme-right radicalism finds expression through major political groups, as exemplified in the French Front National, the Belgian Vlaams Block, the Italian League or Haider's FPÖ in Austria. Elsewhere the phenomenon remains essentially intra-political and does not transit through political parties, but rather through groups exhibiting varying degrees of violence, as exemplified among the skinheads in Great Britain. In other cases, a mixture of elements are at work, as in Germany, where a wave of intra-political violence broke out in the early 1990s just as political difficulties around reunification were emerging in a spectacular manner. In these instances, racist and xenophobic violence targeted immigrants directly, and extreme-right groups sought to coalesce into larger units such as the Republican Party, yet never achieved the electoral scores of the Front National or the Italian League.

Overall, the rise of radical right-wing groups has paralleled the rise in nationalist sentiment, the regionalism exemplified in the Ligue du Nord, and a populism that claims to speak on behalf of the "small man" (as opposed to the "big fish"). The term "national-populism" is sometimes used to describe these movements, which have also surfaced in countries of the former Soviet Empire, including Russia. In their social aspect, these movements not only correspond to anxieties or realities attributable to a decline in social status, impoverishment, and the loss of social bearings. They also exhibit a zeal for modernization and a middle-class ambition to distance themselves from portions of the populations in financial decline or economically dependent upon the Welfare State. The Vlaams Block, by way of example, has pleaded in favor of the separation of the prosperous and thriving Flanders from Walloon, a region in a state of economic disaster. Elsewhere, the Italian League advocates separating the North of Italy from the South, regarding the latter as a national impediment to modernization and economic efficiency.

The ideologies of these movements often surface out of frustrations that are poorly thought through and highly contradictory in their economic dimensions, such that liberalism and an appeal to state intervention or even national sovereignty become bedfellows. National-populist movements have, in many respects, become part of the galaxy of the anti-globalization movement. On the whole, these movements make little effort to produce their own intellectual forum, or to gain the support of ideologists or organic intellectuals, or to construct "think tanks" specific to them. In France, however, the Club de l'Horloge and other initiatives have actually played a central role. It was first expected that extremist phenomena would dissipate to the benefit of democracy, cultural difference, and an enhanced capacity to "live together with our differences," to use the title words from Alain Touraine's recently published book. Yet racism, anti-Semitism, and the extreme right have begun to occupy a significant space within the collective life of several countries, and, as I will now elaborate via examples from my own French culture of origin, there is nothing new about this development.

A Flashback

France has historically maintained a problematical relationship to racist thought and anti-Semitism. The depth of the phenomena in its intellectual and political dimensions

is considerable. This is the country that brought forth both Georges Vacher de Lapouge and Edouard Drumont. Its thinkers, scholars, writers, travelers, and religious dignitaries contributed extensively throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the formulation of classical, scientific racism. France is also the country in which the Dreyfus Affair took place; while part of the population participated in the Resistance during World War II, others worked within the Vichy regime or collaborated with the Nazi occupying forces and participated in the destruction of the Jewish population.This country, furthermore, brought forth Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras. Indeed, its culture has contributed decisively to the formulation of extreme-right ideas; historian Zeev Sternhell has gone so far as to postulate France as the main locus for the formation of the ideologies that led to Nazism and fascism. It is a country where extreme-right tendencies have often held extreme political importance, as exemplified in the Action Française during the interwar period.

Moreover, France traces a long and sustained colonial history. French colonization justified itself as promulgating universal values and the progress of civilization. Republicans such as Jules Ferry perceived colonialism as a means for inferior cultures to accede to the political form of the nation and to civilization, and to gain access to education. But, of course, colonization was largely a process of domination, exploitation, and even destruction of the peoples in question. Decolonization was painful and costly, as evinced in the Algerian and Vietnam wars, and did not so much sever the metropolis from its colonies as establish postcolonial relations. The former colonies of North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, and especially Algeria provided cheap industrial labor throughout the Trente Glorieuses, as we call the postwar era of prosperity. Unskilled immigrant workers were socially integrated into French society, but often chose to remain culturally and politically marginalized for they were intent upon returning to their countries of origin. They fell victim to a racism that combined contempt with sentiments of superiority. Although there was a place for them within French society and a demand for their labor, their designated place was on the last rung of the socioeconomic ladder, where they performed menial and degrading work for the lowest permissible wages.

The colonial past of France remains omnipresent within the national imagination through historical recollections which present the Arabs and Islam as the enemy. In primary school, children are taught that Charles Martel stopped the Arabs at Poitiers in 732 and curbed the invasion and occupation to which Spain was subjected until the sixteenth century. Everyone also knows France as the Church's oldest daughter, having participated in the crusades which occupied holy sites in the Near East that were once held by Muslims. Whether one views racism as a doctrine or an opinion, its various historical manifestations have included anti-Semitism, partisan organizations, extreme-right ideologies, and colonialism. To all this we must add the weight of a culture in which nation and religion have historically stood in conflict with the Arab and Arab–Muslim world. Yet, is this sufficient to explain the surge of racism as expressed through Jean Marie Le Pen and the Front National? The notion of a continuum of racism seems legitimate. This repressed history, which has long included highly meaningful elements that weigh heavily on the existence of the present phenomena of racism and the extreme right, is a considerable burden to contemporary France.

Major Changes in French Society

According to Daniel Bell, the foundations of modernity are grounded in three spheres—the social, the political, and the cultural. France during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century can be regarded as a country in which these three spheres were strongly integrated. Thus, expressions like "national society" or "nation-state" have often seemed more appropriate when applied to France than to many other countries. Indeed, within the sociological tradition, and specifically within the work of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, the terms "society" and "nation" are frequently understood as interchangeable. Thus, until the early 1970s, French society, the State, various public institutions, and national identity were perceived as an integrated whole. With the move toward destructuration, we detect the components that were to culminate in racism and the transformation of the Front National from a small group into a large political party, beginning with the by-election in Dreux in 1983.

The End of Industrial Society

Until the mid-1970s, France was an industrial society, in which collective life focused on the relations of production in the factories and on the shop floor. The central conflict that structured these relationships was the opposition between the working class and those who owned the means of production. This conflict gave an anticapitalist slant to many other aspects of the nation's social life. It served as a reference point for struggles forming in other spheres, such as the universities, in rural areas, consumer groups, in lifestyle activities, and provided the underpinning for a political system based upon the opposition between left and right. Class conflict also organized intellectual life, with intellectuals frequently opposed to one another as a function of their political affinities. One need only recall here the figure of Jean-Paul Sartre, a Communist party sympathizer for whom Marxism constituted an "impassable horizon."

Nowadays the structuring role of this conflict has lost its centrality, so much so that the very figure of the worker has disappeared from the media and representations of social life, even though workers still constitute a full 25 percent of the employed population. This marginalization of the proletariat took place at the same time as France was entering a phase of large-scale deindustrialization, extensive unemployment, and a resulting deterioration of social bonds. There are two important points worth noting in this development. On the one hand, a substantial portion of the local working-class French (français "de souche") as well as some of the middle class experienced a loss in social status, and the displacement of traditional points of reference. This was particularly true in working-class regions vacated by the bourgeois (the process known sa "white flight") as immigrants and their families settled in the same areas. This became a strong contributing force in the rise of racism and in the electoral success of the Front National. On the other hand, immigration patterns also underwent considerable transformation. At one time, the classic image of the immigrant worker was of a man, single or alone, living with similar people in a hostel or a hotel run by unscrupulous people who came to be known as "marchands de sommeil"—or dealers in beds. The immigrant functioned almost

solely in his language of origin, and participated minimally in the life of the host country. This image gave way to that of the "beur" and the "beurette"—young people of North African descent born in France. The term "beur" was coined in verlan (inverted word order) from the word "Arab." They tended to have a higher rate of unemployment than others, which contributed to their social marginalization even as they were otherwise integrated into the culture and civic life of the country. This transformation was brought about through the twin phenomena of family reunification and the aforementioned industrial crisis. Immigrants, having themselves lost their bearings, asserted themselves with increasing visibility both in the public sphere and through a cultural identity often inflected by the Muslim religion. From this point on, immigrants and their children, who were French or would soon be naturalized, were perceived less in their status as workers than through the lens of cultural difference. The racism targeted at them has shifted from stressing their inferior skills and using this as a justification for exploiting their labors, and now aims to hold them at a distance under the pretext that they are incapable of integrating into the national culture.

The Crisis of the Institutions

A process of profound crisis was underway within the institutions of the Republic, which seemed increasingly incapable of fulfilling the famous promises of the Republic for "liberty-equality-fraternity." Some institutions disappeared altogether. The republican army, for example, became a professional army, and numerous public firms were privatized. Others, such as the public education system, the police departments, the justice system, and the major public service concerns, found it increasingly difficult to live up to public expectations.

The crisis took place at three levels. In the first instance, it involved employees or civil servants of relatively secure status who nevertheless felt constrained by their circumstances. Many went into debt in order to leave the public housing projects (HLM) and become owner-occupants. Meanwhile, they witnessed their children struggling to find secure employment and undergoing a decline in social status. By way of example, primary school teachers (known as l'instituteur) were once among the prestigious figures in the rising Republic of the first half of the twentieth century, yet the profession has lost its aura of dignity and respect. The crisis furthermore traveled into the organizational structure of institutions. Since the 1960s endeavors to modernize public institutions by exercising economic constraint and establishing more efficient forms of management have destabilized working habits and internal social relations. This has accentuated corporatist or sectional mechanisms, made employees feel anxious and insecure, and given rise to forms of resistance increasingly perceived by the broader population as justified. At a broader sociological level, all institutions are experiencing a crisis of relevance and seem incapable of clearly defining their aims. Overarching questions about the purpose of public schooling or what extent of public service to provide remain unanswered, or seem to lead to intense and confused discussions. The very meaning of the Republic seems to be at stake.

All these dimensions of the crisis have an impact upon immigrants and their children, who are still referred to as "immigrants" although they are generally French. Employees under stress become short-tempered, anxious, and lose all sense of

generosity or open-mindedness. While few are likely to actually vote for the Front National, they may nevertheless indirectly contribute to the rise of racism through their behavior and their attitudes, which increase the discrimination to which "immigrants" are subjected. The organizational crisis herein arouses defensive behaviors favoring xenophobic and racist viewpoints, inspiring whole sections of the population to attribute institutional difficulties to immigrants, who are perceived as exploiting and perverting the public infrastructure. For example, if the Welfare State is overburdened, it is because "they" come with several wives and crowds of children. If the schools can no longer fulfill their mission, it is because "their" children hold back the educational progress of the "local" French or Français "de souche". This latter term is widely applied and, according to the research of demographer Hervé Le Bras, has spread a great deal of harm. Little surprise then, that the theme of the crisis of Republican integration gained momentum in the mid-1980s, as a theory espousing that immigrants must integrate and that this integration involves the Republic and its institutions.

The Nation

In classical political theory, the nation is modeled after the image of Janus, a two-faced character. On the one hand, the nation is the imaginary framework within which modernity is elaborated. Such infrastructural elements as the educational system, economic life, the public institutions, and the political system, have thrived within the space of the nation. The nation then adapts democratic principles, binds these to the idea of progress and claims to promote a universal message not only for those dwelling within its borders, but also to the outside world. Is not France regarded as the universal nation, the very personification of the rights of man and of the citizen of the world? And yet the nation may also personify the cultural homogeneity of a community, a unity that rapidly leads to xenophobia and racism and a call for closing the frontiers of the country.

Since the early 1980s, France has felt threatened in its cultural existence for reasons that trace back to the painful decline of industrial society and the crisis of republican institutions. The rise in unemployment and the downward mobility of whole sections of the population occurred parallel to the phenomenon of immigration, and led to a cultural, differential form of racism. Simultaneously, economic globalization was seen as bearing threatening social implications and challenging national sovereignty. For implicit in the internationalization of culture is the spread of American hegemony, which is not well received in France. When EuroDisneyland was built just east of Paris, and fast food replaced the traditional "bistro," and Coca Cola replaced lemonade or red wine, it seemed to erode fundamental elements of national identity. These changes, whose valuation is ultimately quite subjective, are reinforced by various apprehensions within Europe: isn't globalization somehow linked to the Trojan horse of neoliberalism? Does globalization undermine national sovereignty? Does it impose technocratic norms that weaken national identity through changes in food consumption patterns, for example? I have heard people debating whether Camembert, which constitutes a national symbol, will continue to be manufactured, given that its characteristics do not meet the norms laid down in Brussels. Economic life seems to have ventured beyond the control of the nation-state, which is now beset by social crisis,

the decline of industrialization, and a nationalism of racist and xenophobic dimensions.

Since the early 1960s, France has experienced two significant assertions of cultural difference in the public sphere. First, the various movements to assert identity politics, including Jewish identity, homosexuality, women, but also groups desiring to transform perceived disabilities into difference, such as the demand among the deaf-and-dumb to live in a world inclusive of sign language. Second, in the 1980s social demands began to weigh more heavily, as in the demand for the public recognition of the religion of Islam, which had become the second most prevalent religion within France in a span of only a few years. For France, this dual surge of identities signified the fragmentation of culture, with public space increasingly the scene for asserting all manner of demands. Herein lies the danger for cultural identity to collapse into the assertion of a "natural" group, a race likely to mix with other human "races," which can lead to the perceived need to mobilize against such a possibility. Racism and cultural differentialism are not the same, yet dwell only a few steps apart from one another.

Dis/continuities

The processes outlined above involve, on the one hand, the lower echelons and changes in the expectations and demands of populations, which are transformed into racism and xenophobia. On the other hand, they also involve the upper echelons, who capitalize on these changes, organize them ideologically, and ensure their treatment within the political sphere. If we view the electoral gains of the Front National in the 1980s and 1990s as expressing politically what is emerging from society at the grassroots level, the theory of a historical continuum holds less conviction. For the aforementioned developments seem to indicate the end of one era and the entry into a new one; they sustain racism and the Front National without the support of ideologies from the past. My own fieldwork demonstrates that the new working-class (populaire) form of racism has no historical depth. There is a complete ignorance pertaining to any of the prewar hypotheses and ideologies, even in instances where institutional membership could ensure the reproduction of racist or anti-Semitic ideas. In the national police force, the racism pervading opinions and stereotypes bears no reference to the past; rather, it is part of present-day life among the police who rationalize that if we lived where they live and if we worked as they work, then we would of necessity become equally racist.

For anyone who endeavors to explain the present through the past, the legacy of the Algerian war offers the most compelling evidence. Benjamin Stora demonstrates that there is a link between the collective memory of this war, especially amongst former settlers (Pieds-noirs) many of whom now dwell in the Provence-Côte d'Azur, and the Front National vote, with its attendant racism. Within the surveys I personally conducted, this type of racism did not surface frequently, certainly less than among those who attribute the social, institutional, and cultural crisis to the immigrants. While the current leaders of the extreme right possess a intellectual background and a historical knowledge that bears continuities with prewar themes, this continuity can only explain the stance of a small group of leaders, and certainly not

the spectacular expansion of power in the early 1980s. Nor does it explain the ensuing brief decline in early 2000, which actually started in 1998 with the division between Bruno Mégret and Jean-Marie Le Pen and the breakup of the Front National into two rival parties. A close reading of the Front National documents further reveals this party is characterized by significant ideological innovations, in contrast with the initiatives of smaller groups that bear greater similarities to prewar thought.

It is perhaps most important to understand how racism, anti-Semitism, and the extreme right have been totally discredited as ideological and political forces as a result of the war years and by collaboration. This disrepute so thoroughly saturates society today that it is practically out of the question to express any public or political sympathy with the ideas and the projects circulating between 1940 and 1945. In order for the extreme right to establish itself as a political force, it first had to attain a degree of respectability, to become a media presence, and to gain legitimacy by either breaking with the ignominious past or by placing it at an appreciable distance. To become part of the political scene, it was also necessary to demonstrate clearly that the Front National respected electoral and democratic processes, and that it had nothing to do with the violence exerted by groups such as the skinheads, or with such acts as the profanation of Jewish cemeteries. Of course, the organization also had to present itself as a break with the system of established parties—what Jean-Marie Le Pen refers to as the "gang of four." The Front National has never completely innovated, instead maintaining a tension between innovation and continuity.

There is nothing inevitable about the spread of racism and the rise of extreme right-wing behaviors in France or elsewhere. While these phenomena may bear some ideological relation to the historical past, racism ultimately evolves with the circumstances at hand and tends more toward renewal than reproduction, piecing together ideas in a bricolage, to use Levi-Strauss's words. The radical right currently occupies a political position whose security is enhanced the more they sever their continuity with their earlier ideological counterparts. While certain political and cultural policies may endure over time, it is much more relevant to recognize the new approaches at work in the phenomena at hand. From a sociological point of view, if we are to understand contemporary racism, the contemporary extreme right wing, and their various developments, we must study more closely the means by which they are produced rather than by which they are reproduced.

Chapter Thirteen

Immigration, Insecurity, and the French Far Right

Franklin Hugh Adler

Fear of crime, or insecurité, has been associated with immigration in French public opinion for the past 20 years. Conventional political wisdom would point to the central role played by France's extreme right party, the *Front National* (FN), in successfully linking the two issues and maintaining their centrality in national political debates. Indeed, for most of this period, other political parties seemed to waffle between two poles. On the one hand, they appeared to be too soft on immigration and insecurity, leaving themselves vulnerable to FN accusations of being lenient or worse. On the other hand, they actually contributed to the FN's xenophobic discourse by taking a stand on certain issues that provoked the wrath of influential antiracist organizations and a significant sector of public opinion—carrying water to the FN's mill, as the French would say.

And yet a significant transition that has been underway during the past two years has gone almost unnoticed. While "insecurity" has clearly worsened and undoubtedly will be a major concern in the coming presidential and parliamentary elections, immigration has almost faded from the national political arena as a volatile issue. One could say that it has been eclipsed by other issues (insecurity, corruption, Corsica, an economic downturn, and renewed unemployment), or that it has entered a period of conspicuous latency. Beyond the extreme right, it was not even mentioned during the recent municipal elections, nor have any of the major parties given any indication that it will appear in next year's electoral campaigns. The left will further delay fulfilling its promise of extending the right to vote in municipal elections to non-EU residents, the right will refrain from tinkering with citizenship or the nationality code, much less promise any new program of expulsions or subsidizing the repatriation of foreigners. If anything, the right seems to have retreated from its earlier commitment to get tough on immigration, perhaps no longer fearing it will lose part of its electorate to the FN. Charles Pasqua, a Gaullist hard-liner on immigration and former interior minister whose very name is associated with restrictive legislation, claimed that Interior Minister Chevènement had not been sufficiently generous in the last round of "regularizing" immigrants of irregular status, and remarked that an "électrochoc" was called for, whereby all applicants not guilty of criminal infractions should be approved. In fact, some leaders of the right, such as Alain Juppé, have called for a fundamental reappraisal of the immigration

issue, noting, in passing, the sizable number of second-and third-generation voters from immigrant constituencies who have become French citizens and who support the left because the right has either written them off or has never really addressed their concerns.[1]

An event occurred during the municipal election campaigns of spring 2001 that is worth noting. A ship, the East Sea, ran aground off Saint-Raphaël while carrying 900 Kurdish refugees in search of asylum. Although the press pointed out that such ships pass through France every ten days, and the Kurds turned out to be from Syria rather than Iraq, where they had claimed they were persecuted, a poll indicated that eight of ten French citizens were in favor of welcoming them.[2] Despite the ongoing problem of illegal immigration, and despite warnings from the extreme right that more Third World cargo would find its way to French shores, neither the East Sea nor the broader issue of refugee smuggling surfaced during the municipal elections.

What has led to this eclipse of immigration as a contentious political issue and its de-coupling from insecurity? Why hasn't the current highly publicized crime wave[3] and attendant concerns for public security led to a renewed round of anti-immigrant sentiment, especially given earlier polling data where 55 to 65 percent of respondents consistently held immigration partially responsible for insecurity, and recent polls in which 60 percent of respondents agree with the proposition that there are too many immigrants in France?[4]

A fully adequate explanation, of course, would be properly nuanced, complex, and multicausal. For present purposes, I shall concentrate only on the internally generated, self-destructive crisis of the FN in December 1998 and the formation of a splinter party in January 1999, the *Mouvement National Républicain* (MNR), headed by Bruno Mégret. Simply put, to the degree that the saliency of immigration was associated with the ascendancy and implantation of the FN from 1984 to l998, so too has the decline of immigration as an issue paralleled the precipitous decline, isolation, and marginalization of the parties of the extreme right. Since 1999, Le Pen and Mégret are rarely seen on television, nor are they covered as extensively in the press as they once were. While they retained control in three of the four municipalities they held prior to the recent elections (Orange, Marignane, Vitrolles), they lost Toulon and literally disappeared in Dreux, their most famous local stronghold. Despite some areas of local and regional strength, their national presence has diminished: instead of the 15 percent of the vote they received in elections before the rupture, they now share roughly 10 percent nationally. Support for Le Pen's ideas has dropped by half in recent polls, while opposition toward forming electoral alliances with either the FN or MNR has increased both among the general electorate and among supporters of those moderate right parties (RPR, UDF, RPF, DL) with whom agreements might have been forged to defeat the left in triangular contests.

Opposition to forming alliances with the FN is 71 percent among all respondents, and 62 percent among supporters of the moderate right parties. Opposition, ironically enough, is even greater vis-à-vis alliances with the party headed by Mégret, who was earlier perceived as more moderate than Le Pen and as champion of an "Italian strategy" of alliance formation: 72 percent among all respondents, and 66 percent among supporters of the moderate right parties.[5] Given the increased isolation and marginality of the extreme-right parties, the issues, constituencies, and

electorate they once commanded are no longer as politically significant as earlier; in fact, they can now be largely ignored by the major parties at little or no apparent cost.

An alternative or complementary explanation might focus less on the FN and more on the long-term evolution of public opinion, which has grown less hostile toward immigration or become resigned to accepting the permanent presence of large numbers of non-European residents whose children will become or already are French nationals (the so-called *jeunes issus de l'immigration*).[6] On this account, there has been a steady decline in support for the extreme right's proposals on immigration, especially the coerced repatriation of long-standing foreign residents and the revocation of status of those naturalized since 1974, a policy never seriously considered since Vichy. Accordingly, support for the extreme right's position on immigration would likely have declined even had there been no crisis debilitating the FN, for the extreme right's marginalization is largely the consequence, rather than the cause, of a shift in public opinion regarding immigration. There is much to be said for this explanation, which decenters the FN and places public opinion on immigration in a broader historical and cultural context.[7] Though the FN's speculation on immigration was central to its ascendancy in 1984, immigration was already an issue pitting the left against restrictive policies enacted under Giscard d'Estaing's presidency by Poniatowski, Stoleru, Bonnet, and Barre. One could even argue that it was the left's victory in 1981, and not just immigration, that created the generalized conditions for Le Pen's ascendancy. After all, the FN had been playing the immigration card without success since its formation in 1972, the issue was not invented in the 1980s.

While a fully adequate explanation would combine both approaches, rather than pursuing one to the exclusion of the other, I have decided to begin by focusing here on the crisis and marginalization of the FN. This was not a slow, gradual decline attributable to external factors, but rather a dramatic crash. In fact, never had the FN been more influential than it was immediately prior to the crisis, never had it been as well implanted locally and nationally, never had it been closer to persuading elements of the moderate right parties to afford it the same consideration on the right that the socialists afforded the communists on the left, never had it been closer to escaping from its political ghetto. Neither the marginalization of the FN, nor the eclipse of the immigration issue would have taken place had it not been for the crisis. This, despite evolutionary changes in public opinion and symbolically significant events, such as the understandably overplayed "*effet coupe du monde*," in which the French soccer team won the World Cup with a multiracial team joyously embraced by immigrants and French alike, with the exception of the extreme right, especially Le Pen.

The Crisis

In the development of the FN from an obscure extreme-right groupuscule to a national political party, three distinct phases can be identified. I shall argue that the crisis emerged from internal contradictions that could no longer be contained during the third phase, when the FN was torn between two fundamentally different and incompatible strategies, articulated alternatively by Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno

Mégret. The first was that of a so-called grande alternative, in which the FN attempted to confront and destabilize the entire "rotten" (*pourri*) establishment, particularly the dominant political parties, the so-called gang of four. French voters would eventually turn to them as things became progressively worse, viewing the FN as the only political force that addressed real issues (immigration, crime, unemployment), that had not failed, and that was not corrupt.

The second, sometimes referred to as the "Italian strategy," derived theoretically from Gramsci and was partially modeled on Gianfranco Fini's transformation of the neofascist MSI into the postfascist *Alleanza Nazionale*. Fini sought to erase the demonic fascist associations from the party's identity, and break out of its political ghetto through strategic alliances with other parties of the center–right. It should be underscored that the conflict between Le Pen and Mégret was fundamentally over strategy, not doctrine, over means, not ends. Though Mégret has differed with some of Le Pen's foreign policy views, and has little patience with what he regards as Le Pen's counterproductive statements on racial inequality, Jews, the Holocaust, Vichy, and the old reactionary right, his general outlook on immigration, French identity, Islam, crime, American power, and globalization are almost identical to Le Pen's. Having himself compiled and synthesized Le Pen's quite disparate and occasionally contradictory pronouncements into a formally articulated, coherent party program, Mégret renounced nothing in the FN's program when he founded the MNR, but instead carried these programmatic commitments wholesale into the new party.

In order to situate the dispute between Le Pen and Mégret, I propose the following three-stage periodization. The first stage (1972–1984) corresponds to what FN members sometimes refer to as "crossing the desert" (*la traversée du désert*). These were difficult years, in which the party labored in almost total obscurity, with no electoral success and no political profile. The typical party member came from either the old reactionary right (including those who had served Vichy and the Waffen-SS), newer extreme-right formations such as *Occident*, *Ordre nouveau*, *FEN*, *Mouvement Solidariste*, *OAS*, as well as those who had supported the campaigns of Pierre Poujade and Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancoeur. Despite defections, internal disputes, and little material support, the singular accomplishment during this stage was to aggregate the various extreme-right groups and factions into one unified, durable organization. Le Pen's leadership was initially subject to challenge, but gradually asserted itself and with time became incontestable; his capacity to mediate between opposing currents and his incomparable charisma laid the basis for a *culte du chef* in which the party was presented as his personal instrument, an extension of his persona. Important decisions were made by him alone rather than debated in the party's deliberative bodies.

The second stage (1984–1997) covers the ascendancy and implantation of the FN in national politics. Beginning with Jean-Pierre Stirbois's electoral breakthrough in Dreux at the end of 1983, and Le Pen's score of 11 percent in the European elections of 1984, the FN began to gain attention and new members. In the hope of securing material support and greater respectability, Le Pen recruited notables from the world of business, academia, and the parliamentary right. In the hope of gaining organizational and political expertise, he recruited a younger group of talented, well-educated "new rightists," Mégret's entourage, who began their careers in the

parliamentary right, but became disaffected after it became clear that no fundamental reform or reconstitution would follow in the wake of the left's 1981 victory. Party membership was no longer confined to those from the classical extreme-right; the social composition of the party became broader and more diverse. There were conflicts and defections; some important notables (Blanchot, Arrighi, Frédérick-Dupont, d'Ormesson) left when Le Pen refused to retract or give apologies for gratuitous and embarrassing anti-Semitic remarks. Mégret's group was afforded a tremendous degree of autonomy in generating new organizational structures, training younger party leaders, and articulating the party's program. Mégret was appointed *délégué général* in 1988 and director of Le Pen's presidential campaign, in part as a way of marginalizing the party's popular secrétaire général Jean-Pierre Stirbois who Le Pen feared was becoming too powerful.

By 1997, the party had not only established for itself an enduring presence in national elections, something no other extreme-right party had ever done in France, it had won municipal elections in Toulon, Orange, Marignane, and Vitrolles. In fact, never had the FN been in a stronger position to determine the outcome of triangular political races where its support would be necessary to defeat the left; never had there been so much pressure amassing within the moderate right parties to reach some electoral agreements with the FN, despite opposition from top party leadership. On May 26, 1997, in the wake of the regional elections in which the FN's damage to the moderate right was striking, Alain Peyrefitte, a preeminent Gaullist elder statesman, hinted in *Le Figaro* that while no alliances between the parliamentary right and an FN headed by M. Le Pen would be acceptable, a FN headed by Mégret would receive serious consideration. Mégret had proven himself far more threatening to Le Pen than Stirbois was earlier. In public discourse, as well as within party circles, effective leadership was shifting toward Mégret who more than Le Pen actually managed the party apparatus and organized national and local elections. Already at the party's Tenth Congress, held in Strasbourg in March 1997, Mégret and his associates convincingly dominated the election to the central committee, besting Bruno Gollnisch and others conspicuously tied to Le Pen. Repeatedly, his presence was greeted with cheers of "Vitrolles, Vitrolles, Vitrolles," in recognition of his wife's electoral victory in a contest that attracted national attention. The question of succession was openly posed in the media. To forestall this at all costs, Le Pen engineered a purge or *démégrétisation* of the party.

The third stage (1997 to the present) brought to an end the peaceful coexistence of the Le Pen and Mégret camps that had lasted 15 years. Through an alliance strategy, in which the FN was to play a leading role in the recomposition of the right, Mégret believed the party could finally address the fundamental question of governance. This entailed giving the party a new, more responsible and more respectable public face, untarnished by Le Pen's anti-Semitism and outrageous personal conduct. By way of example, during a particularly sensitive period, the interval between the two rounds of the 1997 parliamentary election, Le Pen assaulted a female socialist candidate, Annette Peulvast-Bergeal, who was running against his daughter; a day earlier he presented on a plate to Marie-France Stirbois, in front of an audience of 3,000 followers, a replica of the severed head of the socialist mayor of Strasbourg, Catherine Trautman. For Mégret, and many in the party outside his group, Le Pen

had become an obstacle to the FN's further development; he had outlived his usefulness. Le Pen reacted by calling on Jean-Claude Martinez to lead the assault against Mégret. Martinez was asked to create a so-called *pré-gouvernement*, modeled on the British shadow government, which he packed with Mégret opponents, and also to direct the party's campaign in the coming European elections, a responsibility that Mégret had always assumed in the past. Simultaneously, Mégret's staff and collaborators were threatened with exclusion. The conflict became public during the course of a December 5,1998 meeting of the conseil national that Le Pen was forced to finally suspend after persistent interruptions and heckling by Mégret supporters. This led to the circulation of a petition for a special congress to resolve the dispute which, in effect, ended up as the founding congress of a new party in Marignane on January 23, 1999. Toward the end of the congress, during a cocktail party for journalists, Mégret remarked that a cohabitation of two parties with the same program on the same terrain could only be provisional; one would quickly triumph over the other and eliminate it.

In fact, during the subsequent European election, the two parties battled each other more than their traditional adversaries with much spilling of blood and airing of dirty laundry. Whereas before the split, the FN had expected to receive 15 percent of the vote, the two parties ended up sharing ten percent (roughly six percent for Le Pen and three percent for Mégret). If anything, the ghetto of 15 percent had grown smaller and more isolated. There has been no further talk of compromise and reconciliation. FN leadership does not expect the MNR to survive past the 2002 elections; without a minimum of five percent of the vote, they surmise, it will not receive State funding and it will not be able to convince supporters to cover the party's debts still again. MNR leaders privately see significant improvement only in the long term, with the aging, 72-year-old Le Pen's departure from the political scene. In their view, there is no one of sufficient stature remaining in the FN to succeed him, only "courtesans, sycophants, and incompetents." Though they continue to speak publicly about an alliance strategy and about leaving the ghetto, their short-term expectations are rather minimal.

No further analysis of Le Pen's strategy is necessary; he never spoke about transforming the FN, about alliances, or of leaving the ghetto. His strategy was predicated on emerging as a savior from the impending collapse of the French political system or at least from the terminal disgrace of its political elite. His loyal followers continue to believe this doomsday scenario. Though the party has been momentarily damaged by "felons, traitors and ingrates" (in other words, the Mégret camp), its prospects have never been brighter. Thus, for example, Maurice Gros, long-time leader of the FN in Marseille, has never felt more optimistic about Le Pen's prospects than he does now.[8] In reality, the FN had never done as poorly in Marseille as it did in the last municipal election, both absolutely and in relation to the MNR. And yet, Gros, without a trace of guile or intended hyperbole, still seems to see a pot of gold on the other side of the rainbow. In effect, Le Pen's supporters had no strategy besides what the French refer to as *la politique du pire*, or what the Italians call *tanto peggio, tanto meglio*.

More interesting is the development of Mégret's group; it is they, after all, who took the transformation of the FN seriously and were open to an alliance strategy.

They viewed the moderate right, especially Chirac (the devil incarnate for lepenistes), without prejudice, for they had never been part of the old reactionary extreme right and had never felt uncomfortable in the enemy's lair. In fact, unlike Le Pen' *anciens*, they emerged from the very "*établissement*" Le Pen vilifies and have similar backgrounds as their would-be allies in the parliamentary right. In France it is often forgotten that Mégret and the other *modernes* were once prominent young men rising amidst the ranks of such contemporaries as Alain Juppé, Jacques Toubon, and Jean-Francois Mancel. Mégret, educated at Polytechnique, Ponts-et-Chaussées, and Berkeley, had been a member of the RPR central committee from 1979 to 1981, and in 1981 ran against socialist leader Michel Rocard as the RPR candidate in Les Yvelines. Yvan Blot,[9] educated at ENA, protégé first of Jacques Chirac and then Charles Pasqua, had also been on the RPR's central committee and in 1976 served in the cabinet of Interior Minister Michel Poniatowski. Jean-Yves Le Gallou, another *énarque*, was active in the Parti républicain (now Démocratie libérale) and the UDF. Though older than others, and lacking a degree from one of the grands écoles, Jean-Claude Bardet also began his adult political career in the parliamentary right, after having been an OAS activist in his student days. He was defined more than the others by his time in GRECE (Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilisation européenne) and the influence of Alain de Benoist. Bardet was also the least enthusiastic about entering the FN in the mid-1980s, and became the strongest advocate for a total break with the extreme right when Megret's party formed at the Marignane congress.

Indeed, what differentiated this group from other young conservatives during the first half of the 1980s was membership in the New Right, first GRECE[10] and then the more technocratic and activist Club de l'Horloge. Due mainly to Alain de Benoist, Antonio Gramsci became a major theoretical influence on the New Right at this time, and a major programmatic theme became the development of a "*Gramscisme de Droite*," understood specifically as a rightist appropriation of the Italian communist intellectual's concept of hegemony.[11] From their point of view, the left had dominated French culture since 1968 and Gaullism was in ruins; only with new ideas, new organizations, and a new politics could the right reassert its traditional dominance. The Club de l'Horloge was conceived as a forum for the articulation of such ideas.

In 1982, Mégret together with his associates created CAR (Comités d'action républicaine) which, unlike the Club de l'Horloge, was to become the nucleus of a new political party situated in the ambiguous political space to the right of the RPR but clearly to the left of the extreme right—a space Bardet refers to simply as "the right of the right."[12] By the end of 1981, Mégret was convinced that the parliamentary right had shown itself both incapable of resolving France's problems and immune to serious reconstitution. Thus, for him, any strategy of *entrisme*, particularly within the dominant RPR, was hopeless.[13] Yet by 1984, when CAR began receiving overtures from Le Pen, it had become evident that founding a new political party was more difficult than the Mégret group had initially anticipated, especially given their relative youth, lack of public recognition, and, most importantly, the absence of sufficient material resources. They were unable to enter the European elections of 1984, and an effort to run in a number of cantonal elections in 1985 was

largely unsuccessful.[14] It was precisely at this time that the FN made its breakthrough on the national political scene, and a choice had to be made whether to continue with an autonomous political effort that seemed to be going nowhere, or to join an ascendant political movement with resources but little in the way of organization and ideas other than the populist charisma of Le Pen who had suddenly captured the nation's attention (the *phénomène Le Pen*, as it was called at the time).

Bardet wrote a confidential memo highly critical of the FN and recommended keeping it at a distance so that CAR's identity would not be compromised or confused with these malcontents "who come from the most reactionary and retrograde extreme right."[15] Nevertheless, Bardet joined the other CAR members in entering the FN at the end of 1985. Le Pen had neither the desire nor the administrative competence to actually direct the management of a modern political party, having until then only led an amorphously structured groupuscule. He therefore gave Mégret and his associates almost complete autonomy in all areas of party organization other than the finances, which Le Pen personally controlled.[16] Betraying a paranoia that would surface whenever another FN personality received any independent adulation from party members or attention from the press, Le Pen was far more preoccupied at the time with rivalry from the party's *secrétaire général*, Jean-Pierre Stirbois, who died in an automobile accident later in 1988. Never did Le Pen imagine that these faceless technocrats, as he saw them then, would slowly implement their own program and attempt ultimately to commandeer the party itself. Le Pen always tended to judge people on the basis of physical stature and force of personality. Neither the diminutive Mégret, whose size he mercilessly ridiculed in public when the final rupture took place, nor any of Mégret's associates, were perceived by Le Pen as potential rivals.

At no point did Mégret criticize Le Pen in meetings of the party's various executive committees, even after others began to question Le Pen's anti-Semitic remarks and gratuitous acts of bad taste that were giving the party a poor image. In 1987, when moderate notables like Blanchot, Frédéric-Dupont, and d'Ormesson, raised such points, they were rudely attacked by Le Pen while Mégret sat silent. In 1992, when Pierre Sergent complained that the party's image was too negative, that the FN *fait peur*, that the party needed to develop a new image—points that anticipated Mégret's own critique in 1997—Mégret still made no comment. His *mutisme*, in fact, was a main motif in an insider's account of this period, written before the rupture.[17] Mégret certainly agreed with Le Pen's critics, but the time was not yet right to commit a tactical mistake that risked placing his own project in jeopardy. As Mégret remarked about Pierre Sergent, for whom he had "great admiration," Sergent was "not political," he spoke at an inopportune moment and was merely expressing an isolated personal opinion.[18]

There would be no frontal assault on Le Pen; instead, a Gramscian "war of position," a slow, deliberate, carefully calibrated battle for ideological and institutional hegemony within the party was initiated. Mégret's group did so by dominating the party apparatus, articulating the party program, and, most importantly, by training a new generation of party leaders in their own image. They created such new structures as the CEA (*Centre d'études et d'argumentaires*), a think tank aimed at recruiting support from non-FN industrial managers, upper-level functionaries, magistrates, and military officers; the GAP (*Groupe d'action parlementaire*), an

exclusively FN group of technocrats, professionals, and university professors that would generate programmatic and legislative initiatives; and the IFN (Institut de formation nationale), a party school that was to offer organizational and ideological training to the young cadres. Two other "Gramscian" initiatives should be noted. First, penetrating "civil society" through the creation of new new institutional structures among public-sector labor syndicates, business associations, and cultural movements. And second, "prefiguring" what FN might look like at the national level through the conquest and administration of municipalities that were to serve as showcases. As Mégret put it, "The conquest of a certain number of municipalities represents the first base for the conquest of national power . . . It is a permanent laboratory to prove concretely that the FN is a political force."[19]

By way of contrast, Le Pen was largely uninterested in such initiatives. He was entirely focused on presidential elections, where his own persona was central, and not at all on municipal campaigns. In the eyes of Mégret's group, Le Pen exploited the party simply as an instrument for self-promotion, while they were singularly concerned with preparing to assume power and rule. For them, Le Pen was more interested in his own celebrity status than in the arduous work and mundane humdrum of actual governance. In 1995, when Le Gallou informed him that the party had a good chance of winning the town halls of Toulon, Orange, and Marignane, Le Pen replied "God help us!" While everyone else at the party's headquarters was jubilant at achieving victories in the three cities, Le Pen alone remained aloof and disengaged.[20] Mégret's 1997 conquest of Vitrolles through an absolute majority, rather than a triangular victory, was an important aspect of his faction's triumph over Le Pen, Bruno Gollnisch, and the old guard at the party's Tenth Party Congress at Strasbourg in March 1997. "Vitrolles," chanted repeatedly, symbolized a new form of concrete leadership and practical political success that contrasted dramatically with the 70-year-old Le Pen's empty rhetoric and propensity to shoot himself and the party in the foot.

The Shrinking Ghetto

Before the Congress at Marignane, Mégret had spoken repeatedly about the need to leave the ghetto. At one time or another, the argument ran, one French elector out of three had voted for the FN or at least agreed with aspects of its program, yet in any given national election it could not get beyond the ghetto of 15 percent. By recuperating all or part of the "lost" 15 percent, the FN could become the third largest party in France, after the socialists and the RPR. This would put it in a position to eventually become the pole around which the right could be reconstituted. In order for this objective to be realized, the FN would have to shed its diabolical image, put on a new public face, and establish an effective working relationship with the droite classique. It soon became clear that none of this would ever come to pass, in part because of strategic contradictions Mégret had failed to take into account, much less resolve. The consequence was a ghetto for the FN and MNR *combined* that was even smaller than 15–10 percent and perhaps shrinking to still less.

At Marignane, Mégret set for himself two contradictory objectives: first, to recuperate as much as possible of the FN's base; second, to reach out to disaffected

supporters of the moderate right. He ended up, as Bardet put it, neither securing the FN's base nor attracting votes from the right of the right.[21] In the 1999 European elections, the first group voted for Le Pen, while the second voted for the newly formed RPF led jointly by Pasqua and de Villiers, who took advantage of the parliamentary right's disarray to occupy the very space Bardet had intended for the MNR.

In preparation for the Marignane congress, Bardet sent a memo to Mégret advocating a total break with the extreme right which, in his view, commanded no more than 1 or 2 percent of the vote. A strategic choice had to be made between two irreconcilable constituencies; by unambiguously renouncing one, there would be the possibility of securing the other. Renouncing the extreme right, in the general sense, would not be sufficient; in order to really attract support from the right of the right, Mégret would have to distance himself specifically from the most odious elements of the FN's program, adopting, for example, a more nuanced stand on immigration. Toward this end, Bardet suggested that the theme of identity would be a good point of departure, providing it could be developed in a more inclusive, less essentialist direction.

Mégret may have felt caught between Bardet and Le Gallou, whose stance on immigration was arguably more extreme even than that of Le Pen, whose book *La préférence nationale* had earlier served as the single most important point of reference for the FN's stand on the treatment of immigrants. Mégret clearly sided more with Le Gallou than Bardet in placing primacy on the theme of immigration and recuperating the FN's base. Not even symbolic gestures were made toward the moderate right. In his closing speech to the congress, Mégret even omitted reading a sentence present in the prepared text delivered to journalists concerning the need to reach out to elements in the RPR and UDF.[22]

There were two obstacles to following Bardet's advice. First, it would be almost impossible to renounce the FN's programmatic stands on immigration or anything else, since, more than anyone else, Mégret was responsible for having written all the major FN programmatic statements for the past 15 years. Second, among those that came to Marignane some were more opposed to Le Pen as an obstacle to the forward movement of the party than they were committed, as such, to Mégret or to any fundamental change of party line. Their quarrel was with Le Pen's leadership, particularly his inappropriate conduct, and not with the party as such; their complaint was with the messenger, not the message. As Damien Bariller, Mégret's right-hand man, suggests, Mégret was faced with a heterogeneous group of delegates who attended the congress, not all of whom were Mégret loyalists.[23] Such heterogeneity could not be ignored when trying to establish a consensus and work toward a successful outcome. This exigency undoubtedly contributed toward anomalies and contradictions that marked the congress from the very outset, when a written greeting was read to the assembled delegates from none other than François Brigneau, one of the most odious dinosaurs from the old reactionary right, an inveterate anti-Semite who had served under Vichy in the *milice*, and later became a journalist obsessed with Jewish power and influence. No doubt, Brigneau's break with Le Pen was in itself significant, and contributed to the process of delegitimating the old chief, which was already underway. However, it was precisely types like Brigneau, together with the historical baggage they carried, who were to be discarded in putting on a new public face. By

calling for a special party congress to settle the dispute, and by trying, via this route, to effectively "depose" Le Pen and secure the party name, Mégret's strategic options were far more limited than they might have been had he simply broken with the FN and called for the formation of a new party based on his own independent vision.

Mégret continued to believe that there is an opportunity to cultivate supporters beyond the ghetto, those "to the right of the right," especially those disenchanted with the parliamentary right's failure to defend French identity and traditional values, as well as those disaffected from the left. Based on an Ipsos poll conducted in May 2000 for *Le Figaro Magazine*, the French electorate can be divided into four groups: Les Lutteurs (18 percent), Les Mutants (29 percent), Les Marchands (22 percent), and Les Gardiens (31 percent). The Gardiens are opposed to more immigration, the construction of mosques in France's large cities, the right to vote in municipal elections for foreigners, regularizing illegal immigrants, legalizing marijuana, allowing gay couples to adopt children, and applying EU directives on hunting. Although coming mainly from the right, they define themselves across the political spectrum: 57 percent as right, 25 percent as left. In referring to the Gardiens in a speech delivered on January 21, 2001 in Versailles, Mégret maintained, "Ipsos reveals that this new socio-political group, which doesn't yet recognize itself in one of the existing political parties, is the most important since it represents 31 percent of the population and is in full expansion." The MNR's positions, Mégret insists, correspond to this new and growing constituency: "That is why, dear friends, the future smiles on us."[24]

The problem with this analysis, according to Bardet, is that it repeats the same mistake as the earlier 30 percent calculation (in which 30 percent of the electorate could be recuperated—the 30 percent that either voted for the FN at one time or another or shares the FN's views on issues such as immigration). Bardet maintains that the 30–31 percent figure is largely "mythical," as this projected MNR constituency is unlikely to ever be captured by any one political party and, in fact, distributes its votes among the parties of the parliamentary right and left, as well as among Pasqua's RPF and the FN. In fact, what Mégret didn't mention in his speech is that the same Ipsos poll indicates that only 12 percent of the Gardiens sympathized with the FN and MNR, compared to 32 percent for the gauche plurielle, and 42 percent for the parliamentary right. Once again, Bardet's realism should have been heeded. In order to break out of the political ghetto, Mégret would have need to split with the FN's past and not simply with Le Pen.

When his defining moment arrived, Mégret emerged not as someone who could lead the party in a new direction, but simply as Le Pen's competitor for the same restricted extreme-right constituency. In fact, in the months after Marignane, he came across as little more than a meaner, more extreme, and certainly less entertaining Le Pen. Like Al Sharpton in New York, he showed up any time there was a local dispute involving immigrants, or plans to build a mosque, or when a plant was to close; in his view, it was the same *mondialistes* undercutting the French economy as well as undermining French identity through immigration.While he steered clear of Le Pen's anti-Semitism and preoccupation with Jewish lobbies, Mégret's tone was notably harsher in diatribes against immigration and the threat of Islam. He even rather ludicrously attacked the FN for its alleged "multiculturalism," which involved

running a few black and Arab local candidates (e.g., Stéphane Durbec, Farid Smahi) in a fairly transparent effort to demonstrate it was not racist, malgré tout.

Instead of presenting the public with a new image, the MNR has thus remained a carbon copy of the FN; its website appeals exclusively to an extreme-right audience, and its monthly magazine, *Le Chêne*, is practically indistinguishable from the FN's *Français d'abord*! in layout, style, ideology, and adulation of the party leader, despite the undeniable intelligence and talent of its young editor, Christophe Dungelhoeff. The continuity between Français d'abord! and *Le Chêne* is partially attributable to the fact that before the split, Français d'abord! had been edited by Mégret's right-hand man and Dungelhoeff's friend, Damien Bariller, who also studied at Aix-en-Provence. It is surprising that Dungelhoeff chose to emulate Français d'abord!, for Mégret's project initially sought to cultivate a new image and a new identity. Obviously, he fell short of this goal, symbolically and substantively maintaining continuity with the past, even while breaking with the persona of Le Pen

In short, the MNR totally failed to elaborate any new ideas beyond those already represented in the FN's standard repertoire, or to reach out to the "right of the right," as Bardet had counseled. Mégret has neither positioned himself as a real alternative to Le Pen, nor is he any longer regarded as a moderate in contrast with Le Pen's extremism. Today it is inconceivable that anyone of Alain Peyrefitte's stature would suggest, as Peyrefitte did in 1997, that Mégret is more *fréquentable* than Le Pen, someone with whom the parliamentary right could do business. Even Bariller has conceded that Mégret's image has suffered deeply, losing credibility as a moderate and unable to carry forth earlier commitments to reform the party. Consequently, there has been no discernable cultural break with the past, and therefore no new beginning. According to Bariller, these concerns have become topics of intense debates within the MNR, with some calling for a return to the original project and the removal of all ambiguity. However, it is highly unlikely that anything will come of this, because the fundamental problem is less one of style than substance. No affirmative concept of a different and qualitatively better French future has been articulated, other than the facile proposition that removing certain presumed threats to the nation (immigrants, mosques, McDonalds, and multinationals) will permit suppressed organic qualities of France to blossom anew.

Conclusion

The extreme right today is much weaker than prior to the rupture, when the charisma of Le Pen was combined with the administrative competence of Mégret and the ghetto statistically hovered at 15 percent, rather than ten percent. Defectors from Le Pen confide that he is no longer a "federator" of the extreme right, but instead has become a source of division. The right-wing press, which always provided him with unqualified support, has chosen to remain neutral in his battle with Mégret; François Brigneau and Martin Peltier, both major right-wing journalists, broke with Le Pen and joined the MNR. Also joining Mégret were former Le Pen loyalists like Franck Timmermans, who had been in the FN from the very beginning, and Serge Martinez, who Le Pen once considered appointing secrétaire général to counter Mégret, and, of course, Le Pen's own daughter, Marie-Caroline. Revelations concerning corruption

and nepotism have discredited Le Pen and placed in doubt his famous slogan "*Tête haute et mains propres*." In return, Le Pen has sought to strategically undermine Mégret's status as a moderate, claiming that the *mégretistes* were none other than "an extremist, activist even a racist minority."[25] In the battle between Le Pen and Mégret, there were no real winners; both lost ground, as did the extreme right. This brings us back to the starting point, which was the eclipse of immigration as a hot-button political issue. While the crisis of the extreme right may not be the only cause for this eclipse, it is certainly the most immediate and compelling.

Postscript: August 2003

The elections of Spring 2002, generally speaking, confirmed the tendencies described earlier, despite the fact that in the first round of the presidential contest Le Pen narrowly surpassed Lionel Jospin's score and made it into the second round, where he was routed by Jacques Chirac. This took everyone by surprise, as informed public opinion for months had taken for granted that Jospin and Chirac would easily be the top two contenders in the first round, and, consequently, the second round would be a tight race between the sitting prime minister and the sitting president. The shocking results of April 21 were immediately dubbed an "earthquake" by the media, before becoming a political psychodrama that would convulse France in the wake of the May 5 runoff. According to the Ministry of the Interior, more than two-and-a-half million people were mobilized in street demonstrations against Le Pen.[26] One might have believed that France had returned to the 1930s, with fascism at the gates; the left deployed all the hyperbolic, if totally anachronistic, slogans it could muster: No Passaran!, Fight Fascism!, and so on. It called for a massive "republican vote," meaning a vote for Chirac against the "fascist" Le Pen, Chirac who the left had earlier attacked for scandals and dishonesty (e.g., corruption and influence peddling when Mayor of Paris, expensive trips for the Chirac family and entourage paid for with unmarked and unaccounted bags of cash). As the ironic popular expression went: "given a choice between a fascist and a thief, of course I'll vote for the thief."

A detailed analysis of the election is beyond the scope of this postscript, except to note that the most important issue, as predicted, was insecurity, and that Le Pen's momentary success had been due less to his efforts than a range of factors largely external to his candidacy.[27] Having earlier attacked the MNR as racist and extremist to undercut Mégret's status as a moderate, Le Pen then took advantage of the MNR's ludicrous attempts at charging the FN with "betrayal" because it softened its critique of immigration and actually ran a number of minority candidates. Le Pen ably chose to situate himself to the left of Mégret, and ran so moderate a campaign that the press began to call it "Le Pen Light." Ironically, MNR moderates such as Bardet and Barillet noted that Le Pen had finally run precisely the type of campaign the Mégretistes had advocated before the rupture, while Mégret himself ran an uncharacteristically amateurish operation influenced exclusively by Le Gallou, Timmermans, and other MNR hard-liners. In this sense, it is all the more remarkable that after the first round Le Pen was loudly denounced, and more vehemently than ever before, for "fascism" just when he had presented himself as more moderate and had even distanced himself for the first time from some of his earlier outrageous

statements on the Holocaust, Jews, and immigrant youth ("phrases malheureuses. Je ne suis pas parfait"[28]). Yet, despite this new, more moderate spin, Le Pen's basic strategy remained the same: a frontal attack on the political class, with no concern for an alliance strategy through which he might escape the ghetto. And for a brief moment, it appeared as if the *grande alternative*, in which the French would reject the political class and turn to him, has some plausibility. That is, Le Pen had done nothing substantially new, but France itself had been rocked by a startling lack of voter confidence in the system and traditional political leadership, exacerbated by the unusual nature of this particular election. What were some of these factors more or less external to Le Pen's own efforts? Certainly the unanticipated weakness of the two favored candidates, particularly Jospin, neither of whom obtained 20 percent of the vote. In fact, Jospin and Chirac received lower scores than any previous sitting prime minister or president. The ruling *gauche plurielle* suffered one of the French left's greatest humiliations. While the three Trotskyist extreme-left parties, outside the coalition, received their highest score ever, almost ten percent of the vote, the combined total of the socialists and communists, the pillars of the left coalition, for the first time fell to the same level as the combined total of the extreme right, that is the FN and MNR (19 percent). French political scientists, while admitting their lingering astonishment at the results of the first round of the presidential election, write openly about a breach that had been opened in the system itself, and one that could not simply be attributed to voter volatility. There had also been a record number of candidates, 16, 15 of which received more than one percent of the vote, as well as record number of abstentions and blank ballots, almost 30 percent of the electorate. And this is an election where the two favorites, the sitting prime minister and president, received a combined score of 36 percent; that is, significantly less than half the votes cast. Perhaps the most bizarre outcome of all was that Jacques Chirac won the second round by a higher score than any other candidate in French history (82.2 percent), after having received, in the first round, the lowest score ever registered by an incumbent (19.9 percent). The second round defeat of Le Pen, once again, had less to do with any change of course on the part of the FN than with factors external to the far-right party, most importantly the anti-Le Pen "republican" mobilization led by the left. Le Pen, who claimed that anything less than 30 percent of the vote would be a personal defeat, received only 17.8 percent, an increase of 0.9 percent over his first-round score.

In the original essay, I had underscored the ghetto in which the French extreme right found itself, and the likelihood that the FN and MNR would become even further marginalized. While Le Pen certainly did better in the first round of the presidential election than I or any other specialist on the French far right anticipated, it bears repeating that this was due largely to external factors regarding the political system, to a startling lack of confidence in the traditional political class on the part of the electorate. Despite the considerable media hype in France and abroad that followed "Le Pen's success," the fact remains that he added only 230,000 votes to the total he had achieved in his 1995 presidential effort, not in itself terribly significant and hardly an achievement that otherwise would have occasioned so much tumult. Moreover, Le Pen's success was a personal one that did not extend to the FN as such. In the legislative elections that followed in June, the FN received only 11.3 percent

of the vote; that is a drop-off of 6.5 percent from Le Pen's total in the second round of the presidential election, and almost four percent below the FN's 1997 tally in the previous legislative elections, before the rupture, when Mégret had been in operational command. It was even lower than the FN's score in the 1993 legislative elections (12.3 percent). For practically all of its history before Mégret became the FN's délégué général and campaign director, Le Pen's scores in presidential elections were significantly higher than those of the FN in legislative, regional, municipal, or European elections. It was only under Mégret's leadership that the FN began to assume an identity of its own and match or exceed Le Pen's scores, especially at the local level where new leadership was recruited and serious party organization had taken root. This is precisely what Mégret's dramatic ascension at the 1997 Congrès de Strasbourg signified. When Mégret and his followers broke with the FN, what remained was little more than the persona of Le Pen and the questionable competence of his longtime loyalists. And among these there has erupted a pitched battle since the elections, not only over an eventual succession (with Le Pen's daughter Marine and her Génération Le Pen organization pitted against Bruno Gollnisch and the old party hierarchs), but a strident critique by Jacques Bompard, Mayor of Orange, over the excessive *médiatisation of* the Le Pens (father and daughter). Moreover, in stinging reference to the FN's poor showing in the 2002 legislative elections, Bompard castigated Le Pen for the failure to cultivate organizational bases at the local level, a position that had been earlier articulated by the Mégretistes. Bompard even threatened to put himself forward as an alternative to Le Pen, a gesture met with caustic derision by le chef, recalling the fate of Mégret, the last subordinate to challenge his authority. More recently, Bernard Antony, leader of the Catholic fundamentalists within the party, close ally of Bompard and Gollnisch, and open critic of Marine Le Pen, resigned from the party's Political Bureau. In short, not only has the FN failed to advance or break out of the political ghetto, it now shows new signs of implosion.

As for the one issue that worked to Le Pen's advantage during the first round of the presidential campaign, insecurity, subsequent polls indicate a decline in its relative importance, due largely to widespread satisfaction over the performance of Nicolas "Speedy" Sarkozy, the hyperactive Minister of Interior, who for more than a year has enjoyed the highest approval rating among the government's ministers. Sarkozy, in a word, has appropriated the issue of insecurity, and adroitly decoupled it from immigration. He has remained popular even among the FN rank-and-file, which is why he became the prime target of Le Pen's increasingly ineffectual attacks. In December 2002 the two participated in a national television debate where even many on the far right conceded that Le Pen looked old and made little impact. One year after Le Pen's "success" in the first round of the presidential election, 60 percent of the respondents in a Louis-Harris poll believed "the ideas of the extreme right have lost their force."[29]

Mégret and the MNR have all but faded from the French political scene, due to poor election results, including the loss of Vitrolles, indictments for financial irregularities, and, of course, the notoriety that followed from an attempt at assassinating President Chirac during the nationally televised 2002 July 14 parade in Paris by a MNR member, and former municipal candidate, Maxime Brunerie. Party

headquarters on rue de Cronstadt is manned only by a handful of volunteers and a skeleton staff of paid functionaries working part-time. At the 2002 Université d'été, following the assassination attempt, Mégret finally heeded Bardet's original advice and called for a definitive break with the extreme right. By then, however, it was too little, too late. On one hand, Mégret's stance provoked the resignations of Le Gallou and Timmermans who had advocated a hard-line and recruited young extremists like Brunerie. On the other, Mégret failed to secure the continued support of moderates who had been progressively marginalized before Mégret's volte-face. Bardet had been inactive for the past two years, suffering from ill health, as well as political isolation. Because of enduring ties of personal friendship with Mégret, he has not officially resigned but privately concedes that the MNR and Mégret's leadership have been unmitigated disasters.[30] Damien Barillet, who once had been Mégret's right-hand man, resigned from the MNR in July 2003, and shares the same general critique as Bardet.[31]

Notes

1. See the lengthy study, "Analyse sur l'immigration," issued by Juppé's think tank France Moderne on their website, www.france.moderne.asso.fr.
2. *Le Monde*, February 21, 2001; *Le Parisien*, February 22, 2001.
3. During the Spring and Summer of 2001, the French press was filled with reports of violence in schools and on public transportation that generated strikes calling for more security. These events, together with gang violence in fashionable places like La Défense, resort areas, and central Paris, added fuel to an ongoing concern about the spread of more and more "*zones de non-droit*," outside housing projects in the *banlieues* and *quartiers sensibles*. More and more crime involved violence and the threat of violence, whether in extorting money from victims who were trying to access cash machines, stealing cellular phones, or luridly reported gang rapes. During the first semester of 2001, the crime rate shot up 9.58 percent (*Le Figaro*, June 18, 2001). On June 18 *Le Figaro* printed a comparative study bearing the title, "La France plus criminogène que les Etats-Unis," which indicated that crime in the United States was declining but on the rise in France, with France now claiming more robberies and crimes with violence per 100,000 inhabitants. On July 4 *Le Figaro* reported that one in four people residing in the region of Ile-de-France had been the victim of crime. *Le Monde* and *Libération*, which had always been more reticent in covering crime, ran similar stories. *Le Monde*, on August 10, ran a number of articles on violent crimes committed against tourists, including one that cited warnings that had appeared in the foreign press ("La presse étrangère multiplie les mises en garde contre la 'ville des vols en plein jour' "). *Libération* ran an editorial, "Les bonnes intentions," claiming the left would pay dearly in the coming elections if crime statistics continued to worsen and that good intentions were simple not enough.
4. Yvan Gastaut, *L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Ve République* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), p. 486. See *Le Monde-RTL* poll conducted in May 2000 by Sofres for the latest data on the perennial question as to whether there are too many immigrants.
5. *Le Monde-RTL* poll conducted in May 2000 by Sofres. See also Gérard Le Gall, "Le Front national à l'épreuve du temps," in the Sofres volume *L'état de l'opinion* 1998 (Paris: Seuil, 1998), pp. 49–83.
6. In retrospect, one should note the fact that the French regarded North African workers as simply meeting short-term manpower needs when they first began to arrive in greater numbers during the 1950s. These *travailleurs immigrés*, as they were called, were initially brought to France under rotation agreements that called for repatriation at the expiration

of a fixed period, usually three years. No one ever imagined that they would remain in France in great numbers and, through family reunification allowances, bring entire families, leading eventually to a large presence. None other than President De Gaulle would say in 1959 that the French were "above all a European people of the white race, of Greek and Latin culture, and of the Christian religion." Today such a statement would run the risk of violating antiracism statutes and would be uttered only by politicians of the extreme right, certainly not the mainstream. The general added, "It's fine that there are yellow French, black French, and brown French. This shows that France is open to all races and that it has a universal vocation. But on the condition that these remain a small minority. Otherwise, France would no longer be France." Regarding Arabs, De Gaulle was more demonstrative. "Try to mix oil and vinegar. Shake the bottle and after a while they will separate anew. Arabs are Arabs, The French are French. Do you believe that the French body can absorb ten million muslims, who tomorrow will be twenty million, and the day after tomorrow forty million? . . . My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux Églises, but Colombey-les-Deux Mosquées!" Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle*, v.1 (Paris: Fayard, 1995), p. 52. An indication of the degree to which public opinion has changed is evident in responses to the question whether immigrants should be exhorted to repatriate. In 1977, after the economic downturn had set in and immigration had been suspended, 77% responded affirmatively. By 1993, only 18% responded affirmatively, and 76% disagreed. Yvan Gastaut, *L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Ve République* (Paris: Seuil, 2000), pp. 325–27.

7. An outstanding source for exploring this point of view is Yvan Gastaut's voluminous compilation *L'immigration et l'opinion en France sous la Ve République*.
8. Interview with Maurice Gros, July 5, 2001.
9. After initially siding with Mégret, Blot returned to the FN. According to other mégretistes, he was motivated by opportunism, not wanting to lose his FN seat in the European Parliament. He is included here because he was a member of the initial Megret group and a formidable influence on Mégret himself, especially in providing an indeological education to the young technocrat and steering him to the Club de l'Horloge.
10. Unlike Le Gallou and Blot, the younger Mégret was never a member of GRECE, which they both left to form the Club de l'Horloge, which in turn became Mégret's first contact with the New Right. Though Alain de Benoist is frequently and erroneously linked to the FN on the sole basis of Le Gallou, Blot and Pierre Vial's early and brief membership in GRECE, he has been openly and consistently critical of the FN. See my essay "Racism, différence and the Right in France," *Modern & Contemporary France*, 3, 4 (1995): 439–51. For the definitive textual treatment of the French New Right, see Pierre-André Taguieff, *Sur la nouvelle droite* (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1994).
11. Alain de Benoist's appropriation of Gramsci was limited to cultural struggle and became the basis of GRECE's concept of *métapolitique*, the renunciation of political activism. The Mégret group, on the other hand, bears the influence of Gramci's political concepts, the same concepts that were formative in the PCI's development under Togliatti and Berlinguer: namely, war of position, historical blocs, prefiguration. In this sense, there is a discernable similarity their strategic commitment to alliance formation, and in presenting cities under their control as showcases and anticipations of future national rule.
12. Interviews with Jean-Claude Bardet, January 20, 1999 and June 21, 2001.
13. Interview with Bruno Mégret, July 13, 1998.
14. Interview with Jean-Yves Le Gallou, June 22, 2001.
15. Michael Darmon and Romain Rosso, *L'après Le Pen* (Paris: Seuil 1998), pp. 199–200.
16. Interview with Jean-Yves Le Gallou June 22, 2001.
17. Roland Gaucher, *La Montée du FN* (Paris: Jean Picollec, 1997).
18. Interview with Bruno Mégret July 14, 1998.
19. Renaud Dely, *Histoire Secrète du Front National* (Paris: Grasset, 1999), p. 82. This is by far the best account of the rupture in print today. Though Dely, a journalist from

Libération, is regarded as an ideological adversary, MNR leaders have attested to the book's journalistic accuracy.

20. Interview with Jean-Yves Le Gallou, June 22, 2001.
21. Interview with Jean-Claude Bardet, June 21, 2001.
22. Dely, *Histoire*, p. 289.
23. Interview with Damien Bariller, July 12, 2001.
24. Mégret's speech is available on the MNR's website, www.m-n-r.com. The Ipsos poll, which I obtained at the MNR party headquarters on rue Cronstadt in Paris, may be downloaded from the canalipsos website, www.canalipsos.com.
25. *Le Monde*, December 8, 1998.
26. André Gattolin and François Miquet-Marty, "Les mobilisations de l'entre-deus-tours: la réalité et la part du mythe," in La France blessée ed. André Gattolin and François Miquet-Marty (Paris: Denoàl, 2003), p. 105.
27. For detailed analyses of the Spring 2002 elections, see A. Gattolin and F. Miquet-Marty, eds., *La France blessée*, a special issue of *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* 104, 1020–21, (November–December 2002) entitled "Élections 2002: Quelles Logiques?" as well as a special issue of the *Revue Française de Science Politique* 52, 5–6 (October–December 2002) entitled "Sur Quelques Énigmes Des Élections Du Printemps 2002." For an excellent analysis of the extreme right in the Spring 2002 elections, see the new revised and amplified edition of Nonna Mayer's *Ces Français qui votent Le Pen* (Paris: Flammarion, 2002). On the importance of insecurity, see Sébastian Roché, "La lutte contre l'insécurité:les raisons d'un succès d'opinion" in La France blessée A. Gattolin and F. Miquet-Marty, as well as N. Mayer, *Ces Français qui votent Le Pen*, pp. 351–57.
28. Mayer, *Ces Français qui votent Le Pen*, p. 362.
29. Cited by Florence Faucher, "L'esprit retrouvé de la Ve République?" in ed. *La France blessée*, A. Gattolin and F. Miquet-Marty, p. 116.
30. Interview with Jean-Claude Bardet, May 30, 2003.
31. Interview with Damien Barillet, July 23, 2003.

Chapter Fourteen

From Communism to Nazism to Vichy: *Le Livre Noir du Communisme* and the Wages of Comparison

Richard J. Golsan

Two extraordinary events in the Fall of 1997 served to remind the French that, even as the century was drawing to a close, the past was by no means past—if anything, the national obsession with memory was reaching the point of near psychosis. The first of these events was the opening of the trial of Maurice Papon for crimes against humanity. Papon had formerly served as a Vichy official working in the Bordeaux region during the war and was charged with responsibility for the deportation and death of some 1,300 Jews between 1942 and 1944. In the postwar years, Papon had become a successful civil servant and politician, working his way up the state hierarchy and through the political ranks to occupy positions of prestige and influence. As Prefect of the Paris Police in the early 1960s, he oversaw the brutal suppression of Algerian protesters in the streets of Paris, a police action resulting in at least fifty deaths. At Papon's trial, the October 1961 massacre resurfaced as an additional source of controversy and outrage, the heated courtroom debates evincing that the painful and unresolved memories of two distinct historical moments—Vichy and the Algerian War ("the War without a name")—were not that comfortably distinct within the French psyche. Moreover, as those present at the trial were fully aware, Papon's actions in 1961 in no way derailed his career. By the early 1980s, Papon's success as a politician earned him a stint as Budget Minister under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It was only when his role in the deportation of the Jews during the Occupation came to light in 1981 that his upward climb came to an end. Following these revelations, he was forced to resign from public office. From the early 1980s until the beginning of his trial more than a decade and a half later, Papon spent most of his time denouncing and suing his accusers, proclaiming his innocence, and arrogantly flaunting his power and political connections. Many people were therefore embittered to witness Papon freed from incarceration on a technicality at the outset of his tria (thereafter visiting the court proceedings after indulging himself at three star restaurants), and finally assigned a mere ten-year prison sentence for the most heinous of crimes. If the Vichy past, and especially the painful memory of France's complicity in the Nazi Final Solution, could only be put to rest when French perpetrators, even belatedly, were brought to justice, then the Papon trial could hardly be said to have contributed to that goal.[1]

The second major event or "eruption of memory" in France in the autumn of 1997 dealt with a very different past, but one to which the French public proved just as sensitive. In November 1997, the Éditions Robert Laffont published *Le Livre noir du communisme*, a massive, 850-page coauthored work detailing the crimes of Communism worldwide.[2] Preceded by an intense publicity campaign, the appearance of the *Livre noir* provoked a veritable *tollé*—a general uproar. In the editorial pages of daily newspapers, in magazine articles and intellectual reviews, on television and even on the floor of the National Assembly, the book's publication inspired vehement statements of either support or denunciation, vitriolic exchanges, a fair number of exaggerations, and indeed, whopping distortions of history. As an example of the latter, right-wing deputies attacked Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin on the floor of the National Assembly for including in his governing coalition a Communist Party perceived as still unrepentant over its "criminal past." Some of the deputies even brandished what appeared to be copies of the *Livre noir*. Jospin responded to these attacks by stating that he was proud of his Communist allies because the French Communist Party had always supported the struggles of the Left in France, and its Soviet sponsors had worked with the Allies in the struggle against Nazism. For good measure, Jospin also asserted that the French Communist Party (PCF), at least, had never encroached on anyone's liberties.[3] When interviewed in *Le Figaro* about Jospin's claims, Jean-François Revel scoffingly noted that the PCF had refused to join the Cartel des Gauches in the 1920s, and that Jospin had furthermore selectively reported on the Soviet Union's wartime record, making no mention of the Hitler–Stalin pact of August 1939. As for the claim that the PCF had never abridged anyone's civil liberties, Revel underscored the obvious: the PCF had never been in power, and given its Stalinist tendencies, respect for individual freedoms would likely not have been a majority hallmark of its rule had it ever achieved power.[4]

While Jospin chose to defend his political allies by effectively whitewashing Communism, the French Communist Party leader, the avuncular Robert Hue, opted for a somewhat more judicious strategy. Lamenting both the excesses of Stalinism and the PCF's own Stalinist past, Hue asserted that the PCF was now reviewing that past "with courage." Furthermore, he maintained that the French people as a whole remained confident in a party that had been central to the Front populaire during the 1930s and to the later Resistance movement, and a leader in anticolonial struggles. Hue concluded that it was "ludicrous and grotesque" to ignore these accomplishments while reducing the memory of Communism to a "macabre" tally sheet of its crimes.[5]

With this tally sheet, Hue was referring not to the victims of the French Communist Party but rather to the alleged total number of victims of Communist regimes worldwide from 1917 to the present. That tallysheet—or more accurately, body count—had in fact been provided by Stéphane Courtois in his Introduction to the *Livre noir* entitled "Les Crimes du communisme." Although Courtois does not indicate his sources, he presumably drew his figures from those provided by the authors of individual chapters in the *Livre noir*, each addressing individual Communist regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. He arrived at the astonishing figure of 100 million dead, with the Soviet Union held responsible for 20 million dead, China for 65 million, North Korea for 2 million, and Cambodia for 2 million. Other Communist regimes accounted for the remaining 10 million.[6]

The sheer enormity of the number of victims cited by Courtois was certainly one reason for the *succès de scandale* of the *Livre noir*, but it was what Courtois then did with these figures in his analysis of Communism's crimes that set off the greatest fireworks. Courtois proceeded to compare Communism's crimes to those of the Nazis, in order to underscore the basic moral and legal equivalency of the majority of these crimes. On the basis of the sheer number of victims accumulated under Communism and Nazism during their respective histories, he then concluded that Communism had inflicted more extensive damage. In fact, one could only impute some fifteen million dead to Nazism.

With regard to the moral equivalency of the crimes, Courtois argued that death by starvation, deportation, or exhaustion during the process of "decossakization" or "dekulakization" in the early years of Soviet Union was, in practical terms, indistinguishable from the death Jews suffered in similar circumstances under Nazism. Reprising an analogy originally proposed by the Soviet writer Vassili Grossman, Courtois stated that "the death of a Ukranian Kulak child deliberately starved by the policies of Stalinism 'is equal to' the death of a Jewish child in the Warsaw ghetto deliberately starved by the Nazis."[7] Courtois herein concluded that: "the genocide of a 'class' may well be tantamount to the genocide of a 'race.' "[8]

Having established, at least to his own satisfaction, a moral equivalency between the two crimes of the two regimes, Courtois did acknowledge in a single sentence that the crimes of Auschwitz and the industrial killing of the Shoah were unique. But he then proceeded to establish a legal equivalency by indicting those responsible for the crimes of Communism in accordance with the same legal categories applied at Nuremberg. The categories established included crimes against peace, crimes of war, and most controversially, crimes against humanity. Courtois asserted that Stalin committed crimes against peace by secretly negotiating with the Nazis to divide Poland and to allow the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in August 1939.[9] The Soviet Union was also guilty of crimes against peace in launching its war against Finland. In addition, Stalin and the Soviets committed crimes of war in murdering thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn forest and later, in quietly killing German prisoners of war in the Gulag.

However, it was to crimes against humanity and genocide that Courtois devoted most of his attention, and here Communist regimes and the Soviet Union in particular were also found guilty on numerous counts. In this context, Courtois conceded that the Nuremburg statutes were really only applicable to the Axis powers and Nazi Germany in particular. In order to address Communist crimes against humanity and genocide, Courtois drew upon French law, where he found real grist for his mill. He cited in full the new 1992 French Criminal code, which defines genocide and crimes against humanity as the complete or partial destruction of religious, ethnic, or national groups, or any other group arbitrarily designated, as part of a concerted plan that is politically motivated and deploys means including deportation, enslavement, and executions. These definitions are obviously broad enough to include any number of crimes committed by the Soviet Union or other Communist regimes.

In some regards, Courtois's transition to French law might seem perfectly reasonable; after all, crimes against humanity and genocide are integral categories of French law today, while the Nuremberg statutes were only intended to be historically applied

to the Axis powers. (As I have already observed, however, Courtois's scruples on this score did not prevent him from using Nuremberg statutes concerning crimes against peace and war crimes to indict Soviet abuses.) However, if we consider the fact that the Papon trial was in full swing and dominating the national media when *Livre noir* appeared, and the fact that crimes against humanity and the cases associated with them occupy a legally and historically controversial place in France, the framework and thrust of Courtois's discussion in his Introduction could not have been more provocative.

To date, only former Nazis like Klaus Barbie or those Frenchmen deemed to have worked in complicity with Nazi anti-Semitism and its genocidal consequences have been charged with crimes against humanity in France. Cases in which individuals were implicated in the murder of Jews under Nazi hegemony include that of Paul Touvier, a Vichy paramilitary police officer convicted in the spring of 1994, and René Bousquet, former Chief of Vichy police murdered by a crazed publicity seeker in July 1993 before he could stand trial. Touvier had ordered the execution of seven Jews at the cemetery of Rillieux-la-Pape outside Lyons in the summer of 1944 and René Bousquet, as Chief of Vichy police, had ordered the infamous roundup of some 12,000 Jews in Paris in July 1942 in the context of the implementation of the Final Solution in France.[10] In both cases, the accusations and indictments caused considerable controversy. Some maintained that both men were too old to stand trial, and that after a half century, they were not even the same men. Besides, wasn't it time to forgive and forget? Finally was it fair to apply laws retroactively? After all, crimes against humanity statutes in France had only been incorporated into the law 20 years after the Liberation, in 1964.

In the cases of Barbie and Touvier, the law and history itself had to be modified and witnesses had to change their stories in order to secure a conviction. In Barbie's trial, the law had to be changed so that Barbie could be tried and convicted for the murder of Resistance victims as well as of Jews. In Touvier's trial, a guilty verdict could only be secured by doing violence to the historical record, for existing law stipulated that Touvier could only be found guilty of crimes against humanity if it was determined that he acted as an agent of the Germans rather than of Vichy. Although this was a dubious claim to say the very least, the lawyer Arno Klarsfeld managed to make it hold in court. Disheartened by such compromises, legal expert Christian Guéry argued shortly after the conclusion of the Touvier trial that the law and history had been so stretched and modified during the course of the proceedings against Barbie and Touvier that the definition of crimes against humanity no longer possessed any coherence in French law. Guéry's pessimistic assessment did not even take into account the legal and historical conundrums that Papon's trial was furthermore raising in Bordeaux.

Let us return to Stéphane Courtois's indictment of Communism in the *Livre noir* and the implications of his deliberate recourse to the troubled French legal context involving crimes against humanity. What most commentators, as well as several of his coauthors, found most condemnable in Courtois's method was the broader effort to conduct a kind of mock Nuremberg trial for the crimes of Communism, and in the process even equate Communist and Nazi crimes. Given Courtois's general understanding of crimes against humanity, and how they occur, this is not surprising. In his

Afterword to the *Livre noir* entitled "Pourquoi?" Courtois is given to globalizing and vague pronouncements concerning crimes against humanity that would probably make most legal experts uncomfortable and that blur distinctions between any number of very diverse ideologies and regimes. Courtois asserts, for example, that "crimes against humanity are the product of an ideology that reduces people not to a universal but to a particular condition, be it biological, racial, or sociohistorical."[11] In elsewhere discussing societies governed by terror, and the Soviet Union in particular, Courtois proposes a neat, evolutionary progression: "After a relatively short period, society passes from the logic of political struggle to the process of exclusion, then to the ideology of elimination and finally to extermination of impure elements. At the end of the line, there are crimes against humanity."[12] As Eric Weitz has pointed out in his review of the German translation of the *Livre noir*, Courtois plays fast and loose with the notion and use of the word "extermination" in the Soviet context.[13] Moreover, the vague progression proposed above makes it impossible to distinguish between Nazi aims and outcomes and those of the Soviets.

Courtois's line of argumentation and the comparisons he drew between the crimes of Nazism and of Communism seemed to lend a kind of intellectual credibility to earlier calls by Jean-Marie Le Pen and other right-wing extremists for a Nuremberg trial for Communism. However, some commentators felt that the implications of Courtois's approach to be even more radical. Shortly after the *Livre noir* appeared, the distinguished Holocaust historian Annette Wieviorka argued in *Le Monde* that Courtois was in fact attempting to substitute the memory of Communism's crimes for the memory of Nazi crimes. *Livre Noir* was intended not to serve as a companion volume to Vasily Grossman's and Ilya Ehrenbourg's *Livre noir du nazisme*, which chronicled Nazi atrocities on the Eastern Front, but to displace it. Moreover, Courtois's strategy, Wieviorka asserted, was also to distort the memory of the two crimes and even history itself, by arguing that the memory of the Shoah, widely disseminated by the "international Jewish community" since the immediate postwar period, had completely overshadowed the crimes of Communism. Wievioka both wondered to which international Jewish community Courtois might be referring, and further pointed out that the memory of the Shoah had only become a predominant preoccupation in the 1980s, not in the immediate postwar years. She accused Courtois of distorting the facts in the service of a line of argumentation that was less than ideologically innocent and identified his language as moreover offensive, smacking of the worst excesses of the *langue de bois*, the propogandistic rhetoric of the Communist system he set out to denounce. Courtois's Introduction included liberal sprinklings of words like "extermination" and "deportation" in discussing Soviet practices—terms Wieviorka maintained were directly lifted from Raul Hilberg's lexicon in *The Destruction of the European Jews* to hammer home the analytical identity of the Nazi Holocaust and Soviet crimes.[14]

Contributors to the *Livre noir* who later chose to publicly dissociate themselves from the project did so not only on historical and historiographical grounds, but also for philosophical and ethical reasons. On the most fundamental ethical and professional levels, Nicholas Werth, author of the chapters on the Soviet Union, and Jean-Louis Margolin, responsible for the sections on China and Southeast Asia, felt that their trust had been abused and the implications of their work distorted by

Courtois's Introduction. Neither Werth nor Margolin had had a chance to review the introduction before the book was published. They stated that it presented dubious facts as well as a misguided and myopic comparison of Communism and Nazism that had nothing to do with the rest of the book. In an interview in the journal *L'Histoire*, Werth pointed to huge inaccuracies in Courtois's Introduction by noting, for example, that his own tally of victims of Soviet Terror was closer to 15 million dead—5 million less than the 20 million figure Courtois had provided without documentation. Werth moreover reasoned that any calculus of Nazism's crimes should also include the vast majority of the 50 million killed during World War II, for whom he considered the Nazis to be largely responsible.[15] In other venues, Werth joined Margolin in challenging the whole project of comparing Communism and Nazism purely on the basis of their respective crimes. For it was equally important to consider the disparity in the goals pursued by the two ideologies. Werth and Margolin both agreed that Communism sought above all to be a doctrine of liberation for the majority of humankind, whereas Nazism was a racist doctrine that sought to "force most human beings into the shadows."[16]

In the pages of *Le Monde* of December 20, 1997, Courtois responded to the charges made by Wieviorka, Werth, Margolin, and others, but not before figures like Jacques Julliard had already challenged at least one of the central claims of Courtois's detractors. In his column in the weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Julliard pointed out that to insist on the inherent goodness of Communism because of the nobility of its ideal, in effect reduces its crimes to so many "accidents,"—a ludicrous perspective to say the least, but one Julliard continued, which served the interests and eased the consciences of nostalgic former Marxists still unable to swallow the bitter pill of reality.[17] In responding to his critics in *Le Monde*, Courtois was even more blunt: "One has the right to ask in what way it is more excusable to kill in the name of a hope for a better tomorrow than to murder for a racist doctrine. In what sense can self-delusion and hypocrisy be considered extenuating circumstances for mass crimes?" To Annette Wieviorka's charge that he was attempting to downplay Nazism's crimes and the Shoah in particular, Courtois responded bluntly: "The victims of Communism do not erase the victims of Nazism."[18]

The controversy surrounding the publication of *Livre noir* in November 1997 succeeded in foregrounding a number of other important historical issues—for example, the continuities between Leninist and Stalinist Terror and the role of national and ethnic animosities in shaping the repressive practices of Communist regimes. The book simultaneously owed a good measure of its popular success to its status as a catalogue of historical horrors—what Jacques Julliard referred to as its Jurassic Park effect.[19] However, what the various aforementioned remarks most underscore is the powerful impact of the *Livre noir* on the debate over the comparison of Communism with fascism, and with Nazism more specifically. The book's release in 1997 and its commercial success—200,000 copies sold in the first year alone—inspired a remarkable number of ensuing publications, including monographs, edited volumes, special issues of scholarly journals, newspaper articles, and intellectual reviews. The vast majority of these publications sought to reexamine the nature of Communism and its homologies with Nazism in the light of the recent controversy; one exception to this trend was Robert Laffont's *Un pavé dans l'Histoire.*

Le débat français sur Le Livre noir du communisme,[20] a kind of companion volume published in 1998, which, for all intents and purposes, set out to milk the book's success and defend Stéphane Courtois's assertions. Also appearing in 1998 were two important monographs by Claude Lefort and Alain Besançon, both seasoned commentators on the issues at hand. Besançon goes directly to the heart of the debate over the *Livre noir*, as indicated in the title of his monograph, *Le malheur du siècle. Sur le Communisme, le nazisme et l'unicité du Shoah*. Lefort's *La Complication: retour sur le Communisme* engaged specifically with François Furet's 1995 reassessment of Communism and its relation to Fascism in *Le passé d'une illusion*, a work to which I will return shortly.[21]

Responses to the *Livre noir* debate continued during the following year. In 1999, under the direction of Henry Rousso, the *Institut d'histoire du temps présent* in Paris published *Stalinisme et nazism. Histoire et mémoire comparées*, a work not conceived as a direct response to the *Livre noir* but rather as a corrective of sorts to the flawed methodological strategies deployed in Courtois's comparison of Communism and Nazism. In his Introduction to *Stalinisme et Nazisme*, Rousso maintained that, regardless of the fireworks it provided, Courtois's comparison of the crimes of Nazism with those of Communism worldwide was untenable. It would be far more legitimate, he reasoned, to draw comparisons between Nazism and Stalinism, not on the basis of the number of victims generated under the two regimes, but rather on the basis of their historical proximity, their interactions, and their respective institutions and policies.[22]

In 2000 and 2001, the trend continued. As late as the summer of 2001, several years after the publication of pocket book editions of both *Livre noir* and the original *Livre noir du nazisme* alike, the two books could still be be found alongside one another in bookstore displays. Clearly, at the time of the publication of the *Livre noir* and subsequently, efforts to underscore the misguided and even dangerous nature of crude comparisons of the crimes of Nazism with those of Communism were of little avail, especially when it came to selling books.

However, in 2000 and 2001 the debate over the legitimacy of comparing Communism and Nazism also took a more productive, or at least less exploitative, turn that lead to a general reassessment of the concept of totalitarianism. This trend was already evident in a 1999 special issue of the review *Communisme* devoted to the *Livre noir* controversy, which included an essay by Tzvetan Todorov, "Le totalitarisme, encore une fois." It was also evident in the publication in January 2001 of a massive collection of both contemporary and "classic" essays dealing with the concept of totalitarianism, a compendium compiled by Enzo Traverso under the title *Le Totalitarianisme. Le Xxe en débat*.[23]

This brief bibliographical survey confirms that Stéphane Courtois succeeded in determining considerable aspects of the legacy of *Livre noir*, in disregard of the original intentions of many of its authors and the actual nature of their contributions; for by shaping the debate surrounding its publication, he was able to also orchestrate subsequent historical and intellectual responses to the book. Yet the more important question to explore may be why Courtois's comparison of Communism and Fascism had the repercussions it did in fin-de-siècle France, and why so many felt obliged to tackle his premises. In responding to these questions, it is necessary to return to

François Furet's *Le Passé d'une illusion*—the work that actually relaunched the debate over Fascism and Communism in France in the 1990s—and review some of the responses generated following its publication in 1995.[24]

As already noted, *Le Passé d'une illusion* is primarily a history and, in its own way, an indictment of Communism in this century. Yet, in a chapter entitled simply "Communisme et fascisme," Furet compares at length Communism, Nazism, and Italian Fascism and concludes that they shared two crucial characteristics: a deep and abiding hatred of the bourgeoisie, and as a result of their common experience of the horrors of trench warfare during World War I, a willingness to resort to violence and to appeal to elemental passions in order to achieve political ends. In the course of these comparisons Furet also discusses the viability of the totalitarian model, conceding that it allows for valuable structural comparisons between Communism and Nazism in particular, but ignores specific historical circumstances crucial to understanding the origins and crimes of both Soviet Communism and Nazism. However, to put aside the totalitarian model altogether and to focus virtually exclusively on historical realities and their possible interconnections, is to fall prey to the kind of false historical causalities notoriously proposed by Ernst Nolte, causalities that played a crucial role in launching the Historians' Debate in Germany in the 1980s. Summed up succinctly by Ian Kershaw in a lecture given at the German Institute in Paris 1995, that causality affirms that "the Gulag was the original, Aushwitz was the copy."[25]

Although it did not provoke a public controversy comparable to the one resulting from the publication of *Livre noir*, Furet's *Le passé d'une illusion* certainly generated extensive commentary and debate, especially on the subject of the comparison of Communisim and Nazism. Historians including Renzo de Felice, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ian Kershaw (whose lecture at the German Institute was in large part a response to Furet) agreed or disagreed with Furet in the pages of *Le Débat* and *Commentaire*, among other venues. Of these responses, the most fascinating, troubling, and certainly the most illuminating, where the controversy over the *Livre noir* is concerned, was articulated by Ernst Nolte in a series of letters exchanged with Furet, which were published first in the pages of an Italian journal, then in *Commentaire*, and finally in a book entitled *Fascisme et communisme*.[26]

In their letters, Nolte and Furet cover not only the history and origins of the Nazi and Soviet regimes and the viability of the concept of totalitarianism, but more delicate matters such as the uniqueness of and origins of the Shoah and the question of historical revisionism. Early on, Nolte reveals a disturbing willingness to revisit his argument made during the Historian's Debate concerning the origins of Auschwitz, even giving it a new, more general, but equally insidious twist. For "anyone," Nolte writes, who would seek in a "resolute and consequent" manner to oppose Bolshevism and its "abolition of classes," would an "analogous" radicality not have been essential? And what radicality, what objective, could possibly be more logical, under the circumstances, than to target the Jews?[27]

Nolte does not stop there. Even if one leaves aside what is for Nolte the obvious causal link between the Gulag and Auschwitz, or even Soviet class war and Nazi "eliminationist anti-Semitism," to use Daniel Goldhagen's phrase, there would still be what Nolte describes as a "rational core" to Nazi anti-Semitism. There was after

all, a preponderance of Jews in Socialist and Communist leadership roles, and, since Nolte perceived Nazism as born out of an opposition to Marxism, the hatred of Marxists and, by extension, all Jews, was "rational," if not normal.[28]

In the latter stages of his correspondence with Furet, Nolte raises two final points worth stressing here. The first concerns the question of "historical revision" and more specifically the denial of the Holocaust, and the second concerns the crimes of the Wehrmacht. In discussing the former, Nolte's reasoning is perhaps at its most insidious. He maintains that the facts and figures of the Holocaust are constantly being revised, and that much of this revision is carried out by scholars with impeccable credentials. It was Raul Hilberg, for example, who argued in the mid-1980s, according to Nolte, that two and a half million Jewish victims could not possibly have been killed at Auschwitz, and that the number had to be revised downward to approximately 1 million—a figure Nolte states was subsequently accepted.

If historical revisions of this magnitude can be proposed by legitimate scholars and accepted unproblematically, Nolte continues, what sense does it make to completely dismiss from the realm of possibility any revision, no matter how small, proposed by those who question the existence of the Holocaust? Why not consider the Holocaust deniers a kind of radical historiographical fringe, whose research reveals elements of the truth on occasion? To do so, he deems, would serve the interests of knowledge production more than their unjust prosecution under the law, as takes place in Germany and France.[29] In turning to the crimes of the Wehrmacht, Nolte is concerned primarily with the famous exhibit that circulated in Germany and caused a good deal of controversy. While Nolte denounces the exhibit and its inspiration, the broader source of his distress lies in his perception that the seemingly endless emphasis on German crimes during World War II overshadows and, in fact, completely obscures Soviet and Red Army crimes which are treated as "nonexistent."[30]

Nolte herein returns us to the heart of the debate over the *Livre noir*. For his claims support in reverse fashion Annette Wieviorka's assertion about Courtois, as cited earlier, to the effect that his spectacular and emphatic focus upon the extent and horror of Communism's crimes would ultimately succeed in completely overshadowing public memory of the crimes of Nazism. However, there are more consequences for the *Livre noir* debate than are contained in Nolte's correspondence with Furet and the position he assumed during the Historian's Debate. In effect, Courtois's line of reasoning and much of the information provided in his Introduction to the *Livre noir* serve not only as *pièces à l'appui*—evidence in support of Nolte's reasoning—they also serve as the underpinning for his own introduction and conclusion. Courtois's discussion of the sheer horror and number of Communism's crimes, especially those of Leninism and Stalinism, appears to lend credence to Nolte's assertion that Hitler and the Nazis so feared the Soviet menace that they had to come up with a radical and preemptive measure to stymie it. Hence, their effort to "copy the Gulag," as Kershaw would say. In his conclusion, Courtois's furthermore reasons that if the ferocity of Soviet oppression drove the Nazis to respond, and if the crimes of the two regimes were by and large on the same footing—as he so tenaciously maintains—then the only logical and just response is to conduct a kind of Nuremberg for the crimes of Communism as well.

In fairness to Courtois, I should mention that he steers clear of Nolte's dubious historical revisionism and his efforts to legitimize at least some of the research and arguments raised by the Holocaust deniers. However, two aspects of Courtois's argument do point disturbingly in that direction. As Annette Wieviorka asserted in *Le Monde*, Courtois claims in his Introduction that it was the "international Jewish Community" that initiated and nurtured the memory of Nazi crimes. However, Wieviorka neglects to mention that for the majority of Holocaust deniers, the Shoah is not merely a hoax but one created and promulgated by an international Jewish conspiracy—the so-called 'international Jewish community'—in order, among other things, to distract attention from the crimes of Israel.

In this regard, Courtois's arguments seem indicative of a wave of négationisme, the French expression for the denial of the Holocaust, surfacing in other publications around the same time. In June 1996, a little more than a year before the *Livre noir* appeared, the French public was shocked when Abbé Pierre—Father Pierre—a renowned defender of the homeless, sprang to the defense of his old friend Roger Garaudy. A former Communist, then a Christian, and finally a devoted follower of Islam, Garaudy had recently published a book entitled *Les mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne* [*The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics*]. The book's main thesis is that Israel is exploiting the "myth" of the Holocaust in order to justify its own genocide of the Palestinians, a phenomenon Garaudy labels "Zionist colonialism." It is interesting to observe that Garaudy seeks to downplay and ultimately efface the Nazi genocide of the Jews by maintaining that it was nothing in comparison with the American genocide of black Africans. By means of a perverse and convoluted logic that he nevertheless labels "scientific," Garaudy determines the number of victims of America's genocide of black Africans to be between 1 and 200 million people. He reasons that since America "deported" between 10 and 20 million Africans into slavery, and since it is safe to assume that, for each African captured, ten Africans were killed while trying to escape, the total genocidal loss of life lies between 100 and 200 million.[31] Both the enormity of the figure Garaudy suggests and the crudeness of his comparisons and calculations seem to foreshadow Courtois's approach in the *Livre noir*.

Given the disturbing resonances resulting from Courtois's Introduction and the subject matter of the book itself, it is not surprising that the *Livre noir* was welcomed by the intellectual extreme right in France, and for that matter, in the United States.[32] In the pages of the reactionary review, *Éléments*, Alain de Benoist gleefully cited Courtois's figures for Communism's worldwide body count, even mentioning evidence suggesting Courtois had been too conservative in his estimates. Without missing a beat, De Benoist then took up the major theses of Nolte's approach and plugged in figures and arguments from the *Livre noir* as needed.[33]

Given the nature of the debate in the media after the appearance of *Livre noir* and the number of publications thereupon generated with the ambition of raising the intellectual level and legitimacy of the comparison of Nazism with Communism, it is not unreasonable to conclude that what the controversy really did was simply to bring the German Historians' Debate to France a decade later. Yet, in France the memory of the crimes of Nazism has necessarily been filtered through the memory of Vichy, herein implicating Vichy, as the Papon trial confirmed at the very same time the *Livre noir* appeared. As noted previously, Courtois deliberately introduced

French statutes governing crimes against humanity into his discussion of the crimes of Communism, herein lending these crimes a more painful immediacy among the French reading public. He also suggested that France's so-called duty to memory could not be fully satisfied by prosecuting only those Frenchmen who collaborated with Nazis would be necessary to prosecute those who collaborated with the Soviets as well. If this should indeed be the case, then the Papon trial marks not the end, but only the beginning of France's painful legal reckoning with its past. In the Fall of 1997, few, if any, citizens were prepared to confront such consequences.

Notes

1. For a more comprehensive discussion in English of the Papon trial and its legal and socio-historical implications, see my *The Papon Affair: History and Memory on Trial* (New York: Routledge, 2000).
2. All references are to the American edition: *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
3. "M. Jospin se déclare 'fier' que le PCF soit représenté au sein de son gouvernement," *Le Monde*, November 14, 1997.
4. Interview with J.-F. Revel, "Jospin a commis deux erreurs historiques," *Le Figaro*, November 15, 1997.
5. "Aux morts du communisme, Robert Hue repentant," *Libération*, November 9, 1997.
6. *Black Book*, p. 4.
7. Ibid., p. 8
8. Ibid., p. 9. This assertion and the previous quote drawn from Courtois's Introduction seem to indicate that despite his assertions about the equivalency of class and race genocide, he is not entirely comfortable with that equation. He seems to distance himself from his own vocabulary by means of scare quotes in the phrase "is equal to" and in the terms "class" and "race."
9. *Black Book*, p. 5.
10. The best discussion of the complexities of the Touvier case can be found in Éric Conan and Henry Rousso, *Vichy, an Everpresent Past*, trans. Nathan Bracher (Hanover: Dartmouth/UPNE, 1998), pp. 74–123. For a discussion of the Bousquet case, see the Introduction to my *Memory, the Holocaust, and French Justice; The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs* (Hanover: Dartmouth/UPNE, 1996), pp. 1–49.
11. *Black Book*, p. 752.
12. Ibid., p. 748.
13. Eric D. Weitz, "Race, Nation, Class: Das Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus und das Problem des Vergleichs zwischen Nationalsozialistischen und Sowjetischen Verbrechen," *WerkstattGeschichte* 22 (July 1999): 75–91.
14. Annette Wieviorka, "Stéphane Courtois, en un combat douteux," *Le Monde*, November 27, 1997.
15. "Communisme: l'heure du bilan," *L'Histoire*, 217 (January 1998): 6–8.
16. Jean-Louis Margolin and Nicholas Werth, "Communisme: retour à l'histoire," *Le Monde* November 18, 1997
17. Jacques Julliard, "Ne dites plus jamais 'jamais'!" *Le nouvel observateur*, November 20–26, 1997, p. 49.
18. Stéphane Courtois, "Comprendre la tragédie communiste," *Le Monde*, December 20, 1997.
19. Jacques Julliard, *L'Année des phantômes. Journal 1997* (Paris: Grasset, 1998), p. 341.

20. The authors were Pierre Rigoulot, author of the chapter on North Korea in the *Livre noir*, and Ilios Yannakakis.
21. Both the book by Lefort and by Besançon were published by Fayard.
22. *Stalinisme et nazisme* was published in the "Histoire du temps présent" series by Éditions Complexe. For the English translation, see *Stalinism and Nazism; History and Memory Compared*, ed. Henry Rousso, trans. Richard Golsan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004).
23. Traverso's collection was published in the Seuil Essais series.
24. Reference here is made to the American edition, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
25. I would like to thank Henry Rousso for providing me with the manuscript to Kershaw's lecture.
26. *Fascisme et communisme* was published by Plon in 1998. An English translation with the same title, translated by Katherine Golsan and containing a forward by Tzvetan Todorov, is forthcoming from University of Nebraska Press in Spring 2002.
27. *Fascisme et communisme*, p. 53.
28. Ibid., pp. 54–55.
29. Ibid., pp. 90–96.
30. Ibid., p. 83.
31. Garaudy's book and the Abbé Pierre-Garaudy affair are discussed in detail in chapter seven of my *Vichy's Afterlife: History and Counterhistory in Postwar France* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
32. For sentiments of this nature, see Marc A.Thiessen's review, "Why We Fought," *National Review* (January 24, 2000). Thiessen's praise of the *Livre noir* is cast in such a way as to justify Pinochet's actions in Chile.
33. Alain de Benoist, "Nazisme et communisme: vrais ou faux jumeaux?" *Éléments* 92 (July 1998): 14–36.

Chapter Fifteen

Repetition Compulsion and the Tyrannies of Genre: Frieder Schlaich's *Otomo*

Angelica Fenner

Post-Unification Cinema and the Return of Genre Films

Even before the first decade of film production in post-unification Germany had come to a close, film scholars were surveying the topography and drawing conclusions about the state of national cinema. While scholars diverge somewhat in their conclusions, all seem to concur that the 1990s were a decade markedly defined by a return to popular cinema.[1] Petty bourgeois comedies about relationships and gender roles, exemplified in Katja von Garnier's *Abgeschminkt*! (1993, *Without Makeup*!), Sonke Wortmann's *Der bewegte Mann* (1994, *Maybe . . . Maybe Not*) and Angelina Maccarone's *Alles wird gut* (1997, *All Ends Well*) were especially successful, as were a series of road movies that integrated the changing spatial and social topography of unified Germany as viewed through the eyes of men or women evading the commitments of adulthood, notably Thomas Jahn's *Knockin on Heaven's Door* (1996) and von Garnier's *Bandits* (1997). Productions by women filmmakers increased—witness

Figure 15.1 An image from the film *Otomo* (Courtesy of ArtMattan Productions, NY).

Caroline Link's surprise success with *Jenseits der Stille* (1996, *Beyond the Silence*)—although this younger generation operates under distinctly different terms of private financing than did their feminist forbearers in the 1970s and 1980s, and seems less inclined to define their directorial signature in gendered terms. Interest in historical narratives of the past was sustained but bore little resemblance to the interrogations of fascism that defined the work of Fassbinder, Herzog, Kluge, Sanders-Brahms, and other New German cinéastes. Rather than evincing the personal as the political, historical narratives such as *Aimee and Jaguar* (1998) or Dani Levy and Maria Schrader's *Meschugge* (1998) foreground romantic love and drama at the expense of substantive social or political analysis—a devolution away from modernist impulses that film historian Sabine Hake wryly summates as seeming "to confirm the diagnosis by postmodern theoreticians of a gradual disappearance of history into simulation and spectacle."

Whither then the social realist film? This was a genre with which nearly every prominent director of the New German Cinema once proved her- or himself equipped to measure the pulse of social events and filter the data through the cinematographic process for public examination. In films as diverse as Fassbinder's *Angst Essen Seele Auf* (1974), Helma Sanders-Brahms's *Shirin's Hochzeit* (1977), or Werner Schroeter's *Wolfsburg oder Palermo*, the measure of the German public's rehabilitation from an early fascist habitus was directly or indirectedly measured by the treatment of the growing population of foreign laborers and precariously situated immigrants. To an extent, this exploration of the status of ethnic minorities and social marginals within Germany has been taken up by a new generation of Turkish-German directors who have appropriated the Hollywood genre of the gangster film, offering aggressive masculinist attitudes reminiscent of a certain ghetto aesthetic in American cinema. These directors (notably, Fatih Akin, Yüksel Yavuz, Thomas Arslan) present their ethnic dramas about friendship, crime, murder, and diasporic identity in noirish urban settings that distinctly eschew the liberalist discourses of integration and "tolerance" prevalent among earlier German directors. The gradual fading of that trademark West German genre itself merits greater exploration, as it arguably gained life in the context of a particular form of knowledge production about self and other that was part and parcel of the overall agenda of the New German cinema and bound to other epistemes of West German society in the 1970s and 1980s.[2] The reappearance in 1999 of this abject strain of social critique in Frieder Schlaich's *Otomo*, a realist docudramatization about the fate of a Liberian asylum seeker, is thus particularly surprising and, indeed, marks an uncanny moment in the chronicles of German film history (see figure 15.1).

My exegesis in the pages to follow explores how Schlaich's film demarcates the transference of the New German cinema from the register of political intervention (recall Fassbinder's famous quip, "Some people make bombs—I make films"), into the realm of citation or historicized discourse. The canonicization of this wave of once insurrectionary German films may be most convincingly signaled by their return to the screen as cinematic citation, herein entering the nexus of intertextuality that has always characterized and, indeed, constituted the cinema as institution. Yet because the New German cinema was so intimately bound with the interrogation of the fascist legacy, director Schlaich's bracketing of that era of film

history also speaks most significantly about the status of *Vergangenheitsarbeit* at the millenium.

The film *Otomo* draws its material from a public controversy that originated in Stuttgart in 1989 following the fatal shooting of Liberian asylum seeker, Frederic Otomo, during a scuffle in which two officers were also mortally wounded. This violent confrontation came to be regarded as one of the most contentious crimes in Stuttgart's postwar history, as it led to a bitter national debate comparable to that which later arose in New York City following the 1999 fatal shooting of West African Amadou Diallo by New York police officers. It was a tragedy that confronted post-wall Germany with the specter of institutionalized racism, as citizens, policy makers, and special interest groups questioned police procedures and deliberated over national immigration policy. Local documentary filmmaker Frieder Schlaich thereupon sought approval to make a docudrama film about the incident. However, within a political climate of upheaval resulting from the unification process, his project was deemed too controversial, and police refused to offer the documentation needed to accurately recreate the event.

It was only following yet another Wende in 1998, namely the replacement of long reigning Christian Democratic chancellor Helmut Kohl with a "red–green" coalition headed by Gerhard Schroeder, that debates about citizenship, immigration, and the memorialization of the Holocaust regained momentum, particularly as the "Left" spearheaded plans for the "Berlin Republic." Filmmaker Schlaich had meanwhile produced his first feature film, *Paul Bowles—Halbmond*, which received several prizes in 1995, including the German Critics' Award. When he renewed his efforts on behalf of the docudrama project, he arguably found more receptive interlocutors in a climate wherein Germany stood poised to contemplate its internal struggles as a by-product of unification and globalization rather than as necessarily indicative of sinister ideological continuities with the National Socialist past. The film Schlaich ultimately created appears to encompass some of the ideological and discursive contradictions of the broader culture of which it was a product and in which it sought to intervene. Part of my agenda in this essay is to explore how these tensions are tied to shifts in the political climate that took place during the ten years that passed between the film's original conception and its final realization, and furthermore, to examine how the film ambiguously straddles intentionalist and functionalist approaches to the origins of racism in contemporary Germany, and does so via competing ideologies at the level of *histoire* or story, and of discours, the visual rhetoric by which the filmic diegesis is communicated. I invoke these two mutually defining narratological terms from Gérard Genette to identify the manner in which Schlaich cites the earlier aesthetic and political stance of the New German cinema in his search for a cinematic language with which to exert his own social critique.[3]

Like any fictionalized reenactment of a historical event, the film ultimately comprises a blend of both accurate factual details and a degree of surmise about Frédéric Otomo's mental frame of mind and the situations he encountered during his final three hours on the streets of Stuttgart on August 9, 1989. The actor Isaach de Bankolé, well known for previous performances as the taxidriver in Jim Jarmusch's *Night on Earth* (1991), the colonial servant in Clair Denis's *Chocolat* (1988), and more recently an appearance in Jarmusch's *Ghost Dog: Way of the Samurai* (1999), offers a

masterful characterization of a man trapped between despair and perseverence following eight years of subsistence at the margins of a foreign culture. The film begins with Otomo's early morning departure from a Catholic boarding house to visit an employment center where he joins a line of disheartened and acerbic unemployed men. While possessed of residence papers, Otomo nevertheless lacks a work permit with which to also acquire ongoing gainful employment. After a fruitless encounter, in which he is rejected for a construction job because he lacks sturdy shoes, he aimlessly rides the subway, lost in thought until a ticket controller scrutinizes his pass and accuses him of attempting to ride beyond the appropriate tariff zone. The controller insists that he disembark, incensing Otomo, who claims his ticket is valid. In response to the ongoing fuss, Otomo panics, headbutts the official, and immediately exits the train, jumping the turnstile and fleeing into the streets. In the next scene, we see the controller filing charges under reluctant corroboration from his coworker, compelling the police to immediately initiate a city-wide search for a potentially dangerous suspect. When officers in a squad car later spot Otomo on the Gainsburger Bridge, they converge upon him to request identification. During the ensuing scuffle, Otomo fatally stabs two officers with a knife and injures another, only to be shot dead by one of the wounded men as he attempts to escape the scene.

Perhaps the portion of the reenactment most fraught with conjecture involves the three hours that passed between Otomo's flight from the subway and the encounter on the bridge—a window of time for which no witnesses were available to recount his actions and possible deliberations. Director Frieder Schlaich chose to stage an encounter with a sympathetic German woman, clearly a former "68er", who befriends him as he walks along the banks of the Neckar and invites him up to her daughter's apartment for morning coffee. Gisela recognizes that Otomo is in trouble, but this does not dissuade her from extending some measure of friendship to him, inquiring about his family in Liberia and shyly explaining to him that she meets a group of women twice a week for African dance classes. In response to his desperate pleas for money with which to immediately leave the country, she reluctantly agrees to go to the bank and pick up a few hundred DM for him. While awaiting her return, Otomo glances out the apartment window and notices that a squad car is parked across the street. Realizing that the police are on his trail, he runs down the back stairs to escape the building through a basement window while the police dash upstairs to rush the apartment. Gisela, who returns from the bank at the same moment, sizes up the situation and slips into the basement just in time to pass Otomo the cash and exchange a lingering kiss that comes to serves as a symbolic if somewhat implausible gesture of solidarity among marginalized groups in Germany.

Screening the Spectral: Of Ghosts, Monsters, and Ventriloquists

Earlier I referred to Schlaich's film as an uncanny moment in German film history, and it now behooves me to unpack the various dimensions of that Freudian term and its implications for Schlaich's film. In his essay, "The Uncanny" (1919), Freud regards the uncanny as that class of the frightening that "arouses dread and horror" via something that is actually old and long familiar.[4] His etymological pursuit of the term's background and history within the German language reveals the term's capacity to

set into motion powerfully dialectical resonancies, with profound implications for cultural analysis. Freud determined that the term *unheimlich* remains intimately bound with the term *heimlich* or homely, and herein signals a kind of ambivalence that sets in when the familiar becomes unfamiliar and estranged. Indeed, in its psychoanalytical implications, the experience of the uncanny may actually be understood to result from the fact that the seemingly strange and unfamiliar maintains an underbelly of intimate familiarity, an echo of some earlier psychical state. Freud concludes that the uncanny is the return of an earlier state of mind, a primitive animism that should have been suppressed or surmounted in the course of normal individual or societal evolution.

In this regard, the uncanny is intimately bound with the spectral, with tremendous metonymic import for Schlaich's cinematic rendering. For it is a documentary reenactment of the final hours of a man now dead, herein carrying something of the element of an exhumation of his identity and his motives as well as of the behaviors of those who last encountered him. There is a certain redoubling at work here, as every communication medium (TV, radio, film, photography) is related in some crucial way to the spectral, transmitting "ghostly figures" that are not spatially and generally also not temporally synchronous with the spectator.[5] In this instance, however, it is also a case of projecting motives and meaning into a biographical figure who is no longer in a position to speak or act on his own behalf; instead, he is vivified via the very compelling acting of Isaach de Bankolé and assigned iterative capacities through the screenwriting of Schlaich and Klaus Pohl. De Bankole's ventriloqual performance of the fate of a dead man recalls the eerie automaton in E.T.A. Hoffmann's gothic tale, *Der Sandman* (*The Sandman*), a figure whom Freud identified as exemplifying one aspect of the uncanny, namely the capacity to straddle qualities of the living and of the dead. The automaton may exhibit motor control of the body while also implicating some sort of external source of agency or will, or alternately, seem evacuated of motor ability and yet be possessed with subjectivity and speech.[6] For Freud, the automaton in Hoffman's gothic tale recalls the early games of childhood life, in which children do not distinguish sharply between living and inanimate objects and fondly treat their dolls as live people. In this respect, the automaton may trigger earlier childhood beliefs that have been cast off, yet herein suddenly find veredicial evidence, triggering what Freud describes as the uncanny response of "So it is after all true!" or in another rhetorical response, "So the dead do live on and appear on the scene of their former activities!"[7]

A particular scene in *Otomo* condenses this quality of the automaton, that is, the instrumentalization of the dead, and the sense of a spectral haunting. Otomo has come to rest at the banks of the Neckar river after fleeing the scuffle in the subway. As he sits brooding, he slowly tears up his residence permit and casts it into the waters, seeming to repudiate any further claim to an existence in Germany. Suddenly a little girl appears and says, "I've brought you a flower."[8] The direct citation from James Whale's 1931 adaptation of Mary Shelley's novel, *Frankenstein*, not only metonymically signifies a character (Otomo) brought to life through directorial ingenuity (Schlaich), but also casts Otomo as a misunderstood man whose brutelike response in the subway belies a gentle interior. Via the technique of parallel editing, Otomo's hapless wanderings are juxtaposed with the systematic investigation undertaken by

the police, in which another character in the drama offers testimony to this portraiture of "the gentle giant." When the police search the catholic charity where Otomo previously resided, an officer asks the director of the organization, "Was he a violent man?" he promptly responds, "Oh no, you could discuss the bible with him for hours." The director's reply reveals, wittingly or not, the manner in which alterity is translated into cultural acceptability via the moral measure of western Christianity; would the comment be equally reassuring if Otomo were to expound for hours about the Koran? While the citation of film historical exemplars of the monstrous as a means of rendering local perceptions of alterity also seems problematic, there is a level of metonymical truth and directorial self-reflexivity in the analogy. For just as Frankenstein was the product of human tinkerings, the screen character of Otomo becomes the product of directorial imagination and de Bankolé's inspired acting, an approximation of a human life necessarily condensing various cultural tropes. As such, his racialized profile and certainly the script as such reveal more about the surrounding society that hosts these perceptions than about any putative biographical figure. Film scholar Dai Vaughan has discussed the ambiguities inscribed into cultural documentary, as all ethnography ultimately becomes auto-ethnography, a writing of the self.[9] Schlaich's reenactment of Otomo's trauma is really a reenactment of a traumatic and traumatized culture, one struggling to come to terms with signs of alterity within its fold. In the process, a certain aphanesis of the eponymous historical subject of the film takes place. Such a project can only assume moral or ethical legitimacy if one also engages in reflexivity about this inherent constraint upon ontological truth claims.

This returns us to Freud's search for a deeper meaning for the uncanny. In his reasoning, he started out with the literal understanding of the *unheimlich* as not of the homey, not within the intimate bounds of the family, the familiar. Yet without the negational prefix, *heimlich* not only means of the home but can also mean the secretive, that which is intentionally cloaked from the outside world, in effect repressed within the inner sanctum of the family or alternately, sub- or unconscious recesses of the psyche. In this regard, that which is *unheimlich* is also something brought to light from these dark recesses. Or as Schelling puts it, "Something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light."[10] The prefix "un-"in das *Unheimliche* is then the token of repression and simultaneously heralds the loss of concealed status to that which was secret, *das Heimliche*. While it may be true that the uncanny is, tritely speaking, something that is secretly familiar—*heimlich-heimisch*—which has gone under repression and then been roused into memory, Freud argues that this definition in and of itself is not narrow enough in its qualifiers, for many things fulfill that criteria without really being truly uncanny. His asks, therefore, "what is the origin of the uncanny effect of silence, darkness, and solitude?" (246) and concludes that a sense of danger and a sense of intellectual incertitude are also defining elements. While in the instance of the spectral cited earlier, the indeterminacy centers around questions of material reality (something that was perceived as real is realized in later maturity to be a phantom), Freud argues that more powerful sources of the uncanny arise from the repression of some ideational content of thought, that is, from the repression of certain structural experiences having to do with the constitution of the psyche.

New German Cinema and the Fantasy Structure of Reconstructed History

At this point, I would shift from contemplating individual subjectivities, namely that of the figure of Otomo, to contemplating a particular body of cinematic production—namely the New German Cinema—as subject. That body of work was very much born out of an oedipal impetus, a revolt against "papa's kino" summated in the Oberhausen declaration in 1962, "The old film is dead. We believe in the new one."[11] The structural relations that defined the ideological content and the rhetoric of much of its cinematic production since its inception are consciously mimicked by Schlaich in his interrogation of historical trauma, as well as in his choice of casting, and of course, in the resurrection of the genre of the migrant film. To engage with history as he does and as did this earlier generation, is ultimately to engage with the history of trauma, for the act of narrating the past itself indicates a desire to assimilate what was not fully comprehended. Slovenian theorist Slavoj Zizek engages precisely this relationship between trauma and its symbolization when he write:

> . . . this is precisely what defines the notion of a traumatic event: a point of failure of symbolization, but at the same time never given in its positivity. It can only be constructed backwards, from its structural effects. All its efficacy lies in these effects, in the distortions it produces in the symbolic universe of the subject. The traumatic event is ultimately just a fantasy-construct filling out a certain void in a symbolic structure and as such the retroactive effect of this structure.[12]

This element of "fantasy" is perhaps most evident in the film sequence condensing the three hours prior to Otomo's death, a temporal gap for which police documentation and witnesses could offer no accounts. It thus comes to serve in the film as a highly cathected screen for heightened wish-fulfillment and for revisiting the postures of political resistance that defined an earlier era.

Central to this "fantasy" is the casting of Eva Mattes in the role of the idealistic and oppositional figure of Gisela, the good object choice among a cast of nondescript secondary characters. Although she first appears about forty-five minutes into the story, she thereupon becomes a defining, even an overdetermining presence, because of the historical resonancies she activates. At age 17, Mattes was probably the youngest member among the Munich-based entourage of aspiring actors and actresses that assembled around the flamboyant theater director and novice film director Rainer Werner Fassbinder in the late 1960s. She appeared in several of his early experimental films and played the lead role of the murderous nymphet in *Wildwechsel* (1971, *Jailbait*). Mattes went on to pursue a most illustrious acting career in both the theater and the cinema, with one of her most memorable roles remaining that of Lena in Helma Sanders-Brahms's *Germany, Pale Mother* (1977).[13] Her trajectory was not dissimilar to that of several other members of the Fassbinder clique (Karl-Heinz Böhm, Margit Carstensen, Ingrid Caven, Irm Hermann, Kurt Raab, Hannah Schygulla, Volker Spengler, Barbara Valentin). They came to comprise a consistent and highly visible cast in German films of the 1970s and early 1980s, lending that work a coherence as a national cinema in a manner not dissimilar to the star system of the Hollywood cinema during the studio era. Indeed, during this halcyon era of German film history, these figures served as a kind of prosthesis

of the nation, a reassuringly recognizable combination of faces and personalities with whom spectators could identify and vicariously work through emotional topics specific to the German cultural context. In most cases, this meant living out scenes that interrogated power dynamics in intimate relationships, patriarchal structures of family life, parental complicity under fascism, intergenerational strife, and the hypocrisies of bourgeois morality.

For a public familiar with this body of films, Mattes thus enacts a spectral haunting of a different sort, metonymizing a particular postwar generation. This is foregrounded at the level of dialogue in the initial encounter between herself and the character of Otomo. She steps forward on the banks of the Neckar to retrieve her granddaughter, Simone, who has just extended a flower to Otomo. Initially she looks distrustfully at him, but after he assures her that he means no harm, she haltingly invites him to join them on a park bench and they exchange basic biographical information. When Gisela playfully asks Otomo, "How old do you think I am?" spectators, too, are solicited to place her within some sort of a chronological timeline in relationship to German film history. Otomo's estimate of age 55 sparks a response typical of an aging screen star, as she reproaches him for assigning her an unflattering age. When he hastens to explain that in his culture, this would be a compliment, she adds that she is 46 (her true age at the time) and a grandmother to Simone, no less. Her remark functions extra-diegetically to confirm the generational distance that also stands between these two agents of German film history, Mattes and Schlaich. A later intrusion of the Real into the film dialogue occurs when Gisela's adult daughter viciously reproaches her for having invited Otomo into her home and for giving him money, shouting derisively "you old hippy!"

Significantly, it is Gisela's generation, rather than that of her offspring, that is presented here as seeking human connection and cross-cultural understanding. The rookie police officers Heinz (played by Hanno Friedrich) and Rolf (Barnaby Metschurat), who are assigned to search for Otomo and who later die during the shoot-out on the bridge, are also part of this disaffected and less socially idealistic generation. Of the two, Heinz is presented as a "decent cop," who speaks up when other officers at the station begin to make racist remarks in response to the discovery of Otomo's Liberian identification papers found in the bag left behind in the subway. Yet Heinz's ensuing efforts to understand the profile of the suspect seem primarily motivated by the desire to excel in his profession, more specifically, to garner a promotion in rank because his wife is expecting a baby and they need the extra income. Toward that end, he is prepared to turn off the squad siren while in pursuit of the suspect, despite regulations to the contrary. His partner, Rolf, emblifies the stereotype of the bumbling, donut-munching cop: he bides the long hours in the cruiser by idly composing clever lines for his rap tunes and in the process reveals how banal the surface of institutionalized racism can appear. Contemplating the man they are seeking, he can only visualize Otomo in monstrous terms. When they pull up at a traffic intersection next to a glamorous woman in a sportscar, Rolf peers over to her wonders aloud almost lasciviously, what if this woman were to pick up Otomo on the road, why, he'd probably murder her. He begins to rap: "The white woman in a black Tagra, on the banks of the Neckar, so unsuspecting, didn't feel a thing."[14]

The ideological gap between two generations is also conveyed in the moment in which Otomo tells Gisela in a tone of threatening desperation that he urgently needs money to leave the country, and insists that she retrieve some from an automated teller. Gisela is a little put off by his insistence, but also disputes his perception of her as affluent. She retorts defiantly that she is just visiting Stuttgart from Berlin (Mattes's actual residence) and that she doesn't have much money, adding derisively that she has neither a plastic cash card nor a cell phone. Her remarks underscore her ideological and political distance from a contemporary culture of instant cash and instant communication, and link her with an earlier less materialistic and less technologically mediated generation. While she recognizes the dangers that a figure like Otomo could pose, the subtle glances between the two also convey her empathy and allude to the likelihood that—as a character metonymic for a revolutionary generation—Gisela's past is checkered with politically motivated forays outside the law.

Mattes functions in Schlaich's film not only to invoke a particularly idealistic generation, but also a corresponding era in German filmmaking. Whereas these films were grounded in an interrogation of perceived ideological and political continuities between the fascist past and contemporary society,[15] the work of later filmmakers does not seem to constitute nearly as cohesive a corpus, for a number of reasons. Certainly, in that earlier era, the terms of film financing were more favorable and funding from television stations provided more freedom than was available for films that had to recover their investment at the box office. Born in Stuttgart in 1961, Frieder Schlaich represents a generation that dovetailed with the end of that era, whose closure was symbolically inscribed through the death of Fassbinder in 1982. Schlaich's own training in visual communications at the Hamburg College of Fine Arts took place between 1985 and 1991. The forces that define German identity and German filmmaking today have become far more diffuse, such that oedipal resistance to the parental generation is not an exclusive organizing principle, nor does fascism function as the ubiquitous repressed discourse within most expressed narratives. Postwall cinema now seems informed by a number of interrelated discourses including globalization, migration flows, and post-communism.

Prosthetic Forms of Social Conscience

Between roughly 1969 and the late 1980s, a body of West German films addressing issues of racism and the terms of political and social inclusion in society came to constitute a veritable genre of its own, one bearing singular significance within the German historical context.[16] This is a thesis that I have outlined in an earlier essay, in which I postulated a body of films, so-called films of migration as sharing features discernable as a "discursive practice" in the Foucauldian sense of invoking certain discourses within an institutional setting (the cinema as apparatus, as social institution, and mode of production), where relations of power play a central and defining role.[17] I will not cover that ground again in this essay, but rather introduce a few new mosaics to that earlier tessellation of Foucauldian reasoning. For while Foucault's structuralist approach is one of avowed exteriority, Freudian theory posits deeper meanings hidden in discourse, herein reading cultural artifacts as symptoms of

repressed realties. Psychoanalysis is a domain that can enhance and deepen our understanding of particular moments of German film history as formations born out of the repression of trauma.

There is a significant thesis to be teased out here regarding the relationship of this particular genre to the fascist legacy, a relationship that assumes the form of a self-exhumation undertaken via discourses of otherness and abjection, and played out viscerally and violently upon the bodies of the culturally marginalized and socially ostracized. Whether produced by West German cinéastes or by foreign nationals making films in Germany,[18] each film in succession seems caught in the throes of a repetition compulsion constituted through the conviction that this particular dramatic restaging will definitively unearth the etiology of racism within contemporary German society, or at least reiterate arch condemnation of its continuing symptoms. Each traces a traumatic narrative constituted through the ineluctable decline in circumstances of its protagonists, effectively returning us to the ever familiar aporia of a migrant worker or asylum seeker facing a tragic end in Germany. Hence, the spectatorial sense of the uncanny, the journey that traces a seemingly peripatetic path only to reveal itself as a well-trodden trail along long-familiar terrain.

To understand the nature of a recurring pattern not only within a corpus of filmic narratives but also within an era of German film history, let us review how Freud defines the pathology of the repetition compulsion. His ideas on the subject were mapped out at a mature stage of his career, at age 64, when not only his scholarship but also the field of psychoanalysis had achieved credibility and popularity. It was the sobering historical events of World War I that compelled Freud to probe beyond his earlier theorization of an innate human will toward pleasure and satisfaction, to contemplate the more destructive aspects of human nature. His ruminations on the subject culminated in the publication in 1919 of that short but pathbreaking exegesis, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Here, as in earlier work, he regards the regulation of well-being within the human subject as a kind of economy striving toward equilibrium, in which pleasure and unpleasure are linked to the quantity of excitation or instability present in surrounding circumstances. Freud's original assertion of a pleasure principle had been grounded in the observation that "the mental apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant."[19]

Yet there are a number of human behaviors and accompanying circumstances that seem to defy this drive towards constancy. One is, of course, the reality principle, in which satisfaction is postponed and unpleasure is temporarily tolerated as an acknowledged step on the indirect road toward pleasure. This accounts for some human behaviors that lead to unpleasurable experiences, but not all. Freud further observes that unpleasure is found in conflicts that arise during the ego's development into a highly composite organization; when individual instincts or parts of instincts turn out to be incompatible in their aims or demands with those that combine into the inclusive unity of the ego, the former split off through the process of repression and are held back from the possibility of satisfaction. If they seek through roundabout paths a direct or substitutive satisfaction, that event, which otherwise would have offered pleasure, is experienced by the ego as unpleasure. Repression turns a

possibility for pleasure into a source of unpleasure—neurotic unpleasure can be defined as deriving from putatively pleasureable situations that are unable to be experienced as such. Most sources of unpleasure, Freud concludes, are of perceptual origin, whether pertaining to unsatisfied instincts or the perceptual recognition of a threat or danger to the body or the psyche. Here, Freud's investigation into the mental reaction to external danger is significant and is elaborated via the famous example of his nephew engaged in the "fort-da" game. Freud posits the child as overcoming primal experiences of loss or danger by impulsively restaging the trauma: ". . . by repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took an active part."[20]

Of course, if we now shift our attention to the realm of cinema and literature, most if not all narrative trajectories seem fundamentally preoccupied with dramas of loss and recovery—the form that the lost object assumes will vary but the trajectory itself possesses a structural constancy. Perhaps one could even regard extant film genres as coalescing out of particular coordinates along the trajectory of loss and recovery that have succeeded over time in gaining resonance among historical readers or spectators to a point where they achieve the status of a genre. It would go beyond the parameters of this essay to explore what codified form this takes in genres as diverse as the western, the melodrama, the buddy film, and so on. However, West German films about migration are distinctive in that this dramatic cycle of loss and recovery is not completed—the object is not recovered, thus subjecting the drama to replay. If there is any element of redemption or recovery, it is ultimately focalized not through the viewpoint of the abject foreigner, but rather that of German citizens or hegemonic audiences. While these films assume as their apparent protagonist a foreign national negotiating an experience of abjection, the drama itself is staged for those privileged not to have to share these circumstances. It is not, after all, the fictive foreigner who will get to experience the mastery of anxiety associated with this trope, given his or her tragic fate at the end of so many films. Even the artistic process of making the film itself becomes a collective enactment of loss and retrieval, a mastery of the citizenal helplessness to resolve racialized conflicts that the New German cinéastes facilitate in their function as intermediaries between the social imaginary and historical realities that confront the West German nation.

Lost But Now Found: Germany and Normalization

Is there more to the pathology of repetition compulsion than simply the dialectical play of loss and recovery, of pleasure and unpleasure? It would be useful to return to Freud and the conclusions he drew from neurotic patients suffering from trauma, patients whose dreams led them back with regularity to the situation in which the earlier trauma had occurred. Here, it did not seem to be a matter of mastering trauma by reenacting the drama of loss and recovery; rather, these scenarios seemed intent upon triggering an anxiety or defense mechanism whose earlier absence was retroactively intuited to have permitted the subject's traumatization in the first place. In his words: ". . . preparedness for anxiety and the hypercathexis of the receptive systems constitute the last line of defense of the shield against stimuli."[21] Arguably, the aforementioned abject cinematic narratives stage a collective phantasm similarly intent upon triggering a lapsed anxiety or defense mechanism against potential traces of fascist discourse surfacing in racist behaviors of citizens or racist policies within institutional structures.

Of course, this intimation of a repetition-compulsion within the German public sphere has also surfaced elsewhere, most notably among Holocaust scholars seeking to identify recurring waves of self-contemplation—what Atina Grossmann has referred to as "Holocaust moments"—that surface around the publication of books, release of films, critical parliamentary decisions, and scholarly debates preoccupied with the interpretation and representation of the Holocaust.[22] Dan Diner identifies the question of guilt as central to this compulsion:

> Hence, despite—or perhaps, precisely because of—all inner resistance, the question of guilt repeatedly invites renewed discussion—repetition compulsion based on the complex fabric of collective memory: direct or by deferral, revealed or camouflaged, acknowledged or denied. As an erratic backdrop for the collective self-understanding of the Germans, it can be sensed everywhere.[23]

While Schlaich's docudrama project constitutes another ripple within these tides of national self-contemplation, it also contains multiple conflicting ideological registers in relationship to the discourse of guilt. These registers are evident in the film's use of cinematic citations from the New German cinema, which signal a distance, both temporal and ideological, from the pro-filmic material. *Otomo* straddles both the historical moment of the original crime in Stuttgart and the decade that passed until Schlaich's film could be realized, which ultimately renders the film more a cultural product of its own historical moment. The various citizens who encounter Otomo in the film are presented in a light that seems symptomatic of a certain shift in political and social discourses in post-unification Germany, a shift often summated in academic and political parlance about German society under the term "normalization." With unification came a transformation in the perceived status of Germany—from Federal Republic privileged to be founded as a democratic state and abnegating nationalist ambitions or investments and maintaining a unique vigilance with regard to earlier national socialist ideology—to unified nation authorized with good conscience to engage in the same practices as other nations (e.g., deporting refugees from the war in former Yugoslavia, or mobilizing the Bundeswehr for flood disaster relief). In addition to focusing upon ongoing issues of integration and reconciliation between the new and old Länder, the new Germany also focused its attention upon urgent questions shared with other European nations, issues pertaining to European unity, the insecure future of the welfare state, and integration of migration flows from non-Western nations.

Intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas have criticized this "left nationalism," arguing that contemporary anxieties and debates cannot be considered outside of the context of Germany's historical implication in National Socialism.[24] Habermas remains indebted to Karl Jasper's perception that in the aftermath of the Holocaust and World War II, the so-called *Schuldfrage*—the effect of a constant sense of guilt—is and should remain foundational to Germany's moral and historical self-awareness.[25] If democracy is herein born out of defeated fascism, then to be identified as German is to be recognized as necessarily guilty by association, inheritance, and membership in this community. This notion of a cross-generational and predetermined collective German guilt cannot be rationally grounded, of course, and

defies the notion of the autonomous subject. Yet, as Dan Diner has observed:

> . . . a sense of guilt, traceable to the Holocaust and incapable of rational illumination, simply clings, mildew-like to all those who feel part of Germany's collective memory. It is precisely this sense of guilt without culpability of a legal nature that has produced the cross-generational convulsions accompanying public discourse on Nazism and German mass crimes. These guilt feelings, evoked without individual involvement and even displaced temporally, point back to the specificity of the crime branded into the place-name "Ausschwitz."[26]

Arguably, this notion of the *Schuldfrage* also underpins *Otomo*, which like many films about migration, conducts an autopsy intent upon revealing the etiology of failed fealty to this particular form of citizenal identity, or, to cite Freud, "the anxiety whose omission was the cause of traumatic neurosis." Yet Schlaich has articulated that his intent in *Otomo* was not to assign blame or determine guilt in a tragic situation, but rather to expose how such an event could come about in the first place: "Our idea was to make the audience care about both sides, to make people ask, 'Why did it have to come to this?' It was not our goal to blame anyone for this situation, but to trace the steps that lead to disaster."[27] Here I would draw upon a remark from John Mowitt in his brilliant essay, "Shaken but not stirred," in which he observes, "it is precisely in the representation of trauma that the work of moralization begins."[28] I would maintain that it is impossible to get away from the question of guilt, even if it simply takes the form of a sense of moral responsibility. For what does it really mean, for Schlaich to try to understand how these deaths came about—is it not ultimately to seek a source of agency, whether human or institutional? To understand his stance, it is worth recollecting the mapping of discourses in the historiography of Nazism and Holocaust, which also seem to coalesce around questions of institutional and personal association, either by implying guilt and responsibility (the intentionalist approach) or alternately fending off such characterizations (the functionalist approach). While the intentionalist stance regards mass crimes as indicative of culpable action, functionalism is grounded in models positing the principle of negligence, what Dan Diner terms guiltless guilt.[29]

Schlaich's functionalist stance seems evident in the many moments in which individual citizens are presented as occupying conflicted sites of both human empathy and entrenched cultural racism toward Otomo. For example, the kindly middle-aged German barmaid who encounters Otomo in the early morning when he enters her pub and requests a coffee. Her sympathetic gaze upon the man in shabby clothes who stands hesitantly at the door conveys that she has sized up his abject social circumstances, moving her to bring him not only a coffee but also an unsolicited roll, captured in a pointed close up by the camera. Minutes later, when a police officer sweeps through after his departure to inquire whether she has seen a tall black man, she retorts in feigned shock, "What, a black man?" and then looks down to her dog, Elvis, who had barked earlier upon Otomo's entrance, to inquire innocently of him, "Did we see a black man here? God forbid!" What better example of guiltless guilt, of individuals who exhibit compassion in the same breath as they perpetuate racist discourse. Repeated instances seem intent upon revealing the German subject as

interpolated by conflicted discourses of both humanism and institutionalized racism, as embodied in the paternalistic police superintendent who urges the rookie police officers assigned to find Otomo not to get too emotionally involved in the personal dilemmas of a suspect, for other colleagues have had bad experiences in that regard.

Rationalizing Racism

It is undeniable that Schlaich's film is thoughtfully crafted, and that he has put a great deal of thought into the various debates and contestations around the fascist past, around racism, and questions of citizenship. Further, he has a cinéastic eye for metaphor, for iconography, and for framing. Yet in its fealty to the social realist genre, one intent upon a sociologically accurate rendering of society and thus lacking any effusive emotion or lyricism of form, Schlaich's film leans toward the hypostatization of identities, presenting them as unified subjectivities that conform to reified character profiles. This is an almost inevitable trap that one enters when researching the etiology of racism. Racial prejudice in its historical and institutional forms, when subjected to closer breakdown of behaviors, tends to undergo a certain level of rationalization. As Diner has pointed out:

> Every conceptual rationalization, when subject to close empirical scrutiny, disintegrates into a mass of isolated elements which, when taken separately, are incapable of evoking the drama packed into their conceptual synthesis—into their symbolization in the form of rationalizing images. This is as true for the concept of anti-Semitism as for other concepts that rationalize complex social processes and phenomena. To a great extent, the close-range perspective robs the phenomena of the aura of the iconic symbolization embedded in the concept. It is that aura that reflects much more faithfully what contemporaries "truly" experienced than the mere empirical description of the so-called reality.[30]

In some regards, the social realist genre may similarly undermine its own empirical agenda by a too faithful adherence to what film theorist André Bazin regarded as the "ontology of the photographic image," in which the camera is equipped to "objectively" capture truths, in contrast to the motivated vision of the naked eye.[31]

This is not to deny that there are also several moments of self-reflexivity about the entire moral project. One scene in particular captures this notion of compassion and Christian humanism as performance, underscoring also the manner in which defense mechanisms in postfascist society can come to constitute a learned behavior. Early in the film narrative following Otomo's flight from the subway incident, he seeks refuge and an opportunity for contemplation in a Catholic church. As he kneels quietly at a side alter, the camera intercuts images of a minister at the pulpit fervently intoning to an apparently empty row of pews: "And God says, 'if you are only kind to your neighbor, what are you doing that is special?' Every millimeter can represent an infinity. A friendly word can save a life. Most things depend on small words, small gestures . . ." Suddenly, another man in a robe steps forward and interrupts the sermon, coaching him on his intonation and the need to breathe and to speak in measured cadences. Moral proselytization is effectively revealed as rehearsed, metonymically alluding to a self-conscious quality in public morality while also commenting self-reflexively on the stance of the film itself.

The scholar Jeffrey Olick has coined the term "legitimation profiles" to identify how the concept of German national identity in the postwar era has been defined in relationship to evolving images and perceptions of the historical past and different strategies for locating responsibility for this past.[32] He offers another way to talk about national self-identity and its anchoring in various defenses formulated in relationship to evolving public discourse and political regimes. Olick identifies three major legitimation profiles in West German history beginning with the "Reliable Nation," which spanned the founding of the FRG until the early 1960s, and involved institutional changes and a stolid Western orientation intended to evince that Germany was no longer associated with its predecessor regime. A new image of Germany as "Moral Nation" arose with the generational fissure of the early 1960s, which was accompanied by a desire to confront the past and draw more radical lessons, and engage with rapprochement with the East.

But I am particularly struck by Olick's reading of West Germany as "Normal Nation," beginning with Federal President Walter Scheel in the mid-1970s and Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1982. Under Helmut Kohl, Olick maintains that normalization became a form of relativization of the past, such that Germany was viewed as having horrors as did the pasts of other countries. But there was another sense in which normalization also became synonymous with regularization and ritualization:

> After 40 years of West German history, the commemorative apparatus had become a rather well-oiled machine. Acknowledgements of historical responsibility had become regular features of the political liturgy. Distinctive genres had evolved: there were, for instance, German guilt occasions, including anniversaries of 30 January 1933, 8 May 1945, 1 September 1939, 9 November 1938, Israelpolitik, and concentration camp visits; there were celebrations of German suffering, including Memorial Day, and commemorations of the postwar expulsions from Eastern Europe; and there were celebrations of valued German traditions, including the 20 July conspiracy and the Hambacherfest, among others. Each of these genres had developed its own appropriate style and language; as time went on, that language, style, and content became increasingly ritualized and regular. Whether or not the German past was a normal past, it was to a large extent a normal part of West German political ritual. It had been largely domesticated.[33]

Otomo seems to oscillate between two poles of legitimation: cinematographic citations from the New German cinema evoke the voice of the "moral nation" amidst a narrative depiction of the "normal nation" facing the challenges of accelerated migration flows as one of the byproducts of globalization. Despite the compelling nature of these invocations, it is also true that by sheer dint of his generational status, Schlaich cannot really share the overdetermined oedipal agenda of the New German cinema, and his homage to esteemed directors thus admittedly rings somewhat hollow, emptied of biographical legitimacy and an adequate political coherence, like so many commemorations described by Olick.

"X" Marks the Spot: Stuttgart and "Reel" History

The penultimate sequence of Otomo takes place upon a crossway over a large multilane highway, a crossway known as the Gainsburger Bridge. Otomo stands on the

bridge, looking down at the rapid current of moving automobiles, presumably contemplating jumping to his death. There is tremendous metaphoric weight born by this image of the bridge, as Otomo himself is precariously situated between two cultures, serving as living link between the imperial past (his father is alleged to have fought in Liberia on the German side during the colonial wars) and the democratic present, and between economic and social marginalization on the one hand, and the opportunity to work toward self-sufficiency on the other (Otomo did not possess the proper papers to actually work and become economically self-sustaining in Germany), and between the compulsions to alternately deny or promote cultural pluralism. The Autobahn also ominously serves as the River Styx, portending the transition several lives are about to undertake between the world of the living and that of the dead. A police cruiser suddenly catches sight of Otomo and pulls over onto the bridge. Heinz and Rolf disembark and begin walking cautiously toward Otomo, who is completely engulfed in his own conflicted thoughts. They stand uncertainly behind him, unsure even how to proceed or what to say. This shot defies popular perceptions of the police as indifferent agents of the law, revealing them to be individuals themselves struggling with ethical choices, with how to comport themselves in the face of another man's pitiful plight and desperation, and in the face of possible physical danger. It is also, significantly, presented as that turning point, where violence could still be avoided and seconds later becomes almost an inevitability. As they falteringly ask for identification, he flashes around to face them, startled. They attempt English and repeat their inquires. Meanwhile, reinforcements arrive; suddenly five men are asking questions of each other and of him, and tensions escalate as racist comments surface ("Ask him in his tribal language," "Enough with the animal rights activism").

De Bankolé plays this scene very compellingly, presenting a man trapped, misunderstood, and gripped by fear and the instinct that all survival options are closing off. He mutely dodges the police and in a sudden series of fast edits we glimpse a blur of wrestling bodies and hear the exclamation "Watch it, he's got a knife!" Suddenly one policeman is on the ground gripping his chest as blood spurts forth, another also collapses, followed by a close-up of the bloodied knife that has fallen on the ground. As Otomo breaks into a run, the camera's shutter speed seems to slow down and a countershot shows the fallen police officer, Heinz struggling to reach for his revolver and then firing 4 or 5 bullets with the last of his strength, followed by the image of Otomo's backside as he is hit and slowly sinks to the ground, with another close-up this time of the revolver on the ground next to the collapsed officer. The ensuing overhead shot, on overdeveloped film that assumes a ghostly white quality as in a dream, looks down upon bodies splayed on the concrete road in the aftermath of this violent carnage, offering a theological position from which to view the coordinates of this tragic moment; the span of bridge hovering perpendicular to the highway below seems to mark a giant "X" onto this concrete grid in geographical space and historical time. The stasis of various emergency vehicles sprawled across the bridge, and bodies lying prone or being carefully lifted on stretchers into an ambulance stands in contrast to the ongoing current of automobiles now moving past in slow motion underneath the bridge, underscoring the suspension of the narrative in the service of spectacle.

The complete absence of sound from this point onward in the film further functions to shift the viewer figuratively and literally into a mode of visual contemplation. The absence of sound in the cinema has, from its very origins, been understood to heighten the spectral quality of the screen image and to intensify the gap between projected object and viewing subjects. Here, it solicits the spectator to become aware of the act of film viewing as itself an act of witness, inviting moral assessment. Furthermore, the slow fade to white instantiates a temporal shift from a reenactment situated in the immanent narrative present to historical reflection on the past. This is signaled through the ensuing documentary film footage of the elaborate state funeral which took place in Stuttgart for the fallen policemen, an event that drew thousands of participants and received wide media coverage. The solemn crowds shuffling through the streets amidst police escorts on mopeds, and the lavish wreaths offered in honor of the officers' deaths offer testimony to the symbolic significance of these deaths for the Federal Republic. The footage stands in radical contrast with the ensuing closing scene of five figures, including Gisela and the building superintendent from the Catholic charity, huddled numbly around a simple open grave amidst falling snow. The final close-up of Gisela staring reproachfully off camera into the distance signals a double return both to the sense of moral accountability among Mattes's generation of artists and politically engaged citizens as well as to the New German Cinema as cinematic practice.

This closing sequence serves to recall another traumatic moment in Stuttgart's postwar history, namely the "German autumn" of 1977, a season of intensified terrorist kidnappings that culminated in the suicide of imprisoned RAF members Andreas Baader, Gudrun Enslin, and Jean-Carl Raspe in Stuttgart's Stammheim Prison, and the ensuing retaliatory slaying of Hans-Martin Schleyer, who had been president of the Employers Association and a board member of Daimler-Benz. Schlaich's juxtaposition of the highly ritualized state funeral with a modest private burial is a direct cinematic citation from the 1977 omnibus film *Germany in Autumn*, which included segments by Fassbinder, Kluge, and others. That film juxtaposed the elaborate state ceremony of national mourning for Hans-Martin Schleyer with the austere burial of the three Red Army Faction members, whose bodies were laid in a public cemetery despite protest from some city residents. Schlaich's strategic use of citation herein achieves a redoubling, juxtaposing "reel" history with "real" history in two temporal registers. By establishing a similar contrast between the lavish state-financed rituals of mourning for employees of the German state and the private burial of disenfranchised asylum seekers, Schlaich's film enacts its own degree of ritualization, one instantiated in the invocation of the New German as the moral conscience of German cinema. Simultaneously, Schlaich's recourse to discourses of past film history also seems to imply a certain speechlessness within contemporary cinematic production in Germany. That impasse may be born just as much out of an awareness of the shifting epistemological valuation of the social realist film as a heuristic device for understanding the past, as well as out of that genre's increasingly tenuous market status amidst the resurgence of popular genre films in an era in which popular demand drives production values more than do the programmatic imperatives of state funding for the arts. To break free of the repetition trauma represented by this genre of "films about foreigners," a new self-reflexivity about the rhetoric at work in ritualized restagings

of national trauma may be called for, one that is enacted not only at the level of dialogue and the metonymy of images, but also in form and stylistics.

Notes

1. See Sabine Hake, *German National Cinema* (New York: Routledge, 2002); the introduction to Thomas Elsaesser and Michael Wedel, eds., *The BFI Companion of German Cinema* (New York: BFI, 1999); Eric Rentschler, "From New German Cinema to the Post-Wall Cinema of Consensus," in ed. Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie *Cinema and Nation* (NY: Routledge, 2002), pp. 260–77.
2. I have discussed at length the historical significance of a body of films I coin as "migrant films" or "films of migration" in my article "Traversing the Screen Politics of Migration," in *Moving Pictures, Migrating Identities*, ed Eva Rueschmann (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 2003), pp. 18–38.
3. See Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, trans. Jane Lewin. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980). For Genette, the gerund "narrating" is what binds the mutually defining terms of *histoire* (story) and *discours* (narrative): "It is thus the narrative, and that alone, that informs us here both of the events that it recounts and of the activity that supposedly gave birth to it. In other words, our knowledge of the two (the events and the action of writing) must be indirect, unavoidably mediated by the narrative discourse, inasmuch as the events are the very subject of that discourse and the activity of writing leaves in it traces, signs or indices that we can pick up and interpret . . ." (28).
4. See "The 'Uncanny,' " in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, trans. James Strachey. Vol. 17 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), pp. 217–56.
5. André Bazin also alludes to photography's peculiar qualities as that of preserving the dead, a veritable mummification, for with the passage of time, all that is left of the original person is the photographic imprint of the negative. "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," in *What is Cinema*? trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 9.
6. Freud, "The Uncanny," *SE*, Vol. 17, esp. pp. 226–34.
7. Ibid., p. 248.
8. Apropos the spectral, it is worth observing that this same little girl, upon later learning that he is from the African continent, inquires curiously, whether there are ghosts in his country. Grinning, he replies, "Yes, and they steal everything!"
9. Vaughan, "The Aesthetics of Ambiguity," in *Film as Ethnography*, ed. Peter Ian Crawford and David Thurton (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 102. The selective choices made behind the camera and in the editing of images herein offer insights into what cinema philosopher Walter Benjamin had much earlier already referred to as 'the optical unconscious.' See his short essay, "A History of Photography" in *One-Way Street*, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London: New Left Books, 1979), pp. 240–57.
10. Freud, "The Uncanny," SE, vol. 17, p. 224. The source of the Schelling quotation is not indicated.
11. "The Oberhausen Manifesto," in *The European Cinema Reader*, ed. Catherine Fowler (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 73.
12. *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso Books, 1989), p. 107.
13. Born in Tegernsee in 1954 to composer Willy Mattes and film actress Margret Syrucz, Eva Mattes showed acting talent from a young age and began appearing in stage productions. She gained access to screen roles when her mother met Fassbinder in a disco and introduced Eva, stressing her talent and potential. At age 17, she was probably the youngest actress to work with him, aptly qualifying her after his death to assume the male drag role in Radu Gabrea's *A Man like Eva* (1984), playing a character roughly modeled

after Fassbinder. A sampling of Mattes's diverse and very challenging roles includes a prostitute who moves to the United States in Werner Herzog's *Stroszek* (1977), the doomed lover in Werner Hertog *Woyzeck* (1979), the wife in Fassbinder's *In a Year of 13 Moon* (1979), as well as appearances in Margarethe von Trotta's *Das Versprechen* (1995), Joseph Vilsmeier's *Schlafes Bruder* (1995), and most recently, Jean-Jacques Annaud's *Enemy at the Gates* (2001). She has always remained active in the theater and served as artistic director of the premier East Berlin theater, the Berliner Ensemble, during the mid 1990s.

14. "Die weisse Frau im schwarzen Targa am Neckar, Sie wusste nichts und es ging ganz schnell."
15. I might add that this sense of a coherent national cinema evoked in the term "New German cinema" can be somewhat deceiving. In reality, there were a diversity of films made with a variety of formal techniques and disparate social and political agendas. Many women directors of the New German Cinema, for example, were particularly intent upon understanding identities under fascism and in contemporary society as interpellated through the discourse of gender. They furthermore developed innovative narratological techniques for exploring alterity in a dialogical or intersubjective manner. Yet what binds these disparate artists is a consistent engagement with Germany's historical past. See Sandra Frieden, Rick McCormick, Vibeke Petersen, and Laurie Melissa Vogelsang, eds., *Gender and German Cinema: Feminist Interventions, vol. 1 & II*. (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993); Barbara Kosta, *Recasting Autobiography: Women's Counterfictions in Contemporary German Literature and Film* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Susan Linville, *Feminism, Film, Fascism: Women's Auto/Biographical Film in Postwar Germany* (Austin: University of Texas, 1998).
16. I would suggest that Fassbinder's *Katzelmacher* (1969) is the first film to initiate that genre.
17. To cite my earlier position: "It is therefore not merely the thematic of migration that is a unifying factor, but the fact that representations of cultural difference within the visual field of cinema history have been focalized through a certain ethnographic gaze, one that transforms difference into alterity or more often, subalternity and herein effects a form of knowledge production closely wedded to particular relations of institutional power. The nexus of power/knowledge need by no means be understood as some invidious force latent within particular practices; Foucault's methodology of exteriority neutrally situates it at the very surface of discourse. In the instance of "migration films" it is evident in the moral indignation and compassion (itself symptomatic of extant power differentials) which inspired diverse directors to shoot films about the situation of foreign workers and illegal aliens with the Enlightenment based goal of enhancing among hegemonic audiences political and cultural understanding of a particular minority population, i.e. producing/disseminating knowledge about them." Fenner, "Traversing the Screen Politics of Migration," p. 25.
18. Sohrab Shahid Saless's films on the situation of foreign workers include among others: *In der Fremde* (1975, *Far from home*), *Utopie* (1983), and *Rosen für Afrika* (1992). Tevçik Baser made three films about Turks and Kurds in Germany: *40 qm Deutschland* (1986), *Abschied vom falschen Paradies* (1989, *Farewell to False Paradise*), and *Lebewohl Fremde* (1991, *Farewell, Stranger*).
19. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. & ed. James Strachey (1959; New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), p. 3.
20. Ibid., p. 10.
21. Ibid., p. 26.
22. Grossmann points out that many of these have been initiated through U.S. American cultural and journalistic interventions: the stage version of *The Diary of Anne Frank* that toured Germany in 1956, William Shiren's 1961 best-seller, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, the 1979 television series *Holocaust*, Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List*, and Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners*. Of course, many were also the result of events on German soil—parliamentary debates, the *Heimat* television series in 1987, the

Historikerstreit of the mid-1980s. Atina Grossmann, "The "Goldhagen Effect": Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New Germany," in *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism–Facing the German Past*, ed. Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 89.

23. Dan Diner, "On Guilt Discourse and Other Narratives: Epistemological Observations regarding the Holocaust," *History and Memory* 9 (Fall 1997): 301–20 (here 303).
24. Regarding Habermas's patriotism toward the FRG's uniquely founded constitution, see José Brunner, "Ride and Memory: Nationalism, Narcissism, and the Historians' Debate in Germany and Israel," *History and Memory* 9 (Fall 1997): 256–300. Habermas's viewpoint in the mid-1990s is also detectable in the Laudatio written for Daniel Goldhagen, which is printed in full in Karl D. Bredthauer and Arthur Heinrich's *Aus der Geshichte lernen/How to Learn from History: Verleihung des Blätter-Demokratiepreises 1997* (Bonn: Blätter Verlag,1997).
25. See Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage: Von der politischen Haftung Deutschlands* (1946; Munich, 1996); trans.: The Question of German Guilt (New York, 1947). Also Anson Rabinach, "The German as Pariah: Karl Jaspers' The Question of German Guilt," in *In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment*, ed. Anson Rabinach (Berkeley: University of California, 1997).
26. Diner, "On Guilt Discourse and Other Narratives," p. 304.
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29. Ibid., 308.
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31. André Bazin, "The Ontology of the Photographic Image," pp. 9–16.
32. Jeffrey Olick, "What Does it Mean to Normalize the Past? Official Memory in German Politics since 1989," *Social Science History* 22, 4 (Winter 1998): 547–71.
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